

History of Timor



1

Timor Society

Prior to a discussion of Timor's "discovery" or at least first outsider trade contacts, it is important to set down certain basic facts as to indigenous political and social systems, how these systems are buttressed or at least mesh with indigenous religious practices and beliefs, and how political and Cultural complexes translate into economic activity and exchange. We can then ask the question how the first agents of Portuguese seaborne power, as much agents of the church in the form of the Dominican missionaries, adapted or confronted local forms of tributary power and political alliances, local commercial trading networks, and the overall question of colonization, Portugalizacao and Timorese identity down until the end of colonial rule. But we should also look to the island's complex anthropology. In this sense it would be well to consider the reflections of one cultural anthropologist who has worked in Timor, Elizabeth G. Traube, that culture is not immutable, that "the content of cultural forms may justify critiques of or departures from established practices".¹

Here Traube is alluding to processes of cultural evolution and diffusion over long time, but also to the process of cultural adaptation in the face of climactic events such as the arrival of the Portuguese or Dutch. Although, as shown below, there have been periods of relative stasis in Timorese history, particularly prehistory, change and adaptation have always been major themes in Timorese life down unto the present.

Origins

While always subject to much pseudo-analysis and mystification, the ethnic differentiation of Timor was apparent to the first Western visitors to Timor. From a French enlightenment perspective, albeit jaundiced, the observations in Kupang of the visiting Napoleonic mission led by Peron is apposite. In this, Peron speaks of a unity of "three distinct races of the human species", aborigines, Malays, Chinese, plus an additional "species", "a few mongrel Portuguese, the miserable remains of the first conquerors of Asia and the pitiable witnesses of the vicissitudes of nations, and the revolutions of empires"! ²

But just as the Western visitors were intrigued by Timor's mestizo society, so European investigators into Timor's society were much taken by the question of origins. Indeed, the methods as much the results of such investigations, which began to gather pace in the first decades of this century, mirrored metropolitan trends and debates as much the evolution of the various disciplines of the "natural sciences", especially physical, cultural, and social anthropology. The attentions of the Victorians, Wallace and Forbes, have already been mentioned in this regard. From another quarter, Timor became the object of attention from prehistorians seeking to find a link between Australian aborigines and an Asian migration.

Much of the debate on physical anthropology was summarised and advanced by A.A. Mendes Correa in 1944, who postulated four basic racial types represented in Timor, although hardly ever in pure type. These were proto-Malays, deuterio-Malays (revealing more Mongoloid features), Melanesoid, and vedo-Australoid. Overall, he concluded, the proto-Malay or "Indonesian" types predominated over all others. Next followed the deuterio-Malay element (more frequent in women), and third, the vedo-Australoid element (abundant in Suro). Yet, he declaimed, that is not to declare a perfect homogeneity because even within the proto-Malay group, Austroloid, Europoid, Indo-Melanoid, Ainoid and other tendencies could be detected. This includes a mysterious red-haired tribe given some publicity by, inter alia Forbes and Osorio de Castro.

In making this assertion, Mendes Correa challenged the view of a number of observers who had ascribed a special prevalence in Timor of a negroid or Papuan or Melanesian influence. True Melanesians and Papuans were not found, although inclinations or affinities were detected in some groups. Even the Belunese-the most numerous group on the island as a whole, he asserted, Could not be considered as linked to Papuan-Melanesian influence, but rather to the Indonesian type. Only among the Antoni of Dutch Timor

and among the Timorese of Oecussi was the Melanoid element found to be abundant, although still not predominant. In Portuguese Timor, he found, the Melanesoid element only appeared more frequent in the women of Fronteira and Dili. 3

As Glover has explained, little is known of the prehistory of the eastern archipelago until the end of Pleistocene when the archaeological record proper begins with dated pre-Ceramic Late Stone Age sequences in the caves of Timor and Sulawesi (about 14,000 years ago). The first excavations in Timor were pioneered by Alfred Buhler in 1935 and Th. Verhoeven in the late 1950s, establishing the characteristics of the Late Stone Age, specifically as marked by the presence of naked stone tools. Researches carried out by Glover in Cave sites on the edge of the north central plateau near Baucau and in the central mountains between 1966 and 1967 confirmed no deposits older than the Pleistocene period. He determined, however, that from about 5,000 years ago marked economic changes occurred with the introduction of the pig, goat, dog, monkey, phalanger and civet cat, and, finally, in the Christian era, the introduction of cattle and deer. Pottery also arrived in the 3rd millennium BC. Shell adzes, fishhooks, and shell beads, also appeared in the coastal sites at this time. After about 3,000 BC certain important new plants made their appearance, namely *Setaria* (foxtail millet), *bagenaria* (bottle gourd), coconuts, various fruits, and trees, and, in latest levels, peanuts. But, after about 1,000 years ago, there was little occupation in most caves. From this evidence, Glover adduced the arrival on the island about 3,000 BC of agricultural immigrants from the west or north bringing Timor into closer relationship with neighbouring islands.4

In part, this migration from the 3rd millennium BC onwards coincided with the development of better boat-building and sailing techniques. It also initiated the process of differentiation between coastal and inland societies as encountered by Western mariners in historical times. Still, he found, a process of diffusion by continuous expansion such as was possible in continental situations was ruled out in Timor because of its island situation. At the same time he could not find evidence of the primary role of Timor in the settlement of Australia, as held in some popular theorizing.

Indigenous Political System

The question as to the indigenous political system of Timor prior to the arrival of Europeans and even after has been the subject of much discussion and some hyperbole. On the one hand, Timorese societies conform broadly to the segmentary societies of eastern Indonesia, notable for the absence of Indianized forms of kingship and the presence of numerous lineage-based societies fragmented by language and geographical isolation.

According to H.G. Schulte Nordholt, who conducted extensive fieldwork in Dutch Timor in the prewar period, at the time of the arrival of the first Europeans, there existed a realm which might in a sense be considered a unitary state. Supreme power was vested in a ritual centre, the bride giver, to which the various communities shared by virtue of affinal relationships. While the centre existed mainly as a political superstructure, it was also capable of making decisions affecting the entire community, namely warfare, administration, adjudication, and ritual. At the centre of this construct was the kingdom of Waiwiku-Wehale, located in the fertile southeastern part of west Timor, but divided between the Antoni and the Tetum Belu, a division also corresponding with language.5

Anthropologist James Fox clarifies that based on ideas of spiritual precedence, the influence of the Tetum Belu kingdom of Wehale, may once have extended over more than two-thirds of the island joining the petty tribal kingdoms into a unified political system. It makes further sense, he points out, if we see the straight-haired Belunese as more recent Malay-type migrants establishing themselves on Timor's central-north coast in a long process beginning around 3,000 BC before moving inland and displacing and dominating the frizzy-haired "Melanesian" Antoni or "people of the dry land", a process that was evident right up until the time when Europeans began to move into the area.6

But, as taken up below, the centuries-long struggle between the Dutch and the Portuguese for the loyalties of the petty tribal kingdoms, beginning with the partial destruction of Wehale in 1642, obviously disturbed traditional alliances as much the concept of a unified realm. Notable, has been the westward dispersion of the Antoni, today dominating most of west Timor. Was this then a case of the bees deserting the honeycomb", to use the metaphor of Indonesian historian A.B.

Lapian in describing the fragmentation of the realm? 7

Or was the concept of a truly unified historical political centre on Timor a fiction? By way of elaboration, Lawson argues that without diminishing the importance of Common myths, ritual power, and marital alliances extending unity to otherwise independent kingdoms, "one should not underestimate the influence of trade in the processes which gave some kingdoms social esteem and power". She continues that, "Rulers who could organize labor and deliver sandalwood (or other commodities), would gain in material things like cloth, tools, and guns, thereby enlarging their possibilities to gain more prestige and power, might it be through marital alliances or warfare". Between 1515 and 1650, Lawson argues, the destruction of Waiwiku-Wehale-the scattering of the bees from the honeycomb in Lapien's image proceeded as strategically located Coastal kingdoms (reinos) enriched themselves in the new sandalwood trade thereby weakening bonds with the empire-like Waiwiku-Wehale system. For the Portuguese it was imperative to win the loyalty of those kings-style rei, sometimes regulo in Portuguese or liurai in Tetum language and raj by the Dutch-controlling good harbours for the transshipment and supply of sandal.8

As revealed in the earliest Portuguese writings on Timor, at the time of the foundation of Lifau, the island was then, and for long afterwards, divided into two roughly equal spheres, the eastern called Belu (Belu) and the western Called Serviao. Although the tribes of Serviao were the first to accept Portuguese sovereignty, those of Belu who did so shortly afterwards, proved more faithful vassals in the long run.9 Undoubtedly, also, the shift in local alliances across long time contributed to a collective memory of unities and divisions, just as a Luso-Dutch modus vivendi of the mid 1600s tended to coincide with, or at least reinforce a dualistic set of allegiances on the island. For example, in 1818 visiting French scientist-adventurer, Louis de Freycinet, found Timor neatly divided into two great states or provinces, that of the northeast called Belu, and the other, Vaikenos or Serviao. The more numerous of the little states, he found, were kingdoms of the province of Belu with a part of Serviao-Vaikenos tributary or loyal to Portugal and part, in the southwest, loyal to Holland. Even so, as elaborated in the text, certain so-called loyal states were obviously quasi-independent or in a state of rebellion.10

But it is also true that the notion of unity around the Vaiqueno-speaking Sonbai of Serviao of the west endured over longer time, especially as the supremacy of the Sonbai as emperor was recognized by vassal kingdoms.

It would be hard to understand the dynamics of Timorese society without acknowledging the system of government and leadership. Patron-Client links between rulers and followers come to the heart of an understanding of alliances, and shifts of loyalties and help to explain the tenacity of rebel leaders in the face of overwhelming odds. From del Cano down-a reference to the infamous kidnapping of a Timorese prince by the Magellan expedition which, as elaborated in the following chapter, touched Timor in 1522-the importance of dealing with local lords, rajas or reis to win favours, allegiances, and allies has been recognized by all outsiders in their dealings with Timorese, whether Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese, Australian, or Indonesian.

In passing comment on the Timorese concept of government, de Freycinet observed that the rajas exercised "supreme power" over their people, wielding "une autofite absolue et presque despotique" or, in the eyes of their subjects, a "divine et indelebile" power. Rules of succession varied but were, in principle, strictly hereditary. In the absence of a mature male heir, women sometimes assumed the paramount position. Next in rank were the dato, followed by the toumougom and the labo. In this typically pre-literate society, matters of legislation were governed by tradition and local custom, albeit modified to degrees by the adoption of certain Chinese or Muslim ideas. He further observed that the reinos were frequently given to forming defensive and offensive alliances. Treaties, especially, were entered into on the basis of family links. In this way, even the kings of relatively small kingdoms were able to wield considerable authority over large space. 11

Indeed, Governor de Castro writing in 1867 likened them to "pequenas republicas" or small republics. 12 Researching in 1974, Elizabeth Traube found that the power of local leaders of the Mambai people-of which Dili was formerly part- was held to emanate from "other, more powerful sovereigns", namely the Portuguese colonial rulers whose presence in Dili dates back to the shift of the capital from Lifau. She notes that in Mambai political theory there is no tradition of foreign invaders from the outside nor do they have any real conception of a larger outside world which might encompass their own society. Even the malaia, the Tetum term for foreigners, who occupied the structural position of outside rulers "are not strangers at all but are returning younger sons of the land...." In other words, when Portuguese ships sailed into Dili

harbour, the Portuguese were welcomed by the elder people of the land and incorporated into the exchange that linked them to the interior. As with Traube, numerous students of Timor have observed various cultural features of the colonial relationship invoked in ritual. Notable is the ritual veneration of the Portuguese nag and other regalia of office including drum, swords and spears, a practice which dates back many generations. 13

Such veneration even extended to ancient Portuguese letters and documents. At least Gerard Francillon found this to be the case in the successor state of Wehale which he researched between 1962-64. At this time Wehale was a small principedom in the southern part of the Belu subdivision of central-west Timor, the home of 11,000 inhabitants and the most isolated of all the Tetum-speaking areas. Certain of these letters dating from 1778-80 referred to the Rei Veale or Great Lord of Belu. In any case, Nai Bot, the Great Lord of Wehale died in 1924, albeit much mourned over all parts of Timor. Only pacified by the Dutch in 1906, Wehale was still headed by a raja at the time of Francillon's research, addressed as *fetor* (from the Portuguese *feitor*) or *korne* from the Portuguese coronel, or colonel. But while the rajas and their modern descendants became the focus of deep respect and veneration on the part of Wehale people and Timorese elsewhere, Francillon contends that, in the "emptiness" of the sacred house and its impoverished condition, the name of Wehale and its renown was ultimately more important than its representative. 14 Elsewhere, Traube has elaborated upon the Mambai emphasis on antiquarianism as much its manipulation under Portuguese rule. Essentially, the Mambai differentiated between their own ritually organized communities from those created by Portugal by referring to the former as ancient kingdoms or kingdoms of long ago. Whereas the Portuguese regarded the periodic and annual ritualized ceremonies of the Mambai as religious, they too were careful to distinguish them from the secularized political structures imposed by colonial rule. But the Mambai - who had no particular love of the Portuguese - believed that when in 1903, in lieu of the Cash head tax, the Portuguese abolished the tributary arrangements that reached back to the earliest days of their presence in Dili, they also delegitimized themselves. She writes: "when modern Portuguese rulers abolished the tribute system which revolved around the old lords of rock and tree, they were turning their backs on the very figures whose ancestors had summoned them to Timor". In short, legitimation took on cultural form. 15

This is an important point as, in Timor under the Portuguese, just as in other colonialisms, forms of legitimation alongside more drastic means of control always went hand in hand in the construction of networks of beneficiaries and collaborators.

But how does this sense of cultural legitimation on the part of specific communities sit with a generalized sense of "tradition" which, in the absence of significant epigraphical evidence and recorded history, is best found in the rich oral tradition of the Timorese? There is no history of native script in Timor and the work of transcribing this literature only commenced with any rigour in the last decade of colonial rule. As in many other preliterate Asian and African societies "literature" was chanted or sung. In Timor, as Louis Berthe found of the Bunak, this could take the form of elaborately developed narrative recitation, typically involving repetition, rhyme, and alliteration which also helped performers memorize the verses. 16 Legends, such as the creation myth based on the crocodile, in turn represented in graphic art and in decorative pieces are enduring in Timorese society. As Fernando Sylvan recounts, of "the crocodile that became Timor", a boy returned a wayward crocodile to the swamp. Although sorely tempted to eat his new friend, canoe-like the crocodile redeems the boy's dream of making a sea journey, only to change shape and size into the form of a Crocodile-shaped island covered with hills, woods, and rivers. 17

Ruy Cinatti has also recounted one primordial lore or foundation myth that traces the origins of the Timorese to a legendary sea voyage from Malacca via Macassar to Flores and then to Amatumung. 18 Other versions of this legend such as that held by the Ossu people trace the migration from an island between Timor and New Guinea. Timorese myths and legends are not only offer clues to the origin and foundation of various reinos, but, as Eduardo dos Santos' collection and annotation makes clear, are also rich in history and ethnography. 19

From his experience a wartime Timor, Australian Cliff Morris has related that recitation of stories and poetry were arts indulged in by all. In every village, elders would induct the young in the lore of the clan but the ultimate storytellers were the Lia Na 'ain or Na 'Lia, literally meaning "lord of words" or bards, who could expiate for hours on verse that had never been heard until then. Morris observes:

There were a number of traditional patterns but the most common was dadolim, where each verse was put

in two lines and each line was in two phrases. The first phrase of the second line repeated the meaning of the last phrase in the first line but with different words. The second phrase of the second line followed the same pattern. 20?

While Morris is describing the basic mode of transmission of knowledge/lore common to pre-literate societies around the world, it is of interest that this verbatim language as spoken in rumor was rich with metaphor as it was pregnant with the symbolism of the animist culture from which it issued, notably the dualistic conception of nature.

Indigenous Religious Beliefs and Practices

Under Portuguese rule Catholicism never gained more than 15-20 per cent of the population down until 1975. Stated another way, the Catholic church in Timor was obliged to accommodate itself to many traditional practices. Writing in 1972, British anthropologist David flicks observed that although many traditional ritual elements survived, aboriginal religion was nevertheless decaying rapidly. What, then, were the main features of indigenous religious practice and belief? In traditional Timor it was the dato-lulik or ra ulik, community priest or ritual practitioner, who mediated the spiritual world otherwise manifest in such natural phenomena as rivers, mountains, forest and gardens. The dato-lulik was the key practitioner of animal sacrifice marking major events in the life Cycle of the Timorese including the celebration of war and peace. Animal sacrifice were directed towards ancestral spirits and other spirits believed to inhabit wood, stones and streams.

Another facet of Timorese religion was the cult of the relic, placed in the uma lulik or community house, usually the most distinctive building in a town. Totems included animals and plants. Even clans were regarded as totemic groups whose members observed specific food taboos. As mentioned, veneration of old Portuguese nags was very much part of this culture. Head-hunting, also part of Timorese tradition, was only eliminated in this century. While cannibalism was unknown in eastern Timor, headhunting, according to flicks, was a popular activity whose raison d'etre was ritual and social prestige. But when peace returned to the warring princedoms, the captured heads were duly surrendered.²¹

So were blood oaths or juramento frequently resorted to in the way of sealing loyalties between tribes or foreign parties.²²

Indeed, as we shall review in a conclusion, the 400 year long rebellion of the Timorese cannot entirely be separated from the ritualized quality of warfare in rumor as expressed by the Tetum word funu.

One central cultural practice much noted in Portuguese ethnologies on Timor is that of barlaque. From a study by Manuel Alves da Silva, a Catholic missionary in Timor in the 1880s, we learn that this is a term of Malay origin which expresses an alliance between reinos, and their subordinate sucos, and individuals. More than just a dowry, it appeared to Alves da Silva as a trade or even "shamanistic" trade in women for fabulous value. This was expressed by the Portuguese word barlaque or vassau humani, where the parents of the bride are called o humani and the man-shaman the vassau. The cost of vassau could be as high as 30-100 buffaloes, horses, and swords while humani might be measured in such articles as coral, baskets, and cloths. For the church, the material character of these marriages and the guarantees they affirmed, represented a clear obstacle to conversion, as indeed, did other types of relationships, running from concubinage, polygamy - generalized in Timor - and acts deemed superstitious and quasi-idolatrous, such as the cult of the veneration of the dead, death Ceremonies, war Ceremonies, etc.²³

Lazarowitz, who carried out fieldwork among the Makassai of the Baucau region of northeast Timor in 1975, viewed marriage in Timor, as creating an "ongoing alliance between groups", part of a "wider system of social action tying together and integrating the worlds of the living and the spirits in stable equilibrium". He saw the entire system as turning on a profound desire for union and balance across the spectrum of social relations, whether marriage, bridewealth transactions, agricultural ritual, and political and legal organization. This was achieved through the means of "complementary dual oppositions and analogical associations", for example, between wife-giver and wife-taker, masculine-feminine, control over fertility-lack of control, buffalo, horse, swords versus women, pigs, Cloths, necklaces, and, especially that between the world of the spirits (sacred) and the world of the living (secular). He concludes, "It is quite clear that Makassai life is permeated by oppositions which structure social behaviour".²⁴

The principle also extends to geography. Thus, whereas the sheltered, enclosed, and navigable northern sea or tassi-fetu is recognized in Tetum cosmology as female, the southern sea, the tassi-mane, with its limitless horizon and swelling unnavigable seas, represents the male principle.

Barlaque and marriage, of course, is not the only socially celebrated rite de passage in Timor. Saldanha has described other ritualized ceremonies, including those for birth, involving an eye washing ceremony called fasematam, and haircutting ceremony called tesifuk. Besides funerals, death involved such ceremonies as the aifunan mauruk (bitter mower) held one week after death and the alfunan midar (sweet mower) held after 40 days. The kore metan or removing the black is a ceremony held one year after the death of a relative. While women wear black for mourning, men wear a small patch of cloth pinned to a shirt. Such is the pervasiveness of this Luso-Catholic practice that the black patch appears as a subliminal mark of Timorese identity, one that I instantly recognized in the course of a 1995 rendezvous with a Timorese in the amazingly polyethnic environment of the east Malaysian state of Sabah. To these ceremonies might be added those for the planting and harvesting of rice and maize that take place in the umalik of each umakain or clan. The list of ritualized and solidary-building ceremonials increases if we account for such occasions as threshing rice stalks (sama hare), the communal building of houses (dada ai or lugging of wood, and even cockfighting futu manu). 25

Cinatti and others have described the social function of such estilo or ceremonies which sometimes brought together hundreds or even thousands of people from any given region. Such occasions were a time for display of gorgeous tais or traditional woven apparel for males, along with elaborate metal body decorations, and, for women, Timorized versions of the Malay sarong or skirt and kebaya, blouse.

No festa was complete without music, choral or rhythmic singing and dancing.

Musical accompaniment, according to region, could be Macassar gongs, drums, bamboo mutes, or home made guitars. Notable were the gamelan-like orchestras of Oecusse and the snake dance of Suai.²⁶

It can be said that all the estilo have their origins in the Timorese sense of the sacred and profane, a world view that does not compartmentalize one facet of tradition from another, but which, while accommodating to change—dynamically the coming of outsiders with their monotheistic religion—constantly seeks the reassurances offered by the hoary traditions keyed to the passage of seasons and agricultural rhythms as handed down in the form of chants and oral traditions. The great Timorese creation myth of the crocodile to which, as alluded, even the shape of the island is said to resemble—seems to encapsulate this sense. For some, the enduring Timorese belief in spirits conjures up some sense of an ancient human stock in the process of evolution. But such statements are bound to be misleading as the following discussion reveals.

Language and Ethnicity

As alluded in the introduction, the linguistic and ethnic patterning of Timor reflects a long history of migrations and convergences of peoples bearing different cultural influences, notably, Indonesian coming from the west, and, Melanesian coming from the east. Nevertheless, irregular topography, otherwise inhibiting communications between different groups, gave rise to the production of a great range of social institutions including language variety. Linguistically, the island of Timor is occupied by two different language families, one Austronesian, the other non-Austronesian or Papuan. Whereas in the western part of Timor, two Austronesian languages dominate, namely Tetum and Tokodede, on the eastern half of the island, at least fourteen distinct languages are spoken, including, besides Tetum, Mambai, Makassai, Kemak, Bunak, Tokodede, Galoli, Dagada and Baiqueno (Dawan). Even so, there is no precise agreement among anthropologists and linguists as to the precise numbers of languages, or indeed what constitutes a dialect, especially, as would be expected, because of the long process of linguistic borrowings. Further, only a few languages have been studied, codified or transcribed.

These include Tetum, Tetum-Praca, Galoli and Dawan. Only basic grammatical outlines of Tokodede, Mambai and Kemak had been established by the prewar period. Neither were basic ethnographies of the majority of Timorese systematically conducted, lending much imprecision as to questions of nomenclature or ethnic labelling, language and linguistic convergences.²⁷

While Tetum Belu had its origins in the Kingdom of Wehale, according to Cliff Morris, the biggest concentration of "natural" Tetum speakers in eastern Timor in the late colonial period was to be found around on the central south coast, from Luca in the east to Alas in the west. The dialect of this area is

referred to as TetumLos and is centred on the Kingdom of Samoro and the town of Soibada. By contrast, Tetum-Terik is spoken in the northwest of eastern Timor and the northeast of west Timor, a dialect related to Tetum-Belu. This latter dialect is spoken in the southwest of East Timor and southeast of western Timor.²⁸

Tetum-Dili, also known as Tetum-Praca, was the lingua franca used in colonial times and the dialect most favoured by Portuguese official along with missionaries and other outsiders in communicating with Timorese. Yet, unlike the experience in many other South east Asian colonies in acknowledging the status of vernacular languages, nothing was done under official Portuguese auspices to raise Tetum to the level of a print language, much less the numerous minority languages and dialects.²⁹

But again, as Mendes Correa determined, just as the racial heterogeneity of the Timorese may be a result of "blood mixture between conquerors and conquered, or between masters and slaves, with the exogamy of some tribes with true (rapes of Sabine)", so the correlation of language and ethnic group is problematical, although not beyond scientific calculation.³⁰

The Community Mode of Production

Schulte Nordholt, clarifies that, because of trade, the Antoni people of west Timor outgrew the stone age at a relatively early stage. Yet, while raising to a fine art the manufacture of woven or ikat cloth, he found it remarkable that they never learned to forge iron or even silver objects themselves.³¹

But while the smelting of ores may have eluded the Timorese, it is not the same as saying that they did not master metalwork. In fact, the remodelling of iron goods, such as in the making of utensils and knives out of reclaimed bomb Casings, and the forging of metal using bellows made of bamboo, is a specialized male activity. On the other hand, the art of manufacturing melted silver using bamboo forges and clay moulds, a typically feminine activity, developed as a fine art.

Naturally, the production of ikat and tais or woven cloth demands highly specialized skills, such as the cultivation and harvest of cotton, ginning, carding, spinning and weaving. In the colonial period, locally produced cotton was more highly esteemed than that acquired from Chinese merchants. With the exception of the manufacture of looms and frames (a masculine activity), the series of technical activities associated with weaving, including the reproduction of the ikat motifs attributing lineage, are entirely female activities. Indeed, the circulation of cloths in society conformed to a number of precise rules relating to the continuation of the lineage, e.g. birth, marriage, burial, adoption, or the inauguration of a new house. A similar division of sexual labour is adhered to in the production of women's goods. The production of cord fibre from the Arenga palm is a male activity, while the production of, say, baskets with decorative form, is an entirely female activity. Another artisanal activity devolved to women is the production of pottery. Notwithstanding the labour, women are concerned with the acquisition of raw materials, to the baking of the pot in an open kiln, to the selling of the pots.

Depending upon location, this work is reserved for women of certain lineages.³²

Certainly, from my observation in the 1960s and in the 1990s, it is women who retail these pots in such marketplaces as those of Manatuto and Baucau.

By contrast, the specialist construction of houses, such as in cutting and grooving of wood, the rough hewing of beams, or in thatching roofs with Arenga palm leaf, is a masculine activity. It goes without saying that the specialist carpenter cum ritualist house-builder will be versed in local architectural variety according to province. Such geographical variation in Timorese dwellings have been best captured by Portuguese ethnographer, Ruy Cinatti, who has observed striking regional variety from the pyramidal style houses of Maubesse to the distinctive Lautem house of the hills and plateaux of the east, recognizes seven types by broad architectural features and regional identity - Bobonaro, Maubisse, Baucau, Lautem, Viqueque, Suai, and Oecusse. It is clear from his studies and illustrations, however, that the functional organization of space in each of these dwellings responds to complex social and economic needs, respectively living space and granary, social status, obviously, and the need to propitiate the spirits. But variation also existed. For instance in Oecusse, the rectangular shaped houses of the coastal regions were importations, displacing the conical shaped houses and shelters of the interior-land, as confirmed by the author in an overnight stay-among the most primitive in Timor. ³³

Until recently, sticks and dibbles were the common tool used in agriculture. Wet rice agriculture also had it

place in the Timor economy, albeit limited to certain zones.

The ploughs the wheel, and even the hoe, were seldom used. Nevertheless, from an early age, the buffalo found its place especially as a "plough" in the cultivation of wet rice. Likewise, the Timor pony adapted well to the human ecology of the Timorese and remains a striking symbol of their way of life. In colonial times no long-distance journey on and off many of the major routes could be contemplated without recourse to a caravan of ponies. As the author observed in colonial times when en route by Timor pony from Batugede to Balibo and Pantai Macassar to Osilo in Oecusse, care of such ponies was a specialist position. Even river-crossings were in the hands of other specialists (males) who exacted their small tax accordingly. Down until modern times, the majority of the Timorese have engaged in subsistence agriculture. This takes the form of either shifting cultivation of the slash and burn type or the cultivation of such crops as corn, sweet potatoes, cassava, rice, or beans in gardens surrounding households. Portuguese reports of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries agree that Timor was extraordinarily well endowed by nature. Pigafetta's classic account also records: "In this island, and nowhere else, is found white sandalwood, besides ginger, swine, goats, rice, figs, sugarcanes, oranges, wax, almonds, and other things, and parrots of divers sorts and colours".³⁴

Even so, given the long dry seasons, dearth, disease and famine can reduce the Timorese peasant farmer to a level dangerously below subsistence.

The digging stick method frequently demands too much from a population whose energy is often reduced by inadequate nutrition.³⁵

Hunting and gathering is a complimentary activity. This can be a sexually undifferentiated activity such as gathering in the forest or on the seashore. Gathering often occupies "dead time" during the agricultural cycle. But, as observed by the author on the seacoast of the province of Covalima in 1972, the hunt-a male activity-can be both stylized and ritualized. Such was the procession-like quality of a deer hunt actually interrupted by the presence of the author interposed somewhere between the hunted, a deer, and the hunters comprising a group of about twenty, some mounted and others on foot accompanied by dogs. This exclusively male group of Tetum Belu speakers resplendent in tais and bearing a variety of weapons from primitive handmade guns to spears, long knives and blow-pipes broke off the chase to rightly-interrogate the author as to his presence. While this particular hunt may not have been of purely ritual order, in the case of boar hunting before planting rice, it can be so described. ³⁶

Fishing compliments agricultural activities and, as can still be witnessed of the Galole of the rugged north coast, becomes a communal activity or at least a female activity in the harvesting of ingenious stonewalled fish traps constructed on drying shore reefs. The collection of shells for sale to manufacturers of lime or for use in the building industry, such as practised in Dili, is probably a more recent activity. While the fishermen of the Areia Branca zone belong to a group of professionals whose marketplace has always been the townspeople, their technology remains primitive (home made goggles and pronged harpoons or hand spears).

Small, seemingly unseaworthy dugouts and outrigger canoes, also seen in Dili and Atauro, are undoubtedly of Indonesian inspiration and fairly generalized along the north coast. Fishing with individual nets, such as on the northeast coast, is a collective activity and festivity relating to fish migrations at the mouth of stream. The communal drawing in of large nets on the beaches of Dili appears to be of Portuguese inspiration. In several weeks spent in the early 1970s on the south coast of the island in Covalima, and Waiwiku and Amanubang, contiguous regions of west Timor, the author was struck by the absence of either sea or river fishermen, although not, as noted, the absence of hunting in this locale. Nevertheless, the activity of collecting molluscs and crustaceans on the south coast is complimentary to gathering activity in the forest.³⁷

The regional diversity of Timor's human ecology is captured in the research of those Western anthropologists permitted to carry out fieldwork in Portuguese Timor in the 1970s. While concerned to investigate the specificities of traditions of their respective research sites, most of this group of anthropologists working in the structuralist tradition found certain similarities at the level of socioeconomic and political cultural traditions with others peoples of eastern Indonesia.

The Makassai of the Quelicai region, the subject of the research of the American anthropologist Shepherd Forman who carried out fieldwork between 1973-74, were then a group of about 80,000 non-Austronesian language speakers inhabiting the northern coast and Matabean mountain range and high mountain valleys of the east-central part of eastern Timor. He found them largely self-sufficient in agriculture and animal raising

typically cultivating corn and root crops in patrilineally inherited ancestral gardens. This activity was supplemented by rice grown on elaborately sculpted and irrigated terraces. The Makassai also herded water buffaloes, goats, and pigs and raised chickens and fighting cocks. Their crops, livestock along with ikat, ancient swords, glass beads and a few gold amulets comprised their entire exchangeable wealth. The Makassai then lived in small and scattered family compounds in defensive mountain positions. 38 Elizabeth Traube, who researched the Mambai of Aileu in the early 1970s, also remarked upon their subsistence existence based on shifting cultivation and animal husbandry. Agricultural practice included dry land Cultivation of rice, corn and root crops. The Mambai-regarded by other groups as one of the poorest and most "backward" peoples in Timor-worked their gardens cooperatively by kin groups, herded water buffaloes, goats and pigs, but primarily used them in ceremonial exchanges. Small coffee holdings supplied a major source of cash. Like other Timorese, the Mambai lived in dispersed hamlets of between two to five houses. 39

The German agronomist, Metzner, who spent a year in the Baucau-Viqueque district studying methods of food production in an ecologically adverse zone, noted that rain-fed rice and irrigated field rice was expanding at the time of his research.

Yet corn was the main crop otherwise grown by the method of bush-fallowing, meaning the cultivation of several plots of land in succession. As in much of Timor, such staples were supplemented by home gardens growing a profusion of fruit trees, vegetables, tubers, etc. 40

Writing of the social organization of the Ema (called Kemak by outsiders), and numbering 50,000 in colonial times, Clamagirand described them as living in a part of central Timor bounded by the sea to the north, the Bunaq territory to the south and west, and the Mambai to the east. Writing of her field site, Marabo, in the mountains, Clamagirand observed terraced fields built on rocky mountain slopes farmed according to shifting cultivation. The main subsistence crop of the Ema was corn although both dry and wet rice was grown, along with tubers, yams and taro. Additionally they raised Cattle and kept fowls. All Ema houses, she found, are built on stilts according to the same plan. But a core house at the centre of the community confirmed for the Ema the sense that their territory lay at the centre of the earth's navel or sacred centre. 41

Wet-field agriculture is the exception, and finds its place in only certain ecological conditions. In 1993 the author had occasion to observe at close hand the ingenuity of Timorese wet-rice cultivators in Baucau, especially in channelling natural sources of water mowing from limestone formations down the valley that connects the town with the sea. Buffaloes churning a sea of mud in gently terraced and bunded rice paddies suggest early contacts with other Southeast Asian societies. The scene is replicated on larger scale on the mood plains of the Manatuto river where primitive methods of winnowing padi rice is on open display today in the right season. Water buffaloes (frequently victims of war) are in high demand as for ritual purposes and also to pay bride prices. Otherwise Timorese keep a variety of domestic animals, pigs, chickens, Bali cattle, horses, goats, sheep, necessitating the construction of elaborate fences.

But while the management of such exchanges at the level of barter involved a degree of political coordination, no Timorese as such were involved in the external trade process and hence no Timorese merchant caste emerged-the hallmark of the Indian and Islamic influenced state systems further west. In a precarious ecological setting, where the communitarian or at least lineage mode of production dominated, Timorese society had entered a long period of relative social stasis, marked by relatively low technological development and relatively inward directed system of exchanges and contacts. Still, this did not preclude change absolutely. Invariably, external contacts, at least beginning with Chinese visitors, led to the incorporation of new cultural and material elements.

While an item by item analysis of this diffusion and incorporation would be illuminating, suffice it to offer the observations of one visitor to Timor in the late seventeenth century, William Dampier. Whereas, for example, Pigafetta passed no comment upon the near ubiquitous Timor pony, Dampier reckoned it was among a number of domestic animals introduced by the Dutch or Portuguese. Thus he was struck by the presence of ducks and geese at Kupang, but not at Lifau, whereas at Lifau he found beef cattle.

On the other hand, the Dutch fort raised a different kind of black cattle. "Indian" Corn, he observed, was a "common food" among the islanders, although the Portuguese and their Blends also grew some rice. Dampier also listed a profusion of fruits on Timor, many of which he attributed to Dutch or Portuguese importation, for example the pumpkin, although it is also possible that Pigafetta would have encountered

many of the citrus fruits of possible Chinese origin. We should, at the same time, be aware of elements of material change in Timorese society. Conceivably, the introduction by the Portuguese of the match-lock could also have been crucial in effecting major political or technological innovation, as definitely happened in the wake of the Portuguese arrival in Tanegashima and elsewhere in Japan. But, as Dampier observed at first hand, rather than manufacturing guns, the Portugalized communities in the islands purchased them from Batavia.⁴²

What is ignored in much of the colonial literature, including reports written by visitors, is the dynamism of the "native" or bazaar economy. There is no question that, alongside the monetized section of the economy that developed in colonial times, the subsistence or natural economy provided the backbone of economic life in the colony. As underscored below, in our discussion of rebellion, a major feature of the colonial economy in Portuguese Timor down unto modern times is the longevity of the primitive economy upon which the peasant cultivator was thrown back in times of adversity, including war, rebellion, natural disaster, and, as a way of protest against the solicitation of colonial labour recruiters and tax Collectors.

Lazarowitz observed of the Makassai in 1975, that, according to season, up to 1,200 attended the markets at Ossu. With the exception of some products like tobacco, he found that money was not involved in most transactions, just the barter of agricultural goods at a known rate.⁴³

To be sure the mercado semanal or weekly marketplace in Timor was more than just a commercial link in the process of exchange whether by barter or by sale. It was also a social point of contact between Timorese of similar linguistic group or out-groups, between Timorese and non-Timorese including Chinese and Portuguese. It also served as the site of games, including gambling and cockfights. The cockfight ring located next to Dili's once vibrant municipal mercado represented this junction of commerce, social interaction, fortune and ritualized performance Par excellence.

Slavery

While in Timor it would not be accurate to talk of a slave mode of production per se, as no plantation industry developed along these lines before the late nineteenth century, nevertheless Timor was subject to a long history of trafficking in both male and female slaves and even children. Indeed, slaves for the Batavia and Macau markets were, according to Boxer, the next most profitable commodity in Timor after sandalwood and a "constant supply of these unfortunates" was guaranteed-as explained below-by the internecine wars of the d'Hornays and da Costas.⁴⁴ Although the Portuguese state was not directly involved- in any case the practice was not condoned by the Catholic church-Macassans, Chinese and, by the seventeenth century, the Dutch, were all engaged in the dispatch of Timorese slaves throughout the archipelago. In particular, Timorese slaves were used by the Dutch to work the nutmeg and mace plantations in Banda after the conquest and virtual extermination of the Bandanese in 1621.⁴⁵

Writing of the early decades of the nineteenth century, de Freycinet observed that male slaves in Timor fetched between 30-40 piastres, while females, according to their appearance, fetched as much as 100 piastres.⁴⁶

He also observed that in traditional society where death was the punishment for a multitude of small offences, those who escaped capital punishment often became slaves. Warfare and capture also generated slaves. Even so, as de Freycinet learned from his reading of Crawford, categories of slaves existed throughout the archipelago, ranging from prisoners-of-war, to debtors, to criminals, to foreigners, or their children. But in a domestic situation, he acknowledged that "slaves" as domestics could be treated with great affection and as members of the family.⁴⁷

But even when the regional slave trade was proscribed, debt bondage and other forms of indentured labour continued outside the circuits of accumulation and in line with a sense of differential measures of social value. Forms of bondage undoubtedly continued up to the end of Portuguese colonial rule, usually at the level of household labour. To understand this phenomenon it is essential to set down certain facts relative to the family in Timor, including the status of women and children. The observations made by A.A. Mendes Correa of the status of women in prewar Timor are also apposite. He declares that outside of zones where missionary activity was strong or where Portuguese authority had more fully asserted itself, the status of women appeared to be "subordinate". With few exceptions, the patrilineal family was the rule, although as instanced below, there have been "queens" in Timor, and, in the absence of male descendants, the right of

inheritance passes on to women. Yet while appearing as "a piece of merchandise for their parents", he reveals that they are not without rights. In fact, in a situation of exogamy between two sharply defined classes, the relationship between "husband providing clans" and "wife providing clans" proceeds according to the complex rules of barlaque or wife-taking. For example, enslavement of the husband to the family of the wife can occur. In any case exogamy often involves elements of compulsion.⁴⁸ Cliff Morris has described a variant of this albeit benign practice in the modern period as likening the "slave" to a member of the family.⁴⁹

Conclusion

Fundamentally, as described, Timor society conformed to the characteristic model of segmented societies of eastern "Indonesia". There was no evidence of centralized state structures, at least along the lines of Indianized systems as found in islands to the west. While a certain amount of cultural borrowing occurred as a result of foreign trade contacts, Timorese society had entered a long period of stasis at the time of the arrival of the first Christian missionaries. Broadly, in Wallersteinian language, the island of Timor conformed to the generalized category of a "minisystem" outside world-systems defined as regional divisions of labour composed of several cultural groups. Minisystems, by contrast, were "small scale systems covering a limited geographical area, within which all that is essential for the survival of the collectivity is done".⁵⁰

But in dignifying local holders of power with the appellation of rei, the Portuguese were precise. The exercise of statecraft by the liurai involved the creation of coalitions based on mutual interest in highly localized situations, either against local adversaries, or around relations with outsiders engaged in trade. As we have stressed, it is important to view the indigenous political system as integral with traditional beliefs and practices, collective modes of productions, language and ethnicity, out-group relations, and, as shown below, even the means of waging war, the Timorese funu spanning generations.

While such "feudal" and backward practices would not be missed in an independent Timor Loro Sae, as mentioned, sad is to say that much of the anthropological "present" of the 1970s described in this chapter no longer exists. By 1983, to take one example, Forman's Makassai-or at least survivors of a form of ethnic cleansing practised by the Indonesian occupation especially in the Matabean ranges-were reduced to scavenging for wild roots with disease and hunger, especially among women and children, rife. As witnessed by the author in Baucau region ten years later, not much had changed. Forman, Traube and others have offered plaintive testimony as to the nature and scope of destruction of native Timorese society since 1975. Correspondingly, all the more valuable that these precious ethnologies were actually accomplished on the threshold of cataclysmic change, a reference to the Indonesian-induced civil strife, invasion and occupation of the territory that would sweep all before it in the ensuing decades.

In any case, as we shall view, throughout the period of Portuguese domination, as much under Indonesian rule, cultural legitimization by various Timorese actors as much attempts by the state and the missions to remake Timorese in their mould, comes to the heart of concerns over identity and, indeed, what constitutes indigenous form.

Notes

1. Elizabeth S. Traube, "Mambai Perspectives on Colonialism and Decolonisation", in P. Carey and G. Carter Bentley (eds.), *East Timor at the Crossroads: Ike Forging of a Nation*, Cassell, London, 1995, pp. 41-43.
2. M. F. Peron, *A Voyage of Discovery to the Southern Hemisphere*, Richard Phillips, London, 1809, pp. 114-115.
3. A.A. Mendes Correa, *Timor Portuguesa: Contribuiçoes para o seu Estudo Antropológico*, Ministério das Colónias, Imprensa Nacional de Lisboa, 1944.
4. Ian C. Glover, "The Late Stone age in Eastern Indonesia", *Indonesia*, No. 12, March 1977; and *Archaeology in Eastern Timor*, 1966-67, Department of Prehistory, Research School of Pacific studies, ANU, 1986, passim.
5. H.G. Schulte-Nordholt, *The Political System of the Antoni*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971.

6. James Fox, "Forgotten, neglected but not peaceR11. A flistory of Timor", Canberra limes, 27 November 1975 cited in Bill Nico1, l'imor: The Stillborn Nation, Visa, Melbourne, 1978, p. 5.
7. A.B. Lopian, "Comments on The Sulu Zone...", paper presented at International Symposium SoutheastAsia, Kyoto, Japan, 18-20 October, 1996, p. 3.
8. Yvette Lawson, "East Timor: Roots Continue to Grow", University of Amsterdam, MA dissertation, 1989, pp. 4i
9. C. R. Boxer, "Portuguese pl'imor: A Rough Island Story", lHistory Today, 1960, p. 352.
10. Cf. L.C.D. de Freycinet, Voyage autour du monde, execute Sur les corvettes S.M. l'tJranie et la Physiciennependant les annifes 181 7-1820, Paris, 1827, pp. 553-555.
11. Ibid.,pp. 705-712.
12. Affonso de Castro, Asposesso?esportuguesas na oceania, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 1 867, p. 17.
13. Elizabeth S. Traube, Cosmology and Social Life: Ritual Exchange among the Mambai of East Timor, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986. pp. 52-53. and see "Mambai Perspectives on Colonialism and Decolonization", pp. 4.2-58.
14. Gerard Francillon, "Incursions upon Wehale: A Moderll flistory of an Ancient Empire", J.J. Fox (ed.), The Flow of Llife: Essays on Easternlimor, ffarvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 249-258.
15. Traube, "Mambai Perspectives..."
16. Louis Berthe, Bei Gua, Itiniraire de ance^tres.. mythes des Bunaq de Timor, Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1972.
- 1 7. Femando Slyvan, Cantolenda Maubere h the Legends of the Maubel.eS, Borja da Costa Austronesian Foundation.
- 1 8. Ruy Cinatti, Leopoldo Almeida and Sousa Mendes, Ajnquitectura limorense, Instituto Investigagao Cielltifica Tropical, Museu de Etnologia, Lisboa, 1987, pp. 10-1 1.
19. Eduardo dos Santos, Kanoik: Mitos e Lendas de limor, Ultramar, Lisboa, 1967.
20. Cliff Monis, A Traveller A Dictionary in Tetun,English and Elnghish liitunfrom the land of the Sleeping Crocodile: East Timor, Baba Dock Books, Frankston, 1972, p. 10.
- 2 1. David ilicks, "Timor-Roti" in Frank M. Lebar (ed.), Ethnic Groups oflnsular SoutheastAsia, Vol. I, HRAF Press, New Ilaven, 1972, p. 102.
22. Cf. Joao Mariano de Sousa Saldanha, lThe Political Economy of East Timor Development, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1994, pp. 75-6 on the concept of juramento.
23. Manuel M. Alves da Silva, "Relat6rio", A Voz do Crente, 30 do Julho 1887.
24. Toby Fred Lazarowitz, "plIlhe Makassai: Complimentary Dualism in Timor", Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY, 1980.
25. Saldanha, The Political Economy of East Timor, pp. 74-77.
26. Ruy Cinatti, Leopoldo Almeida and Sousa Mendes, Arquitectura limorense
27. Hicks, Ethnic Groups, p. 93
28. CliffMorris, A Traveller 3g Dictionary, p. 8.
29. The historical development ofpl'etum and especially Tetum Praga is best discussed by GeoHrey flull, "A Language Policy for East Timor: Background and Principles", in lis Time to Lead the Way, FJTRA, Melbourne, 1 996, pp. 38-59. While, as flull observes, a certain number ofbon.owings A:om Malay entered Tetum ijrom the fourteenth century as a result of early contacts with Muslim traders, it is noteworthy that a early as 1 867 Governor de Castro observed that Tetum incorporated many Portuguese words, especially pertaining to objects introduced since the "conquista". AHonso de Castro, As Possesso?es Portuguezas na Oceania, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1 867, p. 328. Hull does not mention the fact, but today as the domain ofbahasa Indonesia expands inside easterll Timor, so the tendency ofTetum to incorporate Indonesian terlnS at the expense of Portuguese.
30. Mendes Correa, Iimor Portugue's, p. 192.
- 3 1. Schulte-Nordholt, The Political System of the Antoni.
32. Povos de limor, Fundaeao Oriente, Lisboa, 1992
33. Ibid. And see Ruy Cinatti, Leopoldo de Almeida, Sousa Mendes, Arquitectura Timorense.
- 34 Pigafetta, Magellan 3g Voyage, p. 141.
35. Schulte-Nordholt, The Political System of the Antoni.
36. Another description and analysis ofa Timorese hunt can be found in Ant6nio de Almeida, "flunting and

Fishing in Timor", Proceedings of the Ninth Pacific Science Congress, 1957, Vol. 3, 1963, pp. 239-241, republished in *O Oriente de Expressão Portuguesa*, Fundação Oriente, Centre de Estudos Orientais, Lisboa, 1994, pp. 467-469.

37. *id.*, Luis Filipe Thomaz, *Notas sobre a vida da man'tima em Timor*, Centro de Estudos de Madanha, Lisboa, 1977.

38. See Forlan, "Descent, Alliance, and Exchange Ideology among the Makassae of East Timor", in I.J. Fox (ed.) *The Flow of Life: Essays on Eastern Timor*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 152-177.

39. Traube, *Cosmology and Social Life*.

40. Joachim K. Metzner, *Man and Environment in Eastern Timor*, Development Studies Centre, Monograph No.8, ANU, Canberra, 1977.

41. Brigitte Clamagirand, "The Social Organization of the Ema of Timor", in James J. Fox (ed.), *The Flow of Life: Essays on Eastern Timor*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 134-151.

42. William Dampier, *A Voyage to New Holland: the English Voyage of Discovery to the South Seas in 1699*, Alan Sutton, Gloucester, 1981, pp. 172-186.

43. Lazarowitz, "The Makassai", p. 72

44. Charles R. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East, 1550-1770*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1948.

45. John Villiers, *East of Malacca*, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Bangkok, 1985, p. 67; AHU, Macau, *Boxer's Catalogue* No.4, 1748, "Bishop of Macau, D. Frei Filipe de Santa Rosa to D. Joao V".

46. de Freycinet, *Voyage*, p. 693. There is some irony in the Frenchman's dry recitation of facts on slavery, especially as he accepted the offer of a Timorese slave-boy when in Dili from the hand of the governor. Aged between 6-7 and a native of the reino of Failieor, this boy, christened Josef António, died at the age of 16 in Paris. The story is recounted by de Freycinet's wife, Rose. See Mamie Bassett, *Realms and Islands: The World Voyage of Rose de Freycinet in the Cowetté (1817-1820)*, Oxford University Press, London, 1962, p.107. A likeness of Josef António also appears in this book.

47. de Freycinet, *Voyage*, p. 708.

48. Mendes Correa, *Timor Portuguese's*.

49. Morris, *A History of Timor*, p. 16.

50. I. Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World-Economy*, CUP, Cambridge, 1984, p. 148

2

The Discovery of Timor

Relative to the seventeenth Century, little documentary evidence remains or has been uncovered on the Portuguese in Timor in the sixteenth Century, the Century of discovery, albeit, not yet permanent European settlement on Timor. Whether this owes to Portuguese secrecy or, as the Portuguese writer Porfirio Campos asserts, allegations of criminal negligence on the part of one Governor in allowing fire to destroy the Dili archives in 1779,¹

The problem remains for the modern student of Timor's history, just as it puzzled those Portuguese historians who sought to write the history of the island a century earlier. While, as discussed below, much can be inferred from the scattered and obscure writings of the first Dominican missionaries in the Lesser Sunda islands along with contemporary travellers' reports, we should not ignore a prior Chinese interest in Timor. Notably, as revealed by modern scholarship which emphasizes the importance of Asian regional networks and zones alongside the literature on "incorporation", it is important to consider the way that Timor fitted into or, at least, interrupted, Asian tributary and long-distance trading networks radiating out of

variously, Java, Malacca and China, prefiguring by centuries European interest in the island's fabled source of coveted sandal groves.²

The Sandalwood Trade and Chinese Discovery of primer

The importance of sandalwood to outsider interest in Timor is such to merit digl'eSsion. Most studies of Timor agree that early contacts with Timor was linked with sandalwood exploitation. While *santalum album* is not unique to Timor, but also occurs in certain Pacific island groups, Madagascar, India, and Australia, the islands of Timor, Sunda, and Solor were host to the highest quality white sandalwood in demand. Until resources were massively depleted in the nineteenth century, sandal was widely dispersed through rumor up to 1300 metres in altitude. Crawford, writing in 1820, observed of this perfumed wood, that the best "is the nearest the root of the tree; and for this reason, the largest billets are the highest priced".³

Writing of the ancient sandalwood trade, the geographer Ormeling offers that it bore the character of a thin gold thread linking Timor with Java's coasts add on to India and China. In both these countries the aromatic wood found use in religious and burial ceremonies long before the advent of the Portuguese. Chinese incense sticks offer but one example of the use of sandal in powdered form. It was also the coveted raw material used for the carving of fans and boxes. Oil extracted from sandal was also highly valued. As such, sandal entered the circuits of long-distance trade as a luxury item. Despite the entry of this commodity into world market, Timor was relatively untouched; transactions were mainly with local rulers and the foreign impact was restricted to the coastal regions.⁴

Dutch scholars have established that, at the time of the Javanese empire of Srivijaya (circa tenth century AD), sandalwood from Timor was transported to the Malacca Straits area and then via the monsoon-controlled trade routes to India and China.

Crawford, citing local "annals", observed that as early as 1332 the Javanese along with Malays frequented Ternate in the Spice Islands as the "first link in the long commercial chain" reaching from the Moluccas to Europe. There is no question that sandal from Timor entered this chain as a commodity of Indian or Arab trade.⁵

We also know from such Chinese sources as the 1225 accounts of the Chinese Inspector of Overseas Trade Chau-Ju-Kua, that Timor was regarded as a place rich in sandalwood. Ming dynasty records are more eloquent on the subject, describing Timor as an island covered with the aromatic wood and having at least twelve landing places where Chinese merchants made their landfall.⁶ Also from this time a direct sea route to Timor was opened up by Chinese navigators through the Sulu and Celebes seas to the Moluccas.⁷

From his reading of Chinese sources on this question, Roderich Ptak has established that the earliest extant Chinese description of Timor is that contained in the Tao-i chin-lueh (circa 1350):

[Timor's] mountains do not grow any other trees but sandalwood which is most abundant. It is traded for silver, iron, cups, cloth from Western countries and coloured taffetas. There are altogether twelve localities which are called ports...

In any case, the Tao-i chin-lueh, is of interest in suggesting, inter alia, direct trade between Timor and China, high profits realized from the sale of sandal, and the presence of possible Javanese, Indian, or Arab traders in Timorese ports as bearers of goods from the west.⁸

While no other Yuan or early Ming sources refer to the continuation of direct trade between Timor and China, Ptak speculates that it could be either accidental, or the rise of Majapahit on Java in the second half of the fourteenth century may have interrupted the trade routes. Though Chinese documentation on the South Seas trade increases exponentially because of maritime activity connected with Cheng Ho's famous expeditions, there is no hard evidence that his ships directly touched Timor. Ptak summarizes that, in the period before Portugal's conquest of Malacca, it is fair to assume that sandalwood was shipped to China by both Chinese and non-Chinese merchants on the main commercial routes running via the Celebes, the Moluccas, and the Sulus, before 1400, and via Java, and Malacca after 1400.⁹

Indeed, this is confirmed by an anonymous Chinese manuscript entitled *Shun Feng Hsiang Sung* or "Flair Winds for Escort", a nautical compendium 'composed about 1430 with additions up until or after 1571. Timor figures as the southernmost destination out of 100 voyages mentioned, albeit connected by the

western route across the South China sea. Sailing instructions for the route from Patani to Timor reveal direct passage off the east coast of the Malay peninsula, via Tioman, Karimata, south towards Bantam on Java, east through the lesser Sunda islands, entering the Sapi strait between Sumbawa and Komodo island, continuing east skirting the southern shores of Flores but with Sumba in sight direct to the western end of Timor (Ch'ih-wen). From here the Chinese traders chose a course that would take them either to the north or south coast of the island, in the latter case sighting Solor (Su-1, ta-shan). The voyage from Bantam, after skirting the north coast of Java, follows close to the same itinerary. Besides naming Kupang (Chu-Pang), the Shun Feng Hsiang Sung, indicates five other toponyms on the north coast of Timor visited by Chinese ships. Mills, who has studied this question, identifies these places as Tanjung Sulamu at the entrance of Kupang Bay, Batek Island, Wini, and, proceeding eastwards, perhaps Tanjung Tuwak Mesi, Maubara, Loiquiero, and the northeast extremity of Timor. Six places are mentioned on the south coast of Timor, at the end of the Roti Strait, in the vicinity of Noilmina Bay, and Amanubang.¹⁰ Antonio Pigafetta, scribe aboard the Victoria, sole surviving ship of Magellan's circumnavigation, also passed specific comment on Timor's sandalwood trade and the role of Chinese in this trade.¹¹

All the sandalwood and wax which is traded by the people of Java and Malacca comes From this place, where we found a junk of Lozzon which had Come to trade for sandalwood... and the goods which are commonly taken in trade for the sandal are red cloth, linen, steel, iron and nails.

Of this it can be adduced that, by acting as intermediaries, the "people of Java" delivered up sandal and wax to Malacca thereby connecting Timor with the major arc of Chinese trading-tributary networks in the South China sea zone, while the presence of the "junk of Lozzon", Suggests a resumption of a more direct route to China, albeit via the less favoured eastern route according to prevailing winds and the trading season. We do not know the size of this trading junk, but it could have been considerable. Chinese sea-going junks of the early 1600s were frequently 400 to 800 tons capacity often carrying crews of up to 500. The point is, however, that China's retreat into isolation after the great maritime voyages of the Ming, coupled with the dramatic irruption of Portuguese seapower into the South China Sea, meant a fundamental shift in the way that trade was Conducted, including the trade in sandal, notwithstanding the obligatory accommodation on the part of the Iberian power with local tributary networks.

The European Discovery of Timor

With Afonso d'Alberquerque's conquest of the Muslim Sultanate of Malacca astride the strategic straits of that name on 15 August 1511, Coming only three' years after the Conquest of Goa, Portugal was poised at, perhaps, the greatest moment in its historical world expansion, namely the thrust eastwards, to the source of silk and silver in China, and Japan, and to the source of fabled spices in the Moluccas islands. Ideological vindication for this dramatic thrust eastwards received additional stimulus with the news that the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) had just awarded Portugal the whole hemisphere from the Atlantic to the China Sea, although it is significant that the island famed for its sandalwood is not mentioned in this document. Within months of the conquest of Malacca, Albuquerque received Royal orders to send an expedition to the Moluccas, to determine which side of the meridian they lay, to establish relations with local rulers, and to secure a Portuguese monopoly over the spices and sandalwood trade.

To achieve this mission, Antonio de Abreu, hero of the siege of Malacca, was chosen to head a fleet of three vessels. Second-in-command was Francisco Serrao accompanied by Francisco Rodrigues, the pioneer cartographer of the East Indies.

Legend-but not history -also has it that Fernao Magellan accompanied this mission which departed Malacca in November 1511. Arriving in the Moluccas, Serrao was left behind while Abreu and Rodrigues turned southwest coasting along the interlocked group of islands comprising Wetar, Timor, Alor, and Solor "all so close together as to appear like one entire mainland". But whether or not they actually sighted Timor remains a matter of some conjecture. According to McIntyre, Timor was sighted and marked on a chart, but the landing was made at Solor. This author finds it possible that a number of degraded or deported convicts were unloaded at Solor, the genesis of the Solor-Timor Colony.¹²

Portuguese historians Armando Cortesao and Humberto Leitao, both of whom made careful study of the

relevant rota or sailing directions, refute evidence that Timor was sighted on this journey. While Flores and Solor were charted and represented by Rodriques in the form of pictograph representations of mountains and even human settlements, and while the expedition undoubtedly Coasted past the northern coast of the lesser Sunda chain to the east of Flores, it is not the same as saying that direct observation of Timor was made. Nevertheless, as these authors confirm, one can adduce from various letter and documents that within three years of the first mission out of Malacca, direct contact had been made with Timor by the Portuguese. 13

While Timor along with the Moluccas was undoubtedly known to the Portuguese from the time of their arrival at Malacca, or even earlier as sandal from Timor was one of the trade items entering the marketplace in Goa, the name of the fabled island is first mentioned in Portuguese documentation in a letter written by Rui de Brito Patalim to King Manuel on 2 January 1514. 4

The apocothery and envoy of the first Portuguese mission to China, Tome Pires, noted in his Suma Orienta in 1515, a route "entre esta illa da Solor e de Bima e o canal para as ilhas de Timor", and that junks go there for sandal.15

Timor, along with Solor, is also mentioned in several paragraphs in the manuscript of Duarte Barbosa entitled "Livro em que da relacao do que viu e ouviu no Oriente", written in 1516. 16

Additionally, a report drafted for the King of Portugal from the Captain of Malacca, Afonso Lopes da Costa successor of Jorge de Brito, is explicit in revealing direct contacts with Timor: "os nossos junques que varo pera banda de Timor e Malaquo". From this, and other fragmentary documentation such as price figures for sandal that appear in correspondence sent from Malacca, we can confirm that within a few years of the conquest of Malacca the Portuguese had set on a course that would lead to the exploration of the islands east of Java and that the key motivating factor was direct access to the source of the lucrative sandal trade. 17

Needless to say, Portuguese intelligence on the Sunda archipelago expanded rapidly in this period. In several paragraphs of the Suma Oriental, Tome Pares crystallizes extant commercial knowledge on Solor, Timor and Sumba, specifically mentioning the presence of "heathen" kings, Solor's food resources along with all-important sulphur, and, with much emphasis, the singularity of the sandal reserves on Sumba and Timor. As Pires declaims: "The Malay merchants say that God made Timor for sandalwood and Banda for mace and the Moluccas for cloves, and that this merchandise is not known anywhere else in the world". 18 While documentation on specific Malacca-Timor voyages undertaken by Portuguese in this period are extremely thin, one, that of Jorge Fogasa undertaken in 1516, undoubtedly commissioned by Jorge de Brito (1515-17) is recorded in the form of a letter from Malacca to King Manuel. We learn that the expedition successfully brought back to Malacca lucrative amounts of sandal. But it was also apparently the case that Fogasa resorted to force in the act of collection, perhaps also sowing the seeds of future conflict. As, the letter continues, "they left a land in revolt, since the Portuguese men bludgeoned the merchants of the land" 19

It is noteworthy that no specific mention is made in early documents of the erection of a padrao or stone monument on Timor, the typical Portuguese practice and symbol of conquest, nor does it appear that the Portuguese ever consummated any single act of conquest on Timor in stone or by treaty. Moreover, the Portuguese record of this age offers no explicit description of Timor. Unless further documentation comes to light, this honour owes to Antonio Pigafetta. Unquestionably, the arrival off the village of Amabau (Ambeno) near Batugede on the north central coast of Timor on 26 January 1522 of the Victoria captained by Juan Sebastian del Cano along with a crew of 46 Spaniards and 13 native crew acquired on the course of the voyage through the Philippines and Moluccas islands, heralded the discovery of rumor in Europe. As with other islands and kingdoms in the archipelago visited by the Victoria, Pigafetta's description of Timor is singular-especially concerning trade, local economy and kingship-Wand bears retelling in full:

On Saturday the twenty-fifth of January, one thousand five hundred and twenty-two, we departed From the island of Mallua [Alor]. And on the Sunday following we came to a large island five leagues distant from the other, between south and southwest. And I went ashore alone to speak to the chief man of a town named Amabau, that he might give us provisions. He answered that he would give us oxen, pigs, and goats; but we could not agree together, because he desired for an ox, too many things of which we had little. Wherefore since hunger constrained us, we retained in our ships one of their principal men with a son of

his, who was from another town called Balibo. And fearing lest we kill them, they gave us six oxen, five goats, and two pigs, and to complete the number often pigs and ten goats they gave us an ox, for we had set them to this ransom. Then we sent them ashore very well pleased, for we gave them linen, cloths of silk and of cotton, knives, mirrors, and other things.

It is notable that despite an 18-day sojourn on the island, Pigafetta fails to mention the presence of certain dietary staples, suggesting, perhaps, that eon was introduced by the Portuguese in historical times. While he did not speak of Timor as a new European discovery, he did, however, pass allusion to the presence on the island of the "maladie Portugaise", "Saint Job's" disease or venereal disease that could only have been passed on by travellers from the "New World", in other words by Iberian sailors.

On the people of Timor, their form of government and the enduring myth of Timor gold, Pigafetta continued:

This lord of Amabau, to whom I spoke, had only women to serve him. They go all naked like the others, and wear in their ears little gold rings hanging from silk threads, and on their arms, up to the elbow, they have many bracelets of gold and of cotton. And the men go, like the women, but they have and wear on their neck certain gold rings as large and round as a trencher, and set in their hair bamboo combs garnished with gold. And some of them Wear other gold ornaments...

On the other side of the island are four brothers, its kings. And where we were there are only towns, and some chiefs and lords of them. The names of the habitations of the four kings are: Oibich [Behale], Lichsana [Liquisa?], Suai, and Cabanazza [Camanassa]. Oibich is the largest town. In Cabanazza (as we were told) a quantity of gold is found in a mountain, and they purchase all their things with certain small gold pieces which they have.

For once and for all Timor becomes part of the Western geographical imagination, as much an extension of Cartesian space:

All this island is inhabited, and it is very long from east to west but not very wide from south to north. It is in the latitude often degrees towards the Antarctic Pole, and in the longitude of one hundred and sixty-four and a half degrees from the line of partition, and it is named Timor. 20

Long years would pass before Timor would enter the written record in Europe, a matter of discretion as much naval and mercantile intelligence.²¹

Still, cartographic images of Timor and Solor heralded the islands to a world audience.

Beginning with Rodriques' map of c.1513, which marks Timor with the inscription, "onde nasce o sandalo", the island is also depicted in the Atlas Miller in 1519, the Pedro Reinel map of 1520, the Diego Ribeiro's world map of 1529, and the so-called Dieppe maps or *mappe monde*. With the production of the Pierre Descaliers' map of 1550, the Lesser Sunda Islands from Flores to Timor are well delineated.

As heralded by the publication in 1615 of *Declaracao de Malacca*, Timor also had a special place in the cartographic design or at least imagination-of the Malaccaborn Luso-Malay cosmographer and "discoverer" of Australia, Manuel Godinho de Eredia. But more was at stake than mere cartographic representation. Unquestionably, the Portuguese (and Spanish) monopoly over the basic facts of navigation in eastern water took a plunge with the "defection" of Dutchman Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, five years Secretary to the Viceroy of Goa, whose massively documented and copiously illustrated *Itinerium ofte Schipvaert naer Oas ofte Portugaels Indien*, published in Amsterdam in 1596, aided the Dutch in their advance, even though his information may not have been decisive.

The Solor-Flores Zone

Although well established in the Moluccas by 1522 where treaties secured between the Portuguese and the Sultan of Ternate guaranteed a monopoly over the clove trade, at least until a resurgent Ternate drove them out in 1574, Portugal was as yet unable to establish a permanent settlement on Timor. Rather, in 1556, two years after founding a church in Malacca, members of the Dominican order, named after their early thirteenth century Spanish founder, Domingos de Gusmao, chose to first settle the small island of Solor to the northwest of Timor. This act owed to the pioneering evangelism of Father Antonio Taveira. While the

Society of Jesus had spearheaded evangelization in China, Japan, and other parts of Southeast Asia, the appointment of Dominican superiors to the newly founded dioceses of Malacca and Cochin, an initiative made possible by a papal bull of 1558 creating the bishopric of Goa, led to the reservation of the Lesser Sunda islands to the attentions of the Order of Preachers.²²

As with Timor, Solor, also known as Solor Velho or Lamaquera, was known to the Portuguese from the time of their arrival in Malacca or even before. Fortified by the Dominicans to afford protection to local Christian villages against Muslim raiders from the Celebes, Solor emerged as the main entrepot for Portuguese trading activities in the eastern archipelago or what is described here as the Flores Solor zone, providing a haven from the malarial coasts of Timor and a good anchorage where ships could wait out the Changing monsoon winds.²³

For these and other reasons, we have a far better picture of the early years of Portuguese activity in Solor than on Timor even a hundred years later. That Solor is better documented / than Timor also owes to the publication and survival of various missionary texts and church histories that began to be published in Europe in the early decades of the seventeenth century, among them, as mentioned, Joao de Santos', Ethiopia Oriental and Luis de Sousa's Historia de S. Domingos.

In this formative period, the Estado da India, a reference to Portugal's eastern empire based on Goa, appear to have had relatively little interest in directly controlling the islands, leaving the Dominicans to exercise both religious and temporal power. In any case, by the early 1560s, with the arrival of principal missionaries and the construction on Solor of a monastery, the Dominicans claimed some 5,000 converts in Solor, Timor and Flores.²⁴ While Dominican texts are not in agreement as to the founding date of the Solor fort, according to Leitao, planning for its construction was obviously a priority as the isolated settlement came under threat from marauding Muslim warriors, and in 1566 a stone and lime construction was in place. From an early date units of armed guards were contracted with one of their number nominated as Captain and Confirmed as such by Malacca or Goa.

The link with Goa, then the site of the major Portuguese arsenal in the East, was strengthened in 1575 with the arrival of an armed ship along with captain and twenty soldiers.²⁵

In 1595, the Estado da India assumed the right to appoint the Captain, a matter fiercely contested by the Dominicans who saw their privileges reduced. The first incumbent under the new system was Antonio Viegas.²⁶

The seasonal character of trade, or in Anthony Reid's phrase, "the seasonality of voyaging" has to be remarked upon, especially as the Solor-Flores zone is monsoonal and the long distance trade linking the islands to Goa and later Macau depended upon the rhythm of the trade winds. Invariably over long time the caravels departed Goa in April or September laying over in Malacca until the end of the year for the southward-blowing monsoon. Certain of the cargo of prized Indian fabrics would be traded in Java for Chinese copper coinage in turn exchanged on the journey eastwards for rice and low quality cotton goods in Sumbawa, later to be bartered for spices in Banda and Ternate. Some of these voyages reached Solor and others touched rumor seeking out sandal, returning to Malacca with the southeast monsoon between May and September. Unquestionably, this seasonality not only ensured the development of entrepots where traders waited out the changes of winds but, in the case of Solor and Timor, eventually led to permanent settlement by priests and officials.²⁷

The religious and commercial importance of Solor is also nagged in the Livro das Cidades, e Fortalezas, a handwritten Portuguese account dating from 1582.

Solor is described as hosting a number of Dominican priests along with a fortaleza or small fortification from where the Captain of the Solor fort, answered to Malacca and to where trade to the value of 3,000 to 4,000 cruzados annually was directed. Timor was identified as the lucrative source of red and white sandalwood and gold. Trade in these items with India via Malacca was said to be worth 500 cruzados.

More valuable still was the trade between Macau and Timor reckoned at 1,000 cruzados, 28 although this would not yet have been direct.

By any measure, the Solor story is incredible for the number of times it changed hands. In 1598, the fort of Laboiana (Levahojong or Lavang), after the principal settlement on the northern side of the island, was partly burnt in an abortive rebellion mounted by native forces against the Captain Antonio de Andria, although soon rebuilt and restored. We know that it was well located close to the sea but on high ground with deep valleys on either side. In 1602 Muslim Buginese attacked the fort with a force of 37 ships and

3,000 men. Only the chance arrival of a Portuguese fleet lifted the siege. Needless to say, the risks undertaken by the Dominican pioneers often led to an early death, by disease, shipwreck or more gloriously, martyrdom at the hands of their Mouro or Islamic opponents.

Certain images of the rectangular-shaped and bulwarked fort and churches of Solor have been bequeathed to history. Among them is the gravure of Solor reproduced in Pedro Barreto de Resende's *Livro do Estado da India Oriental* published in 1646. Not to put too fine a point on it, the Solor fort, along with that of Tidor and Macau, represented the easternmost trading post of the Portuguese in a system of fortified cities and islands stretching from Sofala, Mombassa and Mozambique island on the African coast, to the fortress of Muscat and Ormuz in the Gulf area, to Diu, Goa, Cochin and the Coromandel coast of India, to various points on Ceylon and the Bay of Bengal to Malacca astride the straits of that name. But having won out against Muslim rivals in the Indian ocean, the Portuguese were badly exposed in the eastern archipelago to European rivals in what appeared as a zero sum game in the scramble for riches over souls.

Inevitably, the arrival in the East Indies in the last years of the sixteenth century of ships belonging to Protestant Holland brought the Portuguese and Dutch into direct conflict in the Far East. Although Dutch merchant ships used to trade to Lisbon before transshipping their goods to northern Europe, this cosy arrangement came to an abrupt end with the 1585 "Act of Abjuration" on the part of the United Provinces signalling a virtual war between Holland and Spain. Between 1585 and 1600 ten prohibitions against trade with Spain and Portugal were issued by the States General. In 1589-90 English and Portuguese fleets clashed off India and, with the arrival of Captain James Lancaster at Bantam on Java in 1601 England also entered into direct competition with Holland and Portugal for the eastern trade. Eager to control the source of nutmeg and other spices at the source, the Dutch carried the fight to the Moluccas driving the Portuguese out of Tidor in 1604-06, only to have Spain fill the Portuguese role. But neither was the Portuguese position enviable in Malacca, where they fought running wars against Muslim rivals in Aceh and Johore, and from 1606, began to bear the full brunt of the Dutch challenge. The Dutch, notably agents of the newly founded Dutch East India Company (VOC) which visited Timor for the first time in 1613, also sought to wrest control over the lucrative sandalwood trade in the Lesser Sunda islands.

In this year a Dutch fleet under Apollonius Schotte succeeded in capturing the Portuguese fort on Solor, but not before the doughty Dutch captain had sailed into Botton (Buton) a strategic island off the southeast coast of the Celebes midway between Java and the Moluccas, where he signed a treaty with the local authority, probably only converted to Islam some 23 years prior. Arriving off the fort on Solor on 17 January 1613, Schotte's ships bombarded the fortification, while troops landing to attack from the rear burnt the town around it, capturing the fort from Alvarez, the Portuguese commander, the following April. According to the terms of surrender, the Portuguese were free to return to Malacca. Alvarez obliged, although a number of so-called "black" Christians deserted to the Dutch side. Altogether some thousand Portuguese, "blacks" and mestizo, along with seven Dominican priests, took refuge in Larantuka close by on the eastern tip of Flores, where the Dominicans had earlier established a college in 1599. From Schotte's description Solor and Flores hosted a complex socio-religious demography. On Solor he identified three villages of "new" Christians, with another six on Flores, each Christian village ruled by a military officer and priest. His account also offers one of the earliest references to the presence of guns in these Christianized communities, alongside such traditional weapons as bows and arrows, shields and sabres. Besides a large mass of unconverted villagers, he found five Muslim villages on Solor variously subject to the Sultanates of Macassar and Temate. Leader of the anti-Portuguese camp in the islands he identified as one Kitebal, a forced Christian convert whose father had been killed by the Portuguese and who entertained correspondence with Muslim rulers on Botton, Macassar and Bintan and also with the king of Mena on Timor. 29

Renamed by the Dutch, Fort Henricus, the Solor fort was placed under the Command of Adriaan van der Velde, who, according to historian Manuel Teixeira, destroyed the church and Misericordia allowing the converts to lapse back into idolatry. Abandoned in 1615, the fort in Solor was reoccupied in 1618 by Captain Crijin van Raemburch, installed as Opperhoofd or Chief. In May 1620 van Raemburch launched an unsuccessful attack on Larantuka still the major centre of Portuguese influence in the islands. In 1621, the Portuguese, in turn, failed to retake the island, now defended with Muslim help. A Dutch attack against Larantuka in 1621 also failed. Meanwhile, bad morale in the Dutch camp led to numerous desertions including, in 1624, Jan Thomaszoon, van Raemburch's successor as commander of the Solor fort. 30

In a fateful turn of events, and to the great dismay of the Dutch, the new Captain of Solor, Jan de Horney, likewise deserted to the Portuguese of Larantuca in February 1629. This act prompted the VOC to again abandon the Solor fort. 31

Jan de Hornay's desertion induced the Dominicans to reoccupy the fort in April 1630. This was achieved by a group of missionaries arriving from Malacca via Larantuca, numbering Antonio de Sao Jacinto and Christovao Rangel, later Bishop of Cochin. Working with Rangel and the mission, the new Portuguese Captain Major of Solor, Francisco Fernandes, set about the restoration of the damaged fortress and convent. This he achieved with the help of Macau which provided finance in the form of 700 patacas, six Chinese craftsmen including a fundidor or cannon-maker, muskets, and several of the esteemed cannons manufactured in Macau by the master cannonmaker, Bocarro. Fortified with 15 cannons, the Solor defenders successfully repelled a Dutch attack under Tombergen on 18 June 1636.

Even so, the Dominicans soon abandoned the fort which remained untenanted for the next ten years at which time, in February 1646, it was reclaimed by the Dutch.³²

As revealed by a letter of 1642 from the controller of customs at Goa to King Joao IV of Portugal signalling the discovery of copper on the island, a request to dispatch a caravella (carrack) to take over of the fort came too late or was ignored. 33

Forced by the Dutch from Solor in 1636, the Portuguese moved their base to Larantuca, often confused in period maps and writings as Solor itself, albeit in the same trading zone. The Dominicans also fortified the island of Mbinge (Ende) in Flores in the late sixteenth century, then an active site of commerce in sandalwood and slaves.

Ousted in 1630 by acts of local intrigue, certain of the surviving Portuguese or at least Portugalized community settled in the tiny, nearby kingdoms of Sica and Paga, surviving under notional Portuguese rule until the nineteenth century. Overall, the Portuguese settlement at Flores in the 1620-30 period was an integral part of a commercial network in which traders from Cochin, the Coromandel coast, Malacca, Macau, Manila, and increasingly, Macassar, all participated. 34

In 1647 the Dominicans, namely Antonio de Sao Jacinto, commenced building a fortification at Kupang which, as Boxer observes, was rightly sited at the best harbour and most strategic point on the island. With Sao Jacinto's recall to Goa in 1649, the Captain-Major Francisco Carnerio took over the fort.³⁵

Only following an earthquake in Solor in 1653 were the Dutch encouraged to take over the Portuguese fortification, renaming it Concordia, thus beginning their domination of west Timor right down until Indonesia's full independence in 1949. From 1654-65, the Dutch entered into the first major "contracts" with the rulers of five Small states on the northwest coast of Timor that ring the Bay of Kupang, the so-called "five loyal allies" of the Company. 36

It was small solace for Portugal that even after a Treaty of Peace was signed between King Joao IV and the United Provinces on 12 June 1641, Dutch meets continued to harass the Portuguese off Goa and Ceylon, and, more damaging, one year following Portugal's restoration of independence from Spain, carried the siege of Malacca, effectively blockaded since 1633. This devastating blow to Portuguese power in the east also led certain of the Portuguese to relocate to Macassar under the protection of the Sultan of Gowa, while others made their way to Larantuca. But the Dutch were also determined to destroy this network to its advantage. After repeated attacks, the VOC succeeded in defeating Gowa in the Battle of Macassar in 1667.

While this victory signalled a shift in the local balance of power between Portuguese and Dutch, on the one hand, and the Dutch and Muslims, on the other, again Larantuca received a further infusion of Portuguese refugees.

Lach and van Kley have drawn attention to detailed information on Solor published in Lisbon in 1635. Of particular interest is the account of Miguel Rangel (1645), written to demonstrate that the Dominican fort on Solor was necessary to ensure free access to Timor's sandalwood and to protect the Portuguese and native Christians living there and on the neighbouring islands of Timor, Flores, and Ende. While Rangel waxes eloquent over Solor's salubrious natural endowments and trading advantages, his memo on the presence of all materials required for the manufacture of gunpowder, along with the presence of suitable timber for house and shipbuilding, offers certain insights as to the original choice of Solor as a place of settlement. 37 Besides Solor island itself, the Portuguese found in all the islands of the Solor group an abundance of trade commodities that complemented the specific natural resources required to support mercantile and religious

communities in this isolated and hostile region of the archipelago. In fact, Solor was a dry and barren island and, besides the presence of game, produced little of its own food resources and was dependent upon imports from other islands. As Leitao points out, none of the islands were properly speaking vassal of any other power. Neither was there any form of centralized kingship on the islands. Rather, each settlement was ruled by a chief, on Solor known as *sangue-de-pete* and on the other islands *atacabel* or *atuluque*.³⁸ But then, as now, the islands of the Solor-Flores zone were remote in the archipelago, separated by dangerous straits and swift running tides. Barnes, who carried out research on one of the islands of the group between 1969-71, describes the population as fractured and distributed among many quite small societies and linguistic groups on a multitude of islands. The only unity he found was that the peoples of Andonara, Solor, and Lemblata spoke several mutually intelligible dialects of the Solor or Lamaholot language. Most of these peoples, he found, were simple slash-and-burn agriculturalists, living in mountain villages. The staple was dry rice or maize with some secondary crops for sale, depending upon access to markets. Some villages depended upon trade, 39 facts confirmed by the author in the course of a two-day visit to Kalahbahi on Alor Island in August 1974.

Villiers' study on Portuguese trading links with the Solor group of islands is the most useful in English language. The largest of the islands, Flores, he writes, was the best endowed by nature, and especially capable of producing on irrigated fields a substantial surplus of rice, alongside yams, beans, sweet potatoes, sugar cane, and millet. Flores also produced *gamuti*, a strong fibre used for ropes and ship's cables. In Flores, the Dominicans soon put to good use the sulphur produced by the volcanoes in the Straits of Flores and the Bay of Ende, along with saltpetre to be found in Larantuka to produce gunpowder of "high quality".⁴⁰

The island of Ende (sometimes *Ende Menor* or *Torre*) on the south coast of Flores was, according to Boxer, the most important for the Portuguese after Solor. Fortified in 1595 by *Fir. Simao Pacheco* and supporting three churches, one inside the fortress and two outside, the Portuguese were driven out by native rebellions in 1605 and again in 1630. Dominican sources speak of a relief expedition sent to the Christian village of Ende in 1660.⁴¹

But, as mentioned, it was Larantuka which emerged as the major fortified Portuguese settlement in the Solor islands, especially after the decline of Solor. This was accomplished by the Dominican Father *Rangel* who, with the blessing of the Captain-Major of Larantuka, *Francisco Fernandes*, returned from Macau with money, workers, a gunpowder machine, iron-plated doors, and artillery.⁴²

English privateer *William Dampier*, who visited Timor in 1699 soon after his not-too-successful voyage of discovery to Australia, learnt secondhand that Larantuka was "more populous than any Town on Timor; the Island Ende affording greater Plenty in all manner of Fruit, and being much better supplied with all Necessaries, than *Laphao*".⁴³

Such confusion over nomenclature could be excused on the part of Dampier, as Flores was known variously by seventeenth century navigators and writers as *Servite*, *Ilha Grande*, *Larantuka*, *Ende*, *Ende Grande*, *Solor*, *Solor Grande*, *Solor Novo* and *Mangerai*.

Unlike Solor, the island of Adonara (sometimes *Dnara*, *Lamala*, *Crama* or *Sebrao*) was densely populated with seven or eight villages along one coast, most animist, but including one that converted to Christianity although, by the seventeenth century, converted to Islam. This beachhead of Islam was an obstacle to Portuguese dominance on Adonara but the Islamic element provided a reliable trade link to the Portuguese on Larantuka in times of peace. East of Adonara, the island of *Lomblen* (also known as *Lobela*, *Levo-leva* or the modern *Lembata*), was seldom visited by the Portuguese. Except for a Muslim village, the population was entirely pagan. Nevertheless, *Lomblen* produced a surplus in foodstuffs, and kept up a trade in wax, tortoiseshell, whale products, and slaves. *Pantar* island, (also known as *Galiao*, *Putar*, *Also*, *Gal6cio* and *Pondai* along with the other small islands in the Straits of Alor, did not apparently support any Christian communities. *Pantar*, was, however, known as a source of very pure sulphur. Alor (*Malua*), where cannibalism was said to be practised, even up until the mid-thirteenth century, hosted neither Muslim nor Christian communities. Portuguese interest in Alor was confined to the collection of wax, slaves and tortoiseshell. The Portuguese also fanned out to the islands of *Roti* and *Sam* off the western tip of Timor, making Solor and, particularly, Larantuka, key marketplaces for the archipelago-wide trade in slaves. By 1599, according to the *Ethiopia Oriental* of *Fr. Joao de Santos*, the Dominicans had built a total of 18 Churches in the Solor islands, five in Solor, eight in Flores, three in Ende, and two on Adonara.⁴⁴

Boxer contends that it is not easy to ascertain who was even in control of affairs in Larantuca as there were always many candidates for the Captaincy among the mixed Larantuqueiro community of Portuguese soldiers, adventurers, Macanese traders, Dutch deserters, Chinese smugglers, and various racial admixtures. Nevertheless, it is clear that the principal contestants were, as described in the following chapter, the two Eurasian swashbucklers, Antonio de Hornay and Matheus da Costa. 45

With Larantuca and Solor as fortified bases, hosting substantial Christianized communities with basic ecclesiastical institution established, with thriving marketplaces and manufactories to support the seaborne trade, the Estado da India established a commercial network, linked with the annual ships to Malacca but capable of a high degree of self-sufficiency and economic autonomy outside of the requirement for cannon and certain specialist trade Commodities such as iron goods and cottons. But, with the fall of Solor to the Dutch in 1613, Larantuca was developed as the principal Centre of Portuguese influence in the Lesser Sunda Islands.

By the 1620s, Larantuca was linked to Macassar, where the Portuguese were also established, and, in turn to Macau, especially in the trade in sandal.

The Dutch and the Sandalwood Trade

While obviously the Portuguese were well informed from the earliest days as to the sources of sandal on Timor, their Calvinist rivals were not far behind. As Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, wrote in his Itinerario "Timor has whole wildernesses of sandalwood and from thence it is carried to and throughout India, where it is used by Indians, Moors, Heathens and Jews". 46

Linschoten also observed that three species of the aromatic wood grew in Timor, namely red-yellow sandalwood which predominated in the east of the island, otherwise much in demand in India for various medicinal, cosmetic, and religious purposes, a citron species regarded as of low quality found in the west of the island, and, in the centre, a yellow variety in high demand in Macau. 47

Given this knowledge it is not so surprising that in the account of the Eerste Shipvaart, the first voyage to the East Indies by the Dutch (1595-97), sandalwood was recommended as an article offering good profits. 48

Neither were the English backward in their knowledge of Timor's sandalwood.

John Saris, who resided in the great trading mart of Bantam on the north coast of Java, between 1605 and 1609 prior to setting up English East India Company operations in Hirado in Japan, wrote of rumor that "it affords great store of Chindana, by us called white saunders, the greatest logs being accounted best". Of the trade in sandal along with "great cakes" of wax brought from Timor to Bantam by Chinese traders, Saris observed from market prices fetched in Bantam that it brought "great profit" when traded against such item in high demand in Timor as chopping knives, small bugles, porcelain, coloured taffaties, and pieces of silver.

While, as Saris mentions, one of his men actually ventured to Timor with Chinese traders to investigate the trade at first hand, 49

The English did not succeed in following up the sandal trade with Timor at the source.

Ormeling asks, with good reason, what was Dutch interest in a commodity that had virtually no market in Holland? He explains that, from the beginning, Timor sandalwood provided a means by which the Company could break into the highly attractive trade with China. The failure of Governor General Coen's attempts to seize Macau in (1617-23, 1627-29) prompted the Dutch to drive the Chinese, Portuguese, and local Muslim merchants out of the Timor trade, leaving Batavia as the major sandalwood emporium in the East. In this strategy, the status quo of old would re-emerge whereby the Chinese would buy the sandal direct from Java. In fact, however, the Dutch failed to dislodge the Portuguese from Timor and never managed to impose their monopoly. On Timor, the VOC's influence was restricted to Kupang, and environs. Moreover, the Dutch were outmanoeuvred by the Chinese sheltered under the Portuguese nag at Lifau. As Adriaan van der Velde bewailed in 1614 after its first capture from the Portuguese:

The Chinese offer in exchange such articles as porcelain, beads, gold, etc, which are in great demand on Timor and with which the Dutch cannot compete. In addition they offer the people of Timor more than we do, since all the wares in China are abundant and cheap. 50

Rangel, writing in 1633, notes that Macau-based merchants reaped profits as high as 200 per cent on the sandalwood trade. In these transactions the Solor-based Portuguese merchants used gold while Chinese merchants used silver, or for smaller transactions, claris or clarins (small pin-shaped silver coinage) From Goa.⁵¹

Bocarro, the chronicler in-chief of the Estado da India, also recorded in 1635 that large profits were being made on voyages from Macau to Solor in the sandalwood trade, especially since dues were not paid on what was imported or exported:

Owing to the blockade of the Strait of Singapore by the Hollanders, they can no longer Come and go this way, but go direct from Macao in well fitted-out pinnaces, which at arriving at Solor take in some native Christian soldiers, Most of whom keep themselves out of their pay, with which they go to the island of Timor, thirty leagues distant from Solor, and there lade sandalwood, never failing to have frequent skirmishes by land and sea with the Hollanders, who likewise go thither to seek the same sandalwood; however the Portuguese always come off best, for since those of Macao are wealthy and not lacking in artillery, their pinnaces are very well found, whilst the soldiers they take on in Solor are very good, and flight very resolutely against the Dutch. ⁵²

There is no question that the Dutch blockade mentioned by Bocarro actually intensified the Portuguese role in the Southeast Asian trade, even though the mighty four-masted ocean-going caravels, that reached 2,000 tons in the case of the Goa-Macau-Japan trade, came to be replaced from 1618 onwards by far smaller and swifter galiotas or galliots, pataxo or pinnace, naveta or Portuguese rigged junks, fragata (frigates), and cargo or dispatch vessels, in the 200 to 400 ton range. There is also the sense that, apart from driving import costs upwards, Dutch aggression against European rivals actually redounded in favour of the Chinese merchants who alone acted as intermediaries for Batavia and Dutch-controlled Solor. No less, given the failure of the Dutch to capture Macau or gain direct access to the Chinese mainland, the construction of Fort Zeelandia on Taiwan in 1634 notwithstanding, the VOC were obliged cargoes to the Chinese markets.⁵³ to rely on Chinese traders to carry the precious

Conclusion

From our discussion of Chinese trading networks reaching to Timor, it is clear that from an early period the island was deeply enmeshed in a wider tributary-trading network, although we know next to nothing as to how the impingement of outsiders might have altered domestic power relations on the island. But, by the closing decades of the sixteenth century, it is clear that the Portuguese had not only displaced Asian trading rivals in the Flores-Solor-Timor zone, but, through the work of the missions, quickly established themselves as the dominant ideological/ civilizational force in a zone hitherto untouched by the great religions.

Established as a Royal monopoly, the Solor voyages and the sandal trade ineluctably welded Solor and Timor into a Portuguese-dominated East Asian maritime trading network. The boom years, 1570-1630, identified by Reid in his magisterial study on archipelagian commerce, also fitted the pattern of the sandal trade from Timor, but, as demonstrated below; as an item of predominately Chinese and Indian demand, the sandal trade continued to flourish on Timor in Europe's century of crisis. The situation on Timor was thus unlike the spice trade of the fabled Moluccas, where the Dutch monopoly established in Banda in 1621 and on Ambon some thirty years later actually reduced supplies reaching Europe and where Clove trees outside the Dutch monopoly zone were actually destroyed in order to manipulate prices.⁵⁴

As Ptak has pointed out, while far less important than pepper, sin, or silver in the overall East-West trade, and trade centred on sixteenth and seventeenth century Macau, sandal, of which the Timor area was the major source, was nevertheless in high demand over large parts of Europe and Asia including Japan.⁵⁵ It is clear from the foregoing that the evolution of Portuguese authority in the archipelago during and after the "long" sixteenth century, responded to or worked within several important restraints, all of which we address in the following chapter. As described by Portuguese historian Artur Teodoro de Matos, these are fourfold; first, the Confrontation between Portuguese power and that of the Muslims of Macassar in zones over which both claimed nominal sovereignty; second, the threat posed by the Dutch East India Company;

third, internal revolts fomented by the powerful Timorese kingdom of Wehale; and fourth, the actions of an indigenized or creolized group on Timor, notionally loyal to the Portuguese Crown, but in fact acting independently. 56

Notes

1. Pr. Porfido Campos, "Algumas notas sobre Timor: O descobrimento da Ilha", in Boletim Ecclésiástico da Diocese de Macau, 3KXVI, No.419, February 1939.
2. See, for example, Satoshi Ikeda, "The History of the Capitalist World-System vs. the History of East Southeast Asia", Review, XIX, 1, Winter 1996, pp. 49-77, in part an introduction and examination of the writings of Japanese scholars, Takeshi Hamashita and Heita Kawakatsu, notably the former's sense of regional-economy or worldregion of which the Chinese tributary trade system CORreSPONds to an intermediate layer of analysis existing both before and after the creation of the European world-system.
3. John Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, (Vol.III, Edinburgh, 1820, p. 42 1.
4. F.J. Ormeling, The Timor Problem, J.B. Wolters - Gronigen, Djakarta, Martinus Nijhoff-Gravenhage, 1956,p.96.
5. Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, pp. 148- 149.
6. Ormeling, The Timor Problem, p. 96.
7. Yumio Sakurai, "The Structure of Southeast Asian History," paper delivered International Symposium Southeast Asia, Global Area Studies for the 21st Century, Kyoto, Japan, 18-22 October 1996, p. 11.
8. Roderich Ptak, "The Transportation of Sandalwood From Timor to Macau and China during the Ming Dynasty", Review of Culture, 1987, p. 32.
9. Ibid.
10. J.V. Mills, "Chinese Navigators in Insulinde about A.D. 1500", Archipel, No.18, 1979, pp. 69-93.
11. Antonio Pigafetta, Magellan's Voyage: A Narrative Account of the First Circumnavigation, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1969, p. 141.
12. Gordon McIntyre, The Secret Discovery of Australia souvenir Press, Australia, 1977, pp. 42-45.
13. The arguments and evidence of Armando Cortesao, The Suma Oriental of Almeida, Hakluyt, London, 1944 and Humberto Leitao, Os Portugueses em Solor e Timor, de 1515 a 1702, Lisboa, 1948 are discussed dispassionately by Antonio Alberto Banha de Andrade, "Perspectiva histórica de Timor", Estudos de Ciências Políticas e Sociais, No.80, pp. 45-58.
- A useful eighteenth century account of the discovery of Timor by two Christianized Malay merchants from Malacca is given in "Relação do estado de Timor e das coisas que nel se passaram desde o anno de 1762 até ao de 1769, mais extractada de cada um dos tomos do-Sistema Marcial Asiaticos", in Tassi-Yang Kuo (Series II, Vol.III and IV), 1899-1900, pp. 7-12. Unfortunately this account lacks precise dates.
14. Rui de Brito Patalim, cited in Francisco Ferlandes, "Das Missões de Timor", Revista de Estudos Luso-Asiaticos, No. 1, Setembro, 1992, citing Teixeira, Macau e Sua Diocese, Macau, 1974, Chap.X, Timor, p. 5,pp. 9-18.
15. Tome Pires, The Suma Oriental of Almeida, (1515) trans. A. Cortesao, Hakluyt Society, 1944.
16. Augusto Reis Machado, (introduction and notes), Livro em que se dá relação do que viu e ouviu no oriente: Duarte Barbosa, Divisão de Publicações e Biblioteca, Agência Geral das Colónias, MCMXLVI.
17. The enigma of Timor's Western discovery has long antecedents. Drawing upon an array of published and unpublished sources, French explorer and author de Freycinet, writing in 1818, found it "extraordinary that, having an Aived in the Celebes in 1512, no record could be found of Portuguese contact with Timor prior to 1525. L.C.D. de Freycinet, Voyage autour du monde, execute sur les corvettes S.M. Uranie et la Physicienne pendant les années 1817-1820, Paris, 1827, p.528. De Freycinet consulted seventeen classic texts on European exploration in Asia, including Pigafetta, de Barros, de Bry, Crawfurd, Burney, Valentyn and P. SanDomingo, Histoire des conquêtes des Portugues dans les Indes orientales.
18. The Suma Oriental of Almeida Pires (Vol. D Armando Cortesao (trans), Hakluyt Society, London, 1944,p.204..
19. Extract of the letter of Pedro de Faria to King Dom Manuel, Malacca, 5 January 1517 [alias 1518] in Ronald Bishop Smith, The First Age of the Portuguese Embassies, Navigations and Peregrinations to the Kingdom and Islands of Southeast Asia (1509-1521), Decatur Press, Bethesda, Maryland, 1968, p. 56.

20. Pigafetta, Magellan 3g Voyage, p. 141.
21. McIntyre, *The Secret Discovery*. According to some accounts, a Castelano, part of the Magallen mission was abandoned on Timor and later brought to Malacca by Portuguese junks then engaged in the sandal trade, involving the barter of iron goods against sandal. See Luis Filipe F.R.Thomaz, *De Ceuta a Timor* (Diffusao Fjditorial, Lisboa, 1 994, p. 593) citing a document found in the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, cII-IO1-87, on an inquiry made at Malacca, 1 June 1522.
22. John Villiers, *East of Malacca*, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Bangkok, 1985, cited in Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History*, Longman, LJondon, 1993, p. 209.
23. A Jesuit account of 1559 written in Maluku (Molucca) offers such basic data on Solor as food supply, language and Culture of the people, the presence of Christianity and Islam. Solor, in this account, was visited by both Portuguese and Chinese. See Fr. Baltasar Dias SJ to Fr Provincial Antonio de Quadras SJ , Goa, 3 December 1559, Malacca, in flubert Jacobs SJ (ed.), *Documenta Malucensia (1542-1577)*, Rome, 1980
24. Villiers, *East of Malacca*.
25. Leitao, *Os Portugueses*, p. 91.
26. Charles R. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the far East, 1550-1770, Fact and Fancy in the tlistory of Macfromartinus NLhoff*, The Hague, 1948, p. 175.
27. AAnthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of CommejnCe 1450-1680 Volume livo: Expansion and Crisis*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993, pp. 64J55; Thomas, "The Image of the Arehljuelago ".
28. Francisco Paulo Mendes da Luz, (compiler) *Limo das Cidades, e Fortalezas que a Coroa de Portugal Tem Nas Partes da India, e das Capitancias, e mais cargos que nelas ha, e da Importancia delles*, (Circa 1 582), Centro de Estudos I{istoricos Ultramarinos, LJisboa, 1 960.
29. See Schotte, "Relation du Voyage" in *Recueil des Voyages qui ont semi lj 'Etablissement et atLX Progris de la Compagnie de Indes Orientales Formie dans leg Provinces Unies des Pays-Bas*, Tome IV, Etienne Roger, jhsterdam, 1705, pp. 207-214. Schotte is also cited in Donald F. Laeh and Edwin J. Van Kley, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, (VoI.III, Book 1), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, pp. 1459-1460.
30. Manuel Teixeira, *Macau e asua Diocese: Missoes de Timor*, Tipografla da Missao do Padroado, Macau 1974, p. 16.
- 3 1. Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire*, p. 210.
32. Teixeira, *Macau e asua Diocese*, p. 23.
33. AL[U Timor cx.1 doc. No.2: IO7-1642 Dezembro 220-4 Goa: Carta do [vedor da Fazenda do Estado do India] Andr6 Salema, ao rei [D. JoaoIV].
34. Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire*.
35. C.R. Boxer, "Portuguese Timor: A Rough Island Story: 15 15-1960", *lhistory lbdy*, May 1960, p. 352.
36. J.J. Fox, *Harvest of the Palm: Ecological Change in Eastern Indonesia*, Ilarvard University Press, Cambridge, 1977, p. 67.
37. Lach & Van Kley, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, pp. 1456-1459'.
38. Leitao, *Os Portugueses*, p. 72.
39. Robert H. Bames, "Concordance, Structure, and variation: Considerations of Alliance in Kedang", in J.J. Fox, *The Flow of Life: Essays on Eastern Timor*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1 980, pp. 68-97.
40. Vmiers, *East of Malacca*.
41. Leitao, *Os Portuiueses*.
42. Ibid.
43. William Dampier, *A Continuation of a Voyage i_o New Holland, etc. in the Year 1699*, James and John Knapton, at the Crown in St.Paul's Churchyard, London, 1699, p. 184.
44. Villiers, *East of Malacca*.
45. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 181.
46. Jean Hugues Ljinschoten, *lhistoire de la Navigation*, 2eme edition, Amsterdam, 1619, pp. 124-125 cited in de Matos, *Timor Portuguese: 15 15-1769*, Instituto Historico Infante Don Henrique, Faeuldade de Letras

da Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, 1974, p. 169.

47. Ibid.

48. Orneling, *The Timor Problem*.

49. John Saris, *The First Voyage of the English to Japan* (translated and Collated by Takanobu Otsuka), Toyo Bunka, Tokyo, 1941.

50. Ormeling, *The Timor Problem*, p. 101.

51. Rangel cited in Lach and Van Kley, *Asia in the Making of Europe*.

52. Antonio Bocarro, "Descrigao da Cidade do Nome de Deus na China", 1635 in C.R. Boxer, *Macau naopoca da Restauracao* (Macau Three Hundred Years Ago), Imprensa Nacional, Macau, 1942, pp. 45-46.

53. See Roderich Ptak, "The Transportation of Sandalwood from Timor to China and Macau c. 1350-1600", pp. 105.

54. Reid, *Southeast Asia*, pp. 22-23.

55. Ptak, *The Transportation of Sandalwood*

56. Artur Teodoro de Matos, *Timor Portuguese: 1515-1769*, pp. 78-79

3

On the Island of Santa Cruz

As described in chapter 2, down until the early seventeenth Century, it was Solor and Flores, not Timor, that was the focus of Portuguese and Dutch Commercial activities in the eastern archipelago. Timor, including the ports of Lifau, Kupang, Bahao, in the bay of Kupang, and Dili, was visited periodically by the Portuguese during the Solor period, but there was no permanent Portuguese establishment on the island and no population on the island under Portuguese authority. The Dominican mission, however, was more adventurous in this sense. It remains to be studied as to how and why the island of Timor, dubbed Santa Cruz by the early missions, came to emerge by the end of the seventeenth century at centre-stage of intra-colonial rivalry in the archipelago? It also remains to determine whether, as in the Solor phase, Portugal in its conquest of Timor was also obliged to accommodate to local and regional power networks and much overarching Chinese trade networks that made the venture commercially viable?

World Incorporation or Asian Tributary Power?

The phenomenon of European expansion, of which Timor seems to exemplify, has drawn heated debate between two broad schools of world history. This has been summarized by Frank and Gills, as turning upon 500 years of history or a 5,000 years perspective. The 5,000 year perspective allows for a seamless view of history stretching back to antiquity, acknowledging, that the "new world" was in fact home to a world-systems prior to its incorporation from 1492. By contrast, Wallerstein and others regard capital accumulation over the past 500 years as the motor force of world-system theory and continuous capital accumulation as the differentia specifica of the modern world-system. In the latter view, world empires or tributary systems were dominated by ideological questions as opposed to the economic law of value in the accumulation of capital. For Frank, the debate is really about continuity versus discontinuity in world history. 1

For Wallerstein, the East Indies remained external to the European system between 1500 and 1800. The Portuguese did not break the international Asian character of trade and only conducted trade on terms established by the Asian nations.

In making this claim Wallerstein also finds support in arguments of the prewar Dutch scholar and opponent of Eurocentric historiography, J.C. van Leur. Asia, in / the Wallersteinean view therefore remained an external arena in a relationship between two zones "not within a single division of labour" involving the

trade in luxury goods versus trade in bulk or necessities. According to Wallerstein, luxury exports refers to the disposition of socially low-value items at prices far higher than those obtainable for their alternate usages. Such traffic then is only applicable between two separate historical systems holding different measures of social values.²

Such obviously was the case of prized nutmeg and Cloves from the Moluccas which entered trade chains reaching to Europe, but this was also the case of sandalwood from Timor which entered the "external arena" in India and China via Java or Malacca as a product of luxury consumption in religious ceremonies. The Wallersteinean view that the East Indies remained outside the European system up until around 1750, and that the Portuguese and Dutch relations with the Asian states was essentially conducted on Asian terms has been challenged by Victor Lieberman. But while van Leur was correct to signal the maritime outpost character of the trade, Lieberman asserts that even in line with Wallerstein's other criteria, archipelagic Southeast Asia was already on the way to peripheralization by 1650 or 1700. Not to burden this discussion with more facts and theory, Lieberman offers the example of the Manila galleon trade which "deadened" Spanish interest in developing a native economy. Throughout the archipelago, he offers, the VOC succeeded through "brutal assaults and sustained naval attacks" where the Portuguese failed in winning monopolies. But the "historic achievement of the Portuguese", he continues, was to accelerate the political and commercial fragmentation of the western archipelago disrupting and destroying, particularly the integrative thrust of the Malacca Sultanate.

The only exception to the rule that local economies were actually contracting, he offers, is the case of Aceh³

In this discussion we should not also ignore certain of the assumptions of the school of general crisis of the seventeenth century, given early voice in Voltaire's pioneering global history, *Essai*, that uprisings across Europe found their match in India, China and Japan. While there is more than a little coincidence in these events, we cannot ignore the impact even in the Timor-Solor-Flores zone of the consequences of such climactic European events as the Dutch revolt against Spain, the Spanish conquest of Portugal in 1580, the running war by the Dutch against the Iberian powers in South America and the Far East, Portugal's official renewal of war with the Dutch in 1621 and the Portuguese overthrow of Spanish rule in 1640-68.⁴ But to offer a totally European-determinate view of events of this period would be to seriously underestimate the strength of what Japanese scholar Hamashita has called the "tribute trade system". Asian history writ large, he sees as "the history of a unified system characterised by internal tribute or tribute-trade relations, with China at the centre". He sees this regional conception of history as the premise of an understanding of modern Asia.⁵ While, to be sure, we cannot ignore China's and Japan's variable responses to the new Euro-centric trading patterns, at the same time, we should not ignore the new rising maritime centres of power, namely Islamic Macassar and other centres. While for Frank and Gills, the general distinction between the 500 years and 5,000 years debate concerns continuities, the question which concerns us here is whether Portugal ruptured or accommodated existing Asian maritime trading networks in the eastern archipelago?

Mena and the Conquest of Wehale (1589-164)

Although the record on the first Church contacts with Timor remains obscure, even alongside that of Solor, it appears likely that the first port of arrival in Timor to receive the solicitations of the Dominicans was Mena near Atapupu in west Timor. Manuel Teixeira writes that in 1589-90 one Fr. Belchior da Luz or de Antas disembarked in the port of Mena, was well received by the local raja, and constructed a church. But after six months' evangelization he decided to withdraw.

According to this account, while the polygamous raja did not convert, he nevertheless offered up his daughter to the faith and she accompanied Belchior back to Malacca where she was baptized.⁶

While the facts surrounding the first mission in Timor remain unclear, the early nineteenth century French traveller, de Freycinet, who made a rigorous study of extant Dutch and Portuguese printed materials, places this at 1616 when, obliged to see their fortresses on Solor and Flores, certain missionaries arrived at Setem on Timor and commenced evangelization. According to this account, a more concerted effort was made in 1630 with the arrival in Timor from Larantuca of members of the Dominican order who, inter alia, baptized the raja of Silaban, a kingdom located between Atapupu and Batugede.⁷

Even so, as shown below, it would be 50 years before the Order of the Preachers ventured back to Mena. It was no coincidence, then, that Mena was attested by Garcia da Orta in 1563, and Cristovao da Costa in 1578, as the source of the best sandal on Timor.⁸

While the Portuguese were content with their foothold on Solor as local collecting point for trade goods from Timor, up until 1613, they also occupied a small fort on Kupang in west Timor. In that year, as mentioned, the fort was surrendered to the Dutch who garrisoned it with a force of 50 men. According to de Freycinet, fresh from victory over the Portuguese at Solor (20 April 1613), Apollonius Schotte proceeded to Mena, then the seat of one of the more powerful kingdoms at least in terms of its control over the export of sandal. Moving on to explore the bay of Kupang, Schotte, agent of the venerable Dutch East India Company, also entered into various treaties with local rulers and, by Consent or duress, obtained permission to establish fortresses at Mena and at Kupang. To this end, he left behind a number of men at both places prior to his departure.⁹

All Dutch Claims to Timor date from these treaties.¹⁰ Thus with the occupation of the Kupang and Mena forts, the Dutch took up a permanent presence on Timor, even though they temporarily abandoned their position on Timor and Flores in 1616.

Schotte's own account offers certain elaboration. During the siege of Solor prior to his own arrival on Timor, he dispatched to Timor on 7 February the Half Moon under the command of William Jansz along with a Captured Portuguese galiota.

On Timor this expedition captured a Portuguese naveta, its cargo of 250 "bares" of sandal, along with 13 Portuguese, "blacks" and mestico. Another Portuguese galliot was looted of its sandal and destroyed, its crew left to the mercy of the natives.

Schotte describes how, after seeing off the largest group of Portuguese on Solor for Larantuca and Malacca he embarked for Timor on the Patane, recently arrived from Amboina, accompanied by the Half Moon and the galliot, for the specific purpose of drawing up treaties with kings of the interior. Landing on Timor on 4 June 1613 he requested an audience with the king of Mena and the king of Asson seeking to forge an alliance on the model of that already accomplished with the kings of Temate, Buton and Solor. Both, he declared, were the strongest kings on Timor, pagan, albeit more credible than the Moors. Both promised to deliver sandal. Mena offered to load the Half Moon with sandal, while Schotte offered to build a fort for Mena. In these successful negotiations Schotte was assisted by several interpreters including Jean G. de Vrye. He also offered certain trade goods as presents. Although two of his agents, William Jacobiz and Melis Andriez had earlier made contact with the king of Amanubang, said to command much trade in sandal, Schotte was at a loss for time to actually conclude any treaty. Schotte also received envoys of the king of Kupang who offered to convert to Christianity along with all his subjects, "as he also promised the Portuguese, before our arrival". But in dealing with Kupang, Schotte gained valuable intelligence from a captured letter written by Father Vicario, a Dominican on Solor, which waxed eloquent over the advantage offered by Kupang for commerce on the Coast of Timor, "a Portuguese design we should follow", and which also remarked upon the general hostility of the natives which, Schotte Calculated, could be turned to the advantage of the Dutch.¹¹

In 1627, as mentioned, the function of Governor of Solor was taken over by the Dutch protege, Jan d'Hornay. Turned renegade and siding with the Portuguese, the d'Hornay clan, as explained below, later emerged as the de facto sovereign power with their base on Larantuca. This state of affairs lingered on, at least until 1640, when Portugal made a temporary comeback in Asia as a result of separation of the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns. But, in this same year, Macassar rose in revolt against the considerable Portuguese presence in that port and later mounted an invasion of Larantuca, then under the Captain-Major Francisco Fernandez. At this time Macassar traders were involved in the sandalwood, wax and slave trade in the islands and may even have established several trading villages on Timor. Dominican sources state that the Muslim raja (Sultan) of Tolo on Celebes, Karrilikio (Camiliquio), then advanced upon Timor attacking both the north and south coast with a fleet of 150 prauh or sailing vessels along with 7,000 men where he sought, without success, to turn the natives against the Portuguese. After three months of ravages along the coastal littoral of Timor and some success at winning Muslim converts or at least the notional loyalty of two rajas on Timor, Karrilikio retreated.

His endeavours, however, gave stimulus to the Portuguese mission in Larantuca to transfer their activities to Timor.¹²

In the venture, Antonio de Sao Jacinto, the Dominican friar and Vicar-General of Solor, accompanied by 70 soldiers, departed Larantuca for Mena which he found destroyed and the raja dead. In the interim, the deceased raja's wife had taken over as queen but on account of the Muslim invasion, fled to the interior some 12 leagues distant. Having made contact with the queen, the Dominican father won over her confidence and, back in Mena in 1641, accepted her conversion. Her people followed suit. At this time the kingdom of Lifau was governed by a brother-in-law of the queen, Amanubang, a future thorn in the side of the Dutch. He, too, requested conversion and, before too long, several churches were constructed, both on the coast and in the interior. Meanwhile, the Dominicans turned their attentions towards the western part of the island. In this endeavour, the Flores-based missionary, Luiz de Paixao, was assassinated at Kupang. The following year, Antonio de Sao Domingo baptized the king of Kupang and numerous of his people. The Portuguese then referred to Timor as the island of Santa-Cruz, a name which endured over long time. 13 According to de Freycinet owing to the contestation brought about by a number of kingdoms, otherwise influenced by Karrilikio's brand of Islam-although this seems dubious-He Portuguese were moved to advance reinforcements from Larantuca to Mena. Led by Francisco Fernandez, this manoeuvre took the form of four landings of two bodies of men made on 26 May 1641 comprising, in all, some 90 soldiers and clerics. In what might be regarded as the first act of armed conquest on Timor, this force engaged in Combat an army of the raja of Wehale at a river on the perimeter of the kingdom of Mena. Victory in 1642 over Wehale also brought with it the conversion of a number of local rajas and their followers. 14

According to a contemporary account, "The news of the destruction of the mighty potentate of Belos spread rapidly through the other kingdoms in the neighbourhood".

Wehale's defeat, as historian Jill Jolliffe remarks, "marked the beginning of a concerted attack on Timorese society" leading many liurai, little kings or holders of unlimited land to become baptized. 15

For Abilio de Araujo, less sanguine as to the receptivity of the natives of Timor to their evangelization and erstwhile incorporation, the assault on Wehale represented the opening shots of an almost uninterrupted wave of resistance by the Timorese against Portuguese power. 16

There is no question, then, that the evangelization of Father Antonio de Sao Jacinto marks the definitive establishment of the church on Timor. But, as the reinos embraced the faith, they also swore loyalty to the Crown of Portugal confirmed by the obligation to pay up to the head of the Dominican mission certain items of tribute along with manpower in the case of threats by rivals outside the fold. Indeed, the historical personality of Antonio Sao Jacinto, as much the link between the Crown and commercial advantage, is confirmed by the existence in Portuguese archives of a carta or letter sent by the missionary to King Joao I concerning the foundation of Christianity on Timor along with the purported discovery on the island of "great copper mines". So frequent in fact are exaggerated references to Timor's mythical copper and even gold resources in Dominican writings that there is reason to believe that the religious order played this card in the full knowledge that the disastrous loss of the Japan trade would lead to a compensating interest by the Estado da India in the Solor-Flores-Timor zone. 17

Writing in 1992, the Timorese scholar Father Francisco Fernandes has described how the system of winning rei cristao or vassals was multiplied outside the Lifau region to embrace, by 1644, the reinos of Kupang, Acao, and Luca, on the southeast coast. In 1647, a Vicar-General of the church was appointed in Timor, although it was not until 1697 that the first Dominican Bishop, D. Frei Manuel de Santo Antonio, actually took up his office in Timor. While in Timor, as in Solor, the Dominicans exercised both spiritual and temporal power, with the successful arrival of the first Governor in 1702, the Dominicans were freed from affairs of state, devoting themselves to missionary activity, founding a seminary in Oecusse in 1738 with another established some years later in Manatuto east of Dili. 18

While the early history of the church in Timor is dominated by the Order of the Preachers, it was not for want of trying that their rival order, the Jesuits, did not carry their mission to Timor. In fact, an attempt made in 1658 by two Jesuit missionaries, Joao Nogueira and Pero Francisco, to preach the gospel in Luca-then receptive to Christianity-Came undone, at the hands of the King of Ade into whose kingdom on the northeast tip of Timor they had strayed. The leader of a second expedition did achieve success in baptizing a number of children in the Kingdom of Motael, where he found installed a company of Christian soldiers relocated from Larantuca for the purpose of defending Motael against Muslim incursions. 19

A little over a decade later, interdenominational rivalry took a turn for the worse.

Fearful of a Jesuit takeover in the person of Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, the celebrated Macassar-based

Portuguese trader, the Larantuca Dominicans had him murdered in December 1667. As one Church document records, more than one ruler on Flores and Timor (Amarasi wished to have Fathers with "black robes and with a round hat", an allusion to Jesuit garb. Some saw Vieira as their saviour. But others rose in opposition against him. Jesuit documents hint at foul play by jealous Dominicans who, having lived there for 100 years "refuse to lean the native language to [the] great detriment of people's salvation. They do not prevent Muslim preachers from Islamizing the heathens, but they would expel other missionaries. They are steadily occupied in building ships for their commerce and in making profit, leaving the souls uncared for".²⁰ But, even as the missions feuded with each other, church-state relations in Lifau continued to be uneasy. Frei Manuel de Antonio, for instance, found himself expelled from Lifau in 1722 by Governor Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho.

Kupang (1642-99)

Drawing on Françoise Valentijn's account, de Freycinet explains how, after the Dutch seizure of Malacca in 1642, Portugal's Protestant rival took a more assertive position in the eastern archipelago. Notable, in this respect, was the abortive attack launched in 1644 on Kupang also known as Cuppao, where the Portuguese, or, at least, the Dominican Father Antonio de Sao Jacinto, whose resourcefulness in winning converts in Mena and Kupang has already been noted, constructed a rudimentary fortress two years earlier. Later in the same year the Dutch returned with a force of 300 along with a motley force of foreign mercenaries but again were unable to take Kupang. Only in 1646 were they successful in their takeover of the Solor fort on 27 January 1656 the Dutch returned under General Arnold de Vlamingh van Outshoorn who forced a landing in the bay of Kupang at the head of an "imposing" force of European and Indian troops. Vlamingh then advanced on the village of Amarasi to engage the Portuguese and their allies, namely those under Antonio d'Hornay. In the ensuing battle, Vlamingh suffered the loss of 170 European soldiers and was obliged to retreat to his base in Solor.²¹

Four years earlier, in 1652; the Dutch had accomplished their main objective in ousting the Dominican friar from Kupang, seizing their unfinished buildings, and converting them in a stronghold. Even so, the Friars managed to keep the Dutch at bay by calling upon the "Black Portuguese", another name for the Larantuqueiros, or mixed blood Portuguese-native Community which had emerged in Larantuca and Solor.²²

In 1660 the Dutch mounted an unsuccessful attempt by a 26-ship squadron to destroy Larantuca, deemed the major arsenal for the Portuguese in the east. It was in response to this harrowing situation that the Viceroy of Goa, Antonio de Melo e Castro, resolved in 1665 to create the post of Capitao-mor of Timor to coordinate the struggle against the Dutch. The first to hold this position was Simon Luis. But determined that Kupang would be the major Dutch trading post in the eastern islands, Batavia finally got its way in 1688 when the Dutch took Control of the town and several neighbouring kingdoms.²³

Renamed Fort Concordia, Kupang became the major Dutch base and stronghold in the Lesser Sundas over long time.

Dampier, who visited Kupang in 1699, observed a "neat little church or chapel" within the walls of the fort He also found a garrison of about 50 soldiers, a similar number of native troops, along with well-supplied vegetable gardens. He also observed that the Dutch reserved two sloops for the purpose of inter-island trade and commerce with the Coastal peoples of Timor. In an interesting aside, he commented that, unlike the Portuguese, the Dutch in Kupang invariably mastered Malay language as a lingua franca in the business of Commerce.²⁴

Lifau in Oecusse

Eventually, 50 years of destructive conflict between the two European powers was brought to an end by mediation. Under the Treaty of Peace, signed between Portugal and Holland on 6 August 1661 at The Hague, it was determined that each power would reserve to itself the territories already occupied on Solor and Timor.

The Dutch kept Kupang but- Was observed by Dampier- were also obliged to furnish two armed sloops for the service of the Portuguese governor, one to transport the taxes collected in Timor, the other to defend the

coast against the depredations of Macassar. 25

While Lifau (variously Lifau, Liphao, Leiffauw) in Oecusse on the northwest coast of Timor gradually emerged as a favourite port of call for the Portuguese, especially sandalwood traders from Macau, by the 1650s they still had no permanent settlement on the island. As was the practice in Macau prior to gaining a permanent presence in 1557, the Portuguese traders arriving in Timor would build temporary dwellings in which to live for some weeks or months while waiting to conclude business or awaiting the change of season. One of the strongest voices calling for the direct conquest of Timor was the Macau-based trader, Pascoal Barreto.

His petition to King Joao IV from Macau in December 1645 makes interesting reading. Whether accurate or not Barreto was convinced from commercial intelligence received in Macassar that Timor was rich in, besides timber, gold and a particularly high grade of Copper. Observing that, with the decline of the Japan trade, Macau was bereft of this last commodity otherwise used in the manufacture of cannon, and that, notwithstanding the various attempts by Macassar, Timor neither paid tribute nor had it been conquered by any nation. Although Barreto himself was poised to sail to Timor from Macassar in the same year, he detoured to Manila instead upon learning of the restoration of the monarchy. 26

While the Treaty of Peace of 1661 offered a respite and opportunity to the Portuguese in the Far East, it would be 40 odd years before decisive action was taken. A carta or letter sent by the Senate in Macau to the Spanish Governor in Manila on 12 April 1692 argued strongly as to the necessity of establishing both government structures and a mission on Timor. 27

Accordingly, at regular intervals, beginning as early as 1695, the Viceroy of Goa attempted to appoint a Portuguese official as Governor at Lifau. At least until the opening years of the following century, as discussed below, a group of Christianized mestizo rulers and their local allies saw to it that each successive appointee was expelled, besieged, or overthrown. 28

Thus the first Governor to set foot on Timor, Antonio de Mesquita Pimentel, was expelled in 1697 by Domingos da Costa scion of the powerful clan of that name, while his successor, André Coelho Vieira, was arrested by the same person in Larantuka and sent back to Macau.

By 1697 Lifau was evidently well enough established, although hardly well defended, to attract the unwanted attentions of a French pirate vessel. Fresh from seizing the Dutch fort at Kupang and burning the tow, this pirate then proceeded to pillage Lifau for what it was worth. 29

When, in 1699, William Dampier visited Lifau in the course of his three-month sojourn on Timor, he found that a settlement, a community and basic governmental structures had been firmly established. After Kupang, under Dutch control, Lifau emerged as the second most important trading port on the island. While, in Dampier's estimation, Lifau could not hold out against 100 men, and while powder and bullets were scarce and dear, the settlement was, nevertheless, deemed capable of mustering 600 men in 24 hours "all armed with Hand-Guns, Swords and Pistols". But, he continued, "They have no Fort, nor Magazine of Arms: nor does the Vice-Roy of Goa send them any now."

Dampier found in Lifau but three Portuguese, two of whom were priests, the balance of the population made up of Portuguese mestizo and a few resident Chinese trading wax, gold, slaves and sandalwood against rice and porcelain and certain European commodities imported each year on a fleet of about 20 vessels from Macau. As Dampier well understood, the trading season was limited from late March to late August, but with the arrival of the monsoon, Lifau no longer offered a safe anchorage. Characteristically, boats from Macau would leave towards the end of the year sailing direct to Batavia before making the journey east through the archipelago to Timor arriving early the following year. The return journey assisted with the southwest monsoon was also via Batavia.

On government, Dampier observed, the real authority lay with the Captain-Major, a man named Antonio Henriquez, a Portuguese sent by the Viceroy in Goa.

Despite his title this person was deeply involved in forging military alliances with natives against their adversaries. At the time of Dampier's visit, Henriquez was actually resident in a place described as Porta Nova on the "eastern end of the island", a reference to Larantuka on Flores. The second-in-command, one Alexis Mendoza, a mestizo, Dampier referred to as a "Mongrel-Breed of Indians and Portuguese" as were the next most subordinate authorities. He continued, "For though they pretend to be under the King of Portugal, they are assort of lawless People, and are under no Government". 30

Neither, Dampier observed, had Goa reciprocated by sending a supply ship. This reference to Goa is not

without interest as the Estado da India was ostensibly responsible for keeping up contact with the islands by sending an armed frigate with supplies to Larantuca or Lifau. But, by the eighteenth century, only one or two voyages from Goa actually touched Timor. Thereafter, Governors, Captains-Majors, soldiers and supplies invariably arrived in Timor via Macau.³¹

While, as seen, in the last decades of the seventeenth century Lifau came to be established under an ad hoc system of military and religious rule, as of 20 February 1702, the settlement came under tighter control as seat of the Portuguese government in Timor. The first to hold this office in Lifau was Antonio Coelho Guerreiro (1702-05), going by the title of Governor and Captain General of the islands of Timor and Solor and other regions in the South. As a Crown-appointed office, it follows that the documentation on Timor, or at least that surrounding his appointment, also expanded apace. Notably, Governor Guerreiro bequeathed the first map of Lifau, the *Planta da Praia de Lifau*. Dated 1702, it reveals a fairly complex urban structure supporting military, civil and ecclesiastical elements, including the *Ermida de St. Antonio* along with a hospital.

Boxer, who has traced Guerreiro's Career, offers that his was an important appointment, especially given his background as Colonial Secretary of Angola and later as Secretary of State in Goa. Even so, when Guerreiro arrived in Macau from Goa in June of 1701 to take up his appointment, he was not given a specific brief, besides neutralizing Dutch and Chinese control over sandalwood and taking a firm stand against the rebellion of the *da Costas*. He sailed from Macau in January 1702 with less than 100 soldiers to enforce his authority. He also came equipped with military and other equipment for the rundown settlement and *Fortaleza* at Lifau.

His cargo also included 200 piculs of rice necessary to tide over the settlement from certain starvation. In any case, Guerreiro sought and gained a short-lived alliance between the Crown and Portuguese country traders in the form of two of Macau's ships and manpower for military operations in Timor, which also included unauthorized conflict with the Dutch. ³²

While Governor Guerreiro evidently succeeded in imposing order upon the rebellious mestizo population of Lifau and in raising the prestige of the Crown, it is also true that he was closely besieged in Lifau for nearly three years by a rebellious chieftain of the *da Costa* family, an allusion to the rising power of the mestizo, a discussed in a following chapter. Guerreiro also took it in hand to equalize the power of the friendly chiefs, some of whom claimed sovereignty over others, by conferring the rank of *dato*, a traditional title, or *colone* where appropriate, on tribal heads and nobles, a practice, according to Boxer, which continued down to modern times. Even though Governor Guerreiro sent glowing reports to Goa on Timor's riches he finally abandoned the struggle and left Lifau in "disgust and disguise" at the end of 1704. This is known from the reference to a certain "Portuguese gentleman" who shipped out of Lifau with the English sea captain Alexander Hamilton bound from Batavia to Goa, as mentioned in his *A New Account of the East Indies*.
33

Church documents reveal not only that certain governors fled or were expelled from Lifau, but that great tension beset church and crown. Looking back upon his experience at Lifau, Fr. Manuel de Santo Antonio wrote, he had "not a moment of peace in Timor", an allusion to tension between himself (or successors) with a succession of Governors, beginning with Antonio Coelho Guerreiro (1702-05), Jacome de Morais Sarmiento (1708-09), Manuel de Sotto Mayor (1709-13), Manuel Ferreira de Almeida [not mentioned on official lists of Governors, but a possible rival to Domingos da Costa (1713-18)], Francisco de Mello de Castro (1718-20) and Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho (1722- 1725). According to an account published in the official bulletin in Goa, church papers reveal many accusations and recriminations. Certain of these quarrels involved clashes of personality, namely that between the Bishop and Mello de Castro several days after they arrived in Lifau together by ship from Goa, or matters of substance between Church authorities, such as in 1708 when the Bishop requested the dispatch of missionaries of orders other than the Dominicans. In the event, a memo written in the *Limos das Moncoes States* that such problems between civil and ecclesiastical authorities meant little time for the Bishop to devote himself to spiritual matters over the outlying regions of Timor. In a word, "*A hist6ria de Timor naquella epocha he um tecido de desordem e de anarchia*". ³⁴

Generously, Boxer offers that, by this stage, Lifau had "assumed the kind of status of Alsatia, largely populated by cutthroats", a reference to the slave traders and slave raiders, and French and German deserters from the Dutch army, among other roughnecks, who assembled in the place. Neither, from all

accounts, did the Dominican mission raise the moral tone of the desolate outpost. Yet, he continues, while Lifau never seems to have progressed far beyond its pioneer beginnings, it nevertheless constituted the centre of Portuguese power in the island and its establishment marked the transfer of Portuguese power from Flores to Timor, 35

Ushering in some 250 years of actual Portuguese presence on the island. 36

Macau, the Chinese, and the Sandalwood Trade

As one student of Timor's sandalwood trade has written, by the second half of the sixteenth century, Malacca was overtaken as the preferred sailing route to Timor/Solor by Macassar on Celebes. Malacca, embroiled in war with Aceh and Johore, lost its attractiveness as a commercial centre. Macassar, meanwhile, grew to the second in size and rank to Macau within the Portuguese east, especially after the loss of the Japan trade.³⁷

While we have commented upon the rupture between the Portuguese and Tolo over the latter's expedition against Timor in 1641, eventually in 1648 the Estado da India ordered leading Portuguese trader Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo to reach a new modus vivendi with Tolo that would preserve the Portuguese trading position in Macassar while reserving the Solor-Flores-Timor zone to Portugal and its allies. Eventually Portuguese trade at Macassar with Manila, India and Timor became the mainstay for the city of Macau in the period between the 1640s and 1660s, but with the Macassar Dutch treaty of 1660 and the Dutch Conquest of Macassar in 1667, the Portuguese once again lost an important ally, market and emporium in the archipelago.³⁸

Necessarily, both Chinese and Portuguese merchants adapted to the new circumstances. Certainly, the Chinese were well apprised of the importance of Solor in this trade along with all the superior anchorages on the coast of Timor. To the extent that the Chinese engaged in the trade in the decades following the opening of Solor, the Portuguese definitely sought to keep them out. Also, as discussed in a following chapter, the rise of power by the creolized group and the abandonment by the Portuguese of Lifau in favour of Dili facilitated Chinese control of the commodity shipped out of Kupang or Atapupu under only nominal supervision.

The role of Chinese, including Macau Chinese, alongside Portuguese in the sandalwood trade with Timor goes back to the Malacca period and only ended when that city succumbed to the long Dutch blockade and eventual siege. According to de Matos, by the end of the sixteenth century, the Malacca-Timor voyages were auctioned out for the princely sum of 500 cruzados.³⁹

Ptak believes that while the ratio of Chinese shipments to Portuguese remains unclear, the Portuguese share began to increase after 1600. A letter by the Bishop of Cochin, F.

Pedro da Silva, dated 1609, suggests that, while the ordinary price for sandal in Macau was 20 patacas a picul, during years when little shipping arrived from Timor, [via Malacca] the price soured to 150 patacas. Profits increased over the years.

According to the estimate of Bishop Rangel in 1630, profits on the trade ran at 150 to 200 percent, aptly earning Timor the reputation of "Ilha do sandalo".⁴⁰

It is only in 1634 that we first find mention in the *Limos das Moncoes do Reino* of direct sailings from Macau to Macassar and Solor. Timorese and Solorese sailors may have joined the crew of Portuguese ship at this time. Among the martyrs of the ill-fated Portuguese Embassy sent to Nagasaki in 1640 were Alberto a 16 years old Timorese deck hand and slave and Antonio, a 40 year-old slave from Solor, both "owned" by Macau-based members of the Portuguese crew. But just as the crew of the Japan boat were drawn from a mixed Company of Portuguese, Spanish, Arabs, Chinese, Indians, and Africans along with peoples from the Philippines and Indonesian islands, so it is fair to assume that the India and Macau boat arriving in Timor brought to these shores several times a year peoples of variety of races and religions.⁴¹

According to de Matos, until 1638 the sandal trade was carried out by the Royal treasury in Macau, and, until 1689 the voyages were carried out by private persons or the *Capitao-mor* on a voyage assigned for three years. While the trade was not necessarily the monopoly of individuals, it was the monopoly of Macau for the citizens of Macau and at the expense of the Chinese of Canton who traded sandal from Timor with Batavia. It was thus a great loss to the Macau treasury that native rulers carried the trade to Babao where it entered the Dutch trade.⁴²

The significance of the Timor-Macau trade is confirmed by other sources, notably, a Dutch work of 1646 states that 1,000 bahar of sandal was taken to Macau annually. But overall, writes Ptak, the Macau-Timor trade was "favoured by the relative lightness of taxes and dues" and not placed on a strict monopoly basis like the voyages to Japan or the quasi-monopoly status of the Malacca voyages through which the earlier Timor trade had been mediated. 43

From Macau archival sources we know that in 1689 numerous terms of assent were drawn up by the Macau Senate for Chinese merchants to send ships direct to Batavia, or for the Timor and Solor voyage. In that year five pautas or sealed lists were offered by Macau, albeit mandated by the Viceroy of Goa. These were literally vermilion seals embossed in the arms and crown of Portugal. Pedro Vaz de Siqueira was one such individual awarded the Timor voyage in that year for his ship Rozario, that would also be used on future occasions (1698) to transport soldiers to Lifau. In 1693 the Convent of S. Francisco also won a pauta do navio, suggesting a church interest in the trade. The following year the Senate discussed conditions of employment of Malays on the Timor voyages, a possible suggestion that Timorese who had achieved a non-slave or free status also visited the Chinese city, albeit a status that required regulation. 44

Whereas from 1678 to 1689, the Timor voyages were organized either by the Captain-major of Macau or by private individuals on a three year basis, on 20 October 1689, the Senate of Macau passed the following resolution on the sandalwood trade with Timor with specific reference to estimates made by the pilots and Supercargoes:

...each of these ships can load 1,800 piculs of sandalwood cargo, above and below decks, and From these 1,800 piculs, after 622 piculs have been deducted for the liberties of all the crew, there remain 1,178 piculs in each ship, of which one third of all the crew, there remain 1,178 piculs in each ship, of which one third of the lading is allotted to the owners, in consideration of the great expenses which they incur with the ships, and the measurement duties which they have to pay, which amount to 392 piculs, thus leaving to divide among the moradores 784 piculs in each of the said ships, making a total of 1,578 piculs net, to divide among the said moradores in the manner stated in the lists compiled of the Bague. 45

Each year one or two ships would depart Macau according to the monsoon laden with cargoes of refined gold, ivory, iron, cloth and silk, the ships would load, besides sandal, wax, tortoiseshell, cinnamon, and slaves, at the ports of Citrena, Lifau, Dili, Hera, and Tolecao, on the north coast of Timor. Each ship would carry between 1,800,000 sandalwood "peaks". Whenever possible the ships would call in at Batavia trading cloth against rice needed for the Lifau garrison. Occasionally the ship would call in at Malacca, Madura, Bali, Larantuca and other local ports. 46

From about 1695 the Senate in Macau organized a system of trade with Timor and Solor that would continue with minor modifications for nearly a century. As Boxer describes it, every year one, two, or three small ships left Macau annually for Timor, sometimes stopping in Batavia, sometimes direct.

One third of the cargo space was reserved for the shipowner, the remaining two-thirds being distributed-albeit differentially-. A-among the citizens of Macau from captain-General, to widows and orphans. All shipowner in Macau were given a turn in this trade according to the system of pautas arranged between the Senate and Goa.47

Just as the Timor and Solor trade in sandalwood, gold, beeswax, and slaves, became the principal economic resource for Macau during the eighteenth century, so the organization of this trade fundamentally altered local social, and political organization in Timor. According to Souza, the Portuguese country traders from Macau successfully minimized the VOC and Chinese penetration of the Timor market throughout the 1670 and into the 1690s. Attempts by the Crown to impose its authority upon the local and mestizo population did not seriously disturb the preferential supply of sandalwood to Portuguese country-trader shipping from Macau at that time. While Competition did arise from Chinese junks sailing from Batavia to Lifau, the Portuguese country traders were still able to corner superior grades of sandal as well as the largest quantities bound for the Chinese market.

Only the quantities of sandal reaching the market, according to a VOC report of 1690, were in decline by that year, however.48

Yet from the account of Alexander Hamilton published in 1727, the rebellion by Lifau (1688-1703) practically ruined the Macau trade, exhausting men, money and ships.49

There is truth in this account as, in 1705, owing to the inability of the city to pay the annual ground rent to the Chinese authorities, the Macau Senate offered the collateral for the Timor voyage deposited in the church of St. Pauls.⁵⁰

While the Crown was satisfied to accept the submission in 1708 of Domingo da Costa, the most important rebel leader, winning by diplomacy what they could not achieve by arms, support from the country traders lessened to the degree that Governor Guerreiro failed to stop over-cutting of sandal and competition from owners of Chinese junks. By the 1710s, Souza writes, the Batavia market had assumed greater importance for Macau's country traders at Timor's expense. Despite appeals for aid from Macau in the 1720s in the face of another rebellion, the Macau Senate determined the Timor trade unprofitable given Crown administrative mismanagement including the imposition of custom's duties. The result was that, upon the insistence of the Crown, Macau continued to send only one of its ships on an annual basis for the rest of the period. ⁵¹ Ljungstedt, writing from Macau in 1836, observed that while profit from the sandalwood trade had greatly fallen off, the Macau Senate was nevertheless moved in 1720 to cut the poorer merchants out of the trade, a measure in any case overthrown by the court of Goa.⁵²

In a possible retort to Goa, the Macau Senate in December 1723 complained to King Joao V over the imposition of new laws and an alteration in the price of sandal by the Governor of Timor (Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho) -doubtless at the behest of the Estado da India- pleading a fall in commerce at the expense of the people of Macau. In March 1726 the Crown upheld the petition from the Macau Senate ordering Goa to protect the sandal trade and to fall in line.⁵³

In any case, with the edict of Chinese Emperor Yung-ching in 1723 lifting the prohibition on Chinese entering foreign trade and the participation by Chinese merchants in the triangular Timor-Batavia-Canton trade, the voyage from Macau to Timor became unprofitable. Ljungstedt remarks that a yearly vessel dispatched from Macau to Timor was reduced to conveying soldiers, officers, exiles, and ammunition, while loading government paper, treasure etc. to be remitted by way of Macau to Goa. ⁵⁴

From a Dutch perspective, the VOC sandalwood trade came to an end during the eighteenth century. In 1752, following successive losses, the Company decided to waive its monopoly and allow anyone to cut sandalwood who was willing to pay one-third commission. In the event, the trade passed completely into the hands of the Chinese who remained in control for more than a century.⁵⁵

The question remains, what then did the Dutch get out of it? According to a French report of 1782, not much! Every year one or two sloops would call in to Kupang from Batavia bringing varieties of cloth (coarse linen) and making the return journey with wax, tortoise shell, sandal, and "cadiang", a kind of bean used on board Dutch vessels to vary the diet. No particular gain and no particular loss were incurred by the Dutch establishment, or, in the words of the author, "la recette egale la depense" (the profits just answer the expenses). ⁵⁶

Conclusion

While from about 1570 down, captains-major and, from 1696, governors for Solor and Timor, were regularly appointed, as we have seen, many were unable to exercise their authority, and others never reached the islands at all. We have also commented upon the conflict on Solor and, in turn, Timor, between the Dominicans and the state-appointed captains. While, as Boxer has pointed out, Goa sought to intervene in this question by offering up patents of Governorship to selected Portuguese residents in Larantuca for appointment to Lifau, the new centre of Portuguese power in the Flores-Solor zone, inevitably Goa was obliged to acknowledge the de facto leadership of one or other of the indigenized bosses on Timor. In any case, de Hornay was henceforth left alone until his death and, in Boxer's estimation, not such a bad ruler after all given the circumstances. The real test for Goa, in any case, was whether he could deliver up the necessary contributions, which in fact he did. While on paper, as seen, it was the Viceroy in Goa that determined the distribution of voyages, in practice direct support from Goa was almost always more fictional than real. Boxer writes that only in two or three instances in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did Goa send government vessels direct to Timor. ⁵⁷

But, to answer the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, the Wallerstein-Hamashita-Lieberman Conundrum, as to whether Portugal accommodated or ruptured existing tributary and trade networks, at least in the period before the full onslaught of Western (British, Dutch and French) capital in Southeast

Asia, and the development of a plantation economy on Timor, we can say that the Flores-Solor-Timor zone emerged as a discrete territorial and maritime entity under which Portugal and its local allies derived major profits from a reconstituted trade activity, albeit one in which they did not hold monopoly rights. Why? Because Asians - Chinese, Muslims and Timorese- never entirely relinquished the trade to the Portuguese, but adapted to the new circumstances.

Sandal, which had over the centuries served as a milch cow for Timorese and foreign traders alike, eventually went into steady decline, not so much because of vulnerability to foreign competition or world market conditions, although as show below, that also occurred towards the end, but because of overcutting. Indeed, there is a sense that the sandal trade was counter-cyclical to the don trend in the classic spice trade beginning with the Dutch seizure of Banda in 1621. In fact, the sandal trade continued to surge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with demand outstripping supply.

Sandal was simply the commodity which rescued the Macau treasury from utter Penury after the collapse of the Japan trade. However, and this is important, unlike the case of trade in spices in the Moluccas, Timor's sandal fluidly entered the circuits of Chinese trade on largely non-European terms, as mentioned, a commodity on which neither the Portuguese or Dutch ever gained a monopoly.

While Reid -as with van Leur- acknowledges the existence of sandal as a trade item, Timor and the Solor zone is not included as one of his Southeast Asian "hubs of commerce", indeed simply not mentioned, possibly because it did not appear to support a large urban Centre and did not appear to spawn a merchant class, at least not at the source, although this view, too, might underestimate the merchant activities of the Dominicans and Larantuqueiros on Solor, Larantuca and Lifau. But also, as we have emphasized, the basic facts of the Timor trade in sandal contradicts the theory of irremediable decline, at least in the seventeenth century. 58

Eventually, as discussed below, it would be the strident independence of the Larantuqueiros which obliged the first-native born Portuguese governor to withdraw from Lifau to Dili in 1769, irrevocably moving the centre of gravity of Portuguese power on the island although not entirely displacing Chinese trading activities away from the Flores-Solor-Lifau networks. Rather than being a major arena of war between the Portuguese and Asian rivals, the Flores-Solor-Timor zone was one in which many participated at much profit. It is true the Lusitanian "peace" in the zone was assured by military supremacy and a system of fortified posts, but it is also true that the major Challenge to Portuguese command over the seas in this early expansion and "incorporation" stage was from their European as opposed to traditional religious or civilizational rivals.

Notes

1. See Andre Gunder Frank, "World System History", paper presented at annual meeting of the New England Historical Association, Bentley College, Waltham, Mass., 23 April 1994; A.G. Frank and B.K. Gills, *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?*, Routledge, 1993.
2. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System I: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy 1730-1840s*, Aeademie Press, San Diego, 1989, p. 132.
3. Victor Lieberman, "Wallerstein's System and the International Context of Early Modern Southeast Asian History", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 24. No. 1, 1990.
4. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith, *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978.
5. Takeshi Hamashita, "The Tribute trade System and Modern Asia", in A.J.H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu (eds.), *Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy*, Routledge, London, 1994, pp. 91 - 107.
6. Manuel Teixeira, *Macau e a sua Diocese: Missoes de Timor*, Tipografia da Missao do Padroado, 1962, pp.11-12.
7. L.C.D. de Freycinet, *Voyage autour du monde, executé sur les corvettes S.M. l'Uranie et la Physicienne pendant les années 1817-1820*, Paris, 1827.
8. Roderich Ptak, *The Transportation of Sandalwood from Timor to Macau and China during the Ming Dynasty*, *Review of Culture*, 1987, p. 34.
9. de Freycinet, *Voyage*, p. 529.

10. James J. Fox, "Colonial Kupang: Debauchery and Grace in the Dutch Port", in Kal Muller, *East of Bali: from Lombok to Timor*, Periplus Editions, Berkeley, 1991, p. 246.
11. Appolonius Schot, "Relation du Voyage", in *Recueil des Voyages qui ont servi a L 'tablissement et aux Progras de la Compagnie des Indes Orientalesformae dans leg Provinces- tfnies des Pays-Bas*, Tome IV, Etienne Roger, Amsterdam, 1705, pp. 207-214.
12. "F'undagao das primeiras christandades nas ilhas de Solor e Timor", mss in Biblioteca Nacional, Lisboa, antigo Fundo Geral, no.465, transcribed From Vol. IV of "Documentacao....Insulindia", cited in Joao Diogo Alarcao de Carvalho Branco, *A Ordem de S. Domingos e as Origens de Timor*, do Autor, Lisboa, 1987, pp. 9-10, and see de Freycinet, *Voyage*.
13. de Freyeinet, *Voyage*, p. 539
14. *Ibid.*, p. 532.
15. fl. G. Schulte-Northolt, *The Political System of the Antoni*, Martinus NLhoff, The Hague, 1971, p. 154, cited in Jill Jolliffe, *East Timor, Nationalism and Colonialism*, University of Queensland Press, St.Lucia, 1978,p.26.
16. Abilio de Araujo, *Timor Leste: Os Loricos Voltaram a Cantar*, Lisboa, 1977, pp. 82.
17. AHU Timor ex 1 doc no.3, 20 December 1643, Batavia.
18. Francisco Ferllandez, "Das Miss6es de Timor", *Revista de Estudos, ljuSO-Asiaticos (Macau)*, No. 1, Setembro 1992, p. 15.
19. Fr Mathias da MayasJ, Provincial of Japan to Fr.Goswin Nickel, General, Rome; annual letter, Macao, February 18, 1661, in Hubert Jacob SJ (ed.), *The Jesuit Makassar Documents (1 615-1 682)*, Monumenta Historicasocietatas Iesu, Vol. 134, Jesuit flistorical Institute, Rome, 1988, p. 52.
20. Fir. Antonio Franeisco SJ to Fr Giampaolao Oliva, General, Rome, Macao, 5 December 1670, in *The Jesuit Makassar Documents*, p. 234.
21. de Freycinet, *Voyage*, p. 532.
22. C.R. Boxer, "Portuguese Timor: A Rough Island history: 15 15-1960", *lHistory lbdy*, May 1960, p. 352.
23. *Ibid.*
24. William Dampier, *A Continuation of a Voyage to New Holland etc. in the Year 1699*, James and John Knapton, London, 1699 p. 185
25. de Freycinet, *Voyage*, p. 5, 45.
26. AfIU Caixa 1, doc 53, 1 December 1645, Pascoal Baneto to D. Joao. The full text of this letter has been published in Frazao de Vasconcelos, *Timor: Subsídios Históricos*, Divisao de Publicac8es e Biblioteea, Agencia Geral das Colonias, lJisboa, 1937, pp. 19-21.
27. AHU Macau ms 89 Caixa 2 doc.14, "Senado da Camara de Ma}au to Governador de Manila", l2April 1692.
- 28 J.J. Fox, *The Flow of Life: Essays on Eastern Timor*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980, p. 64.
29. de Freyeinet, *Voyage*, p. 545.
30. William Dampier, *A Continuation*, pp. 176-178.
31. C.R. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East: 1550-1770: Fact and Fancy in the History of Mac from artinus NLhoff*, The Hague, 1948, p. 196.
32. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 196.
33. *Ibid.* and see Boxer, "Portuguese Timor", p. 353.
34. "A Missao de Camboja" hart 1), *Boletim do Governo do Estada da India*, No.56, 1865, pp. 57j9. Yearly from 1605-55, the monsoon books or Crown letter orders or dispatches were sent from Lisbon to the Viceroy India.
35. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the FarEast*, p. 188.
36. Artur Teodoro de Mates, *Na rota das Especiarias: De Malaca a Australia/On the Seaway to Spices: From Malacca to Australia*, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 1995, pp. 120-121.
37. Villiers, *EastofMalacca*, pp. 72-73.
38. George Bryan Souza, *Ike Survival of Empire: Portuguese l3Vade and Sociey in China and the South Chinasea, 1630-1754*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 109-111.
39. A. Teodoro de Matos, "Timor and the Portuguese trade in the Orient dudng the 1 8th Century", in A. T. de Matos e i,uis F'ilipe F. Reis Thomaz (eds.), *As Relacoes eni7le a India Portuguesa, a Asia do Sueste e o*

- ExtYlemO Oriente, Actas VI Seminado Internacional de Hist6ria Indo-Portuguesa, Macau 22 a 26 Outubro de 1991, p. 437.
40. Roderich Ptak, "The Transportation of Sandalwood", pp. 34-35.
41. Benjamin Videira Pires, *A Embaixada Mirtir*, Instituto Cultural de Macau, Imprensa Official, Macau, 1988.
42. de Matos, "Timor and the Portuguese Trade", p. 438. These documents comprised orders and dispatches received yearly at Goa from Lisbon in the monsoon of September-October with replies from 1574-1614.
43. Ptak, "The Transportation of Sandalwood", p. 35.
44. See *Ajquivos de Macau 3as6rie Vol. IX, No.4. Abril 1968*.
45. C. R. Boxer, *Portuguese Society in the Topics: The Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda, 1510-1800*, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison and Milwaukee, 1965, minutes of the municipal council meeting of the 20 October 1689, append. 10, p. 170.
46. de Matos, "Timor and the Portuguese Trade", p. 439.
47. Boxer, *The Municipal Councils of Goa*, pp. 57-58.
48. Souza, *The Survival of Empire*, p. 182.
49. Alexander Hamilton cited in C.R. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, pp. 186-7. Boxer believes the source of this account is Jht6nio Coelho Guerreiro, former Governor of Lifau.
50. *Arquivos de Macau, 3o S6rie Vol. IX, No.4, April 1968*.
51. Souza, *The Survival of Empire*, p. 185.
52. Anders Ljungstedt, *An Historical Sketch of the Portuguese Settlements in China and of the Roman Catholic Church and Mission in China and Description of the CiO, of Canton, James Munroe and Co., Boston, 1836*, p. 9.
53. AHU Macau Cx3 No.14i December 26, 1723, "Senado da Camara de Macau to D. Joao V" and Dom Joao V to Vice-rei e capitao-general do Estado da India, Joao de Saldanha da Gama", 3 Marco 1726, Lisboa.
54. Ljungstedt, *An Historical Sketch*, p. 97.
55. F.J. Orneling, *The Timor Problem*, p. 102.
56. Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, *Histoire Philosophique et Politique Des Etablissemens et du Commerce des Europaens dans les Deux Indes*, prome Premier, Jean-Leonard Pellet, Gen6ve, 1782, pp. 225-226. The English language version of Raynal's account appears in J. Justamond, *A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies*, John Exshaw and William Halhead, Dublin, MDCCLXVI.
57. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 196.
58. Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commencee 1450-1680.. Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993, p. 328.

4

The Topasse Rebellion and the Siege of Lifau

The notion that Portuguese power in the archipelago would one day be challenged by their erstwhile Catholicized mixed-race descendants-the topasse-is not entirely without precedent in eighteenth century history-the case of the slave revolt of French Haiti in the late eighteenth century comes to mind-but was an almost natural outcome of a long historical process that saw the development of Portuguese communities, invariably Catholic, invariably of mixed race, and invariably speaking a Portuguese creole, in a long

crescent girding the Indian ocean and studding the archipelago, wherever the Portuguese established forts cum trading posts. Even today the legacy palpably remains in Goa, Malacca and Macau.

But in the seventeenth century- Bocarro's *O Livro do Estado da India Oriental* of 1635 offers one such enumeration-Portugalized communities were generalized over all key trading routes along the coast of Indi including the Bay of Bengal, Aceh, through the Straits of Malacca, to the further reaches of the archipelago at Tidor and Ternate, and, central to our discussion, at Solor. The scholarship of David Lopes, drawing upon history and linguistic analysis, reveals the degree to which Portugalized communities developed in such places as Bengal, Ceylon, Coromandel, Pegu, Siam, and, even after the Dutch capture of Malacca, such communities multiplied in Macassar and even in Batavia under the Dutch.

Needless to say Portuguese was the lingua franca of trade across a vast zone even where the Portuguese presence on the ground, such as Nagasaki, was sporadic or seasonal.¹

The question is raised by the foregoing as to how native Timorese responded to this cultural invasion on the part of a new mixed race-mixed culture group, localised on the one hand, but outside of truly "indigenous" forms of cultural relations as represented by the *reino* and *liurai*. This chapter seeks to set down the main facts concerning the first encounters between the Portuguese, the *topasse* and the Timorese in the period leading up to the dramatic escape of the Portuguese from the beleaguered capital of Lifau on Oecusse in 1769 and the subsequent founding of Dili signalling a new stage in the colonial conquest of Timor. At the same time, we are careful to qualify the rebellions of this epoch in line with our argument that in Timor, unlike in the African colonies, the Portuguese virtually surrendered control to *topasse* power, postponing even the attempt to establish the basis of a colonial capitalist economy, thus setting off this period of winning alliances and consolidating control on the northern coastal littoral of northeast Timor from a later stage of colonial conquest and pacification.

The Rise of Topasse Power

While we have discussed the rise of Lifau as the major locus of Portuguese power on Timor, increasingly the Portuguese presence was beholden to the proxy power of a creolized and Catholicized Portuguese-speaking Eurasian group. As alluded to by Dampier, these people were the product of mixed Portuguese, Chinese, Dutch, and native liaisons, known variously as Schwartz Portuguese (Black Portuguese), *Topasse* or *Larantuqueiros*. While the latter term is an obvious reference to the Larantuca and Solor communities from whence this group originated, the etymology of *topasse* is more obscure. In any case the term originally had wider currency in a Portuguese Indian context, reflecting the likely derivation of the term from the Malayalam word for two languages or interpreter, *topashe* or, in Hindi, *dobashi*.²

A very early reference to the term occurs in correspondence written in October 1545 from the Kingdom of Kandy in Ceylon to the King of Portugal, referring to a "Topaz who had come as the topaz of the factory".³

In 1604, the Dominican friar Gabriel Quiroga de San Antonio encountered *topasse* on the Coromandel coast of India.⁴

From a letter written by the Viceroy of India to the Portuguese Court in 1619, we learn that, in the absence of Portuguese guards in the Malacca fort, *topazes* were preferred to the exclusion of "troublesome" Japanese, Javanese or Malays.⁵

In Dutch writings, the existence of *toupas* alongside *mesticos* are mentioned in Spielbergen's voyage of 1648, and, on the occasion of the Portuguese surrender to the Dutch at Cochin on 7 January 1663, where the rights and liberties of *toepassen* prisoners were set down. In 1690, Engleburt Kaempfer, a German physician in the employ of the Dutch, observed a "village inhabited by a Portuguese race begot by black women" in Ayutthaya, a former capital of Thailand.⁶ Additionally, in his 1727 book, English Captain Alexander Hamilton mentions 200 *topasse* or Indian Portuguese settled and married in Cambodia.⁷

So while *Larantuqueiros* appears to be the more accurate or at least location-specific term, the generalized expression *topasse* seems to have later become synonymous with the Catholicized mixed-race families on Flores and Timor. In any case, within a generation this creolized group emerged as even more dominant than the Portuguese in the Flores-Solor-Timor zone. As Subrahmanyam explains, the distance from Goa and obscurity of these islands meant that in the latter half of the seventeenth century the *Larantuqueiros* evolved their own local structures of power and leadership, largely autonomous of Goa and beyond the

interference of Macau.⁸

According to Boxer, the desertion of the Dutch commander of Solor, Jan de Hornay, to Larantuca in 1629 injected new blood and vigour into the Larantuqueiros.

De Hornay turned Catholic and married a Timorese slave girl with whom he bore two sons. This, Boxer comments, was the origin of the de Hornay or d'Ornay family who, later transplanted to Timor, provided some of the most powerful chieftains, alternatively "champions and enemies of Portuguese rule". Another Larantuca family called the da Costas also provided a line of powerful chiefs, in turn rivals and later allies of the de Hornays. Notably, one of Jan de Hornay's sons, Antonio de Hornay (1613-93), virtually ruled Larantuca, Solor, and Timor as an independent prince between 1673-93 even though acknowledging the suzerainty of the Portuguese Crown.⁹

As mentioned, the 1642 raid on the Wehale kingdom by Francisco Fernandes, the Solor-born topasse, established the topasse as the new power on the island even ahead of the Portuguese. With their base in Lifau in Oeusse, the topasse succeeded Wehale as the new focus of political alliances on the island. James Fox has written that many of the kingdoms that had aligned with the Wehale immediately formed new alliances with the topasse.¹⁰

Not only did these two clans and their followers, especially Antonio de Hornay, wage bitter war between themselves but they also engaged the Dutch and Portuguese, especially in the struggle for control over the sandalwood monopoly. In 1656 the topasse all but eliminated a Dutch military expedition dispatched to pacify them. In the 1690s Domingos da Costa of that family took the place of Antonio de Hornay as head of the Larantuqueiros,¹¹

And, in 1708, was at least temporarily reconciled with Portuguese power.

Undoubtedly Dampier offers up the most colourful picture of the topasse at Lifau, although he does not use this term. Indeed, of the population at Lifau he found it hard to distinguish who was Portuguese and who was native, especially as their language was Portuguese and their religion "Romish". In a telling comment on power relationships, he offered that "They seem in words to acknowledge the King of Portugal for sovereign; yet they will not accept of any officers Sent by him". At the time of his visit the Captain-Major appointed by Goa was actually resident at a place called Porta Nova, a reference to Larantuca, or constantly engaged in battle with native allies of the Dutch in the interior. Local authority was in the hands of an acting Governor or lieutenant called Alexis Mendosa, "a little man of the Indian-Race, Copper-coloured, with black lank hair". This bilingual individual, who impressed Dampier as a "civil brisk man", resided some nine kilometres inland from Lifau. Another topasse lieutenant resided at Lifau. While feigning to be under the King of Portugal, Dampier believed that in reality they were "a sort of lawless people...under no government". As evidence, he recalled that in the recent past, the Captain-major had clapped a governor-designate arriving from Goa in irons and returned him to the ship with instructions that Lifau had "no Occasion for any Officers, and that he could make better officers here".¹²

Another rare source on Lifau arises from the picaresque tale of Balthazar-Pascal Celse, visitor to the court of Louis XV and the supposed son of Gaspar da Costa, the topasse chief of Animata, a tale which entered into various manuscript and print versions in France. In 1734, Antonio Moniz de Macedo, the incoming governor of Timor, told how he was received with absolute confidence by Gaspar da Costa, described as "coronel regente, capitao-mor daquella provincia prizidente da praca de Liffao". Animata, located several kilometres south of Lifau was said to be an agglomeration of over 1,800 dwellings populated by both Portuguese and locals. Six years later, Gaspar further endeared himself to the Portuguese by offering assistance to the Bishop of Malacca in the construction of a seminary in Lifau.

While funds were slow in coming, this he sought to achieve by leaning on his tributaries in the Kingdom of Boboque and Insana. But, by April 1751, Gaspar along with the principal chiefs of Animata were victims of an uprising in Serviao fomented by the Dutch.¹³

Another version has it that, in 1749, taking advantage of a lull in fighting, the topasse turned on the Dutch at Penfui. On 18 October the Kupang fort leant of an advancing army of the Amarasi led by the topasse Lieutenant-General Gaspar da Costa and a number of liurai, including some of the Belu tribes. Virtually bottled up in Kupang by superior forces of the enemy, the Dutch called upon the support of marjdikers from Solor, Roti and Sam, along with allies from among the Timorese at Kupang.¹⁴

Writing in 1688, the Dutch traveller, Johan Nieuhof described the marjdikers or "accommodators" as a "mixture of diverse Indian nations", so-named because they "accommodate themselves easily to the

manners, customs and religion of such they live among". As opposed to the Portugualized topasse, a breed apart in the sense of their Catholic identities and testy loyalty to the Portuguese crown, the marjdiker, as described by Nieuhof, rose in stature as a merchant class, participating actively in the inter-island trade, dressing in the Dutch manner and even residing in stately homes in Batavia.¹⁵

In the event, Dutch victory over Gaspar da Costa in a battle that took a staggering 40,000 enemy lives along with the capture of the raja of Amarasi, represented, according to Jolliffe, "a crucial stemming of the tide" of topasse power in Timor, but at the same time also definitively marked the establishment of Dutch power on the island. In this sense the Penfui battle served as prelude to a series of Dutch attacks on various centres of Timorese power, including Amarasi in 1752 and the topasse centre of Noimutu, notably that led by a German-born commander named Hans von Pluskow.¹⁶

The Dutch assault on the western tip of the island also served another nefarious purpose, namely the trafficking in slaves from Timor, as mentioned, always in great demand in the archipelago, especially on Dutch-run plantations in the Moluccas. In 1752 the Bishop of Malacca, D. Fr. Geraldo de Sao Joseph, writing from Lifau, lamented the pernicious practice of the Dutch in Kupang in selling Timorese slaves to Chinese and "Moors" alike, a crime he pointed out which would lead to excommunication for Catholics.¹⁷

But where the Dutch won only pyrrhic victories through the exercise of force, they were more successful in the exercise of native diplomacy and the winning of commercial allies. Sowash also acknowledges that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was the challenge posed by the Black Portuguese or topasse along with the European allies which provoked the Dutch into taking such countermeasures. Notable was the action of the Company in 1755 in sending Johan Paravacini, an official of Italian origin, to conclude new treaties with fifteen rajas from among the rebellious tribes in Timor, Solor and Sumba. While this pact known as the Contract of Paravicini, signed the following year, did not settle the question of frontiers, it nevertheless marked a key stage in the consolidation of Dutch political authority in the archipelago.¹⁸ At the same time, it also offered crucial commercial guarantees for the Company.¹⁹

Drawing upon a reading of annual letters sent from Kupang to Batavia by the Company, now found in Dutch archives, Fox offers that the difficulty with the early contracts, such as with the five loyal allies in the Bay of Kupang in 1654-55, was confusion as to precisely who signed them on behalf of whom. One example of such ambiguity was the case of the exile to Cape Town in 1771 of an executive ruler of the as punishment for ordering the massacre of a gold-mining expedition, inferring that in Company logic, a scapegoat simply had to be found.

In any case, Fox is probably correct in asserting that there was initial advantage for the Dutch in signing treaties with as many specific rulers or claimants as came forward with promises of loyalty, especially as the Company presence in Kupang was never more than a couple of dozen Europeans at any one time, and not all of them Dutch. By contrast, the contract of Paravicini was a far more complex document elaborating on mutual obligations of signatories.²⁰

The Cailaco Rebellion (1719-69)

But in 1719, following several acts, of revolt, including the slaying of two missionaries and the desecration of churches, chiefs representing Camnace (Camanance), Lamaquitos, and a dozen neighbouring reinos extending as far as Lifau, met together in the house of the regulo of Camnace to Celebrate a "blood pact" according to local rites. This secret and highly ritualized event, performed by a dato-lulic or sacerdote gentilico, also involved the swearing of loyalty among the participants, an act accompanied by the ritual sacrifice of a cockerel and a dog and the drinking of its blood. According to one Portuguese construction of this event, this "loathesome and diabolical" pact sought to extinguish both the name of Christ and the Portuguese from the island.²¹

As such, the Camnace Pact, as it was called by the Portuguese, also initiated what would eventuate as almost 50 years of war between the rebels and the Portuguese.

Three years later, in 1722, under the Governorship of Antonio d'Albuquerque Coelho, the reino of Luca, actually centred far away on the central south coast in the Viqueque region, launched war upon the Portuguese, calling on his people to attack a troop of moradores or a locally recruited militia drawn from the topasse headed by the Captain-Major Joaquim de Matos, en route from Lifau to Cailaco to collect the fintas in practice a tax-in-kind. But, while the rebels may not in principal have gone to war over the practice of

paying *fintas*, the violence with which they were collected tipped the balance in favour of rebellion.²²

Although the system adopted by the first Portuguese on Timor to win loyal vassals also involved the extraction of some kind of tribute, the system of *fintas* or tribute-payment to be paid *en natura* by the kingdoms deemed loyal, was introduced in the period between 1710-14. *Fintas* included sandalwood, oil, wheat or whatever commodity that was exportable in the respective *reino*. The first codification of the system was set down by Governor Antonio Moniz de Macedo (1725-29; 1734-39), with respect to both sexes and with reference to both *reinos* and *sucos*, in a ruling made at Batugede on 10 July 1737. Yet the system was arbitrary, lacking in any kind of census data, and very often the costs of collecting the *fintas* exceeded the returns. Recognizing this weakness, Governor Moniz de Macedo attempted in 1734 to substitute a head tax, but was obliged to abandon the idea.

Writing of the *finta* system as it worked in the nineteenth century, Governor de Castro termed it "vexatious arbitrary and disordered".²³

According to Lawson, the *finta* system along with the practice of granting military titles according to positions of power, were key aspects of a strategy to break the independence of the kingdoms. As the Cailaco rebellion dramatizes, this strategy of intervening in existing political, social, and economic relationships among the petty kingdoms, also sowed the seeds of later revolts.²⁴

Faced with rebellion by the indigenous and the *mestizo* population, Timor appealed to Macau for aid in the form of renewed trade. Macau pleaded hardship, contending the trade was no longer profitable. While a trade connection did continue, it was only in the form of one of Macau's ships on an annual basis,²⁵ suggesting the extreme isolation of Timor within the Portuguese seaborne empire. But the isolation of the Governor was compounded by his own tenuous relations with the Dominicans, a rift which at first facilitated the progress of the rebels, although dissension in their ranks, would, in turn, offer advantage to the Portuguese.

Camnaee, one of the more influential and powerful kingdoms on the island, could thus draw upon support from numerous of the leading *regulos* from Serviao and Belu to join in a revolt against Portuguese authority. It was not until 1725, however, that the major act of rebellion occurred. This was triggered by the refusal of the *reinos* of Lolo Toe to pay the *fintas* to Joaquim de Matos. The Captain Major, in turn, was obliged to retreat to Batugede at risk of his life. Led by Camnaee, the *reinos* of Lemac Hutu, Cailaco, Leo-Hutu, Sanir Atsabe, Lei-Mean, Ai-Funaro, Diribate, Hermera, among others, joined in. According to colonial lore, these pagan *reino* then went over to a rampage destroying religious images along with churches, slaying two missionaries along with numerous Christian converts. In the event, Governor Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho left Timor in 1725 for Macau, having faced down the church, Francisco de Hornay's topasse rebellion, the Dutch (he protested to Batavia), and the Chinese, by sending several voyages to undercut Chinese sloops working the sandal trade. From Goa he published a report on Timor, *A Ilha de Timor em 1726*".²⁶

This perilous situation for the Portuguese prevailed until the arrival from Larantuca of incoming Governor Antonio Moniz de Macedo in 1725. He sought a meeting with the rebels to obtain their submission, while at the same time took stock of the beleaguered colony's defences. By the time he arrived in Timor, however, the *reis* of Serviao, Camnaee, and Belos had taken up arms, obliging Lamac Hitu and Cailaco to fall in line. Moniz de Macedo then proceeded to punish the rebels charging Goncalo de Magalhaes, Captain-Major of the province, to launch attacks on rebel positions in order to force their retreat deep into the mountains. It was then decided to attack Cailaco, considered the rebel headquarters.

According to Basilio de Sa, Portuguese historian of this rebellion, there were two reasons why the chiefs of Cailaco persisted with the rebellion; first, their certainty that all the neighbouring *reinos* would lend support and second, the myth of the impregnable "Pedras de Cailaco", a reference to the *pedras* or natural rock fortress or protection offered Cailaco by the formidable escarpments rising to 2000 metres altitude. Cailaco at the time of the battle, took its name from the principal *reino* of this region located athwart the central cordillera dividing the island from north from south. This was described as a kingdom of 40,000 inhabitants standing in "sovereign isolation" and dominating the Marabo valley, the source of three northern flowing rivers, the Marabo, the Lau-Heli (Lamaquitos), and the Lois.²⁷

To assault Cailaco, the Portuguese commenced to concentrate their forces in Batugede under the command of Joaquim de Matos, drawing upon support from the Laratuqueiros and other forces arriving from Serviao. By the end of October 1726, the Portuguese massed their forces at the foot of Cailaco Mountain. From Dili

already a part of the call of the Portuguese, another force advanced on Cailaco on 23 October via the heights of Ermera under the command of Goncalo de Magalhaes, making up a combined force on the Portuguese side of 4,000 loyal tribesmen. This force also included a company of Sica forces under the command of Sergeantmajor Lucas da Cunha. In the face of a "heroic" resistance of 40 days by the defenders, and assisted by fortuitous torrential rains, the Portuguese forces were obliged to break off the encirclement. On December the military campaign against Cailaco ended with the return to their respective reino of loyalist forces.²⁸

From another account, on 13 January 1727, certain of the rei, among them one Dom Aleixo, conceded defeat, swore allegiance to the Portuguese, and commenced to pay fintas. ²⁹

It is important, as Basilio de Sa highlights, to view the "conspiracy" of the House of Camnasse and the revolt of Cailaco as part of a "prolonged and persistent revolt" running from 1719 to 1769 when the decision was made to abandon Lifau for Dili.³⁰

Indeed, according to de Castro, by 1731 the rebels were still master of all places on the coast of Timor with the single exception of Lifau and Manatuto and within an ace of throwing out the invader and restoring their ancient empires of Sonobai, Menace (?) and Nayale (?). ³¹

In any case, it was not until 19 September 1731 that Camnace sued for peace.³²

While this assertion remains undocumented and while it is difficult to envisage a return to a pristine past or the part of any number of loose coalitions of Timorese reinos at that stage, especially because of the dominance of the topasse and their monopoly of the lucrative sandal trade, it is certainly the case that the Portuguese were on the ropes and fighting.

This is a specific reference to the plight of incoming Governor Colonel Pedro de Mello (1729-31), who arrived in Timor from Macau with a force of 50 European and Macanese troops. Evidently given the brief to explore further east and pacify the coastal littoral, Pedro de Mello pushed towards Manatuto via Dili, arriving on 18 October 1730. In Dili he failed to dislodge local tribes people in revolt, and, on 13 January 1731, barely succeeded in breaking out of an 85 days siege of Manatuto that saw his men reduced to foraging. In this defence he faced off a massed attack by 15,000 Timorese, albeit inflicting some losses on the enemy before making good his temporary exit to Lifau.³³

Pedro de Mello's own account of this siege survives in the form of a three-page illuminated letter written in the Governor's hand and dated 20 February 1731, reino of Manatuto, "province of Bellos in Timor". Despite suffering grave losses of men and materials, Pedro de Mello nevertheless won certain allies from among the chiefs in this pioneering act of conquest in the hitherto neglected eastern part of the island, an action which no doubt psychologically prepared the Portuguese for the shift of capital from Lifau to Dili, and the shift of the centre of gravity of the colony from Serviao in the west to Belos in the east that would occur some half century later.³⁴

Overall, then, the Cailaco rebellion merits attention for several reasons, not only as an example of "heroic" defence on the part of the reinos of central Timor against the injustice of paying fintas, a stand kept up until the very seat of government was relocated from Lifau to Dili, but also because it is, in the words of a Basilio de Sa, one of the few "abundantly and minutely documented episodes in the history of Timor". ³⁵

It is also superbly and graphically illustrated in the "Planta de Cailacao" still preserved in metropolitan archives. Dating from 1727, the authorship of the "Cailacao map" remains unknown but is believed to have been executed by a Canarim or Goanese, then much in demand as scribes and illustrators. A veritable Bayeux p1'apestry of running guerrilla battles, the artist offers graphic representation of village stockades decorated by decapitated heads, mountain defence systems of the Timorese, Portuguese tranqueiras or fortresses under the Cross of Christ flag, as well as period costumes and such details as grazing horses and birds in flight. Joaquim de Matos is also shown in the thick of battle along with his troop of moradores. As such, the Cailaco map stands as a unique pictorial reproduction of the scene of battle and the modes of warfare of this distant age. We can also observe from the Cailaco map, that, unlike the Portuguese-enlisted forces, Larantuqueiros included, indigenous Timorese forces had yet to acquire the matchlocks introduced to the archipelago by their antagonists 200 years prior. Replete with portugalized toponyms the pedras and the rivers are well identified.

Ruy Cinatti has commented that the map also stands as a unique document in which to assay the botany of Timor as it was in a past age. Notable, in this sense, are the depictions of casuarinas along riverine zones, varieties of palm trees and acacias on open savannah landscape, with tamarinds, pandanus and fig trees

represented in zones of secondary forest.³⁶

The Siege of Lifau (1769)

While we have passed comment upon the sorry state of Lifau as described by Dampier in 1699, it nevertheless represented the major outpost of the Estado da India on Timor in an ecclesiastical and governmental sense. As described, the "praca" or establishment at Lifau consisted of a fort constructed of dried stones supporting a small artillery, literally surviving in the absence of outside assistance upon fimas the form of foodstuffs supplied by loyal regulos. But when Governor Pedro de Mello regressed to Lifau in early 1731 following his near debacle in Manatuto, he found the establishment guarded by a single company of soldiers, facing off a siege on all sides by topasse power allied to rebellious Timorese reinos. Such were the extreme privations of the garrison that they survived on "roots, leaves and pulverized horse bones." In these sad conditions, continues de Castro, the decision was made to embark all baggage, and artillery and to set fire to the place leaving it to the rebels while relocating the seat of government to some more propitious location. Happily, writes de Castro, the timely arrival in Lifau from Macau of Governor Pedro de Rigo Barreto da Gama e Castro (1731-34) changed this course of affairs. The arrival of governors it should be remembered, inevitably involved a change of guard and the replenishment of supplies. Lifau was both restored and spared, at least temporarily. ³⁷

It is of great interest that Governl10r da Gama e Castro then set sail for Dili, where, following up the contacts made by his predecessor, entered into negotiations with rebel Chiefs. Moving on to Manatuto, the governor revived the garrison and, by his presence, stiffened the resistance to the rebels in that isolated but strategic outpost. Manatuto, which by this stage evidently hosted some kind of religious or church presence also sent an envoy to Dili to enter into negotiations with the rebel chief Francisco Fernandes Vaerella, otherwise known as Captain-Major and Lieutenant-Superior of Serviao.³⁸

From this name and grandiloquent title we can assume that this person represented topasse power. Impatient with the delay in negotiations, the governor departed Manatuto for Lifau where his presence was obviously required, but not before visiting Batugede, earlier abandoned ahead of the rebellions. Putting "temerity ahead of prudence", the governor made landfall and sued the local rebel leader, D. Lourenco da Costa, to pay his respects to the representative of the Crown in return for a pledge to redress the grievances which led to the alienation of this evidently Christianized topasse leader. Da Costa obeyed. Evidently literate, he demanded to see the patent of governorship. Satisfied, he swore fidelity. According to de Castro it was this event which neutralized the revolt proving the worth of Governor da Gama e Castro's strategy of carrot (negotiations) and stick (force of arms) Style of doing business. Still, in September the same year, he faced down an outbreak of rebellion in Varella assisted by Vermassee. A peace pact signed on 16 March 1732 offered the governor only a short-lived reprieve as, from this date onwards, numerous other acts of rebellion sundered the peace, in familiar pattern. ³⁹

Among other incidents besetting the stability of Lifau mentioned by de Castro was the act of poisoning Governor Dionisio Galvao Rebello (1760-66) by Francisco d'Hornay, Antonio da Costa, de Quintino da Conceicao and Lourenco de Mello, stand out. More the pity this act is not better documented, but we know from the Sarzedas document that, with the death of the Governor on 8 November 1766, de Hornay took over. Three years later he would be master of Lifau. In any case, it is noteworthy that, in the two years period between 1766 and 1768 before the new-and final governor in Lifau-could arrive, Lifau was governed by the Dominican friars Antonio de Boaventura and Jose Rodriques Pereira. Whether or not this loss of prestige on the part of the Crown owed to the ad interim government of the Dominicans, as de Castro suggests, in fact this was the situation confronted by the incoming governor in 1769. ⁴⁰

Undoubtedly the ascendancy of Francisco d'Hornay, the topasse raja of Oecusse, supported by his relative Antonio d'Hornay, augured ill for Portuguese power in Lifau, especially after the reported reunion of the two topasse chiefs in Malacca in 1766 and their pledge to expel the Portuguese from Timor. While they had no immediate success in this goal, especially as the rajas of Belu were, alternatively, engaged in fighting both the Dutch and the Portuguese, there was no question that the Portuguese were highly vulnerable in Lifau. Only the reino of Manatuto offered help to Lifau in the form of men and provisions, undoubtedly a reassuring factor behind the decision to abandon Lifau for the east.

While we have commented upon the establishment of a church in Manatuto in an early period, it would be

relevant to assay the state of the missions in the east, as the winning of rei vassalos usually went hand in hand with the success of the church. From a letter written in 1752 by D. Fr. Geraldo de Sao Joseph, Bishop of Malacca and Timor, we learn that, besides Lifau and Manatuto, churches were then established in Animata, a former site of the Cailaco rebellion, Tullicao, also in Serviao, Vemassey (Vemace) and Lalaya (Lalea), both east of Manatuto and Cagruium (?), Laculo (Laclo) and Lacora (Laicora) between Dili and Manatuto.

No doubt this was an improvement upon the situation faced at the height of the Cailaco rebellion when the missions were almost decimated, but, as the Bishop lamented, the baleful influence of barlaque and other "superstitions" proved a major check on missionization. The Bishop duly drew up a "minimal plan" for conversions, targeted at teaching children the basics of the Holy Creed and the sign of the cross. 41

Certainly, as de Freycinet commented, in certain circumstances the Timorese proved themselves loyal, as opposed to hostile, to the Portuguese presence. He cites the case of Governor Vicento Ferreira de Carvalho who, in 1759, imprudently sold Lifau to the Dutch. But, when the Dutch sought to establish their presence in the territory, namely via the agency of von Pluskow, they were, in turn, met by a show of arms by the local raja and population who assassinated the hapless agent of the Company, while taking it upon themselves to restore Lifau to the newly arrived Portuguese Governor from Goa.42

This would have been Dionisio Goncalves Rebelo Galvao (1760-66) who arrived the following year, temporarily superseding the authority of Francisco de Hornay. But, in another account, the hero of defence of Lifau against Dutch "adventurers" advancing from Kupang was Governor Sebastiao de Azevedo e Brito, a future lieutenant colonel of the brigade in Goa who replaced Ferreira de Carvalho.43

In any case, with the assassination of von Pluskow by the topasse in Lifau, the Dutch resigned themselves to what would transpire as a long-standing policy of non-interference in the affairs of either the Portuguese or the topasse. 44

After a two years absence a new governor was appointed in Lifau. This was Antonio Jose Teles de Meneses (1768-75). Such was the desperate food situation confronting the new Governor in Lifau that, in 1769, he requested the Senate in Macau to dispatch 1000 picos of rice and even a quantity of cooking utensils.

Although Macau responded by dispatching the Santa Catarina, this ship got way laid on business and did not make it to Lifau. The Governor made another desperate appeal to Macau. Otherwise all communications were cutoff with the interior.

Beset by intrigues mounted by the topasse forces of Francisco d'Hornay in league with local chiefs, and finding the city encircled by the rebels and the Fortaleza in weakened condition, Governor Teles de Meneses made the fateful decision to abandon Lifau to the rebels. This was effected on the night of 11 August 1769. Taking advantage of the presence offshore of the S. Vicente and the Santa Rosa which had arrived from Macau, the entire settlement comprising 1,200 inhabitants, over half of whom were women and children, were evacuated by sea to Dili. Baggage and all war materials were also loaded. But in abandoning the west to the rebels the party took the opportunity to stop over on the way to Dili at Batugede where the fort was strengthened. The party duly arrived in Dili on 10 October thus founding a new capital and bringing don a chapter in the early Portuguese settlement of Timor. While Lifau faded into obscurity, Dili has remained the capital ever since. 45

While, in Boxer's phrase, this eastward transfer of the capital represented the "nadir of Portuguese power on the island", 46

It is only true in the sense of abandoning the west to the topasse and the sandal trade to the Chinese working out of Kupang and later Atapupu. Yet, it can also be interpreted as a new beginning. Such a strategic shift of capital may have been reconnoitred decades earlier. Dampier was told of small harbour 14 leagues east of Lifau called Ciccale. This was described as having a narrow entrance open to the northerly winds between two rock ledges, one east one west, dry at low water. This could only have been an allusion to Dili's drying reef and secure harbour.47

De Castro writes of the move from Lifau, that Dili in 1769 offered certain advantages. It was a more secure port, at least offering the natural defence of coral reefs, and in that sense superior to Lifau, Oecusse, Batugede, Manatuto, Laga and even Kupang and Atapupu. It was also sheltered from strong winds from the west and east.

Also, being situated on a vast plain, there was sufficient space for the cultivation of rice necessary to feed

the population.⁴⁸

Crucially, Dili's location on an open plain offered a natural defence against the local inhabitants. In any case, European armies preferred open spaces rather than rough terrain.

But with the desertion of Lifau in 1769, as witnessed by the visiting French ensign F.E. de Rosily three years later, real power had passed into the hands of Francisco d'Hornay and Domingos da Costa. The de facto partitioning of the island between the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the two topasse bosses is confirmed by de Rosily's revelation that topasse authority extended along the coast from "two leagues east of Touloucoita up to ten leagues from Kupang amounting to 25 or 30 leagues of coastline and at the same time are deeply entrenched on land; they also control several ports between them including the best and most frequented, namely Laphau and Coucy...These two kings obey no other authority...they are independent".⁴⁹

Some 15 years earlier, in 1755, the visiting French commander Pierre Poivre had also commented upon the independence of the topasse vis-a-vis the Portuguese, especially in the way in which they tolerated the presence in Lifau of a large-undoubtedly seasonal-Macassar colony, also engaged in the sandal trade.⁵⁰ During colonial times Pante Macassar was the name given to the major settlement in Oecusse located several kilometres east of the historic Lifau site and running parallel with the beach or pantai, as it is known in Malay.

Conclusion

The emergence of a new source of power around a creolized group has no parallel in this hemisphere although, as mentioned, might in a sense be compared to the slave rebellion of Haiti leading to the establishment of a Republic. Yet there are significant differences as well. The topasse of the remote oceanic island were hardly influenced by the message of the French revolution. Theirs was an opportunistic push against both the Portuguese and the Timorese in the quest for a new local equilibrium of power, commensurate with their intermediary role as cultural brokers, as interpreters between two disparate cultures - the peoples of the eastern archipelago and the European - and to restore their status as key brokers with the Chinese and the Dutch in the sandal trade. The great rebellions of the eighteenth century also coincided with a period when the influence of the Church was in decline, a situation that would not be reversed until well into the next century.

While inter-ethnic warring, slave-raiding and head-hunting had long antecedents in Timor society, the precipitous entry into Timor of outsiders-topasse as much European-from the seventeenth century onwards provoked strong resistance by those whose lives were most disrupted, namely indigenous Timorese. Unlike Goa or Malacca, where the conquest of a Sultanate or sophisticated power structure disrupted local tributary arrangements, and where the Portuguese substituted themselves as sovereign masters, and unlike the case of Macau where the Portuguese ingratiated themselves to local Chinese mandarins and the Chinese trade-tributary system through bribery, later institutionalized as ground-rent, the case of Timor was far more African. By this is meant that, in the real absence of a single dominating system of state power -not even Wehale- the conquest or incorporation of one tribal lineage or raja left many other tribal and speech groups on the outside.

Again, while this view of history may have its attractions, there is no sense that rebellion was coordinated across the island, just as there was no one Timor nation in the seventeenth century. Timorese did not speak a common language, there were no books, high priests or centralized kingship Capable of organizing concerted resistance. Yet fierce organized resistance on a local or even regional level, as illustrated by the fly in amber representation of the Cailaco rebellion, was a characteristic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One question that requires further research is that of the acquisition of military skills and technology on the part of the topasse who, as seen, fought alongside the Portuguese at Cailaco but turned upon them at Lifau. Were these scions of Portuguese sailors and merchants privy to foreign military methods, and, equally, were they able in close battle to match firelocks against firelocks which gained increasing currency as trade items in the archipelago by the eighteenth Century?

There is a real sense then that the symbolic links on the part of the topasse with the Portuguese crown, even if their drive for independence often put them at loggerheads with the Portuguese locally, actually enabled the Estado da India to uphold its presence in Timor long after they were expelled from other parts of the

archipelago. This we have seen was achieved by the balancing role played by the topasse between the native Timorese rulers, the Dutch, the Chinese and even the Macassans in the struggle for Control over the sandalwood trade. At this time we can say that the island of Timor was split between three powers, Portuguese in the northeast, the Dutch in the southwest, and the topasse in the north central part of the island in control of sandalwood as the key resource.⁵¹

Notes

1. David Lopes, *Expansão da Língua Portuguesa no Oriente nos séculos XVI, XVII e XVIII*, Portucalense Editora, Porto, 1969.
2. For the etymology of the term, see *Oxford English Dictionary* (2nd edition), Vol. XVIII, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959.
3. P.F.J. Pieris and M.All. Fitzler, *Ceylon and Portugal*, Verlag der Asia Major, Leipzig, 1927, p. 53
4. Gabriel Quiroga de San Antonio, *Brave et Viridique Relation des Evénements du Cambodge*, S. Pablo de Valladolid, 1604 (Paris, 1914), p. 184..
5. See Appendix V, "The Japanese in Malacca" in C.R. Boxer, "The Affairs of the Madre de Deus", *Insights and Proceedings of the Japan Society*; Vol. XXVI, 1928-29, p. 84.
6. Fjnglebur Kaempfer, *The History of Japan*, London, 1727, p. 31
7. Alexander Hamilton; *A New Account of the East Indies*, London (2 vols.), 1727 (1744).
8. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History* Longman, London, 1993, p. 210.
9. Boxer, "Portuguese Timor".
10. James Fox, "Forgotten, neglected but not peaceful: A History of Timor", Canberra Times, 27 November 1975, cited in Bill Nicol, *Timor: The Stillborn Nation*, Visa, Melbourne, 1978, p. 14.
11. Ibid.
12. William Dampier, *A Voyage to New Holland, etc in the Year 1699*, James and John Knapp, at the Crown in St. Paul's Churchyard, London, 1699, pp. 177-178.
13. See June Lombard-Jourdan, "Infortunes d'un Prince de Timor accueilli en France sous Louis XV", *Archipel*, Vol. 16, 1978, pp. 91-133 and Artur Teodoro de Matos, *Timor Portugues: 1515-1769*, *Contribuição para a sua História*, Instituto Histórico Infante Dom Henrique, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, 1974, pp. 395, 404.
14. Jill Lolliffe, *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1978, pp. 29-30.
15. Johan Nieuhof, *Voyages and Travels to the East Indies 1653-1670* (original English edition, London, 1704), reprinted with introduction by A. Reid, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1988.
16. R.G. Schulte Nordholt, *The Political System of the East Indies*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971, p. 31 cited in Jill Lolliffe, *East Timor*, pp. 30-31.
17. "Pastoral do Bispo de Malacca: D.Fr. Geraldo de Sao Joseph", 24 de Junho 1752, *BGF*, I, No.25, 31 Março 1865.
18. William Burton Sowash, "Colonial Rivalries in Timor", *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No.3, May 1948, p.232.
19. I.H. Doko, *Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Indonesia di Nusa Tenggara*, PN Balai Pustaka, Jakarta, 1981.
20. James J. Fox, *Law of the Palm: Ecological Change in Eastern Indonesia*, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1979 pp. 67-72.
21. Documento Sarzedas, Conde de Sarzedas - Vitorino Freire da Cunha Gusmao, 28 Abril 1811, in *Solor e Timor*, Agencia Geral das Colónias, Lisboa, 1943, pp. 138-169.
22. Affonso de Castro, *As possessões portuguesas na Oceania*, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 1867, pp. 58 & 68 and pp. 374-378.
23. Affonso de Castro, *As possessões*.
24. Yvette Lawson, "East Timor: Roots Continue to Grow", University of Amsterdam, 1989.
25. George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630-1754*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 181-183.
26. See Cunha Rivara, "A Ilha de Timor em 1726. Carta do Governador de Albuquerque Coelho ao V.

- Rey da India", Boletim do Governo do Estado da India, No.69, 1865, pp. 453-454, cited in C.R. Boxer, Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho (1652-1745), Tipografia da Imaculada Conceição de Macau, 1939.
27. Artur-Basilio de Sa, A Planta de Cailaco 1727: Valioso Documento para a História de Timor, Pelo Império, Lisboa, 1949, de Castro, As Possessões, p. 88 and see document by Antonio Jose Telles de Menezes, Dili, 31 Mar 1770.
28. O Documento Sarzedas.
29. Basilio de Sa, A Planta de Cailaco 1727.
30. Ibid.
31. de Castro, "Resume Historique...", pp. 470-471.
32. O Documento Sarzedas.
33. C. R. Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East 1550-1770, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1968, cited in Jolliffe, East Timor, p. 29 and see C.R. Boxer, "O Coronel Pedro de Melo e a Sublevação Geral de Timor em 1729-1731", Boletim Eclesiástico da Diocese de Macau, No.405, Dezembro de 1937, pp. 342-375.
34. This article reproduces the illuminated and signed letter sent by Governor Pedro de Mello from Manatuto.
35. de Sa, A Planta de Cailaco.
36. Ruy Cinatti Vaz Monteiro Gomes, Explorações Botânicas em Timor; Estudos, Ensaios e Documentos, Lisboa, 1950, pp. 13-14.
37. de Castro, "Resume Historique", pp. 471-473.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid, and see Documento Sarzedas.
41. Pastoral do bispo de Malacca D. Fr. Geraldo de São José, 24 de Junho 1752, BGFJI, No.25, 31 Março, 1865.
42. de Freycinet, Voyage, pp. 715-716. Also see J.J. Fox, The Flow of LLa. Essays on Eastern Timor, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 65. For a reference on the governor who sold Lifau to the Dutch, see A Auflora Macaense, Vol. 1, No.51, 1844.
43. "Relação do estado de Timor e das coisas que nelle passaram desde o anno de 1762 até o de 1769, mais especificada que a do cap. 1 do 2 tomo do Sistema Marcial Asiático", in Ibsi-Yang Kuo (Series II, Vol.III and IV), 1899-1900, pp. 8-9.
44. Jolliffe, East Timor, pp. 30-31.
45. "Mundanga da capital, de Lifau para Dili", Ofício do governador Antonio Jose de Meneses, de 31-31770 in de Castro, As possessões, reprinted as "Lugares Selectos da Bibliotheca Colonial Portuguesa", in Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias, No.54, Dezembro de 1929, pp. 132-136.
46. Boxer, "Portuguese Timor", p. 354.
47. Dampier, A Voyage to New Holland, p. 178.
48. de Castro, As Possessões.
49. Anne Lombard-Jourdan, "Un memoire inédit de F.Fj. Rosily sur l'île de Timor", Archipel, Vol.23, 1982, p. 93.
50. H. Cordier, "Relation abrégée des voyages faits par le sieur Poivre...", Revue de l'histoire des colonies françaises, t, 1918, pp. 60, cited in Lombard-Jourdan, Ibid.
51. Artur Teodoro de Matos, Na Rota das Especiarias: De Malacca a Australia, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, Lisboa, 1995, p. 128.

5

Dili: The Foundations

In the broader scheme of metropolitan developments it is clear that, unlike Goa and Macau, the distant oceanic colony of Timor was isolated in the extreme. Whereas Goa was to suffer the full consequences of the Inquisition during the reign of João V (1707-50),

Timor was spared. Even the long delayed news received in Timor of the precarious position of Portugal at the hands of Napoleon's armies and the flight of the Prince Regent to Brazil, seemed to have passed Timor by. Especially, there was no British takeover in Portuguese Timor as happened briefly in Macau in 1808 and, as mentioned, in Dutch Timor between 1811-16. No doubt, Dili as took the threat made in 1822 by the ascendant Liberals in Macau to suspend the annual subsidy to Timor very seriously, for most of the century the new establishment remained both vulnerable and dependent upon the Macau connection.

While the facts surrounding the foundation of Dili in October 1769, some 200 years after the pioneering actions by Dominicans in the Solor-Flores zone, and 100 years subsequent to the fortification of Lifau, are not well documented, we know that once established in the new praca or Capital of Dili, the Portuguese looked to fortifying their defences, not only against an external enemy, but also against the Timorese. As documented in this chapter, defences would have mattered little without diplomatic success on the part of the Portuguese in winning allies from among strategic liurai. No less, as this chapter argues, attempts to implant a colonial administration in the eastern part of the island in a period even prior to the establishment of the first British settlement in Australia, would have been doomed without the creation of a customs regime along with other governmental institutions in the endeavour to regain control over the island's trade that had, lamentably, slipped into the hands of Portugal's traditional rivals, the Dutch, the topasse and the Chinese.

Alliances

In a process which remains unelaborated, soon after the Portuguese planted their nag in Dili, some 42 reis made their way to the new capital to swear loyalty.¹ In one account, the key collaborating reino or regulo that made Governor Teles de Meneses' gambit possible were D. Felipe de Freitas Soares of Vermasse and D. Alexandre of Motael, the latter who offered temo or written terms of loyalty on the cession to the Portuguese Crown of what amounted to all the cultivable land on the Dili plain as far as the encircling mountains, along with wood for the construction of public buildings and men and horses to help defend Dili against external aggression.²

Although it is hard to document, there is no question as, discussed in the context of the topasse rebellion, that the survival of the Portuguese in this distant part of the archipelago rested at least as much upon their ability to strike alliances with local tributaries, the luirais or regulos in Timor, as upon their military prowess. Just which regulo, and how many regulos, is always difficult to reconstruct, as opinion varies between sources and over time. Notwithstanding the setback in Lifau and the earlier trials in Dili and Manatuto, it appears from all the evidence that Dili in the foundation period achieved more success in winning over allies from among the regulo than it did by mid-century when rebellion again became endemic. It may not just be a case of better documentation for the later period, but also a case of the withering of bonds created between the church and the regulos reaching back to the Dominicans. Compared to the early period, when the mission was established in Manatuto and even Viqueque, in the latter period, the church had virtually withdrawn itself to the "comforts" of Dili. Thus, former Governor Antonio Joaquim Garcia writing in 1870 observed that, whereas in 1776, 44 reinos paid taxes to the value of 23,000 pardaus (gold), during his term, a mere 23 reinos paid 2,000 florins.³

An anonymous memorial published in 1844 in the Macau newspaper, *Aurora Macaense*, is illuminating. Observing the Serviao-Belu distinction, this writer drew up a balance sheet on Dutch, Portuguese, and topasse power on the island in the decades following the shift to Dili. Maubara, in this account, was under the Dutch nag where, in 1756, a fort was constructed during the governorship of Manoel Doutel de Figueiredo Sarmento (1750-56).⁴

Within decades of the foundation of Dili, then, the Portuguese were masters of the northern coastal littoral from Batugede in the west to Lautem near the eastern extremity of the island. Equally, the Portuguese had won key allies in such interior locations as Motael, south of Dili; Dailor, south of Motael, along with Atsab and Maubesse; east and southeast of Dili, Ermera, Liquisa, and Leamean; west of Dili, Hera and Vermasse; and, on the frontier with Serviao, Cova and Balibo; and southeast of Dili across the cordillera, Somoro, Ijaeluta and Viqueque. But there were also many gaps in this system of alliances, notably on the south coast, and among many interior locations in the east.

The loyalty question, along with basic facts surrounding the establishment of the colony, was also

addressed in a long report on Timor drawn up by Bernardo Jose Maria de Lorena, count of Sarzedas and Governor of Goa (1807-16). This was addressed to incoming Governor Vitorino Flreire da Cunha Gusmao (1812-15) in an attempt to set the record right on what, as he learnt from the Goa archives, was a deplorable state of affairs in the Oceanic colony. Especially because of the loss of the Dili archives in 1779, the Sarzedas document, to which we shall refer in this chapter, represents the most complete account of this period. Governor de Castro also quoted it in his work.⁵

Not all rebellion was from the traditional enemy, however, but also stemmed from subordination within the ranks. Dili's second governor, Caetano de Lemos Telo de Meneses (1776-79), faced down a challenge from two Timorese and a Portuguese, presumably from within the military. As punishment, he had their private property confiscated and transferred to the fazenda or treasury. Goa was not amused at such arbitrariness and, in an order of 25 April 1779, had the unfortunate governor condemned to Mozambique where he died a *degradado* or banishee.⁶

It is unclear, but it is also possible that the unfortunate governor became embroiled in Church affairs, always at bursting point as, in 1777, when the Bishop of Macau fired a missive alleging scandalous behaviour on the part of the governor.⁷

Meneses was succeeded as governor on 15 June 1779 by Lourenco de Brito Correia (1779-82).

Reportedly, all *reinos* in the new colony were then at peace, with the exception of Luca, on the distant southeast coast in the region of Viqueque.⁸

Commencing in 1781, and continuing through the rule of Governor Jose Angelo de Almeida Soares (1782-85), revolt in Luca, also called the *guerra de loucas* or war of the *doidas* or mad, was led by a so-called prophet or *maniaco* (lit. mad) who deemed himself invulnerable. As described by de Castro, leading a "rude, ignorant and superstitious people", he marched on Viqueque. Contemporaneous with the Senobai rebellion against the Dutch in west Timor, this rebellion was only successfully crushed by Governor Joao Baptista Vieira Godinho (1785-88).⁹

The first governor at Dili to win some apparent success in forming alliances with local *reinos* in the conflict against the Dutch, Godinho was deemed a good governor by the standards of the time, especially as he was responsible for winning back Lifau into the fold. This superior act of diplomacy was accomplished by arranging a meeting on Solor with Lt. General Pedro Hornay, to give him his state conferred title, and his nephew, Dom Constantino do Rosario, the *rei* of Solor.

Although Portugal did not then have a permanent official presence on Solor, the latter pledged his loyalty to Portugal, offered help to defend Dili, and usefully offered to support the new colony with provisions. In the opinion of the count of Sarzedas, Godinho's retirement the following year and replacement with an interim governor arriving from Goa was a matter of regret.¹⁰

Incoming Governor Joaquim Xavier de Morais Sarmento (1790-94) encountered rebellion in all the *reinos* of Belos. While it is unlikely that generalized revolt on such a large scale actually occurred, in 1778 Belu and Manatuto revolted and, in 1790, it was the turn of Maubara and Senobai. The Manatuto affair saw the church along with a group of Timorese rebels, including, D. Matias Soares, Boaventura Soares Doute1, and Francisco Soares Doute1, a group of possibly Christianized *illustrados* or *literates*, squared off against Governor Feliciano Antonio Nogueira Lisboa (1788-90), who had imprudently resorted to force in the attack on Manatuto. In this obscure affair, D. Mateus Soares threatened a complete "sedition" by Belu. Francisco Lulls da Cunha, the ecclesiastical authority in Manatuto, was obliged to flee to Batavia by ship, and the governor replaced. In any case, incoming Governor Sarmento arriving from Goa restored order.¹¹ Information is limited but, according to the Sarzedas document, Governor Jose Vicente Soares da Veiga (1804-07) took the almost unprecedented action of sending a rebel Timorese into exile. This was D. Felipe de Freitas, the bastard son of the *rei* of Vemasse, who was sent to Goa.¹²

By the new century, the *reino* of Motael, south of Dili, had risen as a powerful independent force and, when Governor Vitorino da Freire da Cunha Gusmao arrived in Dili in 1811, he found the administration split in two, between the *liurai* of Motael and the church in Manatuto.¹³

While we do not know the specific causes of these last mentioned rebellions, sequels to the war of the *doidos* recurred, just as the messianic theme in rebellions in Timor has recurred until the present age.

In the absence of more nuanced Portuguese documentation on relations with the *reino*, the detailed schema on "kingdoms of the island of Timor", as drawn up by de Freycinet in 1818, is illuminating. This schema identifies *reinos* according to those under, respectively; Portuguese sovereignty (23), those deemed

"tributary" (24), and those deemed "allied" (18) over 200 years. Again, as with the earlier list of reinos, certain are obscure as to name and location. In any case, this list is of great interest, both in offering up the nomenclature of reinos, albeit yet to be standardized in print, and in revealing the early divisioning of the island between colonialisms, important if we are to arrive at an understanding of the development of Timorese identity or identities. Freycinet's list also shows the longevity of certain of these reinos, and how certain lost rank, were superseded, or disappeared into the Dutch sphere of influence owing to their peripheral location, or as a result of future territorial struggles between the Dutch and the Portuguese. De Freycinet offers only five kingdoms then dependent upon Holland, some of them obscure, but certain of considerable extent; namely, Amanubang, Amarassi, Anfoan, Bacannassi, Kupang, Muni and Stolo.¹⁴ Although, as noted below, the visiting Frenchman de Rosily claimed to have seen a citadel in Dili in 1772, this was probably the remains of the first earthen wall constructed by Governor Teles de Meneses, as it was not until 22 September 1796 that an order was given to construct a fortaleza in Dili. This was under Governor Joao Baptista Vesquaim (1784-1800). Two reasons were given for this initiative to be facilitated with the assistance of loyal reis and at the expense of the Fazenda Real or royal treasury. First, the Maubara and Sonobai - to whom the Dutch had offered powder - were in full rebellion against certain rei vassalo of Portugal, and second, Dili was deemed vulnerable to attack from, variously, the French, Dutch, and British, especially as the latter had recently taken over Banda and Amboina as part of British takeover of Dutch possessions in the archipelago during the Napoleonic interregnum. Although Kupang was temporarily reprieved when, in 1799, armed slaves and tribesmen drove out the British occupiers, Governor Jose Joaquim de Sousa (1800-04) saw to it that a tranqueira of loose stone with clay bulwarks was constructed in Dili, fortified with cannon of various calibre. At this time, the military was reorganized into three companies, the Guarda, the Fortaleza de S. Francisco, and S. Domingos.¹⁵

While, as seen, the Portuguese were hard put to win enduring allies from among the Timorese, much less the topasse, they were successful in co-opting a (mostly) loyal cadre of mercenary forces. From the time of the founding of Lifau, these forces comprised three elements; the moradores or civilian military forces, the Bidau, and the Sica. The Bidau and Sica originated, respectively, from Solor and Sica on Flores drawn from Christianized elements also intermarried with Goans and Africans most probably, as discussed below, drawn from the colony's slave population. The Bidau resided over long time in the suburb of that name in Dili as a cohesive group speaking a distinctive Portuguese creole. Equally, a Company of moradores based in Manatuto enabled the Portuguese to maintain control over this important centre over long time.

Ordinarily, these forces received no stipend or even armaments but were called up in time of war.¹⁶ At the time of de Freycinet's visit, the colony also deployed a number of regular soldiers, comprised in part of Europeans and cipayes or sepoyes from India, reinforced by native conscripts supplied by the rajas along with the moradores. Of the officer Cadre, 50 to 60 strong, certain resided permanently in Dili, while others were posted to outlying regions.

De Freycinet mentions 40 military posts spread out along the coast, in addition to a camp d'observation in the interior manned by 2,000 native forces under Portuguese officers for the purpose of neutralizing any Dutch ambitions. The Calibre and effectiveness of the colony's defenses, however, was somewhat called into question by the state of Dili's fortifications, described as highly vulnerable with cannon in bad condition. Owing to a chronic shortage of personnel, many of the lower ranks of the administration were actually staffed by deportados from Goa. ¹⁷

The Rise of Commerce

The northeastern parts of Timor along with Dili were observed in 1772 or a couple of years after the shift from Lifau by F.E. de Rosily then a young ensign on board a French voyage of discovery in the Indian Ocean led by Captain Saint-Allouarn. Dili, he observed, was the seat of the Governor "with around 40 whites, Indians and many sepoyes, most of whom originated from Goa and Mozambique". Dili, he commented, had already established a citadel and was the seat of a bishop, in addition to a military commander and "religious commissioner" at Manatuto. In fact, as de Rosily observed, all the villages along the coast hosted a church. He also commented upon the presence in Manatuto of a "commandant Chinois de Macau" and "sindic et agent de commerce des Portugueses", a reference to the Capitao China or Chinese community leader. The currency then in use, was the Indo-Portuguese pardao, ¹⁸

the gold coin introduced into Solor and Timor by the Dominicans.

It is not sure how many Chinese were among Governor Teles de Meneses' evacuation but, gradually, small colonies of Chinese developed under, variously, Dutch and Portuguese protection in Kupang, Lifau, and, with the shift of capital, Dili.

The activities of the Macau-based traders and the character of the sandalwood trade at various uncontrolled points along the coast led to the first permanent settlement by Chinese in Timor. As Ormeling describes it, always involving "lengthy preliminary discussions with native rulers". By 1775 a distinct Chinese quarter was established in Kupang, with the food trade controlled by the Chinese. Later, the Chinese moved inland from Kupang and Atapupu as travelling traders. With time, some 300 Chinese families of mostly Macau origin, spread out over Kupang, Atapupu and Dili, came to dominate Timor's entire import-export trade, especially in sandalwood destined for China via Macassar and beeswax destined for the Javanese batik industry, but also in demand by Chinese who used it in the manufacture of candles. Through the first half of the nineteenth century there were still signs of direct trade between the Chinese living in Kupang and their native Macau. Notably, the annual Macau-Dili vessel still called regularly at Kupang bringing provisions for the Chinese.¹⁹

In fact, de Rosily observed two Portuguese vessels from Macau in Dili harbour during his sojourn. Each was of 300 tons. Arriving in March they returned in late June having taken on sandal, honey and a few slaves.²⁰

It is clear that the rise of the Chinese connection served to make the venerable Goa connection with Timor and Flores increasingly tenuous. Owing to the interventions and jealousies of Macau, Dili ceased to be in direct shipping communication with Goa after 1790 and thereafter all official communication with the Estado da India, which did not fully relinquish its jurisdiction over Timor until late the following century, passed through Macau. From this time on, governors, judges, soldiers, and other officials appointed by India arrived in Timor after the long circuitous passage via Macau.

Indeed, from 1811, Goa progressively ordered the Leal Senado of Macau to advance funds to cover Timor in six areas, namely, war material, such as gunpowder transported from Goa; support for the Dominican mission to the amount of 750 taels (of silver) annually; further support to the church in Timor derived from the fruits of a lottery established in Macau in May 1810; a 1000 pataca advance to governors, commencing with the appointment of Governor Freire de Gusmao (1811); payment of official travel expenses along with expenses incurred by deportados; and, crucially, for the viability of the colonial administration, commencing in 1820, Macau was required to offer a 6,000 pataca annual subsidy in support of the Timor colony.²¹

The problems of early colonisation in Timor were not entirely lost upon the Portuguese world, at least in Macau where Timor was best understood. The Aurora Macaense report also offered certain critical observations and recommendations, especially over the practice of dumping its most incorrigible, uncouth, and uneducated convicts in the new colony, a practice that commenced during the Lifau period. According to the report, these individuals included those guilty of serious crimes and otherwise lacking "honour". While, acknowledging the importance of the garrison provided by Goa, the report also called for officer graduates and missionaries of good calibre if Timor was to be lifted from its low base. Also observing that the missions on Solor and Larantuca had been practically abandoned, it urged the restoration of these outposts through the provision of new shipping lines that should also be extended to the south coast of Timor. The report also strongly argued for assistance from Macau in the form of commerce, immigration, agriculture, stonemasons, and shipwrights.²²

In part, it is clear that this report answered back at Governor Teles de Meneses' retrograde act of suppressing the inter-island trade conducted by the missionaries, a decree still in force at the time of de Freycinet's visit. As the Frenchman commented, the prohibition prevented the Timorese from using the mission ships for their trading activities thus obliging them to treat with the Dutch and the Macassans to the great disadvantage of Dili.²³

As the Aurora Macaense report concluded, only the revival of the missions would succeed in winning over the vacillating regulos on Timor, thus fending off the depredations of both the Dutch and the Macassans. But, in this scenario, Macau would have to pay the bill until trade paid the colony's way. ²⁴

We learn from the Goa archives that, by 1813, Dili's (non-native) population had increased to 1,768 persons or 40 per cent over the statistic for the 1770s (750 persons of whom 375 were slaves). According to Baus,

this statistic included 688 African slaves or 38 per cent of the population. Although we have not seen other evidence of this African component of Dili society, it is also true, as Bauss confirms, that the Portuguese slave trade across and beyond the Indian Ocean involved the transportation of 200 to 250 Mozambiquan slaves annually until 1830.²⁵

By mid-century, however, in large part owing to the Macau connection, Timor began to attract a settled community of free emigrants. While the practice of sending *degradados* from Macau to Timor goes back to the early years of the foundation of Dili (the archival record mentions one case in 1803), the latter category numbered those who had already served their time.

As seen in a following chapter, numerous observers would applaud the contribution made by the Chinese community to Timor's development.

Beginning with Governor Joao Baptista Vieira Godinho (1785-88), Dili tried in vain to abolish the sandal monopoly held by Macau. This governor supported an open trade between Timor and Goa as Timor imported goods from Batavia which could just as well be imported from Goa. Timor, on the other hand, exported goods much in demand in India, including tobacco, "superior to American and similar to Virginia".

He also cited such promising trade commodities then available in Timor as saltpetre, canella, tobacco, nutmeg, copper and oil. In any case, it is probable that, from 1768, the annual voyage from Macau to Timor was temporarily suspended owing to the insurrection at Lifau. By 1785, however, the Dili customs authority was established, theoretically giving Timor full control over this important source of state revenues. Such control was important as, by the end of the century, the wages of the Governor and officials were paid out of custom's revenues derived from Dili. This new dispensation evidently encouraged certain Portuguese and Armenian families, alongside Chinese, to set up business in Dili. In short time customs posts were established at various points on the north coast either under Portuguese rule, or to signal Portuguese rule to those who might have reason to doubt.²⁶ Even so, it was not until 15 June 1799 under Governor Jose Anselmo Soares that a *Fazenda Real* was established in Dili.

The Sarzedas document gives some idea of the relative volumes of trade in the early decades of Dili. Measured in *paradaus*, customs receipts on wine and tax paid in money and kind amounted to 24\$530, 66 avos in 1793-94 and 38\$244, 74 avos the following year. But by 1808-10 the amount collected was even less and only 16 *reinos* were actually paying *fintas*. The document records vastly diminished returns on extraction of sandal during governorship of Antonio de Mendonca Corte Real (1807-10). This owed to two factors, first the interruptions occasioned by Sonbai's war against the *reino* of Oculosi and, second, as also discussed below, the predatory actions of English whaling ships in local waters in capturing all voyages of commerce, whether Dutch, Macassan or Chinese.²⁷

As all imports into Timor and all exports from the colony were channeled via Dili and, from 1830-41, through customs posts at Cutababa, Lamessane, and Metinara, and, as the colony was dependent upon custom's revenues to help defray official salaries, it can be said that, overall, customs revenues represented barometer of the colony's economic health. Although government income was supplemented by *fintas* imposed upon *reinos* vassalos, the amounts actually collected from this source were largely insignificant even through until the end of the century. Figures published in de Castro's study (customs revenues in Dili reveal that, from 1830 until 1837 there was actually a diminution of receipts (from 9,559 rupiahs to 3,957 rupiahs), but 1838 saw a quadrupling over the previous year to 11,804 rupiahs rising to 21,598 rupiahs in 1841. This erstwhile mini-boom was followed by a slump in the 1840s, which, as shown in a following chapter, would represent the nadir for the colony, and an abyss from which it would only emerge in the late 1850s with the successful adaptation of the coffee industry to Timor under Governor de Castro, and his immediate predecessor *Jul's* Augusto de Almeida Macedo (1856-59). It should be mentioned that, as with other Portuguese colonies, Timor was declared open to foreign shipping in 1844. The "free port" status of Dili, notwithstanding, most imports into Timor were Subject to a 6 per cent *ad valorem* tax, while exports were subject to a 5 per cent tax.²⁸

In the period before Timor was developed as a plantation economy, what products produced in Timor were then in world or regional demand and, indeed, what trade products entered Timor as items of consumption? De Rosily offers that the products most in demand were, besides cloth, firearms, powder and sabres traded against slaves, horses, buffaloes, honey and sandal. Key brokers in these exchanges were the Macassans who arrived in Oecusse every two years in their *ptl2uhs* of 20-30 tons. Trade paces for firearms were two

buffaloes or one good horse for one rime. The Frenchman also recorded the presence of coffee and sugar cane, albeit grown au naturel.²⁸

Writing some decades later, de Freycinet offers the following list of trade items in Timor; slaves, up to 100 piastres for a woman, according to beauty, one third of that for a man; cane sold to Goa in 1799; leather and a certain amount of copper exported from Dili to Macau; cachalot and especially ambergris, much sought after by English and American whalers; bamboo; exported to China; tobacco; grown to supply the needs of foreign vessels, along with fruits, corn, rice and fresh vegetables; trepang; a small quantity collected at Kupang, along with rattan and bird's nests; honey; great quantities exported; salt; long an article of trade; buffalo skins and live animals, including buffalos and horses all exported. Certain other potential export products such as sago and cotton were for local consumption only.³⁰

Crawfurd, writing in 1820 and drawing on information gathered during his period as British Resident to the court of the Sultan of Java, emphasizes the importance of three key trade items from Timor in the archipelago-wide trade. The first was sandalwood, which fetched a price in Java of 8 to 13 Spanish dollars or 45 per cent cheaper than that of Malabar and exported to the Java and the China market at a volume of not under 8,000 piculs. The second was bees' wax, collected naturally at the expense of the honey. The annual quantity of wax exported from Portuguese ports in Timor was 20,000 piculs sold for five Spanish dollars a picul and destined for markets in Bengal and China. Third, was whale-fishery, a reference to the seas around "the Spice islands, and particularly towards Timor, and that part of the Pacific Ocean which lies between the Archipelago and New Holland, [and where] the Cachelot or Spennaceti whale abounds". Evoking the picture drawn in Melville's classic *Moby-Dick* on the activities of roving searchers after cachelot in the narrow Straits between the islands of the eastern archipelago, Crawfurd mentions that during the British interregnum in the Moluccas, between ten and twelve English ships would put in annually at Dili port to re-provision.³¹

Writing half a century later, de Castro observed that of the 50 to 60 ships entering Timor ports annually, most were whalers, and most vessels were Australian and American. None were Portuguese. The regional trade was conducted by Macassan sailing prauhs or Dutch schooners.³²

Although coffee was introduced into Java in the early eighteenth century, and subsequently established as plantation economy by the Dutch in both the West Indies and the East Indies, the potential of Timor for coffee was slow in being realized.

While the first reference to coffee among Timor's lists of products dates from the time of Governor Soares da Veiga in the opening years of the nineteenth century, the first, albeit unsuccessful attempt to establish coffee plantations probably relying on tribute labour, was made in 1815. This was under the governorship of Victorino Freire da Cunha Gusmao, described by de Castro as a man of great intelligence and imbued with the spirit of a reformer. Besides coffee, he also promoted the cultivation of sugar cane and established rum factory.³³

De Freycinet, while duly recording experiments in coffee and sugar growing, was less sanguine as to developments in this area, observing that coffee was merely "an object of pure curiosity" in Timor at that time.³⁴

The pioneering efforts of the Dominicans, notwithstanding, it is notable that the first systematic efforts to take stock of Timor's mineral resources were made at this time. Governor Jose Pinto Alcoforado de Azevedo e Sousa (1815-19) dispatched 200 men on an expedition looking for oil in the regions of Bibicussu Samoro, Turiscain and Tutuloro.

His successor, Manuel Joaquim de Matos G6is (1831-32), engaged an expert to explore for gold, copper, saltpetre, and other resources.³⁵

Vials of the Governors

In a situation where neither of the two European powers on the island actually controlled territory far beyond the immediate vicinity of the main settlements, it would be surprising if the first Governors in Dili did not experience serious challenges to their authority. Arriving during Governor Souza's term of office, the French mission under de Freycinet's command offers up a rare glimpse of Dili society at this age. From the separate accounts of Jacques Arago, artist aboard the *Uranie*, and Rose de Freycinet, the commander's wife, we learn of an effusive reception for the French voyagers and European allies, including

sumptuous dinners toasted with Madeira wine, and coordinated cannon salutes. As Rose describes it, and as recorded in a watercolor by French artist Pellion, the de Freycinet's might have been excused for believing they were entering some Portugalized version of an oriental court. Escorted by slaves bearing giant parasols, they entered the palace gardens to the sounds of music, wherein they were presented to governor and official entourage along with their Timorese wives. These daughters of rajas, Rose observed, were dressed in old-fashioned French style, albeit much discommoded by shoes; ladies' maids were richly attired in Timor fashion with gold ornament, while crouching slaves extended betel nut on demand. In suffocating heat, the European party danced minuets into the night while the ladies of Dili danced a la Malay. 36

It is of interest, as Arago offers, while the governor was "young, amiable, jovial, and...well informed", he was also a political "exile" in Dili for whatever reason. Nevertheless, alongside the "despotic yoke" of the Dutch at Kupang, government at Dili appeared "mild". Local rajas who thronged the Governor were treated with distinction, admitted into his apartments at all hours, and frequently received at his table. It was apparent to Arago, although he could hardly have been disabused, that Dili's greatest strength was "the affection of the inhabitants for their governor". He also observed with candour that, lacking Kupang's "civilized" Chinese quarter, which included school and temple, Dili largely offered the appearance of, a palm leaf thatched village, the only exception being the governor's palace, a new church (St. Anthony's), the fort, and stockades.³⁷

But this was also a turbulent time in Timor. Because of the death of incoming Governor Miguel da Silveira hyena in 1832, interim government was entrusted to F. Vicente Ferreira Varela who, in conflict with two other members of the junta, had them arrested and took charge of government until the arrival of a new governor, Jose Maria Marques.

What this suggests is that, notwithstanding the weakened missionary role of the church in Timor, the authority of the church was such that, in its ongoing feud with the state, it could not easily be dismissed, at least, as seen below, until the full weight of the liberal revolution in Portugal led to the expulsion of the missions in 1834.

Not all threats to the Portuguese were internal, however. Pelissier has written of a little known incident that occurred in September 1847 continuing the following year, the year of revolution in Europe. This concerns the activities of Macassan or more likely Buginese pirates or slave-traders on the coast of Timor at a place called Sama in the district of Lautem. It is not that this incident was rare or particularly threatening to the colony, but in Pelissier's picaresque description, actually exposed the weaknesses of coastal defences under Governor Juliao Jose da Silva Vieira (1844-48). This state of affairs saw the Buginese get the better of an arresting party, killing one alferes or sublieutenant and two soldiers. Later, a disproportionate force of 3,000 men drawn from loyal reinos confronted 70 Buginese who resisted attack for four and a half months. In this debacle of truly Conradian proportions or at least evocative of more than one of this writer's eastern novels, the governor suspected complicity between the reino of Sarau and the Buginese interlopers and ordered an expedition to punish the reino. This was accomplished with great vengeance over a period of eight months, an act that also involved collecting 2,000 rupees indemnity.³⁸

In 1848 incoming Governor Olavo Monteiro Torres (1848-51) bequeathed a colony literally abandoned by his superiors with forces diminished to 120 soldiers, mostly Timorese. Pelissier writes that, before succumbing to Timor's notorious fevers, this governor had not received a single order or decree from Macau. But he, too, became involved in an obscure rebellion involving a disaffected moradores in the reino of Ermera, future district of Maubara. In what may have been the largest campaign since the battle of Cailaco, a force of 6,000 razed Ermera to the ground, killing the liurai and 60 of his subjects. In even more obscure circumstances, the Governor called upon the liurai of Oecusse to rally against Balibo which had also risen in revolt. The actions of the latter in planting the Portuguese flag in Janilo, in turn, brought down recriminations from the Netherlands which feared losing inland access from Atapupu.³⁹

It remained for incoming Governor Jose Joaquim Lopes de Lima (1851-52) to put an end to the revolt of the rebel liurai of Sarau, Dom Mateus, and conspirator alongside the Bugis, by pressing into action the gunboat Mondego while, at the same time, deploying on land the arraias, a troop of warriors mobilized by the Portuguese or offered by the liurai to the Portuguese. Following a successful campaign, all that remained was to transport back to Dili the heads of the victims to await the customary and macabre "festival of heads", by now a ritualized part of Portuguese lore at the Oceanic colony. It seems unclear but it is possible that, at a time when Lopes de Lima was still governing, the Mondego was dispatched to Suai on the south

coast bringing artillery and munitions to reinforce the garrison in a part of the island that had hitherto resisted paying the *finta* and where smuggling sapped the coffers of the customs service. Although the circumstances of this mission are obscure, the reino of Lamaquito was attacked.⁴⁰

As Pelissier declaims of this period, the years 1852-59 remain a "black hole" in terms of our knowledge, except to say that these years saw no more stability than others. A single Portuguese account of this period describes the revolt of a reino called Manumera, albeit not figuring in any list of reinos, suggesting to this author the Portuguese penchant for inventing toponyms, a practice then replicated by copyists. To this sparse knowledge we also learn from the Macau journal *O Independente* that the rebel *liurai* of Vermasse (Dom Domingos de Freitas Soares) who declared war in 1859 was deported to Lisbon.⁴¹

Conclusion

There is no question that the first governors in Dili built upon the labours of the Dominican pioneers in the east in winning loyal allies from among key reinos. We could go as far as to conclude that if it was not for the support offered by such key allies as the reino of Motael, the moradores of Manatuto, and others, the ability of the Portuguese to even survive in Dili is in doubt, especially as the Timor voyage from Goa via Macau was sporadic at best and took up to one year to achieve after waiting out the change of the monsoon in Macau. While the documentation passes lightly over the early struggles that beset the incoming governors in the new colony founded at Dili, it is surprising that there was no repeat of the battle of the Cailaco during this period although, as observed, there were plenty of intimations of what would later become almost inter-generational wars against the malai or Portuguese.

Yet, the Portuguese played it both ways. As various European travellers observed, the most indelible Portuguese contribution to the landscape during this period was the series of fortalezas stretching from Batugede to Lautem, suggesting the imperative never to repeat the lessons of Lifau. Only the most rudimentary of urban structures developed during this period outside of Dili. Likewise, the enduring symbol of the missions, to which many Timorese had identified, came to be replaced with the new symbol of temporal power, the custom house and the fortaleza, located along the north coast wherever the illicit trade appeared to be most focused. But, even with the gradual recovery of commerce on the island in the wake of the topasse rebellion and the establishment of Dili, so much of the new revenue generated fell not into government coffers but into the hands of adventurers and freebooters working the long unguarded coast. From a governmental point of view, the new colony had yet to redeem its promise. Even the *modus vivendi* arrived at with key allies among neighbouring reinos masked the hidden menace of revolt which, as shown below, belied the confidence of the Portuguese in their own project, and always threatened to unravel to their mortal peril.

Notes

1. *O Documento Sarzedas, Conde de Sarzedas*-- -Victorino Freire da Cunha Gusmao, Governador e Capitao Geral das Ilhas de Solor e Timor, Goa, 28 de Abril de 1811, in A. Faria de Moraes, *Solor e Timor*, Agencia Geral das Colonias, Lisboa, 1944, pp. 138-169.
2. J.S. Vaquinhas, "Comunicado: Timor", *O Macaense*, Vol., III, No.99: 3, 6 de Maio de 1884.
3. *BPMT* Vol.1.m, No.45, 31 October 1870.
4. "Memoria sobre as Ilhas de Solor e Timor", *Aujan Ota Macaense*, Vol.I, 6 de Janeiro de 1844.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Afflu Maeau ex Ilha de N= 3*, January 14, 1777.
8. *O Documento Sarzedas*.
9. A Honso de Castro, *As possessoes portuguesas na oceania*, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 1867, p. 378.
10. *O Documento Sarzedas*, and *jm Timor ex dcK: No.20*, 18 de Abril 1784, Goa.
11. *O Documento Sarzedas*.
12. *Ibid.*
13. L.C.D. de Freycinet, *Voyage autour du monde execute' par les corvettes S.M l'Ufemie et la Physicienne pendant les annees 1817-1820*, Paris, 1827.

14. Ibid.
15. O Documento Sarzedas.
16. The fortunes of the Bidau, Sica and the monadores can be traced in the pages of the BGM and BPMT.
17. de Freycinet, Voyage, p. 712. See Planta hydrotopographica da FtTaga e Porto de Dili ten'eno circumvizinho na Ilha de pnmor. Levantado pelo p'lenente Coronel de Artiharia LeaO Cabreira 1841 [250x72mm].
18. Anne Lombard-Jourdan, "Un m6moire in6dit de F'.B. de Rosily sup l'ile de Timor (1772)", *Anchipel*, Vo1.23, 1992, pp. 75- 104. This article also carries comments and elaborations by L.F.R. Thomaz.
19. F.J. Orneling, *The Timor Problem*, J.B. Wolters, Groningen, Djakarta, 1957, pp. 130-3.
20. Lombard-Jourdain, "Un memoire in6dit de F.E. de Rosily".
21. Archival source AH LS 402 Doc 41 cited in Antonio Vale, "Macau nas Ordens R6gias (1810-1820)", *Asianostna.. Revista de Cultura Portuguesa do Oriente*, No. 2, Novembro de 1994, pp. 33-73.
22. "Mem6ria Sobre as Ilhas de Solor e p'Imor", *Aunonl Macaense*, No.51, Vo1.1, 1844, pp. 16-17.
23. de Freycinet, Voyage, pp. 535N6.
24. "Mem6ria", *Aufloa Macaense*.
25. Rudy Bauss, "A demographic study of Portuguese India and Macau as well as corments on Mozambique and Timor, 1750-1850", *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 34, 2, 1977, pp. 199 & 215, who cites "Mappa dos moradores nesta praea Dili, 1813", *correspondencia de Macfromsoon Collection HAG*, 1308, folio 256.
26. A. Teodoro de Matos, "Timor and the Portuguese Trade in the Orient during the 18th Century" in A.T. de Matos e L. F. R.Thomaz (eds.) *As Relacoes entre a India Portuguesa, aAsia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente*, Actas do VI Seminario Intemacional de Hist6ria Indo-Portuguesa, Macau 22-26 Out. 1991, Macau/Lisboa, 1993, pp. 437-45.
27. O Documento Sarzedas
28. de Castro, *Asposseiros*, pp. 336-60.
29. Lombard-Jourdain, "Un memoire in6dit de F.E. de Rosily", p. 98. De Rosily, concerned to sound out the possibilities of acquiring slaves from Timor to work in the plantations on the French Indian ocean colony of Mauritius, chided the Portuguese for not more actively exploiting this trade opportunity. He reckoned that such reluctance could be owed either to a Portuguese preference for slaves from Mozambique, or to their reluctance to publicize this trade item to Timor lest it attract gurnners and adventurers.
30. de Freycinet, Voyage, pp. 693J594.
31. John Crawford, *History of the Archipelago*, Edinburgh, 1820, pp. 421-22, 438-39, 447.
32. de Castro, *Asposseiros*, pp. 336-60.
33. rbid.
34. de Freycinet, Voyage, p. 693.
35. P. Manuel Teixeira, *Macau e a sua diocese.. Missoes de Timor, pnpografla da Missao do Padroado*, Maeau, 1974.
36. Manbe Bassett, *Realms and Islands: The World Voyage of Rose de FjnyCinet in the Corvette Urmie 1817-1822*, Oxford, London, 1962, pp. 103-107.
37. J. Arago, *Narrative of a Voyage Round the World*, Treuttel, London, 1823, pp. 213i
38. Rend P6lissier, *Timor en Guerre*, Le Crocodile et les Portugais (1847-1913), P6lissier, Orgeval, 1996, p.
- 25, citing de Castro, *Asposseiros*.
39. Ibid., p. 29.
40. Ibid. In another version, while en route from Timor to Batavia, the Mondego, under the Command of Lieut. Manuelos6 da Nobrega, was attacked by pirates and -a young oilfleeer killed. p'lo avenge his death, two of the pirate ships were captured, 19 killed, the rest put to flight by swimnhg and die pirate stKkade destroyed [GPMTS, Vo1.VIII, No.2, 10 January 1852].
41. P6lissier, *Timor en Guerre*, pp. 40-41.

Colonial Process in Nineteenth Century Portuguese Timor

Whereas the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed the discovery and first settlement of Timor by the Portuguese along with the establishment of the Christian mission in the colony, it was only in the nineteenth century that the colonial power saw to the establishment of a colonial economy. In part this was pragmatic, owing to the burden imposed by Timor upon, respectively, Goa and Macau and in part fitted with modern colonial logic that colonies should pay for themselves. But separated by long distance from metropole and sub-metropole (Goa and Macau) and given the backward state of the local economy, the rebellious character of the local population, as much the particularity of local forms of tributary rule based upon *reinos*, along with the ambitions of colonial rival Holland in the eastern archipelago, Lisbon despaired of its wayward colony, treating it as a dumping ground for *deportados* and Governors alike. Outside of church-state relations, always testy in Timor, not much of Portugal's Liberal revolution of the early decades of the nineteenth century found local echoes in Timor, as was definitely the case in Goa and Macau. Such ambivalence in attitudes by the metropolitan government reflected in the many experiments in colonial administration foisted upon the unfortunate half island, at times administered from Goa, and at times, dependant upon Macau for orders as much as cash to pay official salaries. This chapter seeks to trace the character of colonial rule in nineteenth century Timor as much the rise of a colonial economy fundamentally based upon the export of fleeholder and then plantation coffee.

Public Administration and Governance

Whereas the period from 1769, following the shift of the capital from Lifau up until 1836 can be described as a discrete administrative phase, insofar as Dili served as the Capital of Portuguese power on Timor and the Governor served as "Governor of the islands", the various arrangements by which Timor was administered through the nineteenth century are more complex, essentially reflecting experiments as much as economic and military realities which, in various ways, made Timor dependent upon, respectively Goa, Macau and metropolis.

From 1836 until 1844, then, Timor along with Solor was administratively dependent upon the Estado da India and governed by a Governor delegate of the Viceroy seated in Goa. Judicial power was exercised by an *ouvidor* or judge named either by Goa or the Governor of Timor. This changed with the decree of 20 September 1844 separating the City of Macau and its dependencies, namely Solor and Timor, from rule by the Governor General of India (Goa). Timor and Solor thereby became part of the Province of Macau, Solor and Timor. Yet, as Governor de Castro commented, this important administrative rationalization hardly altered the form of government in Timor.¹

In a short-lived experiment ushered in by a royal decree of 30 October 1850, Timor and Solor were reconstituted as an independent colony outside of the control of Goa or Macau and answerable only to metropolitan Portugal. According to de Castro, this decentralizing measure allowed for the creation of a *conselho do governo* comprised of a judge, head of mission, chief of the armed forces, two natives and a *junta da fazenda* or customs service.²

Scarcely a year later, in 1851 (Royal decree of 15 September) the status quo ante was restored with Timor and Solor again linked with Macau. The *conselho do governo* was dissolved and the *junta de fazenda* was replaced by an adjunct. As the government gazette commented, the separation of Timor from Macau "must necessarily result a great convenience to the good of the system of administration of the peoples of these distant possessions, for which it is certain that direct shipping with the Metropole can be considered null".³

According to a Royal decree of 25 September 1856, it was again decided to make Timor and Solor subordinate to the Estado da India. It was conceded that the 1844 separation of the islands from Portuguese India (Goa) and annexation to Macau did not bring advantage but, rather, because of communication problems with Macau and its inability to render urgent assistance, proved a liability.⁴

Even so, according to de Castro, the annexation of Timor to India produced the same results as that of its former linkage with Macau, namely that Timor continued in misery and only survived upon a subvention solicited from metropolitan Portugal.⁵

This administrative situation endured until 1863 (decree of 17 September) when Timor was declared an Overseas Province of Portugal and was administratively reorganized along the lines of other colonies, such as Macau, and Sao Tome and Principe. At the apex stood the Governor assisted by a secretary, a judge of law, a representative of the prosecutor, and a Notary. Under the new dispensation, Dili was elevated from vila or town to cidade or capital city and seat of government status. One judge, one representative of the crown prosecutor and Exchequer, and one sheriff served the new comarca or jurisdiction in Dili. Only in judicial matters was Dili subordinate to the Judicial District of Appeal in Goa. Commensurate with its new status the military presence in the colony was boosted to 400 soldiers.⁶

According to a decree of 18 March 1869 Macau and Timor together were offered only one seat in the Cortes or Portuguese parliament, effectively blocking a local voice from Timor, although in response to a vigorous protest on this question from certain Portuguese authorities in Timor, the additional seat was subsequently granted.⁷

Needless to say, the franchise for the election of this representative was not only highly restrictive, but also based on blood. In an election carried out in Timor in 1871, out of 695 votes cast, Doctor Thomas de Carvalho, a resident professor of the Lisbon medical school, received 687 votes and was duly appointed. While 29 eligible votes in the Batugede electoral district were recorded, for want of any literate person at that post, they were not actually recorded! ⁸

But in 1866 (decree of 26 November), with the loss of Solo-Timor reverted to dependency of Macau status, otherwise known as the "Province of Macau and Timor". While the Governor in Timor was subaltern to the Governor of Macau, authority was given the Governor, in emergency or when there was insufficient time to receive orders from Macau, to exercise executive power with the advice of a council including the most senior military officer in Dili, the Superior of the mission, the judge, and the treasurer. Judicially, however Timor remained part of the District of Nova Goa.⁹

This administrative rationalization prevailed until 15 October 1896 when Timor was finally declared an "Autonomous District", albeit still dependent in many ways upon Macau or metropole for financial subventions and even Goa in the way of administrative personnel. Under this dispensation the Governor of Timor was accorded the same status as his Macau counterpart, namely full civil and military powers, albeit directly subordinate to metropole. Also under the new dispensation Timor reclaimed the right to send its own representative to the Cortes.

Colonial Budget

Was Timor a drain or a boon to colonial coffers? According to Pelissier, analogous to the situation in Tahiti and New Caledonia under French rule, only the metropolitan subvention kept Timor afloat. In examining the disbursement of expenditure, the lion's share, 53 per Cent in 1866, was Consumed by the military, with about one quarter going to general administration. A minuscule amount went to education, of which most was consumed by four bursaries, two for Goa and two for Lisbon.¹⁰

Yet it is clear that from 1868-1881 budget receipts record a steady upward trend. Notably, the figure for 1881 is 43,722 reis compared to 9,786 reis in 1868. These receipts were matched by customs receipts on firearms and gunpowder rising steeply from 3,237 rupiah (rupee) in 1879-1880 to 12,953 in 1881. Again, scrutiny of customs receipts for the period 1884-89 reveals that external trade increased considerably despite contraband. Although a system of customs posts had been established on the north coast of Timor between 1800-42, these had been allowed to run down. Accordingly, to prevent seepage from the customs net, new customs posts were erected in 1889 west of Dili at Aipelo, Liquica, Maubara, Batugede and Oecusse, and east of Dili at Manatuto, Baucau, and Laga. There was no customs presence on contra costa nor did the customs service deploy any meet worth mentioning. Still, however the matter is viewed, Pelissier contends, the trend in customs receipts was steadily upwards. But why in these circumstances did Governors of Timor in this period continually plead lack of money, even in a situation where Macau continued to send an annual subvention? There is no clear answer, he suggests, not even if military expenses are included as Macau covered requisition costs. Was it a question of corruption, waste or mismanagement? Pelissier is silent.¹¹

The minutiae of colonial bookkeeping escapes this author, especially given the varieties of Currencies then in use in Timor, but some of Pelissier's unanswered questions can undoubtedly be found in the still extant but faded handwritten pages of the Junta da Fazenda or Delegacao da Fazenda de Macau em Timor,

preserved in the Macau archives. Typically, the Fazenda met fortnightly at 11 am in the Governor's palace with the Governor serving as President and attended by four staff, a judge, a secretary, a treasurer and a contador or controller. Typically, the previous meetings' minutes would be acknowledged prior to an examination of receipts, current account and expenses in the colony. One typical session held on 19 December 1878 noted 28,500 rupiah in receipts from the reino of Viqueque, expenses incurred by the Portuguese consul in Singapore on behalf of the steamer D. Joao, 28,785 rupiah expenses incurred for the military in Batavia, and 23,427 rupiah expenses incurred by the Portuguese Consul in Surabaya on behalf of the colony.¹²

In colonial lore, colonies were meant to pay for themselves, although in the case of Timor the administrative twinning with Macau always offered an excuse for sloppy accounts and/or lack of effort mitigation it can be said that there were always unanticipated demands made upon the budget such as with the claims by the consulates, and that receipts were often more fictive than real, especially with respect to the reino.

While the resilience of pre-capitalist social formations on Timor blocked the classic colonial project of magnetization and the transition from a tax system based on kind to one based upon cash, there is no question that since the advent of Dominican rule in the archipelago the Portuguese quickened the use of fixed currencies in external exchange. Invariably the coinage in common use was gold or silver-based, including the official Pataca Mexicana. Copper-based Coinage was unknown in Timor.

But, as one Portuguese official explained in *O Macaense* in 1883, the units of currency in use in the late nineteenth century were not only varied but of shifting values. Pounds were exchanged for 12-15 Java rupiahs (also known as florin), in turn equal to 320 reis. Yet, it appeared, the gold pardau handed down by the Dominicans was favoured in local exchanges in Timor. Thus with one gold pardau, then equal to 3 rupiahs, (the silver pardau had no established value), the following purchases could be made; a parang, two steel knives, one handkerchief, a goat, 70 cattie of sandal; while a horse could be purchased for 5-10 pardaus, buffalos, 1-4 pardaus (corresponding to 5 rupiahs). According to the custom established by Governor Juliao Jose da Silva Vieira, the reinos paid fintas at the rate of one sarong or one white cloth per pardau or rupiah. ¹³

By 1897, in line with Timor's new "autonomous" status, for the first time the Timor Exchequer known as the Fazenda Publica de Timor was created independent of Macau thereby transferring full responsibility for all customs matters to Timor. Financially, though, Macau was still required to support Timor with an annual dotacao (endowment) of 60,000 patacas.¹⁴

Colonial Rationalization

Still, much remained to be accomplished in the rebuilding of Dili. In a much-quoted statement, English naturalist Wallace described Dili in the early 1860s as "a most miserable place". The only building of notable appearance, he conceded, was the Governor's house, a mere "white-washed Cottage or bungalow".¹⁵

Affonso de Castro, who was Governor at the time of Wallace's visit, also wryly observed that, except for the strong house and the church, the town had no buildings worth mentioning. At this time the population of Dili was a mere 3,000 including Europeans, Indians, Chinese and natives.¹⁶

Outside of Dili, the colony could boast only a few substantive public buildings such as at Batugede, Manatuto and at Lautem, where work was in progress on a Fortaleza at least from 1851.

While there had never been a census conducted in Timor at this date, and unlikely that any administration on the island had the capacity to conduct one, certain foreign observers in this period had offered up what Governor de Castro believed were wildly inflated figures. Working from estimates of the population in each of the 47 reinos then under Portuguese administration, he reckoned the population under Portuguese authority was around 150,000, and for the whole island, double that amount.¹⁷

More accurate counts awaited the pacification of the island when future Governors saw too it that the collection of head taxes demanded an accurate census.

We have remarked that, owing to the Macau connection, Timor began to attract a settled Chinese community of free emigrants by the early decades of the century. Writing in 1861, A. Marques Pereira, Superintendent of Chinese Emigration in Macau stated, "Few as they are (the Chinese of Dili) are the most useful part of the population of that city". ¹⁸

As show below, not only did the Chinese establish, themselves in commerce but were also in high demand as masons, wood workers, or for other skills otherwise lacking among the Timorese. Later in the same decade the captain of a visiting Portuguese corvette, who also delivered up a blistering account of the colony, praised the Chinese of Dili as "the only part of the population which carries on trade, which builds, which works, which lastly lives". 19

This aside was not only directed at the Timorese, usually dismissed in colonial lore as "lazy natives", but at the Portuguese, whom he labelled incompetent alongside the Dutch.

In 1863, de Castro's successor, Governor Jose Manuel Pereira de Almeida (1863-64), embarked on a major public works program in Dili, albeit reflecting colonial rather than native priorities. These works included the construction of a wall on the fort, military barracks and offices, and extensions to the Governor's palace. In this period, the Castro-Lahane hospital (today an Indonesian military squat) was completed along with the Lahane road and bridge. As reported to the Chamber of Deputies in Lisbon, the prison was completed and, indeed, tenanted, while a "college of education" for the sons of regulos was also completed. A Goa-trained doctor was appointed to serve the battalion. 20

This sense of progress was written into an official report on Timor drafted in 1863 and presented for metropolitan consumption. In this account the colony was applauded for "tending to emerge from lethargy in which it had lain for so long". This turnaround was attributed to the economic measure by which, for a subsidy of 500 florins monthly, Dutch steamers on the Moluccas run had been induced to call at Dili, thus providing a much needed outlet for exports. This report also coincided with the apparent return to normalcy of the colony following the crushing of the expensive Lacleo rebellion of that year, as discussed in a following chapter. In any case, as usual, it was Macau which defrayed the cost of such military operations. 21

Impressive even by the standards of other colonialisms, the foundations of state-sponsored schooling were laid in this period. From an official report of 1864, some 60 students served by a teacher of Royal appointment then attended a primary school in Dili. 20 students taught by a Goanese missionary attended another school at Manatuto. The commander of the Batugede fort also offered instruction to 15 pupils at that location. A College of Education had also been established in Dili for the sons of regulos, although it awaited the arrival of textbooks along with the appointed instructor, the metropolitan-educated Timorese Father Jacob dos Reis e Cunha, although as seen below, he would later be appointed to the mission.²² The importance of this college was recognized by Governor de Castro who declared the institution the only way of dealing with the customs of these "barbaric" people and instilling the basic tenets of Portuguese style civilization.²³

But from this tentative beginning in instruction in the first and second grades, it is clear that the future development of a comprehensive educational infrastructure would depend upon the development of the colony itself, by no means assured decades ahead.

In October 1866 news arrived in Macau that Dili had been virtually reduced to ashes by a fire. On 24 August consuming the military barracks, the church, the munitions store, the Public Treasury, the government palacio, and 15 private properties, mostly built of palapa. It also destroyed what remained of the archives dating back to the Lifau period. Only some furniture from government house along with ammunition was saved. Happily, it was reported, nobody died in the conflagration that began in a Chinese house. In Macau, the Governor of that territory addressed an appeal to patriotism to help rebuild the city of Dili. To this end, he raised 2,630 patacas, about one-fifth generously offered by the Chinese of Macau.²⁴ Along with medicines for the military hospital and the inevitable cargo of "incorrigibles", visiting Macau governor, Jose Maria da Ponte e Horta brought with him to Dili images and ornaments for the new church. He also used his visit in late 1867 to elaborate upon the need for a government-backed development company for Timor, albeit with support from patriotic-minded Portuguese and the assistance of Chinese from Macau. 25

A year later it was reported that reconstruction of the city was going on very slowly for want of such more durable materials as tiles and skilled workers. Reconstruction of the church, however, was undoubtedly a priority. It was described as 40 metres in length and 10 metres wide with walls of stone. It had eight windows on each side with two in the front and two behind. On the day of the consecration of the church, popular celebrations were held in Dili, including jousts, dances (tabedaes), and songs (batandas). Images and decorations for the restored church were brought in from Macau.²⁶

While reportedly of fine appearance, and strongly constructed in limestone, the church again fell into disrepair in later years as a consequence of earth tremors.

Writing of his term of office of one year and four months, former Governor Antonio Joaquim Garcia (1866-69) memoed that, owing to the state of war, the epidemic of cholera and smallpox, general lack of means, including lack of workmen, he was simply unable to carry out improvements in Dili, much less the rest of the colony. Yet, he remonstrated, "I handed over the District in better condition than I received it".

Comparing Dili to such dynamic centres of commerce as Batavia, Surabaya, Macassar and other cities in the Netherlands East Indies, he deplored the lack of public establishments in Timor and entered a plea for work to begin on the hospital, to complete the barracks and to rebuild the governor's residence. The existing hospital, he revealed, could only accommodate a few patients and was otherwise in a bad state of hygiene, while the barracks were deplorably airless, with the soldiery obliged to sleep clothed and booted on the earthen moor for want of beds and blankets. Many of the public buildings in Dili, he observed, were ridden with white ants and in a state of collapse, an unnecessary situation given the abundance of good timbers in the reinos.²⁷

While the documentation on Dili is obviously more focused, a brief account of conditions in other major centres is offered by the captain of the corvette, Sa da Bandeira, who, having arrived in Dili during the height of a cholera epidemic in 1869, backed off in near horror in the direction of Kupang, stopping off at Maubara, Batugede and Oecusse. Maubara, he described as composed of "a small number of temporary structures of straw and palm fronds", one belonging to the commander of the district. The Fortaleza or stockade constructed of loose stone and sited close to the seashore was defended by a single rusty cannon. Batugede, he described as a little larger than Maubara "but just as miserable". The Fortaleza was of rectangular shape with a small bulwark at each angle defended by a few antique cannons mounted on wooden trestles. Of conditions in Oecusse he wrote, "The most fertile imagination could not conceive of a greater state of misery" in which the soldiers were obliged to live, namely in barracks constructed of palapa otherwise considered very poor even by the standards of horses. While his description of Dili has hardly more nattering, he was even more surprised to find upon dropping anchor off Kupang, that his 21 gun salute was not reciprocated for lack of guns and even soldiery, a matter he nevertheless rationalized as an admirable example of Dutch-style "economical administration".²⁸

Work on the barracks and prison in Dili was still going on in 1871 with labour as well as materials supplied by the reinos, the only cost to the state being the prison bars supplied by Macau.²⁹ The Plano do Porto e Cidade de Dilly, a 90 x 40 map of the port and town of Dili produced by T. Andrea and T. Machado in 1870 reveals that the physical recovery of the town had made some progress by that date, notably, the hydrographic charting of the harbour was complete and the anchorage protected by a fortaleza called Carqueto on one side and a lighthouse on the other. The basic street grid is also apparent on this chart, as is the dominating outline of the reconstructed Nossa Senhora da Conceicao fort, a structure of classic Portuguese design straddling the foreshore as far as the river in the west.

Additionally, this map features another Fortaleza known as Rozario, a lighthouse, a military hospital and a ponte, or jetty named after D. Luiz I.

By 1879, in the account of a visitor from Macau, Dili was a "pequena cidade florescente" with a population of 4,114 of whom 2,498 were Catholics. A single main road connected the eastern bairro or suburb of Bidau with Sica in the east, in turn connected at perpendicular angles by a number of other rough-made streets, all lined by a number of private houses of modest appearance. Sica, in turn, was connected by road with Motael. Occupying centre-place in the town was the prison, constructed of limestone although badly ruined. Other public buildings in Dili included the palacio, poorly sited close to the swamp albeit indicated as "ruins" in the 1870 map, the church, the barracks, the hospital, the custom's house, the arsenal, and the school house of good appearance, although hastily constructed. Bidau was described as the major centre of Chinese trade where most of the commercial houses of the town were concentrated. At this time, Bidau was also the home of the moradores militia and supported a small chapel of mean appearance. The Lahane zone was well established.³⁰

As indicated by a map of Dili port by A. Heitor executed in 1892, houses with tiled and even zinc or tin roofs had made an appearance in Dili by this date along side the traditional palapa style construction. By 1893 the first blueprints of the Lahane quarter were drawn up by Portuguese civil engineers along modern lines, revealing a veritable colonial enclave settlement hugging the contours of the foothills of Dili but

separate from the malaria and "miasma" ridden lowlands of the old colonial port city and bazaar. But whereas the locus of government was now focused on Lahane, Dili remained the commercial quarter. Street maps of Dili from this year preserved in the Macau archives indicate the presence of substantial Chinese commercial houses on the intersections of respectively Rua do Comercio and Estrada de Lahane and Travessa das Figueiras, namely those belonging to Lay Ajuk and Lay-Lan-chu. Similarly the merchant house of Baba Fong Seng was well established on Rua do Jose Maria Marques, parallel to the leafy seaside Rua da Praia Grande. Rua de S. Domingos, Connecting these two thoroughfares was also the address of the Collegio Irmãs de Caridade Canossians.

In a rare published aside on social life and social conditions in Dili in the 1880s, Gomes da Silva paints a picture of a desperately isolated European community, lacking-besides the church-even the basics of Civil society at least alongside cosmopolitan Macau. In the absence of such social institutions as theatres, libraries, orchestras, billiards, clubs or unions or even a central meeting place, the only distraction for newcomers was to "make politics", to debate the pros and cons of local authorities, in any case with two or three exceptions were always present in the colony on short-term commissions. By all accounts the other major distraction was drinking. Portuguese wines were rarely found; rather the sugarcane-based alcoholic drink of canipa was favoured along with the native sugar palm-based tuaca (tuak). By that time Dili produced "good" wheat bread, while tea was imported from Macau. We have few images of local dress from this period, but from Gomes da Silva's account, officials attired themselves in Macau-style vests and wore woven-palm leaf style hats. European ladies affected the current Dutch style of apparel, while Chinese preferred kebaya. At home, Java-style was the mode for the official caste.³¹

Public health

Notorious as a graveyard for residents and travellers alike, Portuguese Timor attracted various negative epithets from European visitors. As Wallace observed of Dili in 1861, "Dili surrounded for some distance by swamps and mud-mats is very unhealthy, and a single night often gives a fever to newcomers which not infrequently proves fatal".³²

As noted, it was not until after Wallace's visit that a public hospital was erected at Lahane in 1864. From an official source, fever and dysentery had spread to the interior in the early months of 1868 with seasonal rains turning the state of the colony for the worse.³³

Dili was again wracked by a cholera epidemic around 1869. Arriving in Dili in early 1870, the captain of a Portuguese frigate remarked: "The cholera had ceased but the havoc wrought by it had been substituted, whatever the cause, by pernicious fevers which, in their fatal intensity, had nothing to envy in the previous epidemic".³⁴

The difficulty of mounting a mass smallpox vaccination program was highlighted in a report of 1871 which observed, *inter alia*, that it was difficult to convince native people to allow themselves to be vaccinated. Moreover, as most people in Dili had already contacted the disease, vaccination was in any case not very effective.³⁵

Six years later, illness (cholera?) took the life of two of the crew of the visiting Australian schooner *Victoria* while striking down most of the crew and passengers. McMinn, a British-Australian observer writes of the Dili hospital, to which the sailing master was admitted, that it was one of the finest institutions in the place, being large, airy, and clean, with plenty of attendance. This housed three wards; one for officers, one for Chinese and one for natives charged at respectively, four, three and two rupees a day.³⁶ As reported in the Macau press in October 1887, numerous victims of illness, namely dysentery and *beri beri*, were being treated at the Lahane College and in the Casa de Beneficencia of the mission.

Many African soldiers had fallen victim to *beri beri*.³⁷

It was undoubtedly in response to this harrowing public health situation that in 1883 a medical officer was appointed in Dili as head of the Timor branch of the Macau-Timor Health service. This was J. Gomes da Silva, a man of great intelligence and energy. More the pity his reports were not acted upon. Despite the vastly improved city plan that he described, Gomes da Silva found many shortcomings in public health facilities. For example, the hospital lacked many basic facilities including an infirmary for mothers. Of all 11 Cemeteries he examined, only that reserved for Chinese met basic public health criteria. One sad truth, he revealed, was that unlike the Dutch military who had developed a system of bathing on alternative days,

and unlike erstwhile uncivilised Timorese and African soldiers who bathed in the Lahane river, he European soldier in Dili simply did not bave. Little wonder then that the percentage of mortality in military hospitals in Timor was hen three times the rate of Macau or equal to that of Mozambique. Even the availability of quinine, he observed, did not always alleviate the dangers of fever. 38

Writing of the state of health of the colony in the 1880s, Anna Forbes, whose observations on Timor are often more perceptive than those of her naturalist husband commented:

No traveller will of choice visit Dilly, for its reputation as the unhealthiest port of the archipelago is not undeserved, and the report that one night passed in its miasmal atmosphere may result fatally deters any who would, except of necessity, go there. Those who are appointed here make up their minds, shortly after arrival, that they will go as soon as possible.... Feverstricken people and places are recognisable at a glance the pale faces and enduring air of the residents explain the lifeless town and dilapidated buildings.³⁹

Again, between December 1893 and February 1894, at least 1,000 people died from the direct or indirect affects of a cholera outbreak. In Maubara this was attributable to the rotting corpses strewn around after the bloody suppression of the rebellion, but Dili, Manatuto and other centres were also affected.⁴⁰ Cholera, malaria, TB, dysentery, still endemic in the twentieth century, were undoubtedly a major scourge and demographic check in the last.

State of the Missions

No discussion on colonial process would be complete without a sense of the development of Civil-state relations, particularly -in the case of Timor- on the status of the missions and their pastoral and educative role. While we have mentioned the pioneering role of the Dominican mission in the Solor zone and on the island of Timor, in the period following the shift of capital from Lifau to Dili, the number of missionaries o Timor suffered a gradual decline, never more than eleven, and by 1812 reduced to two including the Bishop who resided in Manatuto. In 1831, The visiting missionary group from Portugal bound for Macau observed that only five or six priests remained on the island. 41

For 20 years, commencing in 1834, all remaining missionaries were ordered expelled from Timor leaving the crown-appointed Governor as the exclusive mediator between the administration and the people. This measure, decreed by Dom Pedro IV and ushered in by the Liberal revolution in Portugal itself a now on from the ideas unleashed by the French revolution-further set back the albeit restricted legacy of the Dominicans in Timor, In any case mainly Goanese whose reputation over the years had become deeply sullied. While the church was one institution that would indelibly imprint Timorese identity in the future, th ecclesiastical legacy was somewhat mixed at this juncture, especially given the propensity of the church to enter into compromises with local traditions and superstitions, a shortcoming which appalled the reigning religious orthodoxy in Macau. In this period the pioneering Portuguese mission on Solor and Flores was reported to have been abandoned.⁴²

On paper, at least, the anticlerical mood was overridden on 26 December 1854 in the form of a Royal decree allowing for the dispatch of priests from Portugal and India to both Timor and Mozambique because of "lack and detriment to civilization and disgust of inhabitants deprived of religious consolation and worship". 43

Even so, as Governor de Castro wrote in 1861, the mission in Timor itself was almost abandoned. Only two missionaries remained and they seldom left the relative comfort of Dili, whether for illness or other reasons while the mass of the population lived in "paganism" and "superstition". 44

In general terms, this situation prevailed until 1874 when, in line with the Apostolic Letter *Universis Orbis Ecclesiis* of 15 June, Timor was transferred from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Goa to the Diocese of Macau and, in the same year, Pe. Antonio Joaquim de Medeiros, Rector of the S.Jose Seminary in Macau, was appointed as visador with the brief to proceed to Timor to take stock of the missions with a view to their rehabilitation. Even so, archival records for March 1877 and again 188 1 reveal the state of discord between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities in Timor. In 1882 the Bishop complained at lack of government support for the mission.

In any case it owed to the government Charter of a "celebrated" Dutch schooner that the party of seven

selected missionaries, all European, were able to arrive in Timor on 2 July 1877, after a harrowing 53 day voyage through typhoon-infested seas. Two others, including P. Medeiros, arrived on another ship. After some acclimatization, the newly arrived missionaries were strategically dispersed to Batugede, Oecusse, Manatuto, and Lacluta, each with their jurisdiction over specified reinos. As Vicar General and Superior of the church, Pe. Medeiros was stationed in Dili. Additionally, four other missionaries were stationed in Dili, one of whom was charged with the Catholic communities of Bidau and Hera, another charged with running a primary school (Motael), while a Chinese missionary, a native of Canton, was charged with catechizing Chinese school children and otherwise serving the Chinese community in Dili. A native Timorese missionary, P. Jacob dos Reis e Cunha, son of a regulo who had attended seminary in Macau, was appointed roving missionary with jurisdiction over the south coast between Luca and Alas. 45

Duly appointed Vicar General of the Missions in Timor, Bishop Medeiros went about his task with vision and energy. But he also had his work cut out for him. He estimated the number of Christians in Timor as around 40,000 only. In his ten years service to the church in Timor the Bishop oversaw the establishment of an experimental agricultural station in the hills south of Dili, the establishment of the Jesuit College of Soibada, or what one Timorese student of the church in Timor has described as a Coimbra in miniature after the famous university in Portugal, and the establishment of another college in Lahane which also served a similar purpose in training the sons of regulos as future catechists and officials. 46

Although earlier built of "putrefying" palapa, the Bishop had the Lahane mission handsomely reconstructed at the cost of 16,000 rupees. Opened in 1879, the complex of buildings housed living quarters, a school, a library -the first in Timor- and served as the archive of the mission in Timor. Inaugurated in 1879, the Dili church, built at a cost of 15,000 rupees, reflected, in the words of the Bishop, "the elegance of classical Architecture". With a view to expanding the base of mission work Bishop Medeiros opened two colleges in Dili in 1879, one for the education of boys, directed by missionaries, and another for girls by personnel seconded from the Instituto Canossiano in Macau.

While the Timorese were especially reluctant to surrender their daughters to such establishments, with time the sons of regulo and other traditional Timorese leaders joined this circle. In this work the government cooperated, especially in providing certain basic services to the missionaries such as subsidized, housing and transport for the missionaries. From 1877, (decree of 12 November), the missionaries working in the interior were legally required to open schools. At a later date the Canossians opened schools in Bidau and Montael along with a Casa de Beneficencia. In Manatuto the Canossians attracted some 180 students to their school. Also, in August 1879, the evidently renovated church building was inaugurated.47

While we have commented upon the beginnings of state sponsored education under Governor de Castro, Bishop Medeiros had a low opinion of the quality of this service. Writing in 1881, he observed that teacher ignored even the rudimentary principles of pedagogy while schools basically lacked pens, ink and paper. 48

The matter was stated with some clarity in the Macau newspaper, *A Voz do Crente* in February 1891, "Dilly continues to be the poorest city of our colonial dominions but which continues to dissipate ignorance". This report listed the establishment of eight schools in Dili with a combined total of 320 pupils namely a government school in Dili with 50 students (including 10 female), the Lahane College, the Casa de Beneficencia, the Escola de Bidau, and the Escola de Motael.49

Additionally, in 1890, elementary schools were established in Baucau and Manatuto.

The use of Coffee and Economic Boom

Typically, the cyclical patterns of boom and slump experienced in the Timor economy by the mid-nineteenth century, represented changes in economic developments within Timor as much world market conditions. By 1858 coffee was already figuring in export statistics as a high volume, high value export alongside more traditional exports such as wax, honey, leather, wheat, sandalwood, turtles, and horses. While travellers to Timor in the early decades of the nineteenth century were distressed to observe a trade in slaves, by 1854 slavery was definitely proscribed by metropolitan decrees although such measures were hardly applicable to the reinos where, as discussed in the opening chapter, the practice lingered on as a form of bondage or household labour into the modern period.

In 1867 Timor's coffee economy began to boom in what one official report described as an "extraordinary manner". In August and September of that year, revenue derived from Dili's custom's house"- a sure

indicator of economic health in the colony- exceeded more than that collected for the whole of 1866. In September alone, five Dutch ships, and one English ship (a total of 661 tonnage), arrived in Dili from Kupang, Melbourne, Amboina, and Macassar, loading both coffee and sandalwood.⁵⁰

In the same year, the government set to place the coffee industry on more rational lines. Coffee seeds were collected in state-held plantations to enlarge nurseries while new nurseries were established in different parts of the island.⁵¹

The first hand observations of the plantations in early 1877 by the Australian visitor, G. R. McMinn, are not without interest.

The plantations are situated on the northwestern slopes of the hills, and are thoroughly irrigated from springs situated above them, the water being led down by bamboo shoots supported by forked stakes. The plants are put in 18 feet apart and grow to from twelve to sixteen feet in height.

Generally bananas are planted between each two trees for the purpose of shielding the young plant and watering it with the dew it collects.

Observing that the industry was exporting around 1300, tons per annum, McMinn nevertheless offers the backhanded rider, that, "had the land been in the hands of go-ahead people ten times this amount would have been produced ere this".⁵²

Modern historian of Portuguese Africa W.G. Clarence-Smith writes in a study on Timor that while coffee appears to have been introduced into the colony by the Dutch in the Maubara enclave in the middle of the eighteenth Century, it took a century for it to become Timor's leading export commodity, only dominating the export economy from the early 1860s. He summarizes that coffee cultivation was at first confined to coastal areas to the west of Dili, especially Maubara and Liquisa and only gradually spread into the interior part of the island. Smallholder production of coffee, he continues, was predominant until the end of the Century with some stimulus offered by Governor Affonso de Castro in the 1860s to oblige the Timorese to provide coffee in lieu of traditional forms of tribute and also, as mentioned, some attempts at distribution of seedlings. Rather, he attributes the rapid expansion of coffee Cultivation in the 1860s to rising world prices.⁵³ [see Table 6.1]

Table 6.1: Coffee exports in metric tonnes (1858-65)

1858-59	19,461
1859-60	24,461
1860-61	46,058
1861-October 62	91,976
1865	145,000

Source: (de Castro 1867)

Clarence-Smith observes that while coffee only accounted for 7 per Cent of officially recorded exports by value in 1858-60, the figure for 1863-65 was 53 per cent.⁵⁴

By contrast, sandalwood, Timor's historic principal export had dwindled to an insignificant sum by the 1860s. Such was the effect of the discovery of sandalwood in other countries on world prices that it was no longer even considered economical to export. Other traditional exports such as honey, (to Australia), and horses, diminished rapidly in this period. Exports of horses slumped from 942 in 1859 to three in 1865, attributed to competition from horse exporters in Sumba and Roti in the Dutch colony, although exports of buffaloes in the same period offered some compensation.⁵⁵

Economic Decline

But while custom's revenues were sufficient to meet the salaries of regular soldiers, the colony of Timor was not yet sufficiently healthy to dispense with the periodic subsidy from Macau. As Governor Joao Climaco de Carvalho (1870-71) disingenuously remarked in a letter to Macau in early 1871, Timor's economy had improved to the extent that it had received a subsidy of 5,000 patacas from Macau. Later that year in a letter to the Governor of Macau he pleaded for a regular monthly subsidy of 1,500

patacas to meet the monthly salary of officials in Timor otherwise six months in arrears.⁵⁶

As described by the captain of the corvette Sa da Bandeira which arrived back in Dili on 20 April 1870 "the state of the District had improved little or nought during our short absence". The Captain, who earlier in Surabaya had to undergo the humiliation of requesting financial assistance from the Dutch Governor General, wrote that. "Not a single real existed in the District's coffers, and revenue from the Custom's House was and promises to continue to be very diminutive". Owing to various rebellions, and the appalling state of the military forces and their wretched auxiliaries, he found Portuguese authority at low ebb, a matter not helped by the incapacitating illness of Governor Francisco Teixeira da Silva (1866-69).⁵⁷

As Governor Garcia observed in 1870, the colony's revenues were almost entirely linked to receipts from a "precarious customs-house" and with the balance to the "insignificant" amount of tax (2,000 florins) paid by a decreasing number (23) of loyal regulos. Yet he was adamant that Timor was blessed with abundant agricultural and mineral riches, including copper in Vermasse, sulphur in Viqueque, gold, salt and coal in Laga, etc., to sustain a viable trade and economy. But, he recommended, what was needed to prevent leakage from the Dili custom house, which evidently was then extensive, and also to transport coffee beans from Maubara to Dili, was a steam warship, or, failing that, a two-masted schooner.⁵⁸

While the incessant internal wars always managed to upset the bold initiatives of the state in setting down plantation industry on modern lines, Clarence-Smith writes that the quality of Portuguese Timor's coffee was high and it invariably fetched a good price. While coffee exports from 1879 to 1892 regularly topped the 10,000-ton mark and sometimes doubled that figure, by the 1890s a long stagnation set in lasting until the 1930s. Exports of coffee regressed to below 5,000 tons for some years even though the commodity continued to dominate the colony's economy (at the expense of sandalwood and copra). This decline owed as much to the debilitating coffee plant disease hemilia vastatrix from the mid-1880s to the consequence on the world market of Brazilian overproduction.⁵⁹

Where the state had evidently failed to rationalize the industry in the way of either increasing export revenues or in improving the livelihood of the Timorese cultivator, the Church intervened. As revealed by a scientific Study on coffee in Timor published by the Roman Catholic Seminary in Macau in 1891, the Portuguese mission had sought to learn from the Dutch experience with big plantations in Java, while also acknowledging the superiority of the Timor-grown product. From scientific tests Carried out in Hong Kong this study concluded that the best aromatic coffee produced in Timor was that grow on the slopes above Fatumasse, Maubara and Liquisa. At his time, Maubara and Liquisa along with Motael near Dili were the major production centres with Vaquenos serving as distribution centre. In 1888, the mission had introduced into Timor via the Buitenszurg gardens in Bogor in Java a Liberian variety of coffee. This was tested at a small plantation established at Vematua at only 1200 metres above sea level.

The author of this work argued that extension of this variety, as a supplement to the well-established montahna variety, to Batugede, Hera and Manatuto, would enrich the livelihoods of the coastal peoples. Three obstacles stood in the way of improvement of the industry, however; ambitions of coffee merchants, ignorance of the cultivators, and excessive government regulations. To overcome these obstacles, the study invited the initiation of agricultural instruction for cultivators, government inspection of plantations and the coffee trade, and the institution of a system of classification of grades of coffee. The study also invited the involvement in Timor coffee of private capital from Macau.⁶⁰

Twenty years earlier Governor de Castro, much attracted by J. W. B. Money's study on Dutch methods in Java (Java, or how to Manage a Colony), and much admiring of the Culture System of forced deliveries as initiated in Java by Dutch Governor van den Bosch, grasped the idea that an increase in agricultural productivity would attract more European trading houses and shipping and, in turn, translate into the "penetration of civilisation and the end to barbarism" in the colony. To enter this cycle, the development of agriculture was essential as a first Step.⁶¹

In fact, however, it was Jose Celestino da Silva who, during his 15 years as Governor of Timor (1894-1908), laid the foundations of a functioning coffee plantation system in the colony. He also introduced rubber plantations in Hatolia, Uato Lari and Luca. But where the church study stressed the role of private capital in a regulated environment, the incoming Governor held to the view of a dominating role of the state in all spheres of activity, land, labour, and capital. Where the church study argued for careful scientific Preparation and experimentation, Celestino da Silva rushed in, where the church also looked to the livelihood of the peasant cultivators, Celestino da Silva only thought big.

Clarence-Smith contends that Celestino da Silva believed in the superiority of plantations over smallholdings and that it was he who recognized the potential for plantation development of the Ermera area southwest of Dili. Right from the beginning of his long term in office, Celestino da Silva followed the Dutch Culture System practice of state intervention in the livelihoods of the peasantry. This variation of forced cultivation involved certain familiar Colonial capitalist practices, wars of pacification, land alienation for European settlement, forced deliveries, the use of military organized coercion and the introduction of more scientific techniques. Despite the elements of coercion involved, as Clarence-Smith observes, coffee exports fell rather than rose during this period. Portuguese administration was too thinly spread or undercapitalized to turn the situation around. 62

Writing of the last decade of the century, the Portuguese writer, Bento da Franca, described industry and agriculture in Timor as in a primitivo estado. In the absence of a local Portuguese commercial bourgeoisie, trade was tied up by Dutch or mestizo adventurers, many Chinese, and some Arabs. Owing to Timor's extreme isolation compounded by the lack of shipping lines, the market for coffee and sandalwood was limited and anyway at the mercy of the Macassans.63

In any case, it was only in the 1930s that the coffee plant disease *hemilea vastarix* was confirmed in Timor. This was an important breakthrough, even though, as shall be seen, it was only in the postwar years that the industry was rehabilitated along scientific lines to overcome the problem of disease. Still, as Felgas determined, coffee took over as number one, not only because Timor offered a suitable climate but also because of it could be cultivated in a forestry condition, a reference to the practice of cultivating coffee tree under the overarching canopies of, typically, the giant casuarina trees (*Albizzia moluccans*)- the "mother trees"- where it thrives sheltered from drought and torrential rains. To be sure, as Felgas points out, outside of the plantation sector, Coffee growing by the native population "cannot depend on capitalist organization". 64

Conclusion

Colonial process, it is tempting to conclude, was *sui generis*; namely there could not be development without pacification. But even where pacific relations were established between the colonial power and native tributaries, there could not be development without enhanced extraction. Whereas in the past, when Timor's economy depended upon exports of sandal and it was sufficient to extra fintas for the sustenance of the garrison, by the nineteenth century, the survival of the colony required the collection of both a capitatio tax and custom's revenues on exports. But, in a primitive economy, where the circulation of money never entirely replaced barter in the trade system, it was also part of colonial logic to introduce wage labour, offering the wherewithal for extraction in money form. But to introduce forms of wage labour also required the setting down of infrastructure and an export economy based upon plantation labour. It was the genius of the early governors on Timor to anticipate the decline of sandal as an export and to follow the example of the Dutch in introducing a new export crop, coffee, while, at the same time, examining the prospects for minerals exploitation. This formula could have been Timor's saviour but only given the injection of capital. As we have seen in this chapter Timor remained an economic drain throughout the nineteenth century, notwithstanding the belated success of coffee exports. While we have traced the rise of Dili as a typical Southeast Asian colonial capital, albeit with Portugalized characteristics, development remained a highly restricted concept, whether measured by the state-sponsored education project, the missionizing project, the ability of the state to attract private investment in the way of a Timor Development Company, or even in the ability of the military to achieve a decisive victory at arms on the half-island. Indeed, as shown in a following chapter, the other side to restricted development in nineteenth century Timor was the realities of armed resistance, the Timorese *funu* which came close on more than one occasion in driving the Portuguese back to the sea.

Notes

1. Affonso de Castro, *Asposseoes portuguesas na oceania*, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 1867, p. 370.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 365.
3. BPMT, 22 November 1851.

4. BPMT, 18 February 1867.
5. Castro, *Asposseço?es*, p. 367.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 367.
7. BPMT, Vol.XVI, No.17, 25 April 1870.
8. BMP1, Vol.XVII. No.21, 22 May 1871, p. 83.
9. BPMT, 18 February 1867.
10. *R6ne P6lissieTimor en Guerre: le Crocodile et les Portugais (1847-1913)*, P6lissier, Orgeval, France, 1996, pp. 66-69.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 97, pp. 113-114.
12. AHM Financas No.417, Cx1 10, CotaAHnF/318.
13. J. dos Santos Vaquinhas, "Estudos Sobre Timor", *O Macaense*, Vol.II, 152, 25 de Outubro de 1883.
14. See J. Fen'aro Vaz, *Moeda de Timor, Baneo Nacional Ultramarino*, Lisboa, 1964. This usehl publication enumerates Chronologically the various subventions made over to primor by, respectively, Goa Macau, and metropole.
15. AIB:ed Russel Wallae, prhe Malay Archipelago: The Land of the Orang-utan and the Bird of Paradise (1869), Dover, i,ondon, 1964, chap.XII. -
16. de Castro, *As possessço?es*. i
17. Affonso de Castro, "Resume Historique de l'Etablissement Portugais a plhor, des Us et Coutumes de ses flabitants", *TLdschrift voor Indische Tal-Land-en Volkenkunde*, Vol. I 1 , 1 862, pp. 465-70.
18. BPMT, 18 July 1864.
19. BGM, Vol.IX, No.52, 30 November 1863, p. 210.
20. BGM, Vol XII, No.41, 8 October 1866, p. 167.
21. BPMT, Vol.XVII, No.25, 9 June 1871, p. loo.
22. BPMT, Vol.X, No.29, 18 July 1864, pp. 115-118
23. deCastro, *As possessço?es*.
24. BGM, Vo1.II, No.41, 8 October 1866. p. 167.
25. BMPT Vol.XIII, No.4.0 and BMPT, 11 July, Vo1.XIV, No.28, 11 July 1868.
26. BPMT, 21 October 1867.
27. BMPT, Vol.XVI, No.45, 31 October 1870.
28. BMPT, Vo1.XVI, No.26/27, 1870.
29. BMPT, Vol.XVIII. No.25, 9 June 1871, p. loo.
30. J. Gomes da Silva, *Relat6rio do Sewico de Sa2ide da Pnovl'nCia de Macau e Timor; em tlelaGa?O aO annO de 1886*, Typographia Mercantil, 1 887, p. 37, and for an embellished and possibly derivative account, see Raphael das Dores, *Apontamentos para um Diccionario ChotlOgraPhico de limor*, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 1 903.
31. *Ibid.*
32. Wallae, *The Malay ArchL9elago*, chap.XII.
33. BPMT, Vo1.XIX, No.25, 20 June 1861.
34. BPMT, No.49 of 1870.
35. BPMT, Vol.XVII, No.24, 12 June 171, p. 95.
36. McMinn, G.R., "Reminiscences of a Voyager: From Port Darwin to Kisser and Timor in 1877", *Northern li?rritoTy Times and Gazette*, Palmerston, Vo1.IV, No. 106, p. 3, 13 October 1877 as annotated by Kevin Sheriock (Darwin Public Library).
37. *A Voz do Crente (Macau)*, 1 October 1887.
38. da Silva, *Relat6rio*.
39. jhna Forbes, *Insulinde*, William Blackwood and Sons, 1887.
40. *P6lissieTimor en Gumle*, P. 128.
41. Jose Pereira da Costa, "Communicacao sobre a relacao da viagem", *Stvdia*, Lisboa, No.48.
42. uMem6ria sobre as Ilhas de Solor e Timer".
43. BGPMTS, 28 April 1855.
44. de Castro, "Resume Historique", p. 476.
45. Jaime Goulart, "Reorganizagao das Miss6es de Timor", *Boletim Eclesidstico da Diocese de Macau*, No.423, 1939, pp. 854-864.

46. Francisco Ferllandes, "Das Missões de Timor", Luso-Asiáticos (Macau), No. 1, September 1992.
47. D. Joao Paulino d'Azevedo e Castro, Os bens das Missões Portuguesas na China, Redacção do 'Boletim do Governo Ecclesiastico de Macau, Macau, 1917, pp. 162-83.
48. Goulart, "Reorganização das Missões de Timor", p. 858.
49. A Voz do Oriente (Macau), 7 Fevereiro 1887.
50. BPMT, 18 November 1867.
51. BPMT, 30 September 1867.
52. McMinn, "Reminiscences". I
53. Clarence-Smith, "Planters and Smallholders", p. 17.
54. Clarence-Smith, "Planters and Smallholders", p. 15.
55. de Castro, Asposseções, pp. 355-356.
56. BPMT, Vol.II, No.21; 24, 22 May, 12 June 1871.
57. BPMT, No.49 of 1870.
58. BPMT Vol.XVI, No.45, 31 October 1870.
59. Clarence-Smith, "Planters and Smallholders", p. 15.
60. anon, O Café em Timor por um Missionário, Impresso na Typographia do Semanario, Macau, 1991.
61. de Castro, Asposseções, pp. 362-363 and chap. IX.
62. Clarence-Smith, "Planters and Smallholders", p. 20.
63. Bento da Franea, Macau e os seus habitantes, p. 251.
64. Helio A. Esteves Felgas, Timor Portuguese's, Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1956, p. 39.

7

Dutch-Portuguese Rivalry over Timor

From a world history perspective it is clear that Dutch-Portuguese rivalry over the island of Timor was but part of a broader contest arising out of the complex political situation of the devastating Thirty Years War in Europe out of which, in Wallersteinian language, Holland emerged as hegemonic core state par excellence. At the heart of this conflict, the rebellion of the Dutch against Spain was the attempt of the United Provinces to capture the stream of silver and gold flowing from the New World into Lisbon and Seville. As one historian of Macau has written, "the capture of Macau, Malacca and Nagasaki would mean tapping the river at one of its main sources". While the Dutch and English had long mounted sea raids on Iberian shipping and coastal towns in Europe, the battle took on global dimensions as the arena of conflict shifted to the Americas and to the Asia Pacific region. Notably, in 1603, Dutch Admiral, Maatliet successfully ousted the Portuguese from the Moluccas thus capturing the source of the lucrative spice trade, and, the following year, practically annihilated the Portuguese fleet off Malacca, a prelude to the eventual Dutch capture of the fortified trading city in 1641. Even though Macau successfully defended itself against successive Dutch assaults commencing in June 1622, the Batavia-based VOC emerged as the major beneficiaries of the final expulsion of the Portuguese from Nagasaki after 1643. By 1630, on the other side of the globe, Pernambuco and northeastern Brazil would also be wrested from Portuguese control by the Dutch.¹

But on Timor, even the delayed news of the Portuguese-Dutch Peace Treaty of 1641 did not put an end to Dutch pretensions over territory claimed by Portugal, especially at the key north coast trading ports of Atapupu and Maubara.²

In fact, the contest between the two European powers over the allegiance of the Timorese continued unabated until the final acts of a negotiated boundary settlement were concluded early this century. Yet, as this chapter seeks to unfold, the diplomatic dialogue between Portugal and Holland over territorial control on Timor was fraught with misunderstanding and misjudgements, just as the administrative styles and political cultures of the two antagonists were literally worlds apart. No less, an understanding of Dutch-Portuguese rivalry over Timor and the century-long process of consolidation of boundaries and divisions of colonial spheres of influence is central to the question of Timorese identity or identities as they gelled against the background of European intervention in internal affairs on the island.

European Rivalries

While, as seen, with the end of Dutch participation in the sandalwood trade, the Company in Kupang barely balanced their books, the question remains as to what induced them to stay on? The French historian Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, writing in his 1782 compendium on world history, observed that the only possible justification for a Continued Dutch presence on Timor (and Celebes) could have been what in modern language would be called "strategic denial". 3

The "big strategic picture" of Timor as portrayed by Raynal became even more focused at the end of the century. At this time Kupang became embroiled in the intramural conflicts that beset both the VOC in its trials with the Batavian government at home, and the British who sought in part to occupy Dutch possessions to prevent a French takeover. Such concerns also related to a broad push by France into the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea with respect to Indochina. We have noted in this respect the voyage by Pierre Poivre to Timor in 1755. In part ensuing from the controversy surrounding the "Prince of Timor" at the court of Louis XV, various private merchants sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to gain royal sanction for voyages to Timor. Poivre had also -unsuccessfully- sought to gain the sanction of the French East India Company to open a "new vein of commerce" with Timor.4

Official French interest in Timor took a new turn, however, with the arrival in 1772 off the northeast coast of Timor in the proximity of modern Baucau of the Gros Vente, as mentioned above in the context of the reports by de Rosily, part of a French voyage of discovery to the west coast of Australia. In any case, the French vessel only gained the reluctant permission of local Portuguese authorities to remain in Portuguese waters for the purpose of allowing the crew to recuperate from illness. Such caution was not misguided as in the course of a 38-day sojourn, the French expedition had gathered substantive political, commercial and military intelligence. De Rosily, who went on to an illustrious career in French naval circles, advocated a takeover, to be justified in part by the potential of securing a supply of slaves for French plantations on Ile de France (Mauritius). 5

While this advice was not acted upon, French commercial and political interest in Timor was to be again awakened, as explained below, by the voyages of Baudin, Peron, and de Freycinet some 30 years later.

In 1795, three years after this French vessel touched Timor, the flight of the House of Orange to England and the creation of the Batavian Republic in Holland led to a new alliance between Holland and revolutionary France against Britain.

Britain then sought to occupy the remaining Dutch possessions with the blessing of exiled chief director of VOC, William V. A first attempt by the British in 1797 to take over Kupang, still under VOC control, however, was foiled by the actions of a local Dutch commander supported by armed slaves. When, at the close of the century, the Dutch government took over the possessions of the moribund VOC, west Timor was included in this transfer. Surviving another British challenge in 1810, the Dutch only surrendered control of Kupang the following year. By early 1812 the British had taken over the Dutch portion of Timor. Only on 7 October 1816, with the restoration of the House of Orange following the Napoleonic debacle in Europe, did Britain return the colony to Dutch administration.6

Boxer observes that, when HMS Glatton left an English flag at Solor as a mark of sovereignty, the Portuguese Governor in Dili with the support of a local chieftainess promptly secured its removal and a formal acknowledgement of Portuguese sovereignty. 7

With the end of the Napoleonic wars the threats to Dutch hegemony in the archipelago came less from the dangers of late arriving colonialisms than the commercial challenges posed by the British, especially after the foundation of Singapore by Stamford Raffles in 1819 as the preeminent British centre of trade and military power in the archipelago. The Dutch responded to their feared loss of trade by seeking to exclude British traders through the imposition of high tariffs on their imports. Commensurate with Raffles' mercantilist designs on the archipelago based on a British-centred concept of free trade, the Royal Navy sought in October 1838 to establish a military colony at Port Essington on the remote Coburg peninsula, across the Timor sea in northern Australia. This scheme has been described by Peter Spillet as a military base to secure British possessions in the area and to provide a supply and trading centre for British shipping passing east and west through the Torres Straits. But from the outset the new colony depended upon Dutch and, especially, Portuguese goodwill. Within a month the British dispatched a vessel to the Dutch-ruled island of Kisar off the northeastern tip of Timor to requisition fresh food. But Dili was the nearest European

outpost to the new settlement of Victoria, and on 1 February 1839, the *Essington* sailed to Dili returning with buffaloes, Timor ponies, and some English newspapers. Following the actual act of possession of Port Essington on 13 February 1839, leader of the British party, Captain Bremer, proceeded to Dili on the *Britomart* where he was received by the governor, Colonel Frederico Leao Cabreira (1839-44), with full honours befitting his status. Accompanied by George Earl, linguist and botanist and John Armstrong, botanist, Bremer spent five days in Dili, consolidating links between ancient allies -in part a reference to the Methuen treaty of 1703 under which England offered protection for Portugal in exchange for gaining trade concessions- while sounding out commercial prospects, in particular making an albeit unsuccessful pitch to encourage Chinese merchant participation in the new colony. While the Port Essington colony was soon to founder there is no question that Governor Cabreira sensed the proximity of an ancient ally to be of advantage in his one-sided duel against aggressive Dutch colonialism in the east archipelago.⁸

The Portuguese-Dutch Territorial Contest

As revealed by Francois Valentijn's map published in his *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien* (1726), the Dutch had achieved a relatively detailed grasp of the basic geographical features of Timor and the Sunda islands by that date. However, it was only in 1760 that the VOC produced a large scale map of Timor, in what might have been the first attempt to cartographically demarcate Dutch from Portuguese territory on the island. Doubtless prompted by the confused events in Lifau several years earlier leading to the death of von Pluskow, the map, according to one interpreter, links "the situation on the island in the year 1757, in terms of agriculture, geography and politics". For its time, the map contains a large amount of topographic detail, not only highlighting Timor's rugged interior terrain, but also describing rice fields, coconut trees and other land use. Habitations are indicated along with major forts identified with, respectively, Portuguese or Dutch flags.

Notably, the boundary between Portuguese and Dutch territory is marked in two positions to reflect the fluctuation in their respective control of the island.⁹

Whatever else, the existence of the map confirms the axiom that the expansion of geographic knowledge went hand-in-hand with the expansion of political control, or at least ambition.

To a great extent the rise of Kupang in the west, commensurate with the consolidation of Dutch control after the Napoleonic interlude, came at the expense of the new town of Dili. As de Freycinet observed first hand, while the Dutch in Timor did not control as many tributary kingdoms on the island as did the Portuguese, they nevertheless could count upon control over certain of the most productive, among them Simao, Roti, Savu, and part of Solor.¹⁰

Only with the restoration of Dutch rule in Kupang on 7 October 1816 was the colony in a position to attack the leading rebel ruler in the west, Amanubang, a figure who had been baptized, educated in Kupang, and who had even travelled to Batavia. Even so, a first expedition mounted against Amanubang in 1815 met with failure and the following year Dutch forces sustained a further loss of 60 lives against six casualties on the side of the rebels. At the time of de Freycinet's visit to Kupang, the two sides were squared off with the rebel chief at the command of 6,000 forces and Resident Hazaert commanding around 10,000.¹¹

According to Moor, a British contemporary, Amanubang's success was in part determined by his ability to wage a kind of running guerrilla war, plundering unsuspecting neighbours before retreating with his subject population into caves in the interior. The power of the Dutch and the Portuguese, however, were so weakened by the opportunistic actions of backing opponents of their enemies that their authority was only recognized by those chiefs who needed assistance against their adversaries.¹²

While the results of the campaign of pacification launched by Dutch resident Hazaert were mixed, his scheming to annex certain parts of the island under Portuguese rule brought him into direct conflict with Dili. Such was the episode of 20 April 1818 when 30 soldiers descended upon Atapupu, the then important river port adjacent the Portuguese fort at Batugede. Having overcome by force of arms the local defences, Hazaert's band ran down the Portuguese ensign and replaced it with the Dutch colours. Indeed, the Dutch flag over Atapupu was witnessed by de Freycinet when sailing through the Straits of Ombai. But this coup de main was not achieved without preparation. Notably, the Chinese of Kupang had laid the groundwork among the local population for a change of government. In particular, discontent on the part of the Chinese merchants arose over a Portuguese government requirement to pay taxes on goods exported and imported

through Atapupu.

This was no isolated event but a sequel to the punishment meted out to this mutinous element by the Portuguese in 1786 and again in 1808. 13

Next to Dili, Atapupu served as one of the few ports on the northern coastal littoral of Timor, and as anchorage of preference for small vessels. The river port was also a major source of customs revenue for the Portuguese crown. Finding no satisfaction in dealing with Hazaert, and eager to uphold the Dutch-Portuguese entente in the archipelago, the matter was raised with Batavia. Inter alia, the Portuguese complained of Hazaert's attempts to take over the Batugede fort, to entice loyal kingdoms to rebel against the Portuguese, and in the use of Chinese as fifth columnists in this venture. The concerned Portuguese Governor, d' Azevedo e Sousa, remonstrated that, if the matter could not be settled by conciliation, then it would be settled by force. He claimed to be able to muster 1,000 men under arms or even 8,000 if necessary. Further, he demanded of the Dutch, compensation for the financial loss afforded to the Portuguese treasury by the loss of the port of Atapupu.

In this brief, he attached the necessary documentation confirming the ancient Portuguese sovereignty over Atapupu, Batugede and the kingdoms dependent upon these places. This was signed at Liquisa for the Timorese side on 16 May 1818 by Dona Usula da Costa (Queen of Liquisa), Mone Thaa, Agostino Carvalho (datos of the reino of Liquisa), Sole Crae (labo of Liquisa), and various Timorese of the rank of toumougom, a counterfoil document was also signed on 20 November 1818 by Governor de Azevedo e Sousa. 14

In answer to the Portuguese protest, Hazaert was called to account in Batavia and a commission of enquiry was sent to Timor. However, the commission found that Hazaert was in the right in opposing the [British] occupation of Kupang and Atapupu in 1812 and that the Portuguese had entirely misrepresented the 1818 affair. Hazaert was duly acquitted and, in 1820, restored to office. A figure described by James Fox as having an extraordinary impact upon the Course and development of the indigenous peoples of Timor, it seems that nothing could damage his career, neither the British interregnum, nor the period of suspension following the Atapupu affair. 15

Of this affair, de Freycinet remarked that he had reason to surmise that the Dutch Resident and the Kupang Chinese would undoubtedly continue their intrigues and, that the Portuguese colony, otherwise so obviously stripped of its former splendour, and all but forgotten by the mother country, would continue to lose both its territories and influence, at least until a more invigorating administration took over.

Alternatively, he conjectured, the Portuguese would back die Amanubang revolt with men and arms. Nevertheless, he conceded, the Portuguese establishments in Timor rested on a far sounder base than those of the Dutch colony. 16

As Sowash summarizes, such was the intractability of border problems between the two colonial powers on Timor, the natives were almost completely independent. As he describes the situation, such was the warlike disposition of the Timorese, aided and abetted by each colonial power in their resistance to the other, that chaos was often the result. Moreover, many of the interior peoples failed to recognize European domination even up until the twentieth century. The imprecision of boundaries only abetted this situation, especially as many tribes recognized the sovereignty of both powers or alternated their allegiance. As a result, neither administration had the resources to stem a situation of petty internal wars, slave trading, head-hunting, arson, and cattle stealing. Moreover, mischief makers were wanted to escape punishment by drifting to the other side of the island. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the two colonial powers even saw to it to restrict the importation of firearms. 17

From de Freycinet's careful study of the various reinos on Timor under, respectively, Dutch and Portuguese control, as cited, it is clear that Portugal held by far the largest territory at the time of his visit. On Flores and Solor the Portuguese could also count on the loyalty of the reinos of Sica, Noumba, Larantuca, and Maubesse. Two kingdoms on Ombai (Alor), Lomblen, and various establishments on Cambi, were also dependencies of Dili. By 1814, the islands of Pantar and Adonara also recognized Portuguese suzerainty. 18

Governor Lopes de Lima and the Great Sell-off

The leopard-spot character of Portuguese dependencies in the Dutch-controlled archipelago was bound to

be challenged, however, especially as the technological/pacification balance shifted in favour of Portugal's Protestant rivals. Yet, even by the rules of Western imperialism, certain matters -namely boundaries and spheres of influence- had to be adjudicated, lessons evidently forgotten by Holland's colonial successor state when it came to redrawing the map of Timor with great violence in the period after 1975.

In 1847, Governor Juliao Jose da Silva Vieira became involved in a dispute with the Governor and Resident of Kupang over acts allegedly committed by the regulo of Oecusse, a Hornay descendant, in asserting claims on Ombai and Pantar, territories deemed by the Dutch to be theirs. To regularize the question of sovereignty over these islands, the Dutch Governor General in Batavia mandated D.C. Styen Parve to Dili in March 1848 to negotiate the matter. Governor Silva Vieira answered back: "considerar Portuguese todos os territorios que tinham a bandeira portugueza e hollandez QS que arvorassem a hollandeza". 19

But while instructing the regulo of Oecusse to hold his position, Governor Silva Vieira conceded possession of the disputed islands to the Netherlands, pending conclusion of an accord in Europe. It could not have been lost upon the Governor that the Dutch then deployed mere 50 soldiers in Timor, vastly inferior to the Portuguese contingent.

But it was also the case that, as ever, the Portuguese were in no position to actually finance a physical presence on these obscure and impecunious outposts. 20

In 1850 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands transmitted a note to their Portuguese counterparts insisting on the need to settle the question of boundaries and ownership. The following year commissioners were appointed by both sides with a view to entering into negotiations. One wonders, however, as to the state of preparation on the Portuguese side as to answering such a complex operation. While officials on the ground were no doubt privy to much local information, the major extant Portuguese chart of this period was as much antiquated as inaccurate. At least that is my opinion of the Planta das ilhas de Solor e Timor e outros adjacentes, a 57x37cm map drawn up by Joaquim Pedro Celestino Soares in January 1836 from information contained in the sailing directions of Horsburgh, the British surveyor-general in Singapore. Yet, by all accounts, neither were the Dutch better informed as to local realities in these islands.

On 23 June 1851 a new governor arrived in Timor at the end of a long voyage from Lisbon via Rio de Janeiro aboard the gunboat Mondego, which he captained.

This was Jose Joaquim Lopes de Lima, a former Governor of Goa, now bearing the title capitao-de-mar-e-guerra and Governor of Timor and Solor. In November 1851, the Portuguese government announced that Lopes de Lima was to be decommissioned from government and vested with the position of commissioner in the forthcoming discussions with the Dutch. According to Montalto de Jesus, the controversial Portuguese historian of Macau, it was out of sheer deference to Lopes de Lima's status that, under the decree of 30 October 1850, Timor and Solor were detached from Macau and turned into a separate province. 21

In the ensuing discussions, the Resident of Kupang, Baron van Lynden, travelled to Dili and during the month of July conferred with Lopes de Lima assisted by the loyal regulo of Motael, a man considered to have intimate knowledge of local alliances and networks on Timor as well as in the islands. Pelissier, who has researched Dutch sources on this question, offers that Lopes de Lima was not only in a bind, but a doomed man. Dili was bankrupt, and certain trade-offs were in order. At this time the Larantuka customs offered up a mere 50 rupees a year, insufficient to even cover the cost of maintaining six cannons and six soldiers which constituted the fort. Even though Larantuka was visited twice a year by an official party from Dili, the local regulo had made common cause with Buginese pirates further weakening the Portuguese position. The commercial relationship between the other claimed islands and Dili was even more tenuous. 22

While answering to the metropolitan government, there is no question that Lopes de Lima exceeded his authority by making over to the Dutch the coveted Larantuka district in Flores along with the Solor group of islands, and in Pelissier's felicitous phrase became the "felon majeur" of Portuguese nationalist historiography. 23 To be sure, as Boxer observes, Lopes de Lima was only empowered to negotiate ad referendum, and, by inference, not act without reference on the question to Lisbon. 24

Amidst a popular outcry, the Portuguese government repudiated the Convention drawn up in 1854, by reconstituting the Province of Macau, Timor and Solor, and instructed the Governor of Macau to send a

substitute for Lopes de Lima. But appointed by the Crown, Lopes de Lima refused to transfer power to a substitute appointed by Macau. The matter was settled by the dispatch of the gunboat *Mondego*, the arrival on 8 September 1852 of the new governor, Dom Manoel da Saldanha Gama, and the arrest and transportation of Lopes de Lima out of the colony. Montalto de Jesus writes that Lopes de Lima died en route in Batavia not so much from malaria contracted in Timor as of intense moral sufferings.²⁵

As Governor de Castro commented, plenipotentiary Lopes de Lima was imprudent in the extreme in not obtaining adequate compensation for the ceded territories, ²⁶

A view more than echoed in official Portuguese circles.

Though repudiated, the Convention was not actually abrogated on account of noncompliance with the demanded recoupment of the first instalment of 80,000 florins. In any case, Portugal vetoed the clause in the Dutch treaty pertaining to the mutual exercise of religious liberty by both parties, seen by the Portuguese side as weakening the status of the Catholicized populations. But, as a Dutch source records, this stumbling block was eventually removed, paving the way for the signing of a definitive treaty.²⁷

Drawn up on 20 April 1859, ratified by the Portuguese Chamber of Deputies in 1860, and executed in 1861, the Lisbon Treaty on the demarcation of Portuguese and Netherlands possessions in the Solor and Timor archipelago comprised a number of complex elements. This was despite or because the demarcation represented the first formal divisioning of the island on an east-west basis by way of linking an estuary on the north coast with one on the south as part of the boundary.

Accordingly, various reinos were named as being on one or the other side of the border. Cova and Suai were determined as part of Portuguese territory, while Juanilo and Lakecune were determined to be Dutch. Additionally, while Portugal recognized Dutch control over the enclave of Maucatar, the historical enclave of Oecusse remained under Portuguese control. The Netherlands also dropped all pretensions to Kambing or Atauro Island. The boundary was not surveyed, however, as neither side possessed sufficient authority in the concerned zones. Further confusing the issue, native peoples on either side of the boundaries continued to assert their respective rights to territories on the other side.

While the divisioning of the island of Timor would come to haunt the destiny of the Timorese, it was the least controversial part of the deal. Stemming from Lopes de Lima's transgression, Portugal was obliged to cede to the Netherlands the historic enclaves in the eastern part of the island of Flores, namely Larantuca, Sica (Sikka) and Paga, as well as the island of Adenara (Adonara), including the state of Wour6, the island of Solor including the raja of Pamang Kaju. Portugal also dropped pretensions over Lomblen, Pantar and Ombai, ending Portugal's 300-year "rule" in these communities. Portugal was to be offered 200,000 florins indemnity in three instalments. The status of Maubara was also broached but the Dutch were in no hurry to retrocede this enclave back to the Portuguese, only achieved in April 1861.²⁸

All in all, from a Portuguese perspective, one could hardly think of a more derisory settlement, but also from an indigenous perspective one that is no less troubled.

Meanwhile, the Dutch promptly moved in to occupy Larantuca and Solor where they remained despite the outcry in Lisbon. Even so, for matters of economy, the Dutch evacuated the fortress at both Larantuca and Solor in 1869. Three years later, according to a Dutch account, the government went over to a policy of renouncing interference in native affairs, leaving local Chiefs to squabble over the spoils from "slave-trading, piracy and looting", a sad envoi indeed to the former glory of these toposse strongholds. Only when the recalcitrant behaviour of the "dwarf state" of Larantuca got out of hand, did the Dutch bother to dispatch the odd man-of-war. Catholicism was only revitalized on Flores with the arrival of Dutch clergy in 1862. Sporadic resistance to the Dutch continued on Flores up until the early 20th Century, at least until the principal nuisance, the Catholic raja of Larantuca was expelled in 1905.²⁹

Small consolation to history, indeed, that Portuguese influence lingers on in local folklore in Larantuca and other parts of Flores in the form of Catholicized communities. Notable in this sense is the Konfreira or Larantuca-based religious organisation which acquired paramount importance to the town's faithful in the way of the handing down of prayers in oral form during long years from the end of the seventeenth century when the town was left without clergy. It is of more than passing interest that the Portuguese nag was defiantly mown in Sica until the end of the nineteenth century, even during the period of Dutch rule. The last Portugalized raja of Sica, Dom Sentia da Silva, gave up his political power or more likely his tradition-conferred privileges-"with independence."³⁰

Telkamp, citing a Dutch source, observes that, despite this arrangement, some native districts on the island

of Ombai (Alor) in 1886 still paid an annual tribute to the Timorese prince of Likusan and of Liquisa which consisted of rice, Corn, cotton or small livestock.³¹

Armando Pinto Correia, a Portuguese official who served in Timor during the early interwar period, offers that in the old days the people of Timor had strong family links with Kisar, also home of a colony of Dutch-native descendants. There were frequent visits, barlaque links, trade in gold and buffalos and even the transfer of finta, by the raja of Vonreli (on Kisar) to Vemassim on Timor. Governor Celestino da Silva who, piqued at the evident refusal of the raja of Kisar to convert from Protestantism to Catholicism, prohibited all official contacts only interrupted such links in the 1890s.

Nevertheless 15 years later, barlaque relations were re-established with the Baucau region when the raja of Kisar arrived at Baucau beach accompanied by a flotilla of 20 cocoras or small sailing boats.³²

But metropolitan indignation at the loss of the territories required consolation.

A new Portuguese plenipotentiary appointed in 1858 proposed to Holland to cede all of the island of Timor to Portugal, in exchange for the cessions already made on Flores and the islands, plus some unspecified Portuguese territory in Africa. Although the Dutch in principle were not averse to exchanging territories where it suited them, the notion of a great Lusophone Timor, it is perhaps to be regretted, did not meet with acceptance.³³

It is of more than passing interest that, in 1884, a delegation was dispatched from Dili to Atauro, to raise the Portuguese nag. The single island in the Chain retained by Portugal after Lopes de Lima's infamous exchange, Atauro lay some 20 kilometres north of Dili. Obviously, on the question of sovereignty, then sorely tested in Macau versus China, there was no room for half-measures and evasion. The prospect of a foreign nag dying across the Ombai strait from Dili was not a prospect relished in the Portuguese colony. But still, it would not be until 1905 that the island commenced to pay finta and only in April of the same year was the island militarily occupied. ³⁴

In 1885 the situation in Dutch Timor deteriorated when, Sonbai, one of the larger states in the central part of the island, fell into anarchy with the death of the raja. Following an invasion of Kupang in the temporary absence of the Dutch Resident and garrison, the Dutch retaliated by abandoning their old policy of noninterference. Governor-General J.B. van Heutsz immediately dispatched troops and placed central Timor under military control. Even though the rebel chiefs on Timor were bound to the Dutch by ancient contracts, under a new dispensation binding across the outer islands, they were now obliged to sign Korte Verklaring or Concise Declarations acknowledging Dutch dominion and strictly forbidding relations with foreign powers. In the years 1889 to 1892, alleged mistreatment of Timorese in the Dutch-held zones by Portuguese officials created additional friction.³⁵

Even so, as reported in the Macau press on 29 July 1893, certain chiefs in Maubara looked to support from the Dutch in Atapupu to back their claims of mistreatment by the Portuguese commander in Maubara. Such recidivist claims in the name of the Dutch nag were, however, quashed with the support of the 729-ton, three-masted, mixed steam and sail gunboat Diu dispatched to offer "protection" to the inhabitants against "rebels" against Portuguese authority. The political and commercial importance of Atapupu under the Dutch was seen as stemming from its favorable location as the major port of export, via a monthly Dutch mail packet, for all the reinos located to the southeast, namely Cova, Savir, Lamaquitos, and Suai. Although comprising the reinos of Failure and Juanilo, otherwise separating Batugede from Oecusse, Atapupu itself was described as an "insignificant" town hosting only one state building, watched over by one controleur, and lacking either civil or military institutions of any kind.³⁶

Problem of the Enclaves

Eventually, such problems pushed the two sides to resolve the border question, notably by doing away with the troublesome enclaves on Timor.³⁷

A new Convention -the Lisbon Convention- was signed in Lisbon on 10 June 1893 followed by a Declaration of 1 July 1893. This Convention provided for an Expert Commission to draw up proposals for another convention to secure a clearly marked boundary and to readjust the various enclaves, ³⁸

Or more specifically "to cause the enclaves now existing to disappear". The Convention also specified that the traffic in arms was to be interdicted, native fisheries were to be given protection, most-favoured-nation privileges were granted by both powers, and the Dutch would renounce certain claims against Portugal

arising from previous incidents. Both contracting parties also promised preference to each other in the event of disposal of their rights in Timor. 39

In 1896 (decree of 29 October), the Portuguese government named a commissioner, namely the "capitão-de-mar-e-guerra," José Cristiano de Almeida, to work with the Dutch in demarcating the boundary. While the mixed commission proceeded with its work in 1898-99, it nevertheless broke down over disagreements. The two sides came together again in a conference at The Hague in 1902 in an effort to resolve the problems encountered by the mixed commission.⁴⁰

The main point of contention concerned whether Oecusse-Ambeno was included in the 1893 agreement or the exchange of enclaves. Portugal answered the Dutch argument for surrender of this territory, site of the historic Lifau settlement, with the contention that, as it constituted a long seacoast and several ports, it hardly constituted an enclave any more than Belgium or Portugal. Rather, the much smaller district of Noimuti fitted the definition of enclave as specified in the 1893 treaty. Besides Noimuti, Portugal also offered to cede the border districts of Tahakay, Tamira-Ailala, Maubessi, Maoe-Boesa and Lamas, in return for the cession of the Dutch enclave of Maucatar. The Dutch climb-down over Oecusse-Ambeno, however, was not at the expense of claims upon certain forests of sandalwood on the eastern perimeter of the territory, otherwise claimed by Portugal, and only yielded when Holland threatened to carry the question of enclaves to a court of arbitration. The results of this conference were embodied in The Hague Convention of 1 October 1904 signed at The Hague. In addition to territorial clauses on the exchange of enclaves, both powers agreed not to cede their rights on Timor to third powers, guaranteed religious liberty in the districts exchanged - a concession by Portugal to its Protestant rival - and promised to submit to arbitration any question arising from the treaty or its execution.⁴¹

While the Portuguese parliament duly ratified the Hague Convention and exchanged instruments of ratification later in the month, still, in 1909, disputes arose again over surveying the eastern boundaries of Oecusse-Ambeno along the line chosen in 1904. At the heart of the dispute was the Noimuti enclave or "exclave" and the Bikumi strip. This dispute was further complicated by the action of a liurai of Oecusse in arresting a chief of Toenbaba. In 1911, however, the Portuguese and the Dutch came to the brink in a contest that Pelissier describes as reminiscent of that of one hundred years earlier. This time around, however, as the Portuguese learned the hard way, the military superiority of the Dutch was overwhelming, just as the resolve of the Dutch Governor General, A.W.F. van Idenburg (1909-16) was determinant. And so, when the Portuguese made incursions into Maucatar in February 1911, they were met the following June with a force of Europeans backed with Ambonese infantry. When on 11 June Portuguese forces occupied Lakmaras on the main border, Batavia decided to reinforce infantry to assure control of the land route between Maucatar via Lakmaras. On 18 July Dutch forces, reinforced via Atapupu, invaded Lakmaras. Sources conflict as to casualties, but three Mozambiquans were killed while the alferes or sub-lieutenant, Francisco da Costa and his party was taken prisoner. Having overwhelmed Portuguese defences the Dutch sued for peace. In any case, notes were exchanged between Lisbon and The Hague. Generally it was agreed to honour the terms of the 1904 Convention. The status quo on Bikumi and Toenbaba was upheld on the eastern boundary of Ambeno although undefined. Noimuti, Tahakay, Tamira Ailala, and Maucatar, however, remained undefined. Many semi-obscure clashes continued through 1911 leading to some exodus of 500 refugees from Portuguese to Dutch territory. By the end of the year, however, as explained in a following chapter, the Portuguese would be overwhelmed by the Manufahi revolt.⁴²

Eventually, both sides agreed to submit the problem to The Hague Court of Arbitration [Arbitration Convention of 3 April 1913]. On 25 June 1914, Charles Lardy, a Swiss member of the Court, brought down a ruling known as the "sentence arbitral". Otherwise favouring the Dutch contention, all enclaves were abolished except for Oecusse. Sensibly, Maucatar was transferred to Portugal and Noimuti, Tahakay, and Taffiroe were transferred to Holland.⁴³

Even though the groundwork of the various border commissions was complete by April 1915, it was only on 21 November 1916 that effective transfers of the territories were made. But the attitude of local peoples varied according to reinos. The population of Tamira Ailala wished to remain Portuguese but in Tahakau the Dutch were welcomed, while in Maucatar around 5,000 of the population deserted the plains and decamped to Dutch Timor. Pelissier believes that the population of Noimuti upheld divided loyalties.⁴⁴ To be sure, as Telkamp comments, "cattle-lifting, spontaneous migration of tribes and other border incidents

were signs of popular protest at the rather arbitrary delimitation of the frontier and oppressive Portuguese rule". 45

With the exception of some incidents in the Pacific and Indian oceans, Timor - was obviously a great distance from theatres of war. Nevertheless, as Sherlock has highlighted, Portuguese Timor also became the object of intra-imperialist ambitions. While the Netherlands had remained neutral in the war, Portugal had acted against the Germans in southwest and east Africa and, after February 1916, joined the Allied side. The matter became real in August 1914 with the arrival of the German cruiser Emden off the eastern tip of Timor. In an act of high theatre occurring under the watch of the feisty Governor Filomeno da Camara, the head of the Tutuala posto boarded the Emden ordering it out of Portuguese waters.⁴⁶

Of concern in official Portuguese circles was that Holland would enter the war against the Allies including Portugal, thus exposing Portuguese Timor in the extreme. Notably, in April 1916, Lisbon received information from Batavia that German ships were present in the Netherlands East Indies, awaiting supplies of arms with a view to advancing on Timor. To this end, in mid-1916, the Governor requested the dispatch from Macau of the gunboat Patria to meet the expected crisis, as shown in the following chapter, the same gunboat used against the Boaventura rebels.⁴⁷ Further anxiety stemmed from conflicting signals in the course of 1917 as to concentrations of Dutch troops near the border, a period when Anglo-Dutch relations were at low ebb.⁴⁸ As Hastings has established, Anglo-Australian concerns stemmed from a mistaken belief that Portugal would do a deal over Timor and sell the colony to some foreign power, Holland, Germany or Japan. Notably, at the end of the war, certain Australian interests lobbied Prime Minister Andrew Fisher to possess the colony.⁴⁹

Again, in 1928, as revealed in an Australian Defence Ministry paper, the purchase of Portuguese Timor was mooted with especial reference to Timor's oil potential and possible strategic importance to Imperial defence. The official Australian position as voiced by Prime Minister S.M. Bruce is as revealing as it is guarded:

My government desires, however, to approach H.M. Government in Great Britain with the request that, should there be any possibility at any time of Portuguese Timor being disposed of by the Portuguese Government - a position which no doubt would be brought to the notice of H.M. Government - steps might be taken to prevent it falling into undesirable hands. 50

While such preposterous designs were never acted upon directly indeed an examination of Portuguese archives reveals no such wavering as to their resolve to keep the flag flying in the Southeast Asian outpost - in future decades, as Shown below, Australia would act upon British advice as much its own interests in seeking to checkmate what was perceived as unseemly Japanese commercial interests in the colony, an attitude that eventually led to the Australian invasion of Portuguese Timor days after Pearl Harbour and prior to the subsequent full-scale invasion by Japan.

As mentioned in the introduction, the diplomatic wrangling over the boundary questions also gave stimulus to the mapping of Timor by the respective powers.

Such Cartesian imperatives also went hand in hand with technological mastery and administrative control. At least this was made evident to officers aboard the gunboat Patria involved in numerous coasting operations in 1912 when pressed into action against rebels in Oecusse, Baucau and on the contra costa or south coast, literally uncharted terrain. As Jaime do Inso, a naval lieutenant aboard this vessel later observe there were great discrepancies between Dutch and British maps of Timor, and like charts for the rest of the eastern islands, were "incomplete and erroneous". Much remained, he laconically remarked, to build on pioneering cartographic work undertaken in 1898.⁵¹

Still, the evolution of Dutch Cartography on Timor was erratic. For example, the Administrative Indeeeling van de Afdeeling Timor (1:500,000, 1911) was drawn on the basis of information derived from reconnaissance and explorer's sketches.

Relief offered sparse hachures showing "little relationship to the actual topography", Depictions of drainage patterns were "inaccurate" and coastlines were "greatly out of position". Similar inaccuracies were reckoned as to the locations of major settlements including headquarters of the Residents. By contrast, the Schetskaart van Timor (Nederlandsch Gebied), 1:250,000, 1920-1941) published by the Topographische Dienst was based on sketch and patrol surveys of 1919. The topography of Timor was shown by contours

and gradient lines for Dutch Timor and form lines for Portuguese Timor. Otherwise this map was viewed as comprehensive as to representations of drainage patterns, coastline, and other physical features, including the transportation patterns and even international and tribal boundary information. Between 1924 and 1941 the Topographische Dienst published 21 sheets covering Dutch Timor (Graadafdeelinbladen van het Eiland Timor 1 - 1 00,000). Superseding earlier versions, these full colour charts were based upon reconnaissance topographic surveys, using theodolite and spirit compass. Described in an American report as "the best physical map available on Dutch Timor", it depicts contours at 50 metre intervals, draining patterns, coastlines, roads, land use, vegetation pattern and native villages. The best official prewar map of Timor was the 1:20,000 scale *Carta da provincia de Portugal* of 1927. Produced in three Colours and printed in Paris this map was still little better than a wall chart. The best prewar map on Portuguese Timor, according to the US report, was that published by the Asia Investment Company, Ltd. (Timor Portuguese, 1:250,000, 1937), which, as shown below, emerged in the prewar period as a Japanese front in Portuguese Timor. Even so, this map offered only a "generalized conception of topography" with "highly selected" cultural features. Roads, while indicated, were questionable as to accuracy of location. In 1941 the Dutch Topographische Dienst copied the map in colour adding place names and a city sketch of Dili at 1:20,000.⁵²

Conclusion

Our study of Dutch-Portuguese rivalry on Timor over long time is not disconnected with the broad question of the making of Timorese identities. It is clear that, from the first contacts with Timor by the two European powers, complex webs of alliances and dependencies were struck that can be described as intergenerational over long time. On Timor these European engendered networks coincided broadly with the mental divisioning of the island into the semi-mythologized *Serviao* and *Belos* divisions. But in the case of the original alliances struck on Timor by Schotte, the principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend appeared to have been well grasped in Timorese statecraft, although it might also have been well apprehended by concerned Timorese that the Dutch approach to crucial issues of trade appeared to have been disconnected from questions of religious loyalty such as engendered in the archipelago by the entreaties of the Dominicans. So, to restate the obvious, the Portuguese system of alliances were almost always double edged in the sense of requiring this or that traditional ruler to swear allegiance to the Crown, the most obvious test being whether he or she would accept the Catholic faith, itself subject to certain basic tests. While each of the European powers offered "protection" to its indigenous clients and camp followers against the depredations of mutual enemies, each sought guaranteed deliveries of sandalwood and other commodities. The *quid pro qua* accepted by native princes or coalitions of princes was a guaranteed market and access to status enhancing trade goods.

What is amazing about this pattern of alliances is that the template of European control over respective territories on the island endured over long time with minimal change. This is all the remarkable considering the rise of Holland as world hegemonic power wielding disproportionate economic and military power both in the European core as much in the colonial periphery, implying also that Portugal's colonial possessions were bound to be consigned over long time to a semi-periphery status. But (where change occurred to ancient loyalties on Timor or in the archipelago it was usually as the result of extraneous factors, and not the fruit of military conquests as might have been expected with Portugal's absolute loss of rank within the European core. Such was the case of the Chinese treason at *Atapupu*, the unconscionable act by *Lopes de Lima* in unilaterally dispossessing Portugal of its historical possessions, or, as in the case of the border demarcations, the results of international fiat clearly beyond the mental horizons of the concerned Timorese who had always upheld kin or trade relations in a fairly fluid manner outside of the legal constraints implied by boundary markers.

In any case, with the Luso-Dutch transfers of territory, Portuguese Timor acquired the boundaries intact down until the Indonesian invasion of 1975. Because of this ancient divisioning of the island, two Timorese idioms emerged, one connected with a Dutch colonial project, but equally to a pan-Indonesian nationalist idiom as it developed in the early decades of this century, and no less obviously, an identity on those parts of the island controlled by Portugal that spoke with a strong Lusitanian identity, incorporating even African

and Indian and Macau Chinese elements which, because of language, faith, and the state-engendered control of Timor's external links, became increasingly disconnected from the cataclysmic events of independent Indonesia and the rest of post-colonial Southeast Asia.

Notes

1. Cesar Guillen-Nujiez, Macau, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1984, pp. 16-17.
2. L.C.D. Freycinet, Voyage autour du monde execute' Fur leg corvettes S.M. l'Utmie et la Physicienne pendant les anne'es 1817-1820, Paris, 1827, pp. 537-715.
3. Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, Histoire Philosophique et Politique Des Etablissements et du Commence des Eunopaens dans leg Deux Indes, Tome Premier, Jean-Leonard Pellet, G6n6ve, 1782, pp. 225-6.
4. Anne Lombard-Jourdan, "Infortunes d'un Prince de Timor Aceuei li en France sous Louis XV", Archipel, Vol.16, 1978, pp. 91-133.
5. Anne Lombard-Jourdan, "Un m6moire in6dit de F.E. de Rosily sur l'ne de Timor (1772)", Archipel, Vol.23, 1982, pp. 75-104.
6. William Sowash, "Colonial Rivalries in primor", The Far Eastern Quarterly, VII, No.3, May 1948, p. 231.
7. C.H. Boxer, "Portuguese Timor: A Rough Island Story: 1515-1960", History Today, May 1960, pp. 354-355.
8. Peter G. Spillet, Forsaken Settlement: An Illustrated History of the Settlement of Hctoria, Port Essington, North Australia, 1838-1849, Landowne Press, Melbourne, 1972, p. 35.
9. "A Manuscript Chart of the Island of Timor", <http://www.lowendahl.com/p91.htm>. According to the description offered on this site, along with a graphic reproduction in miniature, the chart was drafted in either Batavia or Amsterdam by an anonymous mapmaker. It is drawn in ink and wash on paper bearing the watermark of J. Honig & Zoonen and pasted to the size of 91 A 58.5 cm with names and detail in Dutch but with late 18th and early 19th Century annotations in French. Drawn to the scale of 1 :450,000.
10. de Freycinet, Voyage, pp. 555-557.
11. Ibid, p. 537.
12. J.H. Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries, Frank Cass, 1837.
13. de Freycinet, Voyage, pp. 538-539.
14. Ibid.
15. Fox, Harvest, p. 127; E.S. de Klerck, History of the Netherlands Indies, (Vol.II, Brusse, Rotterdam, 1938, p.96.
16. de Freycinet, Voyage, pp. 538-539.
17. Sowash, "Colonial Rivalries", p. 232.
18. Freycinet, Voyage, p. 556.
19. Bento da Franga, Macau e os seus Habitantes: RelaEO'es com Timor, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 1897, p.267.
20. Rend P61issie Timor en Guerre, Le Crocodile et les Portugese (1847-1913), Orgeval, 1996, pp. 2830.
21. C.A. Montalto de Jesus, Historic Macao: Intemational Traits in China Old and New, Salesian Printing Press and Tipografla Mercanti1, 1926. Although credited with certain improvements during his spell as Governor of Goa (September 1840-42), Lopes de Lima was deposed by military revolt, an event, however, which evidently did not damage his career. He went on to author a massive official study of Portugal's colonial possessions entitled Ensaio sobre a Estatstica das Possess6es Portuguesas da AJh'ca Occidental e Oriental na China, e na Oceania. I can con finn the publication of three volumes of this work published by Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, I 844, but not the adveTised volume three on Macau, p11imor e Solor.
22. P61issier, Tl'mOr en Guenne, p. 33.
23. Ibid., pp. 33-36.
24. Boxer, "Portuguese Timor", p. 355.
25. Montalto de Jesus, Historic Macao, pp. 413-415.
26. Affonso de Castro, As possess6es portuguesas na oceania, Imprensa Nacional Lisboa, p. 180.
27. F.J.S. de Klerk, History of the Netherlands Indies, Vol.II, Brusse, Rotterdam, 1938, p. 318.
28. H. Krieger (ed.), East Tl'mOr and the Intemational Community: Basic Documents, Cambddge

University Press, Melbourne, 1997, pp. 1-3.

29. de Klerk, *History of the Netherlands Indies*, p. 384, 471.

30. Kal Muller (ed.), *East of Bali: From LDmbok to Tl'mOr*, Periplus Editions, Berkeley/Singapore, 1991 pp.140-141.

31. Gerald Telkamp, "The Economic structure of an outpost in the outer islands in the Indonesian Archipelago: Portuguese Timor 1850-1975", a, P Creutzberg, *Between People and Statistics*, MaTinus NLhoff, p'l'he Hague, 1979, p. 72.

32. Jh1l ando Pinto Correia, *Tl'mOr de Le'S a uS*, Agencia Geral das Colonias, Lisboa, 1944, p. 299.

33. P61issier, *Tl'mOr en Guenle*, PP. 38-39.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 219-220.

35. Sowash, "Colonial Rivaldes"; de Klerk, *Histoiy Of the Netherlands Indies*, p. 472.

36. *A Voz do Ctente* (Macau), 29 Julho 1893 and 12 Mareo 1882.

37. Sowash, "Colonial fualries".

38. anon, *Portuguese Tl'mOr*, Historical Section of the F'oreign OfTICe, HM Stationery Office, 110ndon, 1920, pp. 7-9.

39. Sowash, "Colonial mvalries", p. 233; Xiieger, *East Tl'mOr and the Intemational Communiy*, pp. 2-3.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 234.

41. *Ibid.*

42. P6lissieTimor en Guerre, pp. 238-239, 248-252.

43. Krieger (ed.), *East Timor and the International Community*, pp. 5-17.

44. P6lissieTimor en Guerre, p. 302.

45. Telkamp, "The Economic Structure", p. 72.

46. Kevin Sherlock, "Timor during World Wars I and II: Some Notes on Sources", *Kabar Sebemng*, 1988, Nos. 19+20.

47. *rbid.*, pp. 50-51.

48. CxIO8-525/0, 0 Governo de Timor; requisieao dos servigos da Canhoneira Pdtria naquela Provincia, 1 June, 1916 and CxIO8-5250, Governor of Timor, Dili to Governor, Macau, 14 Abril 1916.

49. Peter Hastings, "The Th10r Problem - II, Some Australian Attitudes, 1903N1941", *Australian Outlook* 29, No.2, 1975, passim.

50. AA Vie MP124/6 482/201/206, Defence Minister paper on Timor Oil fields in "Timor Oil fields".

51. Jaime do Inso, *rimor-1912*, Cosmos, Lisboa, 1939, p. 97.

52. Oifice Of Strategic Services, "Map jhalysis of Java to Timer", Washington, 9 August 1945, Reel 5 of 21.

8

The Anti-Tax Rebellions (1860-1912)

There is merit in viewing the rebellions commencing in 1860 as of a qualitatively different order than those of the earlier epoch though there may be certain leitmotif or themes running through all anti-colonial rebellions in Timor. Certainly, as Lawson has commented, the Lisbon treaty of 1859 with the Dutch signalling the end to almost two centuries of fighting and war between the two colonial powers in Timor gave the Portuguese the opportunity to start with the actual occupation of the territory. But, as Lawson acknowledges from her reading of De Araujo, territorial control coincided with important economic changes, namely the need by the colonial power to organize land and labour on a new basis, especially as the traditional source of income, sandalwood, had been badly depleted by centuries of over cutting without reforestation badly affecting sources of government income. 1

We should also not ignore shifts in technology that made the crushing of rebellions possible by the nineteenth century, namely the albeit delayed shift from sail power to steam power commensurate with the

deployment of Better trained, organized, and requisitioned colonial troops. At the same time, the ability of the rebellious liurai to keep up the resistance must also have been facilitated by the licit and illicit trade in firearms, averaging imports of a round 1000 annually until prohibition was enforced in the 1880s.²

As we have seen in Chapter 5, it was to coffee that Governor Affonso de Castro turned and with labour supplied by forced cultivation along the lines of Dutch Governor van den Bosch's infamous Culture System as implemented in Java from the 1830s. Veritable "coffee wars", as Pelissier styles them, de Castro's new dispensation was clearly based upon the erroneous assumption that the subjects would willingly deliver up their labour power in the grandiose project of rescuing the fisc. To be sure, the position of Governor of Timor was no sinecure in the year between 1867- 1894. A dozen insurrections and revolts, the assassination of a Governor and other intrigues guaranteed that this would be so. But was all rebellion necessarily anti-colonial?

Not at all. Pelissier contends that conflict between the reino was as frequent as wars waged against the despised malai.³

While we are concerned in this chapter of find logic in the succession of rebellions that washed over the island of Timor, especially in the way of finding a correlated behaviour between outside pressures and native responses, we should not at the same time ignore the quality of Warfare in Timor, the Timorese-fun which, to outsiders, offered up highly ritualized and irrational features but which also revealed a leitmotif across generations or at least imparted an inter-generational quality to rebellion in Timor.

Colonial Pacification and Rebellion in Timor

It is notable that one year after the 1859 Lisbon treaty, the colony was divided into ten districts by Governor de Castro. To this end, first ten and then eleven district military commands were established to head districts assisted by a secretary. As the embryo of the modern politico-administrative system on Timor these commands were centred on, respectively, Dili, Manatuto, Viqueque, Lautem, Vemasse, Alas, Buursuco, Cailaco, Maubara, and Batugede. Oecusse was added in 1863.⁴

In theory, according to Pelissier, the system was that of indirect rule. The Batalhao Defensor forces or the mixed force of Portuguese, Goanese, Macanese, and Mozambiquans created by Governor Luis Augusto de Almeida Macedo were, by law, forbidden to interfere in the internal administration of the reinos, and required the prior consent of the liurai before central government orders could be executed. While de Castro's new dispensation represented a departure from established Portuguese colonial doctrine, as Pelissier points out, in practice, the low calibre of officers and soldiers in the field meant that the autonomy of the reinos was often breached with impunity.⁵

It was also the case, as Lawson observes, that the leaders of about 50 petty kingdoms were not consulted at all. Rather, they were confronted with "new forms of administrative interference". In addition, the liurais were ordered to grow coffee and expected to yield 20 per cent of their harvest to the Portuguese authorities. The Portuguese also interfered in the Timorese subsistence economy. Those kingdoms not cultivating coffee were obliged to offer up one-tenth of their rice-harvest. But while rice was not the most important crop in many areas, it was important for all kinds of Ceremonies and feasts. In line with the Dutch model, the Timorese were obliged to sell their coffee to the Portuguese authorities for a price set by the colonial administration. Equally, the onus was placed upon native chiefs to oblige their people to cultivate coffee on their land and to deliver up their labour to state-owned plantations.⁶

Lawson comments that the "granting of Military ranks, levying of fintas, forced cultivation of cash crops and the division in districts controlled by Portuguese military officials...were not only measures which gradually embedded the kingdoms into a colonial system, the liurais also became more directly dependent upon the Portuguese authorities". She continues: "Forced cultivation of cash crops, forced and contract labour, illegal recruitment and starvation wages, became all parts of a far from admirable colonial policy".

The finta, Pelissier writes, actually became the central "symbol of Submission" for the native population, a political tax cutoff from all demographic and political reality.

Fixed at an insignificant Sum of 2,803 rupees annually, it grew over the years until in 1866 the reinos had defaulted to the tune of 60,000 rupees or double the totality of Budget receipts of Timor and twenty times over their annual fixed assessment. In Pelissier's acerbic comment, "What better demonstration of the absence of Submission to colonial power than the powerlessness of the fisc to facilitate the montagnards to

pay up?"⁸

But this was three years before the Royal edict of 25 February 1869 abolishing slavery in Portugal and possessions. It remains to be seen what such concessions to metropolitan liberalism this brought the Timorese!

Rebellion of 1861

In 1861, almost immediately after de Castro's new -rationalization came into effect, the petty kingdoms of Lacle, and Ulmera, both near Dili, revolted. Governor de Castro met these rebellions with force. It also happens that, thanks to Governor de Castro's penchant for setting the record straight, the 1861 revolt remains one of the best documented, although it is also the case that on the question of causation, the governor is less forthcoming. In de Castro's words, not a ripple disturbed the tranquillity of the colony when in January 1861 he left for Java to "recuperate". The following month, however, Duarte Leao Cabreira, appointed Governor ad interim, learnt of the default by workers on public works project in a reino to the west of Dili, signalling an act of insubordination, albeit a form of Passive resistance. The following month news was received in Dili of Preparations for war on the part of the reino of Lacle situated about 40 kilometres east of Dili astride strategic communications between the capital and Manatuto. An emissary was then dispatched to enquire about dissatisfaction provoked by a certain lieutenant colonel. The spark, which ignited rebellion, according to de Castro, was the provocative actions of a veteran Portuguese sergeant killed and decapitated after entering enemy territory. ⁹

On 6 April Governor de Castro staged a timely return and assumed command. He did not return empty-handed from the Dutch colony. This was a time of rare good relations between the ancient adversaries and de Castro brought with him some badly needed weapons and ammunition. Cabreira a veteran soldier in the colony, expert on Timor affairs, and also one of the pioneers of coffee plantation, was dispatched to Manatuto to establish a base of operations against Lacle while the Governor sought to rally the loyal reino of Liquisa to advance on Ulmera, leading centre of rebellion located some 15 kilometre west of Dili. But even when Cabreira installed himself in Manatuto one and a half months later, he could only rely upon forces from Vermasse. Manatuto's sympathies were with Lacle, and, in the west, a number of reinos, especially including Maubara recently retroceded from the Dutch, held common cause with Ulmera.¹⁰

On 10 June the Governor called down a state of emergency in Dili and distributed arms to citizens while preparing Dili's defences. So drastic was the situation that even the Capitao China was called upon to "arm all Chinese, their children and their slaves". ¹¹

The Governor could also handily call upon the support of 40 jundus or Indian soldiers, exiled to Timor following their defection from British forces after the Sepoy rebellion of 1857.¹²

Although de Castro had taken the pre caution of calling upon reinforcements from Goa in the form of troop and supplies, he knew that this would be long in coming.

Taking no chances, and calling upon his close contacts in the neighbouring colony, de Castro requested reinforcements from the Dutch authorities in the Moluccas. In a rare gesture of intra-colonial collaboration in this part of the world, the Governor General in Batavia authorized the dispatch of the steam corvette Citadelle d'Anvers, arriving in Dili on 22 June. Although the request for troops was declined, the demonstration effect of this new type of Naval power was salutary. After three days in Dili, the corvette moved east along the coast to Manatuto.

The Manatuto camp rallied and drove the rebels from their forward positions. In the event, the battle against Lacle, first commenced in April, did not conclude until 26 August after a succession of armed assaults on the part of the colonial columns and running guerrilla warfare on the part of Lacle. Even though the re gent of Lacle sued for peace, de Castro wished to make an example of This rebel lion by reducing the Lacle camp to ashes and offering carte blanche to his native retainers to bum, pillage, and collect heads. The state of Siege on Dili was lifted, and the order du jour sounded publicly by drum and read in loud voice proclaimed amnesty to surviving rebels who requested mercy and who disposed of their arms.

It only remained for the victorious troops to return to Dili with the bones of the unfortunate sergeant, later buried with state honours. ¹³

What is more remarkable in de Castro's account is the kind of Ceremonial triumphalism with which victor

was celebrated, even if more battles awaited before the monsoon rains set in. As de Castro lugubriously describes the scene: "In the middle of the public square, an arch of Triumph was erected, surmounted by nags and banners, one inscribed with two verses from Camões". De Castro himself was installed in a strategically placed tent from which muttered the nag of Portugal. In front of him filed a guard of honour of Mountain tribesmen and irregulars. Fifty mounted warriors uttering blood-curdling cries staged a pass-by. All paused for three hurrahs, one for the King of Portugal, one for the nation of Portugal and one for the Governor. For the piece de resistance, Timorese women performed a tabadaes dance around the severed heads of the prisoners (actually only six prisoners and ten severed heads, unusually small for a campaign of Six months). Such "fantastic" scenes were replayed in the Manatuto camp in honour of the victorious "cutters of heads". 14

Yet before we condemn de Castro for his apparent acquiescence in barbarity, we should reflect, as seen in a succeeding chapter, that this bizarre ceremony was also replayed in Dili by Governor Filomeno da Camara in the age of the Republic.

But no sooner had this stage of the campaign wound up than revolt ignited in the west. Faced with the quandary of the approaching rains and the matter of fact that Timorese were reluctant to supply warriors at a time when they customarily tended their gardens, de Castro announced that he would personally command the forces, thus calling upon the loyalty and fidelity of the chiefs to the Crown and its representative in Timor. On 18 September 1,200 armed native forces assembled on the great square in Dili, the largest assembly ever seen. Despite setbacks and some indiscipline, the Governor's Party arrived in the reino of the rebel raja. Now joined by men of Liquisa, the Governor rallied 3,000 men, eventually pressed into a final assault on rebel headquarters. Taken prisoner, the raja and his son were transported to Dili where another elaborate surrender ceremony was staged, with the captive raja obliged to kneel before the nag and governor and obliged to pay heavy indemnities. This was concluded with the inevitable festival of heads. As de Castro wrote of this rebellion: "Il faut employer la force non-pour tyranniser, mais pour obeir aux loi et contraindre au travail un peuple indolent". 15

Several months later (March 1862) a corvette arrived in Timor from Macau, too late for the purposes of crushing the 1861 rebellion, but bringing much needed money and troops, and helping, in de Castro's words "to consolidate our domination, to boost the precarious state of our administrative personnel, to favour all the sources of commerce and industry in our colony". 16

This was an allusion to the governor's plans to open coffee plantations in each reino, starting especially with Liquisa and Manatuto. It was in the context of this rebellion that de Castro decided to appoint military detachments in each district to break the relative autonomy of the kingdoms.

But what was the real cause of this rebellion, involving two peoples, one Tetum speaking and one Mambai speaking? There seems to be no specific link between the two, unless it was a broad opportunistic push at driving the malai into the ocean at a time when the Governor was absent from the colony and when colonia defences did not look impressive. Or, in the case of Ulmera, was it a revolt against the imposition of corvee as de Castro hints, at a time when the state commenced to place great demands upon locally recruited corvee labour to conduct public works at Lahane? Or, as Pelissier speculates, was the Ulmera revolt connected with the actions of Dom Carlos, the liurai of Maubara, who could not even be convinced by a visiting Dutch warship from Kupang to accept the de jure retrocession of his kingdom back to Portugal? 17

In June 1863, Laga in the Makassai country revolted in what may be regarded as part of the great revolt of Laçlo. In retaliation, colonial forces dispatched by Governor Jose Manuel Pereira de Almeida destroyed the population centre of the revolt. These actions, led by a "battle experienced corporal" resulted in the capture of the rebel chief of Laçlo, one of the original instigators of the 1861 rebellion. But this Governor lasted only one year of his term, otherwise forced to withdraw from the colony two months before his successor could arrive in the face of a revolt by the guard over nonpayment of Salaries and opposition to his alleged dictatorial attitude. In a sequel to this affair, European and Timorese members of the Batalhao Defensor mutinied against an inner circle of Goanese officials, killing an Indian alferes, the Capitao China, and driving the Indians to Batugede. 18

Until incoming Governor J. Eduardo da Costa Meneses arrived in 1864, the colony was governed by a council comprised of the commander of the garrison, judge, and head of customs and mission. A former Governor of Sao Tome, Costa Meneses sought to solve the financial crisis, the catalyst behind the rebellion by taking out a loan with the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies. Virtually deserting office by

returning to Lisbon on sick leave, the Governor was arraigned before a court for abusing his privileges on the loan question. He died during the enquiry.¹⁹

The British traveller Bickmore, who visited Dili a few months after this event, learnt that, passing through Macassar on the way home, the hapless Governor had no means to pay his passage back to Europe.²⁰

It was left to Governor Francisco Teixeira da Silva to redress the deleterious effect caused by the mutiny, by annulling the promotions and salary increases brought down by his predecessor.²¹

Later, it was the turn of -Fatumasse to revolt and, in turn, to be put down. In this operation the colonial forces were assisted by the regulo of Ermera.²²

The following year the Portuguese Chamber of Deputies heard a harrowing account of the state of affairs in Timor as presented by the Minister of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs:

These repeated uprisings and raids require that we arrange ourselves in a situation which might facilitate the fulfilment of the obligations contracted on receiving sovereignty and dominion over the country. It is important to pay serious attention to toning down the customs of the natives in progressively modifying the cruelty of their practices, in moulding them to our ways, in instilling in them respect for the laws, above all in confronting them with loving Catholic instruction [*amoravel catechese catholica*] so potent a course for those crudities and cruelties, and so essentially useful.²³

Citing de Araujo, Lawson observes that in 1865 the military troops of Governor Teixeira da Silva were attacked by Timorese fighters in Cotubaba on the north coast and within the Batugede military district. Meanwhile, the major reinos of Cova and Balibo also joined forces and revolted. In response, the coastal areas of the colony then under revolt were bombarded by the thirteen-gun steam corvette, *Sa de Bandeira*.²⁴

Clearly, this action represented a new balance of forces in the colony with the technological means for victory changing in favour of the European power, at least in the coastal districts. Yet, as seen below, despite the obvious technological superiority of the Portuguese, such kingdoms as Cova managed to stay independent into this century. In any case, the Portuguese presence was still very thin on the ground and largely concentrated in the northern littoral. The south coast remained virtually uncharted territory, at least until the final conquest of 1912.

Rebellion in Vemasse, Lermean and Saniry (1867)

As observed in August 1867 by Governor Teixeira da Silva, the people of Vemasse, a reino on the northeast coast including Laga in the Makassai country, rebelled against Lalcia in the way of Staging a siege or encirclement. The Governor, accompanied by a force of Soldiers joined by "guards" supplied by friendly reinos of Montael, Hera, Laculo, and Manatuto, marched on the scene of revolt, lifted the siege, and ended the standoff. This was done by replacing the reino of Vemasse, the main cause of Vemasse's grievances, by his deputy who swore allegiance to Portugal and signed a bond of good relations with the people and his neighbours. The Governor also persuaded the near "independent" reinos of Futuro and Saran to pledge allegiance, ²⁵

Although as subsequent history proved, such pledges secured under duress of ten proved spurious.

Fifteen years later, however, disputes between the regulos of Laleila and Vemasse again dared up. This time the blame was placed at the feet of the commander of the military district of Vemasse who was dismissed for negligence.

The anthropologist Forman writes that the incorporation of the Makassai only took place in the last decade of the nineteenth century. According to local lore, the ancestors to heirs to the principedom of Letemumo arrived in the Vemasse region from Larantuca via Oecusse in the expectation that the Portuguese would establish their capital in the area. A century later, in this version, they were rewarded by the Portuguese when one Don Domingos da Costa Freitas, alias Gali Kai, a Galoli speaker, was made "little king" of Vemasse. Along with certain paraphernalia of office, he was accorded right to tribute from the inhabitants of his kingdom. While, as explained above, this pact with the Portuguese evidently broke down with the rebellion of 1867, two years later, Gali Kai's son, Don Francisco da Costa Freitas, a native aide de camp of the Governor, was named head of the kingdom of Baucau, which incorporated the Makassai of the north

coast. In turn, his son-in-law, Tomas de Costa Soares, was elevated to the "little king of Letumumo in the same year.

Forman explains that although the "little king" system was done away with at the turn of the century, Dom Francisco retained the prestige of his office until his death in 1922, then assumed by Dom Tomas, until his death in 1929.²⁶

In what was described in an official Portuguese report as an anti-tax rebellion-and there is no need to doubt that description- the Kingdom of Lernean, speakers of Kemac, rebelled against Portuguese authority in early 1867. At that time Lernean was a reino in the central part of the island, notionally under the military command of Maubara. In an unequal demonstration of Military prowess, Governor Teixeira da Silva called upon military power to crush the rebellion. In the resulting battle that saw a 48-hour defence by the rebels against overwhelming fire-power, 15 villages were occupied and burned. While Timorese casualties are not mentioned in this report, the Portuguese side suffered two killed and eight wounded. The captured lands were then partitioned out to neighbouring kingdoms. The report continued, "the example being set, the chief of the Kingdom of Artessabe [Atsabe] -it was hoped- would also render vassalage and pay taxes".²⁷ In 1868 the Portuguese dispatched a military force to Saniry (Sanir) whose reino refused to pay taxes. Sanir also speakers of Kemak, were notionally tributary to Balibo and came under the Batugede military command.

Rebellion in Cova (1868)

Rebellion in Cova had evidently been simmering for many years and was deemed sufficiently threatening to the status quo in the colony that in the course of 1868 a major exercise in military power was required to pacify the disputed area. This also occurred on Governor Teixeira da Silva's watch, although carried on by his successor.

The Tetum-speaking reino of Cova extended its authority to the north coast of the island including parts of Dutch Timor. One worrying aspect for the Portuguese must have been that the rebels in Cova were joined by a number of regulos from the west and from the interior who had otherwise sworn loyalty to Holland. At this juncture, Governor Teixeira da Silva declared martial law in Dili, and proceeded to organize a considerable force to storm the rebels. The fort at Batugede, otherwise located in Cova domains, was mobilized to serve as centre of Military operations.²⁸

On 20 August 1868, Portuguese forces attacked and destroyed three fortified settlements located within the rebel kingdom. Led by regular forces dispatched from Dili, and backed by irregulars from Manatuto, Viqueque, and Luca, under the command of the "loyal" regent of Manatuto, the Portuguese attacked the rebel headquarters with bombs and rockets inflicting heavy Casualties while sustaining one killed and one wounded on their side.²⁹

That was not the end of the story, however. Within the month, the Portuguese forces were obliged to retreat to the security afforded by Batugede. As described in the official report, "well-entrenched rebel fortes inflicted a punishing eighty-three casualties, including chief of the Laelo irregulars". Governor Teixeira da Silva responded to this debacle by dispatching two howitzers and two campaign pieces, a reinforcement of 1,200 men drawn from the regular army, the loyal moradores, and among the loyal reinos of Barique, Laleia, Ermera, Cailaco, and Alas. The strategy he planned was to move on Cova in a pincer movement deploying 800 men to the north of Batugede, with the balance deployed in another direction.³⁰

A month later, the Cova campaign was declared "unfinished". This time, additional forces were called upon from Oecusse, Ambeno, Cailaco, and Ermera with a view to assembling at Batugede before delivering a decisive blow to the rebels.³¹

Defeat of the rebel forces was never in doubt, however. All that remained for the colonial power was to finesse the victory. This was to be achieved both ceremonially and symbolically. On the appointed day in May 1871, the then Governor of the colony, Joao Climaco de Carvalho, arrived with entourage in Batugede for a rendezvous with the Queen of Cova and the Queen of Balibo, who had sided with the former in the rebellion. As the Governor wrote before the event, the "submission" ceremony was to be held with the "greatest possible solemnity...and customary formalities". But, while the Queen of Balibo and entourage showed up at the appointed time on 29 May, the formidable Queen of Cova, Dona Maria Pires, made no such appearance. While the Queen of Balibo fell in line with Portuguese demands, it is clear that the terms

of "vassalage" dictated by the victors were unremitting. This is revealed by the text of the submission signed and pledged by the Queen of Balibo, Dona Maria Michaelia Doutel da Costa, at Batugede on 1 June 1871. On this occasion the traditional leader of Balibo expressed her repentance for "disobedience" to Dom Luiz I, King of Portugal, swore upon the Holy Gospels "vassalage, fidelity and obedience" to the King and his legitimate representatives in Timor, swore "to Pay the taxes of the kingdom", and pledged "to give help in war, and to render whatever other service may be ordered of Me by the same Sirs Governors". 32

In fact, it was not until early 1881 that the Governor of Timor could categorically inform Macau that the Kingdom of Cova had submitted to Portuguese authority. An interesting gloss on the modus operandi of Native forces alongside colonial regulars in quelling the Cova rebellion is supplied by the Captain of the corvette Sa da Bandeira that arrived in Dili on 20 April 1870 after an eventful voyage from Macau via Surabaya. In seeking to explain the 1868 debacle of Cotubaba, 9 which brought down "disrespect and discredit upon Portuguese authority", this report observed that the native auxiliaries were only offered gunpowder and some arms and were otherwise lacking in materials except those which they may have acquired at their own cost one can imagine the disciplinary consequences of the requirement which obliged them to forage for their own food. Further, according to the report, "for the most part, the regulos of Timor were linked by barlaques or pagan marriages". Thus the irony should not be lost that "the Portuguese are at war with a regulo who is a vassalo mano of another; that the other one gives us men for the war, but gives as many or more to his ally. Thus it frequently occurs that men from the same regulo are in both camps; and it is easy to imagine how they resolve the difficulty: when it comes to the point of fighting each other they fire into the air". As the rapporteur of this account observed, "It is a case of God is good, but the Devil isn't bad either". 33

Revolt of the Moradores (1887)

Undoubtedly, the Portuguese colony of Timor reached a nadir in 1887 when the hapless Governor Alfredo de Lacerda e Maia (1885-87) was assassinated by a group of Moradores on 3 March 1887 in an ambush perpetrated on the road from Dili to Lahane.

Dili was described in the Macau press as in a state of "completo terror". 34

From the time of the founding of Lifau, as mentioned, the military forces in Timor comprised three elements, the moradores, the Bidau and the Sica, deemed second line I forces. But where the Bidau and the Sica, as mentioned, resided with their families in a distinct quarter of Dili, and even spoke a particular creolized version of Portuguese, the moradores were native Timorese raised as levees. They were neither salaried, uniformed, or offered provisions. They were recruited from loyal reinos in numbers proportional to their population. In the 1880s the moradores were divided between Dili, Batugede with a detachment of 70 and Manatuto with a detachment of 56.

At the time of the rebellion, the main front line defences of the colony included batalhao defensor force made up of 100 to 150 European soldiers to whom answered an equal or larger numbers of Indian and Timorese soldiers.35

The incoming Governor, Ant6nio Joaquim Garcia, was mandated to enquire, prosecute, and imprison those implicated in the crime. While the motive appears to have been the excesses committed in the name of the Governor by his secretary, Francisco Ferreira, identification and arrest of the culprits, as opposed to scapegoats, was not easy. Nor was it easy to disband the moradores, as had been suggested. First, certain had headed for the hills where mass rallies of armed men were reported in Liquisa and much "agitation" in the reinos, especially Manatuto. Second, in the absence of genuine public opinion in Timor, Macau, via its vibrant media, wished to uphold the rule of law and avoid vengeance and dictatorial rule. In the event, certain of the accused -or scapegoats- were placed aboard the gunboat Rio Lima, dispatched to Macau, and there imprisoned in the formidable Monte fort. Others, notably Lucas Martins, the regulo of Motael, was acquitted by the Tribunal or court of Goa, thanks to the "brilliant" defence by a Timorese missionary.36

Needless to say this event shook the Portuguese establishment in Timor more than anything. In the words of French historian Gabriel Defert, Governor da Lacerda Maia's assassination actually marked the beginning of an insurrection jointly conducted by numerous liurais but led by Dom Duarte and his son Don Boaventura of Manufahi.37

Revolt of the Maubara (1893)

Claims on land and tax were also part of the new order of Demands imposed by colonial capitalism in the periphery. Portuguese Timor by the early decades of this century was no exception to this axiom. According to Dunn, rebellion in Timor in the modern period stemmed from a general decline in political and economic conditions. Specifically, most of the native rulers reacted angrily to attempts by Governor António Francisco da Costa (1887-88) -successor to the ill-fated Governor Lacerda Maia- to assert a tighter military and administrative control over the land, especially by the introduction of a more effective tax collection. The revolt of the Maubara commencing in 1893 during the watch by Governor Cipriano Forjaz (1891-94) was a case in point. The Maubara, one of the most important kingdoms to the west of Dili, unleashed a series of uprisings that devastated much of the central section of the colony.³⁸

In this affair, according to Esparteiro, a Portuguese military historian, the regulo of Maubara, in full rebellion, attacked the postos of Dare and Fatuboro and killed several troops of the guard. He then proceeded to offer up the captured territory to the Dutch. At this point the government once again called upon the gunboat, Diu.

Leaving Macau on 13 June, the Diu arrived of Dili eight days later, having made a course across the South China Sea through the Sulu and Moluccas straits. Decades earlier such a rapid response would of course have been impossible. Within short time the Diu launched a naval bombardment on Fatuboro. Equipped with Krupp cannons and rapid-firing Hotchkiss guns, the Diu made short work of a rebel counter-attack. The process was repeated off Dare, but, in this case, a landing party, comprising 37 African soldiers, 220 men of Liquisa, 60 men of Maubara, 96 moradores and 204 others, succeeded in lowering the Dutch flag and restoring Portuguese authority. Meantime, early the following month, Manuel de Azevedo Gomes, captain of the Diu who also held the position of commander of the Macau naval station, issued an ultimatum in the name of the King of Portugal, addressed to the regulo of Atabai, also in revolt. The demonstration effect of the onslaught on Maubara was evidently salutary as on 14 July the regulo of Atabai swore allegiance to the Portuguese authority as well as to Cotubaba and, accordingly, agreed to pay up various indemnities in the form of Money, buffaloes, and pigs, to both Cotubaba and the Portuguese, as appropriate. The Diu, having made its statement with blood, withdrew as dramatically as it arrived, in the direction of the Flores Sea, arriving back in Macau on 2 August.³⁹

The macabre result of the Maubara massacre was recorded with rare candour by Jose da Silva, head of the newly created Dili branch of the Macau and Timor health service. Noting the correspondence between the putrefying animal and human corpses strewn around Maubara and the sudden incidence of Cholera in the colony, nor just Maubara but also Tibar, Atapupu and Alor, he commented that, just like the colonial wars fought by the Dutch in Sumatra (against the Padris and the Acehnese) and the British in Egypt, so it was probable that the cholera epidemic then current in Timor had its direct origins in the military campaign against Maubara.⁴⁰

Guerra de Manufahi (1894)

After a veritable roulette of Governors, the situation of anarchy and economic devastation was inherited by incoming Governor Celestino da Silva (1894-1908), by which time the banner of rebellion had been taken up for the Timorese by Don Boaventura of Same (Manufahi).⁴¹

Lawson observes that military and administrative measures taken by Governor Celestino da Silva were eventually decisive in Portugal's attempts to gain full territorial control over the colony. As a matter of course, the governor increased the number of Military posts and launched numerous "carnages" in his pacification war on certain kingdoms.⁴²

These took the form of three major offensives; in October 1894 against Lamaquitos, Agassa, Volguno and Luro-Bote; in March 1895 against Fatumane, Fohorem, Lalaba, Cassabau, Calalo, Obulo and Marabo, and the most intractable, that mounted in August 1895, directed against the reino of Manufahi. It is notable that under Celestino's rules the terms of vassalage of a number of rebel reinos was drawn up. These included, besides Maubara (November 1893), Hera and Dailor (January 1894), Fatumane (September 1895), and Boebau and Luca (April 1896).

These ritualized documents sworn in the name of the King of Portugal, cannot always be taken at face

value, especially when they were signed under duress. Nor did such written documents guarantee that resistance would not be continued in other forms on other occasions. Lawson observes that in 1895 the kings of Manufahi, Raimean, and Suai united various population groups or kingdoms by means of Blood pact. Citing de Araujo, she continues that, meanwhile, the king of Manufahi, Dom Duarte, sent his son, Dom Boaventura to Cailaco, Atsabe, Balibo and other kingdoms to find support for a large scale revolt the kingdom of Manufahi, attacked from three sides by colonial forces along with some 12,000 Timorese, held off, at least until 1896 when the colonial power succeeded in taking several strategic positions.⁴³

The cost of victory was not cheap. On the one hand, the Batugede fort was temporarily occupied by rebels from Fatumean at a time when the local garrison was called upon to defend other sectors. On the other hand, as the Macau archives reveal, in July 1896 Celestino da Silva requested Macau to pay 15,000-20,000 patacas to cover the cost of Munitions used against the rebels. War, Celestino da Silva lectured his metropolitan audience in a report written in 1896, is very different in Timor compared to other colonies, "unique" even alongside the African colonies.

Specifically, he referred to unique topography, and the unique character of the Timorese. A narrow coastal plain giving way to an extraordinary mountainous topography inhibits the transport of Munitions while combat took the form of a series of running assaults mounted from fortified positions on mountain heights. Where European forces soon wilted under the suffocating heat, Timorese warriors easily survived on a daily ration of Corn, rice and water. The ability of the Timorese to form alliances of conveniences among the different reinos, he considered a major military problem. And while Portuguese were regarded as eternal foreigners or malai, so were the moradores considered malai-meta. While Celestino blamed the Chinese of a tapupu and other smugglers for inflaming the rebellions, it is hard to attribute a single cause to this long simmering sequence of rebellions. But, he counselled, the avoidance of future wars depended upon the calibre of the military and civilian officials as well as the good works of the missionades.⁴⁴

There is also the sense that Celestino was about setting the record straight for posterity, or at least in heading off his detractors, whom, as we shall see, went for his jugular. The other side of Celestino's pacification mission was of course his desire to open up the country for exploitation of what he recognized was its vast potential as a plantation production and export base for coffee grown on its good soils with docile and cheap labour. As a way of overcoming what he called the natural "indolence" of the native, it was imperative that the government open up schools in various parts of the country to teach the basics of agriculture science.⁴⁵

Needless to say, Timorese casualties in these African-style pacification campaigns were enormous. Eventually, in 1900, facing a general massacre) having lost the support of Defeated allies, and suffering from an evident cholera epidemic, the kingdom of Manufahi surrendered. While certain colonial opinion believed this victory a decisive blow for the pacification of the colony, in 1902 the Portuguese were again confronted with rebellions in Ainaro, and with rebellions breaking out in Letefoho, Aileu (1903), Quelicai (1904), and Manufahi again in 1907.⁴⁶

Meanwhile, as discussed in the following chapter, the *fintas* were replaced by a per capita tax to be paid in cash, the nonplus ultra for the implantation of a truly colonial economy. In a further administrative rationalization aimed at reducing the authority of the *liurai*, the Portuguese intervened in the area of conflict resolution, taking the matter out of the hands of the *liurai* and placing all judicial questions in the hands of Colonial authority.⁴⁷

Conclusion

Teofilo Duarte, Governor of Timor from 1926-28, wrote of Governor Celestino da Silva's expeditions against rebel forces as involving "an enormous expense of Money and the adoption of Special precautions" unknown even in other colonies.

Notably, Celestino da Silva's special method involved large scale operations drawing upon large numbers of forces deployed over large distances without the benefit of Such modern means of communication as the telegraph or telephone.⁴⁸ Yet it is also clear that, beginning with Governor Celestino da Silva, the time-old balance between the *praca* or establishment, and coalitions of Loyal vassals, was radically altered under a new doctrine which saw the state definitely going over to a version of Pacification on the African model. To restate the problem from the perspective of colonial logic, without the raising of Primitive capital, colonial

capitalism could not work. But therein lay the dilemma for the European colonizer, the more the recalcitrant native cum labourer cum wage earner was pushed into an alien work regime and cultural milieu, the more he or she resisted. History is replete with examples of rebel heroes thrown up by the clash of cultures and the forces unleashed by world incorporation, albeit imperfect in the case of Timor. Yet worse was to come for the isolated Lusitanian outpost.

It should also be recalled that not all warfare in Timor was anti-colonial or anti-malai. According to the anthropologist Schulte Nordholte, while the roots of conflict in Timor invariably stemmed from "historically-grown hostility", the immediate causes of war also arose from disputes over borderland in turr arising from conflicting claims over sandal trees with bird's nests or areca palms. Thus, between 1760 and 1782, the Mold and the Miomafo of south central Dutch Timor clashed over gold-mining, while, between 1864-70 the Sonbai and Amfoan Sorbean of the Kupang principedom clashed over the issue of areca palms. Cattle raiding and unwillingness to give up tribute-paying territory were also causes of conflict. As Schulte Nordholt writes, and a theme taken up in the conclusion: "it is clear from the whole of the background of warfare that there must always have been head hunting raids". Indeed observes, many Timorese alive in 1946 had participated in headhunting. Nevertheless, he continues, "It is impossible to say anything definite in respect of Wars in which various principedoms formed alliances against others, because the large scale wa waged during the past few centuries had much to do with foreigners who had settled on the coasts of Timor and therefore are beyond the scope of autochtonous structures". 49

Notes

1. Yvette Lawson, "East Timor: Roots Continue to Grow: A Provisional Analysis of Changes in Foreign Domination and the Continuing Struggle for freedom and Independence", University of Amsterdam, August 1989.
2. R6ne Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre, Le Crocodile et les Portugais (1847-1913)*, Pelissier, Orgeval 1996. See figures, p. 64.
3. Ibid. p.65.
4. Affonso de Castro, *As possessoes portuguesas na oceania*, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 1867.
5. Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre*.
6. Luna de Oliveira, *Timor na historia de Portugal*, Agencia Geral das Coldnias, cited in Lawson, "East Timor".
7. Ibid.
8. Pelissier, *nmor en Guerre*, pp. 65-6 citing de Castro, *Aspossessoesportuguesas na oceania*, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 1867, p. 378.
9. Affonso de Castro, "Une rebellion a Timor en 1861", *Tjdschriji voorIndische Taalland-en Volkenkunde*, Vo113, 1864, pp. 389-409.
10. Ibid.
11. Teofilo Duarte, *Timor: Ante-Camara do InjTernof amalicao*, Lisboa, 19BO, p. 227.
12. Pelissier, *nmor en Guerre*, p. 45.
13. de Castro, "Une rebellion".
14. Ibid., and Pelissier, *nmor en Guerre*, p.47/
15. rbid., p. 409.
16. Ibid.
17. Pilissier, *27mor en Guerre*, pp. 43-59.
18. Ibid., pp. 50-58.
19. Ibid.
20. Teofilio Duarte, *Timor: Ante-Camara do Inferno?I, Famalicao*, Lisboa, 1930, p. 27, and see Albert S. Bickmore, *Travels in the East Indian Archipelago*, D. Appleton and Co., New York, 1869, p. 122.
21. Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre*, p. 58.
22. BGM, Vo1.X, No.28, 11 July 1864.
23. "Reporton Affairs Overseas presented to the Chamber of Deputies by the Minister of State for Marine and Overseas Affairs, BPMT, 11 July 1864. Translation by Kevin Sherlock.
24. Abilio d'Araujo, *TTimor Leste.. Os Loricos Voltaram a Cantar: Das Guerras Independendistas a*

- Revolucao do Povo Maubere, Lisboa, 1977 cited in Lawson, "East Timor: Roots Continue to Grow".
25. BMPT, Vol.XIII, No.13, August 1867.
 26. Shephard Forman, "Politics during CQlonial Times: The Quelicai Region", Timor Information Service No.24, April 1978.
 - 27 BMPT, Vo1.XIV, No.4, 27 January 1868.
 28. BMPT, 7 September 1868.
 29. BMPT, 26 October 1868.
 30. BMPT, 9 November 1868.
 31. BMPT, 7 December 1868. This campaign also saw a judgement)fought down in Macau on 22 May I 870 against five Portuguese soldiers for -despotism, night and abandonment of Post", a reference to questionable actions taken on 2 November 1868 in escaping the theatre of Battle by sea and leaving their comrades to face the rebels without powder or shot [BPMT, Vol XVI, No.22, 30 May 1879 and BMPT, Vo1. XVI, 12 September 1870, Supp.No.37].
 32. BMPT, Vol.XVIII, No.27, 3 July 1871.
 33. "Voyage of the Corvette Sa de Bandeira to Timor", BMPT, No.49 of 1870.
 34. See articles in A Voz de Crente (Macau), 24 March, 5 April, 30 April, 24 December 1887 and 24 March1888.
 35. Pelissier, Timor en Guerre, pp. 106110.
 36. A Vozdo Crente, op. cit.
 37. Gabriel DefTert, Timor EstI Le Genocide Oublie Droit d'un peuple et raisons d'Etat, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1992, p. 284.
 38. James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, Jacaranda Press, Milton, 1983, p. 19.
 39. jhtonio Marques Esparteiro, "A Canhoneira (Diu' e a Guerra de Timor", Boletim Geral das Col6nias, Ano XXVI, No.309, Mar de 1951, pp. 2-47.
 40. BGPMT, No.11894, p. 3.
 41. Abilio de Araujo, Timor Leste, pp. 198-9, cited in Lawson, "East Timor: Roots Continue to grow".
 42. Ibid.
 43. Ibid.
 44. Governor [Celestino da Silva], Relatdrio das Operac6es de Guerra no Districto Autonomo de Timor no Anno de 1896, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 1897, and see version in Boletim da Agencia Geral das Coldnias, No.23, Maio de 1927, pp. 89-100.
 45. Ibid.
 46. Lawson, "Roots Continue to Grow".
 47. Ibid.
 48. Teoflo Duarte, Timor: Ante-Camara do inferno!?, pp. 42-49. .
 49. H.G. Schulte-Nordholt, The Political System of the Antoni, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971, pp. 317, 328, 346

Revolt of the Manufaistas

There is no question that the- revolutionary process in Portugal culminating in 1910 with the ousting of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic was matched in Timor by a degree of violence even unanticipated during the reign of "King" Celestino da Silva. This is a reference to the revolt of the Manufaistas also known after its principal leader as the Boaventura rebellion of 1911-12, perhaps the most costly in terms of Blood and treasure yet mounted in Timor. But, as various analysts have questioned, was this rebellion of a different calibre to those which preceded it? Was it merely a reaction to paying the head-tax, was it a backward looking rebellion in the attempt to drive away the malai and to restore feudal privileges, or did it carry with it what might be called proto-nationalist assumptions, especially in the way that certain of the Dili-based letrado (learned or lettered) made common cause with the erstwhile primitive

rebels? It is also the case that, while this rebellion remains poorly researched, the quality of Colonial documentation, in the form of Newspaper reports, eye witness accounts and official missives is superior, at least in quantity, compared to those of earlier periods.¹

Timor and the Advent of the Republic (1910)

In Timor, as in Macau, the drama associated with the news of the proclamation of the Republic in October 1910 met, correspondingly, with strong opposition in certain quarters leading to the resignation in both colonies of the governor and, in both cases, to the expulsion of the Jesuit missionaries.²

Unlike in Macau, however, where the Chinese populations were preoccupied with the climactic events surrounding the Chinese revolution of 1911, in Timor, native responses to the seemingly inexplicable end of the Portuguese monarchy were bound to redound upon public security. In one version, news of the end of the monarchy and proclamation of the Republic in all of Portugal and its colonies was first heard in Dili in the form of rumour spread by an itinerant Australian. The matter was confirmed officially via telegram on 7 October and, the following day, via the Portuguese cruiser S. Gabriel, then in Darwin harbour. On 30 October, Governor Alfredo Cardoso Soveral Martins, who nevertheless was obliged to relinquish his own office, formally proclaimed the advent of the Republic in the Province of Timor before an assembled audience of high officials, church, military, and captains of industry and commerce. The old and venerable blue and white Royal ensign was run down and the new red and green flag of the Republic was run up to a 21-gun salute. It was not until 5 November that the democratic character of the new order was laid down in a series of Public orders and pronouncements. As Governor Martins explained with understatement, this would require certain cosmetic changes such as change of Military uniforms, letterheads on official papers, forms of address, and, of course, removal of Symbols and emblems of the Crown.³

One important exception to this rule, as explained in the following chapter, was the expedient measure of allowing old pataca banknotes embossed with Royal insignia to circulate in Timor right through the interwar Period.

But Pelissier is correct in his observation that this climactic about-face by the Portuguese administration in doing away with the symbols of the monarchy was achieved over the heads of the Timorese as if it were an exclusive matter for metropolitans and civilise. Thus while the officers and functionaries greeted the proclamation of the Republic with euphoria, the historic event was matched by the confusion of the liurai.⁴ Certain among the native population of Timor did not take the change of regime lightly.

For generations the liurai had treated the Royal ensign as a relic or paraphernalia. There is no question that this was encouraged by the Portuguese to win the submission of the liurai. As Luna de Oliveira explains, it was no easy matter for officials of the new regime to explain the revolution and its goals. Pending the arrival in the colony of the First Governor of the Republic, Filomeno da Camara Melo Cabral (1911-17), certain officials conspired against the Republican ideal. Such a conjuncture also gave way to native intrigues backed by the Dutch who, allegedly, distributed pictures of Queen Wilhelmina to inflame Royalist and thus anti-Republican sentiment among certain natives. Whatever the case, the Dutch saw opportunity in this confused situation to strike a coup in the disputed territory of Lakmaras, otherwise backed by armed European and Javanese forces.⁵

Pelissier explains that the instability in Dili also reflected the absence of clear instructions from Lisbon. Governor Martins departed Dili early November 1910 after the unfortunate death of his wife and his position was temporarily filled by his secretary, Captain Anselmo Augusto Coelho de Carvalho, in turn replaced on 22 December by Captain Jose Carrazedo de Sousa Caldas Vianna e Andrade. But it was the expulsion orders against the missionaries which also added an element of confusion, especially in Timor where the priests were also considered a kind of Lulic. Acting on metropolitan orders the Jesuit missionaries in Soibada were expelled from Dili on 23 December along with a score of Cannosians. Pelissier explains that while Soibada was taken over by other missionaries, the deportations created a setback which would take long years to recover. The anticlerical trend in metropolitan Portugal also found its counterpart in the setting up in Dili of a number of republican cells and even a masonic lodge, attracting the attentions of some Europeans, and assimilated Timorese.⁶

It is hard to gauge the reaction and even the possible role of the Chinese community in Dili in these climactic events. But as one Portuguese official observed several years before the advent of the Chinese Republic, just as the Timor-Macau steamship service had brought with it coolie immigrants from Macau, so it also carried with it what he described as pig-tailed "oradores-agitadores" (speaker-agitators) fleeing the

Manchu repression.⁷

In any case, as described by a Portuguese visitor to Dili in 1912, he found the Chinese community very well organized, supporting not only a clubhouse, the origins of the *Associação Commercial Chinezade Timor*, but a school and a Buddhist temple. Here he witnessed a kind of Parade by high-spirited Chinese youth singing what he believed could only have been praise for the new China in this year of revolution.⁸

To be sure, as Pelissier points out, the concepts of equality and equal rights carried in the republican slogans appeared subversive to local vested administrative interests dominated by metropolitans, Goanese, and Macanese. In any case, it would be incoming Governor Filomeno da Camara Melo Cabral, who would stamp his personality on the half-island. As described by Pelissier, Filomeno da Camara, as he was commonly known in Portuguese writings, was "an energetic but impulsive individual, authoritarian, heady and over-confident".⁹

He also had six years ahead of him, including major outbreaks of rebellion in Suai, followed by revolts in Bobonaro, Manufahi, Baucau and the east.

Revolt of Don Boaventura of Manufahi (1911-12)

But the most tenacious of the revolts was that led by Dom Boaventura of Manufahi (Manufai), a reino located on the south coast. Reaching a climax in 1911 the Boaventura or Manufahi rebellion, after the leader of that name (Don Boaventura was the liurai of Manufahi), eventually took a force of some 28 Europeans and more than 12,000 other troops to quell, as shown below, an epochal event not only in Timorese history but in Portuguese colonial history.

Who were the Manufahi and in what sense did this ethnic group manifest their separate identity? Raphael das Dores in his 1903 dictionary on Timor described the area thus. A south coast reino forming part of the military district of Alas in line with the rationalization of 1860. With a population of 42,000 and 6,500 houses, its finta obligation was calculated at \$96,000 but deemed almost impossible to collect; also known for its many livestock, including horses and sheep; besides cereals and fruits the district also produced coffee and tobacco.¹⁰

According to Osorio de Castro, Manufahi produced the finest quality silver and gold work, including bracelets for legs or arms. The men also manufactured leather cartridge belts and produced musket shot, poker-worked bamboo pipes, among other examples of Craft work,¹¹

Suggesting skills that could also be put to martial ends.

Drawing on official sources, Pelissier has explained that, at the end of October 1911, in response to news announced by the commander of Suai that the head tax would be increased, a number of Local liurai, including Boaventura, sought to assemble at Suai to request a remission. Ahead of a threatening situation the Suai posto was evacuated on 8 December along with several English oil prospectors. A Mozambiquan soldier, charged with conveying the news to Bobonaro, was killed en route. By 29 December some 1,200 Timorese, including the liurai of Camenassa and entourage, entered the enclave of Maucatar to seek Dutch protection from certain Portuguese reprisals.¹²

First European victim of the revolt, as widely acknowledged in Portuguese writing, was Lt. Alvares da Silva, commander of the Same posto situated in Manufahi reino. On this day, 24 December 1911, seen as the opening shots of the rebellion, the unfortunate Lieutenant's severed head was presented to his wife, otherwise spared, but not another four or five Europeans also killed on orders of Boaventura. The prestige of the colony was obviously at stake. Although telephone lines were cut in certain places, Aileu sounded the alarm rousing the Governor into almost immediate action.¹³

Sad Christmas for Dili, writes Pelissier, but more was in store for 1912.¹⁴

What then was the context surrounding the introduction of the new and vexatious tax regime? In 1906, on the recommendation of Celestino da Silva, the system of fintas that reached back to the first days of Portuguese contact was replaced with a capitation tax. According to the decree of 13 September 1906, all heads of Native Timorese families were subject to a tax of 500 reis annually, except for *contratados* or those subject to work contracts and working on agricultural plantations larger than 500 hectares, and those living in reinos cultivating 500,000 pounds of coffee, cocoa or cotton. The *regulos*, considered as state functionaries, received 50 per cent of capitation raised in their reino. Additionally, all reinos with less than 600 heads of family were to be suppressed (although this measure appears not to have been enforced).

Liurais were forbidden from collecting any other tribute or tax from subjects, a measure which breached age-old traditions of community law.

In other words, the reino came to be increasingly identified as a fiscal entity outside of Tradition. Half of the taxes collected were retained for the disposition of Local military commanders. As Pelissier observes, the system sought to bring in additional revenue to the government, to impose another layer of administrative structure over the chiefs while, at the same time, seeing that the cultivator was pushed towards a more intensive production of Coffee, the wherewithal to find the requisite cash to pay the tax. It is also true, as Pelissier observes, the system contained built-in weaknesses, namely the absence of an accurate population census, and the difficulty to implement the new system uniformly. Nevertheless, in 1910, a commission determined the number of eligible taxpayers at 98,920 heads of family. At this time the number of loyal reinos stood at 73 or 75. Certain reinos, such as the war zone of Manufahi and those along the frontier, suffered from diminished populations. 15

In due course, lurid reports of the rebellion entered the pages of such Australian newspapers as the Melbourne Argus and the Sydney Morning Herald. As the latter paper reported on 19 February 1912:

The greater part of the island of Timor has revolted. The Ramea tribesmen raided Dili, murdered many residents and burnt many buildings. Major Ingley, Lt. Silva, and several soldiers were killed during the street fighting. The heads were cut off by the rebels and stuck on poles. Government House was looted. 16

While there is an element of hyperbole in this report, Dili was indeed gravely threatened and a number of European families evacuated. Jaime do Inso, then a second lieutenant aboard the Patria, writes of the grisly spectacle of three human heads found suspended at the Lacro posto some ten minutes from Dili, evidence of "the repugnant cruelty of a war by primitive people". As such, he was reflecting upon the Timorese custom of the collecting of heads of enemies to be taken back to ancestral domains and exhibited as lulic, accompanied by a tabedai or dance and "lugubrious" chanting called loursai. 17

Nevertheless, the town was defended by a hastily assembled collection of individuals pending the arrival of reinforcements from overseas.

In response to urgent requests from Governor Filomeno da Camara, Lisbon ordered the gunboat Patria to proceed from Macau to Timor. Lisbon also instructed Mozambique to mobilize an additional full company of troops for duty in the troubled colony. To this end the Portuguese vessel Zaire was chartered for the purpose. A special subvention for expenses incurred in putting down the rebellion was requested by the Minister of colonies to the Ministry of Finance. 18

According to Pina, a Portuguese military historian, local initiative was immediately taken by the concerned military commander in Manufahi in attacking rebel positions and securing indispensable positions for future attacks. The revolt spread to neighbouring areas leaving plantations abandoned. At this point the colony disposed of 56 European soldiers, along with an artillery section with two sergeants, 18 European soldiers, and 96 Africans. In addition there were the indigenous forces of moradores and arraias or troops of Warriors with their base in Dili. It should also be recalled that the armament of this force was not exactly impressive. According to ranks a colonial soldier might be equipped with a Remington, a rifle of sorts, or even a flintlock, and, in the case of the moradores, a catana or cutlass. 19

But, paradoxically, Dili was also the centre of the rebellion, at least for dissenting chiefs. It transpires that on 5 October 1911, on the anniversary of the proclamation of the republic, a number of r6gulos and their respective retinues made camp in the suburbs. It was here, according to do Inso, that the "black eminences" laid their plans and drew up a conspiracy to murder all Europeans.

The matter seems dubious but he asserts that they lost heart owing to the chance presence in Dili port of an English merchant ship. 20

But to crush the rebellion Filomeno da Camara issued orders to defeat the rebels in the home ground. On 4 January the doughty Governor left Dili at the head of a column, of 200 men comprising 25 Europeans and moradores for Aileu with the view to establishing a base of operations to convince the population as to the futility of revolt. Along the way the party was joined by loyal arraias. Another objective was to stave off attack on the capital itself. Three weeks of campaigning during this season of rains wrested back large swathes of Territory to Portuguese control, yet it became clear to the Governor that his numerically weaker forces were badly exposed. He then began boosting his forces to 2,070 irregulars, 264 moradores, 65 first line

soldiers and eight officers, albeit insufficient for the task. 21

It is clear that in determining his strategy Filomeno da Camara arrived at a clear understanding as to the localized character of the revolt as much the balance of Power between loyal and disloyal reinos. Such knowledge, as much the ability to play off loyalists against dissenters, had been a feature of Portuguese rule in Timor down through the centuries. But in precipitously rushing into the filly, Filomeno took grave risks. Would opposition to the head tax present him with a generalized rebellion? Would erstwhile rivals among the reinos make common cause with the kind of anti-malai sentiment being put about in Dili, with the evident connivance of assimilado elements? There were many unknowns in this situation, but it is clear that Filomeno saw precipitous action as the way to pre-empt longer term problems.

Filomeno da Camara was, however, fortunate in the support of Suru, otherwise pacified in 1900, as this strategically located reino assured vital lines of communication between the north coast and the south. In 1907, Suru had been under the jurisdiction of the reino of Atsabe, but in this year, Naicau, the leading chief of Suru, sought independence from Atsabe. This was granted and Naicau assumed the function of regulo of Suru, an interior kingdom straddling the heights of Tatamailau, and bordering upon Manufahi to the east and south. So when Boaventura's forces attacked the Ainaro posto, it was Naicau who sounded the alarm and rallied to its defence. 22

Fortunately for the colony the gunboat Patria arrived on 6 February after a long passage via Singapore and Surabaya, where it had been delayed by the monsoon.

Some days later (11 February) a European company from India (the Companhia Europeia da India) arrived via Macau aboard the English steamship St. Albans bringing 75 men, around half European. Again, in a show of imperial solidarity, another English ship, the Aldenam, arrived four days later disembarking the 8th Companhia Indigena de Mogambique. 23

The campaign continued through February to May without let up, without regard to the season or the harassment by the rebels. Meanwhile, the rebels opened up another front in Oecussi, although it is hard to see any coordination in the rebellions across the island on the part of the Timorese. Meanwhile, as described by do Inso, Governor Filomeno da Camara divided his forces into four armed columns. With the goal of isolating the reino of Manufahi, seen as the headquarters of the rebels, although this operation also entailed the suppression of the neighbouring rebel reinos of Raimean, Cailaco, Bibisusso, Alas and Toriscaí. The main column, with its base at Maubesse, was commanded by the Governor at the head of 20 Europeans, 200 Africans, 500 moradores and arraias, a grand total of 4,000 forces, also handily equipped with a Krupp BM75L. The second column proceeding from Soibada, armed with a Nordenfeldt machinegun, comprised an Indian company along with some hundreds of Moradores. The third column, with its base at Suro, comprised two Europeans, 70 Africans and 200 moradores armed with one machine gun. The fourth, a Lying column from the Dutch border, comprised 100 moradores. 24

Even though, it appears, D. Boaventura sued for peace, the Governor, scenting victory, pushed ahead with the military campaign. Who was Boaventura? What part did leadership play in this rebellion? It is important that Boaventura was the eldest son of Dom Duarte who, seven years earlier, was leader of the Manufahi rebellion. Pelissier observes other characteristics linking father and son. Both had entered into bonds with other liurais in their rebellion against the Portuguese, and both had close contacts with the world of the assimilado, certain of them members of the Masonic lodge in Dili. Certain of this circle, which also included some moradores, had secretly given gunpowder and balls to the rebels. Why? As Pelissier offers, these were "egalitarian illusions" born out of the Republic on the part of the assimilados, and alliances and circumstances on the part of the Timorese who looked back to a precolonial situation. 25

Eventually, on 27 May, the rebels mounted a heroic stand in the mountains of Cablac (2362 m.), a place of plunging ravines and high rocky crags or pedras.

Here, the rebels constructed a tranqueira of wood and stonework as a way of reinforcing their "natural fortress", all in all suggesting sophisticated organization and military skills. 26

This was also a zone of mist and rain, and, in the Timorese context, unimaginable cold. Certain of the rebels also sought refuge in underground grottoes and caves. Cornered in an area of 35 sq km. in the Riaco and Leo-Laco redoubts, the rebels vowed to fight to the finish rather than surrender. By this point Filomeno da Camara deployed 8,000 irregulars, 647-second line forces, 500 first line forces and 34 officers, undoubtedly the largest foreign forces ever assembled in Timor up until that time. 27

Lawson continues that more than 12,000 men, women, and children retreated to Leo-Laco Mountain,

where they became encircled by colonial troops.

But, when they tried to break through the encirclements, more than 3,000 were killed in what must have been a grisly massacre. Don Boaventura succeeded in escaping, but one month later he surrendered to the colonial authorities.²⁸

By April, the guns of the Patria had put to night the last remaining rebellious elements still emboldened to confront the Portuguese forces. But while the services of the Patria were also required in Macau in this year of revolution in China, military reinforcements were again ordered to Timor the following month as the rebellion simmered on. The actions of the Patria under the command of Gago Coutinho in bombing Boaventura's forces in their south coast stronghold are told in some detail by a participant, Jaime do Inso. A this young naval officer observed of actions off Betano, the noise of artillery as much the random havoc created lent both psychological and military advantage to the Portuguese side. The Patria, also bringing much-needed arms and supplies, enabled the Portuguese infantry to encircle Boaventura and to take thousands of Prisoners-of War, as he termed them. According to de Inso) although he offers no embellishment, a single bombardment on the residence of the Queen of Betano, in the act of Convening a convocation of Local chiefs, resulted in the deaths of around 1000 Timorese. That was not the end of the story, however. Through most of 1912 the Patria was pressed into action in such diverse locales as Oecusse Baucau and Quilicai, demonstrating, in Jolliffe's words, "the breadth of the rebellion", ²⁹

Or more accurately, rebellions, as these disparate uprisings were highly localized and there was no apparent common cause aside from a breakdown in the age-old pact between natives and foreign rulers, although this statement, too, is subject to more investigation.

We know less from the colonial record of the military tactics of Boaventura.

But, at the end of the conflict, the Portuguese side captured 36 rifles, 590 cartridges, and 495 swords along with a few remaining cartridges.³⁰

Still, according to Pelissier, actual combat was rare as the rebels disposed more spears than guns.³¹

But it was also probably the case that, having expended rare supplies of Powder, the rebels did not wish to engage the enemy at close range, otherwise overwhelmed by superiority in weapons. Where the Timorese rebels were effective was undoubtedly as a running guerrilla force. The siege on 11 June-21 July 1912 of Cablac, the sacred mountain redoubt of the Manufaiistas, conjures up the battle of Camenasse hundreds of years earlier; a doomed but mythically heroic stand.

Just as the outbreak of rebellion was reported in the Australian media, so, in August, The Times of London blandly reported the conclusion, namely that a "major battle" between colonial forces and rebels on Timor had left 3,000 killed and wounded and 4,000 taken prisoner.³²

Pearse, an Australian passenger aboard a visiting E & A Line vessel, also left an account of the rebellion. Pearce's visit to the Dili was not fortuitous but involved-in a gesture of imperial solidarity-the transfer from his vessel of some 180 tons of Welsh coal for use by the Patria. As this traveller vividly described the scene 400 rebel prisoners under guard cleared the coal. Pearce also learnt during his stay that the leaders of the "revolution", were to be deported to Africa, and the rank and file to the adjoining island of Atauro, ³³ Destined to be used more than once as a prison island.

Causes of the Rebellion

Do Inso, offers that while the causes of the rebellion were undoubtedly "complex" and generally anti-colonial, the leading cause, or, more accurately we might say trigger or pretext, was unquestionably the proposed augmentation of the head tax from one pataca to two patacas, ten avos. As evidence he offers that in the early days of the revolt, the aggrieved Timorese uttered the challenge: "Venham ca buscar duas patacas, se sao capazes!" (Come and fetch your two patacas if you can!).

Additionally, native grievance stemmed from the prohibition on cutting of Sandalwood before a prescribed age, the imposition of a tax of two patacas for every tree cut, the registration of Livestock and even coconu trees, and the creation of a new five patacas tax on the slaughter of animals for festive occasions. Also, as mentioned, the change of the Portuguese flag with the advent of the Republic had been resented, as the flag was traditionally an object of Lulic worship. To this end, the new flag had been torn down in some places, and a version of the old one run up. To this was added an abiding sense of Treachery on the part of Portugal's old antagonist on the island, the Dutch, bitter at their colonial rival and not at all displeased if the

eastern half of the island was added to their eastern treasure house. 34

Pelissier, who has made a major study of This revolt offers an additional hypothesis that would situate the revolt in a specific historical conjuncture -namely the advent of the republic- and from which he adduces evidence suggesting a nationalist or, more accurately, proto-nationalist dimension to this revolt. What then the evidence for this assertion, which, if true would distinguish Boaventura from his predecessors? The credibility of this version of the revolt rests on proving the conspiracy or incitation by Timorese assimilado in turn pushed by frustrated European republicans or other enemies of the Governor. The evidence is thin, even anecdotal. Pelissier offers die example of Domingos de Sena Barreto, a senior customs officer in Dili, Macau-educated, of Mixed Timorese-Goanese parentage and confidant of the then chief magistrate in Timor, the poet Alberto Osorio de Castro (1868-1946). 35

There is no question, as Osorio de Castro makes clear in his *A Ilha Verde e Vermelha de Timor*, that Barreto had unsurpassed knowledge of the danse macabre of the heads derived first hand from his contacts with Timorese liurai.36

But whether or nor he was the eminence gris behind the rebellion remained to be Proven

Pelissier continues with reason that "the princes" of 1911 were simply not the same as those of 1895. Missionary education, as we have seen, expanded their horizons. Indeed, as we have seen, sons of the regulos were especially targeted for the new government schools. But whether or not, as he suggests, the example of the Philippines independence movement made its impact upon the Timorese is a moot question It is certainly' intriguing, as Pelissier points out, that ten armed rebellions broke out on the island of Flores between 1911-12.37

It is also intriguing to speculate that among a circle of a dozen or so individuals in Dili there may have been those who wished independence upon Timor, but was Boaventura one of them? How many among Boaventura's entourage would have understood this concept in modern terms? The slave revolt of Haiti comes to mind here, a reference to establishment of the Republic of Haiti on 1 January 1804, after a slave revolt expelled erstwhile republican masters. But where leader of the rebellion Toussaint L'Ouverture spoke for liberty, we unfortunately lack the printed record of such enlightenment utterances from Boaventura, or even his erstwhile assimilado supporters.38

Pelissier does not answer directly, but has also supplied a convincing analysis of why and how the aspirations of 5,000 or so assimilados would have diverged from the 100 or so micro-feudal states of Timor. It was also the case that the majority of Liurais remained sceptical of the chances of Success of a generalized revolt in 1911-12. It would be an insult to their intelligence to believe otherwise.

While there is a sense that the 1911-12 rebellion was the apogee of rebellion against the Portuguese, it was at the same time highly localized, even encircled by neutral or collaborationist reinos.39

The view that the colonial pacification of the overlapping Manufahi "guerra" or revolts of 1894-1901, 1907-08, 1910-13 demographically devastated certain regions of Timor with the cost of 90,000 lives might not be too far fetched. For good reason, the name of Boaventura invokes awe and pride among Timorese who how and has entered the pages of Timorese historiography as hero.40

While, as Pelissier contends, the number of Timorese casualties of the revolt cannot be ascertained with certainty, it is also true that the number of victims is seriously disconcerting. As he points out, while the scope of the campaign is telling, lasting for 222 days of Which 123 days saw combat, this in itself tells nothing of Mortality.

Neither are population estimates before and after the rebellion accurate. Nevertheless, one official source cited by this author offers the figure of 303,600 inhabitants for 1913, by far the lowest estimate given for the colony for decades. In weighing all the evidence, Pelissier concludes that the Boaventura revolt and its sequels cost between 15 and 25,000 deaths, not counting those who went into exile. At least 200 prisoners swept up in this campaign also died of Malnutrition or maltreatment.

But to this figure would have to be added victims of the terrible dysentery epidemic which struck the arraia on the government side, not to mention the rebels, along with an estimated 2,000 deaths in Baucau, 300 in Lautem, among other places, badly exposing the extension of Medical services in the colony, and possibly further weakening the demographic profile of Timor at this juncture.41

Sequels to the Rebellion

Lawson observes that, as a reaction to the Boaventura revolt, the Portuguese tightened military and administrative control. Undoubtedly, Portuguese successes against the Boaventura rebellion were also boosted by warriors supplied by loyal liurai.⁴²

De Araujo explains that these liurai were rewarded by the Portuguese with the rank of Major and lieutenant colonel of the second rank. Progressively, as the dato and liurai capitulated, the first to do so were rewarded with larger domains at the expense of rival and rebel kingdoms.⁴³

To be sure, many liurai and dato were killed during the rebellions and many other were taken prisoner. New liurai were promoted in their place, not by traditional methods or ethnic rules of Succession, but according to Portuguese standards of "loyalty".⁴⁴

As Pelissier explains, the victory over the Manufaistas was quickly exploited.

Constitutional guarantees, otherwise suspended at the outset of the revolt, were restored on 16 August 1912 while, the following day, a great celebration was held in Dili to mark the triumphant return of the conquistadores. That may have been taken for granted, but Governor Filomeno da Camara went one step further. The great civilizer sanctioned the celebration in the capital by the moradores of a festival of the heads a la Timorese, a grotesque display of the heads of victims in the capital of the Portuguese colony, an act that even Celestino da Silva eschewed.⁴⁵

Indeed, not even an act sanctioned by the White Rajah of Sarawak, where the crusade by the British in Borneo against head-hunting was unremitting. Surely, Conrad's 1915 description of Dili in his classic *Victory: An Island Tale*, as that "pestilential place" found its origins in this reputation.

But in the aftermath of the rebellion, the accusations new. As Pelissier describes it, each accused the other in a cynical game, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the imprisoned liurai, the mixed blood officials, and, in the official view, European-enemies of the Governor in league with the liurai. At least this was the thrust of the report commissioned by Governor Filomeno da Camara in 1913 and written by the pacifier of

Oecussi-Ambeno, Goncalo Pereira Pimenta de Castro. Among those arrested were Domingos de Sena Barreto although names of such European conspirators as Dr. Paiva Gomes and Manuel de Sousa Gentil were also mentioned. Among the Timorese leaders then in prison, certain were stripped of their rank. This was the fate of Dom Boaventura (18 July 1913), losing his rank of rei-coronel of Manufahi, even before he died in obscure circumstances in prison in Atauro or Aipelo on an unknown date. Similarly, Afonso Hornai de Soares Pereira of Bibisusso lost his rank. But, in a more sweeping change on 13 August 1913, interim governor Goncalo Pereira Pimenta de Castro revoked the command of the moradores of Dili, Marcal Sequira, Manuel Bianca and Francisco do Rego. On metropolitan orders the moradores companies of Dili, Sica, Bidau, Aipelo and Batugede were dissolved and transformed into first line commands under European officers. The remaining moradores, such as Baucau and Manatuto were regrouped as clPayes.⁴⁶

Governor Filomeno wasted no time in using his military victory to dole out rewards and punishments. From 23 August 1912 he decided that the Raimera, Riaco and Leo Laco regions would be declared domain land destined to be transformed into a plantation named Republica on which, as a kind of War indemnity, they would furnish gratuitous corvee. Widows of the fallen arraias, along with wounded on the government side were awarded coconut or cocoa trees and other non-taxable benefits, while, on the other hand, villagers from the rebel zones were obliged to plant coconut and cocoa trees and to supply free labour to appointed plantations. Governor Filomeno also pushed the defeated Timorese to plant coffee, on the basis of 600 coffee bushes per family. In 1916 alone nearly 8 million coffee bushes were planted in a frenzy of activity across Timor. He also codified labour obligation for all Timorese from 14 to 60 years old. To be sure, as Pelissier comments, it was Filomeno da Camara who initiated forced culture in Timor on a scale never before seen. The ability of Governor Filomeno da Camara-as with Celestino da Silva and Afonso da Castro before him-to stamp his design on Timor was also obviously facilitated by long tenure in Timor, in the case of Filomeno da Camara ensured because the outbreak of World War prevented his return to Portugal until 1917.⁴⁷

The Making of an Elite

While we have ascribed causation to the rebellions of Timor to varieties of Traditional responses, ranging from anti-finta sentiment, to messianic themes, to hatred of the malai, to traditional forms of intra-tribal warfare, we must also acknowledge that Timor society was changing as the colonial order more deeply

implanted itself, as the colonial economy took deeper root, and as forms of Labour conscription and land alienation broke down traditional solidarities. But it is also worth taking stock of the role of New elites} of those thrown up by the colonial system as bridging the worlds of the Timorese and the outsiders. Intermediaries always found their place in colonial systems and, notwithstanding the checkered history of the church in Timor; it is also the case that the missions even more than the state were responsible for grooming the new elite.

Following the restoration of the missions in the late nineteenth century under the labours of Bishop Medeiros, his immediate successor, D. Jose Manuel de Carvalho, restructured the church in Timor into two circumscripciones, that of the north and that of the contra costa. Accordingly, the church in Timor came under two Vicar Generals, one centred on Lahane with responsibility for the north, and the other run by the Jesuit in Soibada in the reino of Samoro with responsibility for the south. Despite serious difficulties in communications, the Soibada mission emerged as the centrepiece of both the evangelical mission and the civilizing mission in this outpost of Timor. The Soibada mission opened a boys school in 1904 teaching, besides the basics of Christian doctrine, reading and writing Portuguese and such subjects as agricultural methods. From 1902 the Canossians also became active in Timor, especially in teaching, including girls, albeit at the level of Domestic science. At least up until the expulsion of the missions in 1910, the church in Timor thrived under official patronage and protection. As the Bishop of Macau, D. Joao Paulino d'Azevedo e Castro effused, a veritable religious movement radiated out of Soibada transforming the people both morally and socially.

As he summarized the accomplishments of the mission on the eve of the revolution, there were 11 schools for males with 412 pupils, two schools for females with 223 pupils) two colleges for males with 105 students, two colleges for young girls with 153 students, or a total of 1,053 students, taught by 30 members of the church and 141 lay teachers.⁴⁸

As Abilio d'Araujo has written, the task of educating the chosen few at the Jesuit mission in Soibada at the turn of the century was also with the aim of Preparing teacher catechists as well as educating the sons of the liurais. From this college, d'Araujo explains, came the first Timorese letrados, the embryo of a future Timorese native elite, drawn especially from the strata of Liurai and dato. Although the hereditary nobility continued to hold political power locally, the new social group from the traditional society became admired and respected because they had succeeded in adapting to colonial values, the hallmark of which were their literary skills in Portuguese as much their embrace of the faith. Colonialism discovered that it was necessary to support this new group, which accepted the policy of propagating the Christian religion and would never turn against it because of Privileges received through contact with colonial culture. It was also necessary, on the one hand, to give this group a status equal to that of the liurai and dato and, on the other, to remind them of the responsibilities attached to their status- to maintain order and justice within a framework of collaboration, understanding and tolerance.⁴⁹

The acceptance by the liurai of the new social position of the letrados remained in the future, however. Indeed, the preparations of a loyal cadre of collaborators awaited the twentieth century and, indeed, sorely contested in the anti-colonial wars which wracked Portuguese colonialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ⁵⁰

Although, as seen, the state had already commenced to set in motion regulations making it obligatory for sons of indigenous chiefs to enter primary school at the age of seven. One who stood with the Portuguese against D.Boaventura was Nai-Sessu, better known by his Catholic name, D. Aleixo CorteReal, following his conversion in 1931. As chief of Ainaro, D. Aleixo achieved hero status in the colony, especially, as shown below, because of his loyalty to Portugal at the time of the Japanese occupation.⁵¹

Lawson relates that, with the advent of the plantation economy, the liurai became subjugated to military district commanders appointed by the Portuguese colonial authorities. As key intermediary between Portuguese authority at the district level and the Timorese peasant at the subsistence level, the liurai were required to fulfill certain key services. Notably the liurai were held responsible for delivering up a yearly finta to the Portuguese authorities. In return, they were offered a percentage of the finta collected on their territories. Subordinate to the liurai, the dados acting on the instructions of the former, penetrated to the village level where village chiefs were held responsible for carrying out colonial orders, namely recruitment of Labour, introducing coffee plantations, and collecting taxes. Lawson writes that, in fact, "the Portuguese simply placed their colonial administrative structure of Cash crop production, labour recruitment and tax

collection, without giving them any tools for participation in policy". 52

The anthropologist, Capell, also observes that many liurai were eclipsed by the Portuguese following the great revolt of 1911-12 and their authority divided amongst the dato ruling over the various sucu. Thus, by 1944, the time when Capell did his research in Timor, the liurai almost always represented a broken succession. 53

Conclusion

It is hard not to agree with Pelissier that, by any measure, the repression of the revolt of the Manufaiistas remains one of the "black pages" of the first Portuguese republic. As this author remarks from an advised knowledge of African history, it opened the way for the great massacres of Guinea, of Mozambique, and Angola.

The lesson derived for colonial rule in Africa from the Timor case was that no more acts of Mass insubordination would be tolerated.54

But drawing from their Africa experience as well, there is no question that the Portuguese looked to overhaul the arbitrary and archaic features of their oceanic possession. Still, in Timor, military supremacy did not easily translate into allegiance. All the more surprising that the bond between ruler and ruled in Timor did not unravel irrevocably in the wake of the Boaventura rebellion. While a discussion of Labour control and colonial coercion is reserved for another chapter, it is notable that in the wake of the Boaventur rebellion, Governor Filomeno da Camara moved quickly to establish a new social charter or contract with the Timorese, based in part upon the redivisioning of the colony into smaller administrative units for ease of Control and, in large part, by the promotion of a new traditional elite closely attuned to colonial values. Contemporaneously, in the western part of the island, the Dutch although facing no parallel rebellious challenge-likewise sought to alter traditional institutions of government and landowning regulations.55

It is not such an abstract sentiment to express that the importance of the Boaventura rebellion for ordinary Timorese is the way that his name has been passed down through the generations as a legendary hero of the resistance, the last identifiable leader of the last great rebellion against the Portuguese. The other side of the coin is that his name has also been appropriated by Timorese nationalists.

Speaking before the United Nations Security Council on 12 April 1976, Jose Ramos Horta in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the newly formed Democratic Republic of East Timor, observed with pride that Queen Maria de Manufahi, Boaventura's widow, then 80 years old, was "a militant" of the political party he represented. 56

Notes

1. In making this statement I am guided by Pelissier's research on this rebellion as much his statement that the volume of extant official correspondence on this rebellion would merit a separate monograph of 200-300 pages. For his part, and his purposes, Pelissier has read only the summary annexes attached to the official reports. See Rene Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre: Le Crocodile et les Portugais (1847-1913)* 9 Pelissier Orgeval, 1996, p. 264. For my part and for the purposes of Compression, I have read Pelissier selectively along with a mix of other printed sources. Unlike Pelissier I have not consulted the AHU archives on this question.

2. See author's *Encountering Macau/ The Rise of a Portuguese Cio,-State on the Periphery of China*, 155711999, West view Press, Boulder, 1996, pp. 95-96.

3. Luna de Oliveira, *nmor na Hisidria de Portugal*, Agencia Geral das Co16nias, Lisboa, 1952, pp. 37-44.

4. Rend Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre: Le CjnOCodile et le Portugais (184711913)*, Orgeval, 1996, pp. 254-255.

5. Luna de Oliveira, *Timor na Hist6ria de Portugal*, pp. 50-51.

6. Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre*, p. 247.

7. Alberto Osorio de Castro, "Camilo Pessanha em Macau", *Atldntico*, 1942.

8. Jaime do Inso, *TTimor-1912*, *Edic6es Cosmos*, Lisboa, 1939, pp. 101103.

9. Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre*, p. 247.

10. Raphael da Dores, *A pontamentos para um Diccionario Chrographico de Timor*, Imprensa Nacional,

Lisboa, 19Q3, p. 46.

11. Alberto Osbrío de Castro, *A Ilha Vejn de e Vermelha de Timor*, Cotovia, Lisboa, 1996, p. 144,
12. P6lisier, *Timor en Guerre*, pp. 257-258.
13. Jaime do Inso, *Timor-1912*, p. 29.
14. Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre*, p. 260.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 224.
16. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 February 1912.
17. do Inso, *Timor-1912*, p. 53.
18. See MacauArchives Processo no. 154, Serie E, (cx67-3394), 2 Agosto 1912, "Embarque desta Provincia para a de Timor, de uma Companhia Europeia de Infantaria da India".
19. Luis Maria da Camara Pina, *Um Apontamento Hisi6rico (A Campanha de nmor em 1912)*, Speme, n.p.,n.d.
20. do Inso, nmor-1912, p. 23.
21. Pina, *um Apontamento Histdrico*.
22. Josi Sim6es Martinho, *nda e Morte do Rigulo Timorense D. Aleixo*, Agencia Geral das Col6nias, 1947, pp. 18.
23. do Inso, *Timor-1912*, p. 49.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.
25. Pelissier, *77mor en Guerre*, pp. 254-255.
26. do Inso, *Timor-1912*, p. 53.
27. Pino, t[m Apontamento Hist6rico. .
28. Lawson, "East Timor: Roots Continue to Grow".
29. do Inso cited in Jo1 liff e, *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*, University of Queensland Press, S Lucia, 1978, p. 36.
30. Pelissier, nmor en Guerjne, P. 293.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 266.
32. I;he nmes, 16, 20, 25 February 1912.
33. W. Pearse, *Recent Travel*, John Andrews and Co., Sydney, 1914, p. 43q.
34. Jo1 lif3Fe, *East nmor and see do Inso, Timor-1912*, p. 68.
35. Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre*, p. 255.
36. Alberto Osorio de Castro, *A Ilha Vejn de e Vermelha de 2Timor*, Agencia Geral das Coldnias, Lisboa, 1943 [Cotovia, Lisboa, 1996].
37. Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre*, pp. 260-261.
38. Cf. Noam Chomsky9 Year 501/ *The Conquest Continues*, Verso, 1993, pp. 197-219.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 260-261.
40. deAraujo, *TimorLeTkte*, p. 37.
41. Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre*, pp. 290-292.
42. Lawson, "East Timor: Roots Continue to Grow".
43. de AraujoJimor Leste, p. 3
- i 441awson, "East Timor: Roots Continue to Grow".
45. Pelissier, 2Timor en Guerre, p. 294.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 303-304.
47. Helder LainS e Silva, *Timor e a Cultura do Caj(2E*, Ministerio do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1956, p.41; PeliSsier, *Ibid.*, pp. 295, and W.G. Clarence-Smith, "Planters and Smallholders in Portuguese Timor in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries"*IndonesianCijnCle*, March 1992, p. 18.
48. D. Joao Paulino d'Azevedo e Castro, *Os Bens das Misso-es Portuguezas na China*, Redacao do Boletim do Governo Ecclesiastico de Macau, Macau, 1917, pp. 180-184.
49. Abilio de Araujo (Jill Jo1 liffTe and Bob Reece, eds.), *Timorese Elites*, Canberra, 1975.
50. Francisco Femandes, "Das Missoes de Timor", *Luso.Asidticos (Macau)*, No.1 September 1992, p. 17.
51. Jose Simoes Martinho, *nda e Morte do Rigulo Timorense D. Aleijco*.
- 52 Lawson, "East Timor: Roots Continue to grow".
53. A. Cappel, "People and Language of Timor", *Oceania*, March, Vol.XX, No.3, 1944, p. 198.
54. Pilissier, *Timor en Guerre*, pp. 261-262.

55. Anon. Republik Indonesia: Sunda Ketjil, Kementerian Penerangan, Jakarta, n.d.

56. Heike Xiieger (ed.), East Timor and the International CommuniO,: Basic Documents, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1997, p. 97.

10

Colonial Capitalism in Portuguese Timor (1894-1941)

While we have viewed the rebellions of 1860-1912 as responding to important economic changes, especially in the way that the colonial power organized land and labour on a new basis, it is important to trace the rise of a colonial economy in Timor on its own terms, at least in a way which emphasizes a dynamic encounter between the local economy and the world economy, not a picture of total economic stasis and inaction as detractors of Portuguese rule in Timor would aver. Far from arguing the case that a colonial capitalist mode of Production became predominant in Timor, we nevertheless seek to stress the revolutionary consequences for Timor society of the creation of an export economy, while, at the same time identifying the reasons why full-scale colonial capitalism did not develop in the Portuguese colony. To this end we first seek to analyze the modes of state finance in Timor, as obviously the ability of the state to produce a budget deficit weighed heavily upon its overall development project. We then seek to explore the complex relationship between the state and private sectors in Timor with reference to land, labour and capital. To this end we highlight three important spheres of economic activity vital to the development of an island economy, namely communications infrastructure, planter capitalism, and minerals exploration.

Modes of State Finance

If, by the latter half of the 19th century, the Portuguese African colonies were mainly seen as sources of revenue to develop the metropole, by the late 1870s onwards, the extraction of revenues was overshadowed by the need for metropolitan manufacturers to find market outlets in the colonies. While metropolitan and foreign capital trickled into the wealthier colonies such as Sao Tome and southern Mozambique, the colonies were placed in an extreme protectionist environment.

Especially after the 1910 republican revolution in Portugal, however, the state intervened more strongly to encourage a plantation sector based on migrant labour while regulating the petty commodity production of peasant producers. But to achieve this goal, the originally autonomous or tributary peasant societies necessarily were brought with violence into exchange processes involving taxation. The institution of Slavery gave way to forced labour, although the distinction was of ten blurred. In Portuguese Africa, the pacification project intensified, beginning in southern Mozambique in the 1890s and continuing in Angola in the 1910s. In his study of Slaves, peasants and capitalism in southern Angola, British historian Clarence-Smith rejects the school of historiography, which contends that Portuguese colonialism was not economically motivated and that palpable lack of economic returns proved a lack of economic motivations. After all, colonies were seen by European powers as speculative long-term investments.¹

We seek in the following to replay this argument against the case of Timor.

Not surprisingly the great rebellion of 1908-13 arrested economic development in Timor, as did the expensive pacification campaigns of the turn of the century.

Added to that, the effects of the First World War resulted in a 50 per cent diminution of imports and export in Timor, prompting the metropolitan journal, *Revista Colonial* (25 July 1915) to describe the economic situation in Timor as one of Crisis. The Great Depression left Portugal on the verge of Bankruptcy. Neither it appeared, did Portugal have the technocratic means to even enhance extraction in its distant colony. While individuals were enriched, for the state, Timor was an economic drain. Yet, the optimists looked at Timor as an island of Promise, especially as coffee culture reached new heights, and the coffee plants themselves came through the bloody wars largely unscathed.

The major difficulty in calculating the state of Timor's finances stems not so much from a lack of Basic data, but from the complexity of Local accounting methods, and especially, as discussed below, the number of fluctuating currencies involved. Another complicating factor was that revenues accrued from more than one source, both within and without the colony. This is a reference to both direct and indirect taxes within the colony, the regular subvention from Macau, and irregular subventions From Portugal, certain of Which

were earmarked to cover military expenditure which more of Ten than not took the lion's share of Budget expenditure.

Whatever else, the colony of Timor could count upon its annual subsidy of 60,000 patacas from Macau. This was set down in a decree of 15 October 1896, renewed in 1909. The complexity of the system is revealed by the budget figures for the period 1901-05 as analyzed by Pelissier. He found that the budget deficit grew from 83,000 mil reis in 1901-02, to 102,000 mil reis in 1904-05, with the subvention from Macau carrying the loss. Yet the military budget for 1902-03 reached 85,835 mil reis, and for 1904-05 reached 104,597 mil reis. The system of *fintas*, still in place, realized a derisory 3,000-4,000 mil reis annually in 1901-05, hardly making up for the budget losses. In Pelissier's phrase "the more pacification proceeded, the more it consumed the Timor budget". 2

While, in 1912, Lisbon voted a one-off credit of 200,000 escudos for Timor as a result of the military expeditions, it was also seen as a serious political gesture to rescue the colony from certain oblivion.

Unlike Macau, the authorities in Timor never systematically, much less successfully, developed a system of State monopolies. This was not without trying, however. In 1886, a government monopoly on the sale of *canipa*, a sugar cane based alcoholic drink was established, soon after sugar cane plantations in Timor were introduced for that purpose. In 1892, a *fantan* monopoly for Timor was auctioned in Macau. Yet, it is unknown whether this gambling venture was actually launched in Timor. Again, in 1911, tenders were advertised in the military command of Manatuto for games of "Gallo", "China cards", and "Clu-Clu", a system gradually extended to some other regions of Timor. In 1914, the question of the manufacture of opium in Timor was raised by a Hong Kong-based Chinese syndicate operating under the name of Leong Kwong. Two years later, after lengthy negotiations, Leong Kwong was granted a license for this purpose. Notwithstanding the question of whether he would be granted permission from the British government to actually import the raw opium from India, he went ahead and erected a factory in Dili. However, the first 50 chests of a consignment of 500 chests of opium already purchased, were seized by the authorities at Singapore when en route for Timor "[T]he primary reason for its manufacture", opined the British Consular agent in Kupang, "is to bring revenue to the already exhausted Portuguese Treasury in Timor". 3

Meanwhile, the state moved ahead to place financial services on a more rational basis. The key to this initiative was the introduction of Modern banking services, the *sine qua non* of a modern colonial colony. Just as this function was served in French colonies by the *Banque de l'Indochine*, so in Portuguese colonies it was the *Banco Nacional Ultramarino* (BNU), which served this purpose. Founded with private capital in Lisbon in 1864 the BNU set up branches in all the Portuguese colonies. Established in Macau in November 1901, the BNU served as treasury and cashier for the government from 1906. Set up in Dili in 1912, it was expected -A tile wards of Governor Filomeno da Camara- that it would provide credit to planters, help resolve money problems, and help to canalize trade to Lisbon. 4

The opening of banking services in Timor, however, only occurred after a long debate over the choice of currency for Timor. As noted above, to the extent that the Portuguese colony was monetized, it was the Dutch florin replacing the rupee, which came to dominate in financial transactions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While the first references to the circulation in Timor of Patacas or *Pataca Mexicana*, as Mexican 8 reales or silver dollar coins were known in Portuguese, goes back to 1880, it was not until 1894 that the pataca freely entered Timor, becoming the standard for paying official and military salaries. Nevertheless, the two currencies coexisted with a fluctuating exchange rate (1:2,40 florins in 1880 1:2 florins in 1891). Further measures were taken in 1893-94 to reduce the value of the pataca in circulation in Timor and to fix the exchange rate against the florin. But also in 1900 *portaria* 49 of 8 June), the importation of Mexican silver money as well as patacas was sanctioned for holders of special licenses and subject to regulations to check against counterfeits.5

Not surprisingly, the jumble of currencies circulating in Timor was reflected in the returns from the capitation tax. In 1911, according to an official account, the kind of Currency recouped depended upon location. Thus, while Dutch money was in vogue in Dili, in Baucau, Batugede, Manatuto, and Lautem, the capitation was paid in Mexican currency. In Bobonaro, Hato-Lia and Motael, the capitation was paid in mixed Mexican and Dutch currency.6

But, whereas in Macau the BNU commenced to issue legal tender banknotes in pataca denomination in 1901, it was not until 1912 that the first banknotes circulated in Timor. These were 10,000 one pataca notes and 2,500 notes of 25-pataca denomination overprinted "Pagavel em Timor". Originally issued in 1906 they

still carried the crowned Portuguese coat of arms. This exercise was repeated in 1932 and 1945 with the addition of a five-pataca note.⁷

There is no question, however, that in Timor, as in Macau, a population accustomed to premium silver coin poorly received these note issues.

But still, according to a 1932 study on the monetary system in Timor by Correia de Campos, different schools of thought contended as to choice of currency in the pre-First World War period. The choices were starkly laid out by the President of the Bank of Java whose opinion was solicited by one of the interested parties. In the mind of this authority, there was no choice for Portuguese Timor but to accept a gold-based standard as opposed to a currency based on silver (the Mexican dollar) otherwise subject to fluctuating value based on its intrinsic value as silver. To this he added the more obvious arguments that most of Timor's imports were sourced through the Netherlands East Indies while exports likewise passed through Dutch ports. But, in arguing for the substitution of Dutch currency for the pataca, he also observed that other currencies could not be excluded, hence the imperative to introduce banking services for exchange as much as handling paper remittances. The discussion evidently went on for seven more years when, on 16 January 1915, the Conselho do Governo in Dili voted to introduce the pataca as the exclusive currency for the colony. A decree to that effect was brought down on 4 May 1918.⁸

Clearly, in this initiative, national interest prevailed over stark economic logic, but then why should Portugal have surrendered up its economic sovereignty to the Netherlands?

With this decision, the door was opened in Timor for the introduction and circulation of two other currencies alongside the pataca or Mexican dollar. The Dili branch of the BNU and Chinese merchants alike imported quantities of cedula or subsidiary banknotes issued by Chinese banks, along with a lesser quantity of Chinese coins, in part reflecting the hodgepodge of Currencies in use in Macau.

But when Macau suffered a shortage of Coins, in part owing to a run on silver, the BNU moved ahead on 2 January 1920 to issue its own subsidiary notes.⁹

Still, the choice of Pataca as Timor's currency was not the end of Problems. The major problem confronting economic management in Timor, at least from 1924 down until the period when Portugal dropped off the gold standard, was the marked devalorization of the pataca relative to the metropolitan currency, the escudo. This financial and economic crisis, according to Correia de Campos, stemmed from the devalorization of Silver versus gold over the same period, to a degree of Some 35 per cent. This was especially significant in Timor where, despite the decree of 1918, most commercial transactions were still effected in Dutch florins through until the 1930s and not with Macau. In the event, Correia de Campos's call for a Timorese escudo linked with metropolitan money would not transpire until the postwar period.¹⁰

Archer, the British Consul in Batavia, who visited Portuguese Timor in March 1941, observed that Portuguese Timor received no financial assistance From Portugal. Government revenues were derived from customs duties on both imports and exports. In the case of coffee exports, the duty was over 20 per cent. The principal source of foreign exchange was derived from a mandatory contribution on the part of coffee exporters of No less than 70 per cent of receipts of foreign currency earned from the exchange of their goods, to an exchange fund. This fund, in turn, was administered by the BNU, which reimbursed the exporters with patacas at the bank's official rate. In practice, owing to low prices obtained for the colony's coffee, the fund was in low water, meaning great scope for black market operations mainly by Chinese shopkeepers. Indeed, shops were reportedly well stocked as a result of Black market operations. Poll tax also represented a major source of revenue amounting to up to three months of a coolie's cash wage surrendered in direct taxation. This amounted to 611 or 16 patacas, according to the category of Work (comparing unfavourably with the 3.30 patacas tax paid in the Dutch colony or the equivalent of 10 days wage per annum). Thus, of the 1941 budget of 1,556,051 patacas, 663,000 was drawn from poll tax paid by all native workers, and 28,000 from a professional tax, paid by higher paid workers. Import and export tax amounted to 160,000 and 220,000 respectively. It is clear, then, that a large part of the government's revenue and foreign exchange derived from the maintenance of coffee exports. Expenditure covered the bare essentials of administration, including the military, and the servicing of a loan from the metropole.

It is noteworthy that a high customs tariff was imposed upon both imports and exports. The export duty, 20 per cent in the- case of coffee, was additional to the contribution made by exporters to the exchange fund, but could not be considered a tax as the contributor received an equal amount of Local currency in exchange.¹¹

Thus, while this budgetary regime supported an extremely low level of Development, the prewar experience proved without doubt that given the application of Modern management and scientific Practices Timor was a viable economy.

Planter capitalism and control over Land

While we have looked to the role of the state in setting the parameters of Development in Timor, what exactly was the role of Private capital or, at least, segments of Private capital, whether or not linked to the state or beneficiaries of State patronage? Certainly, the European colonization of Timor had its boosters. Possibly the earliest private venture in Timor was that of the Companhia commercial formed and capitalized by a circle of Dili-based merchants in the early 1860s.

Essentially a trading venture operating a schooner between Dili and Macassar, Surabaya and Singapore, this enterprise folded in 1865. Another early expression of Private capitalist interest in Timor was the Companhia de Timor e Macau, established in 1884 ostensibly to promote the agricultural and mineral exploitation of the territory and to develop commercial relations between Portugal and its Far Eastern territories. This was capitalized at 990 contos at five libras (pounds) each and formed in Lisbon by Portugal-based merchants and influential Macau-based individuals. It was envisaged that the company—although we lack knowledge of its actual *modus operandi* on Timor—would inject both capital and know-how into Timor. As such, according to *O Macaense* of April 1886, it would help the circulation of Money and multiply commoditization while offering employment to Timorese. 12

While, as Clarence-Smith has clarified, smallholders dominated export production in Portuguese Timor, persistent if unsuccessful attempts were made under colonial auspices to sustain a plantation sector. But it was Governor Celestino da Silva who laid the foundations for a functioning plantation system in the colony after 1894. Pacification of the mountain district of Ermera to the southwest of Dili, and site of Prime plantation land, was thus a necessary prelude. It was Celestino da Silva who, in 1897, established the Sociedade Agricola Patria e Trabalho (SAPT), a powerful agro-business described by Clarence-Smith as a virtual state within a state.¹³

Following the passage of a new law on overseas land concessions brought down on 9 May 1901, a number of Metropolitan investors and speculators were drawn to Timor. First was the Companhia de Timor, financed by 14 metropolitan capitalists who were major investors in cocoa plantations on Sao Tome and who pledged an amount double the 1901-02 budget for Timor. Established in Timor in 1904, this company emerged as a rival to SAPT in the coffee plantation sector in the Ermera district, but also with interests in tea, coffee and rubber. Its output never matched that of SAPT and was criticized for poor cultivation techniques.

Neither was the dream of a second Sao Tome in cocoa production realized on Timor. Moreover, as Pelissie comments, this investment only amounted to 51,000 pounds, and, in reality, commerce in Timor remained pretty much tied up by Chinese distribution networks.¹⁴

By the 1910s these two Societies were joined by four other plantation companies, the most important of which was the Sociedade Commercial Agricola e Industrial de Timor, set up by a local Portuguese trading company known as Casa Quintas and administered by Celestino da Silva's son. By 1910, an additional 6,000 hectares of Land had been granted to other individual Portuguese planters. 15

Celestino da Silva's method cannot pass without comment, especially as his detractors accused him of fomenting wars to seize land and even prisoners of War to work as virtual slave labour, and of using his official position and even his connections with King Carlos, who had served under him in the royal lancers to boost his fortunes.

Clarence-Smith doubts whether Portuguese African-style legislation involving coerced labour was actually used on plantations in Timor but that some free labour, especially on Chinese plantations around Liquisa, coexisted with "a kind of quasi-slavery" suggested by the practice of constant renewal of five-year labour contracts and use of short-term forced labour supplied by traditional chiefs and heads of the military posts. Even so, despite abysmally low wages, it was an expensive form of Labour, given low productivity and the necessity for controls and supervision. 16

But the first major attempts to impose a colonial land regime took the form of a special decree of 5 December 1910. Under this act the Governor had exclusive responsibility for all grants of Land on a

"quit-rent" or *foro* tenure and for transfers of Property up to 2,500 hectares. District administrators were also empowered to make grants of "unoccupied" land up to 100 hectares, under certain conditions, to Portuguese subjects or foreigners taking up residence in the colony.

In either case, the concessionaries had to prove, on pain of Confiscation, that they put the land to productive use. In the case of Native tenure, transfer had to be approved by the Governor. To establish a right to his property "the native occupier must cultivate or build upon at least half its area, and must have possessed it for a certain number of years, or have acquired it by legal transfer". To be sure, this new category of owner or possessor was as anomalous as it new in the face of Tradition.

Yet, here was the paradox, without a category of Land ownership and property the basis of a colonial economy could not be constructed. 17

Lawson continues that, under Governor Filomeno da Camara's dispensation, traditional "Melanesian" notions of usufruct were done away with and replaced with a colonial definition of Land as belonging to the state. She explains that the colonial need for control over land was only frustrated by the inability of the state to actually claim it for want of efficient administrative, technical and scientific means, especially in the inaccessible interior. Nevertheless, Filomeno's regime set down the basis of a settler economy in an erstwhile colonial sphere of Production. As cultivators of cash crops such as coffee, the Timorese cultivator would, in this schema, claim title to the land they worked. In practice, however, this right came at the cost of delivering up a certain percentage of the coffee harvest to the colonial authorities. 18

Deprived of communal land, the dispossessed Timorese would also supply their labour on the new estates earning the wherewithal to acquit their yearly head-tax in cash.

As Governor Filomeno da Camara wrote in a long report in 1912, it was not easy to calculate the returns on agricultural production. Besides customs data on exports calculated "with the greatest of rigour" there were no satisfactory statistical data on agriculture. In this sense, then, the customs data on exports by value given by the Governor for the year 1911 is indicative of the relative importance of various exports. In this year, it is noteworthy that coffee exports dominated, followed by sandalwood, copra, wax and cocoa. 19

Sandal exports picked up in the years following the First World War as Pacific supplies ran out and European demand increased, reaching an export figure of 908 tons in 1913. Sandal, which grew naturally, was never of course a capitalist activity at least at the level of Production. Notwithstanding conservation measures brought down by, respectively, Governors Celestino da Silva and Filomeno da Camara, the sandal groves of Timor, including such prime growing areas as Oecusse, Bobonaro and Cova Lima, were decimated by overcutting in the 1920s. Sandal never accounted for more than 10 per cent of the colony's exports by value after 1920. With an official prohibition on the cutting of Sandal brought down in 1926, this commodity disappeared altogether from statistics after 1939, remaining, in the words of Felgas, "a botanical relic", a reference to the forty or more years in which it takes the sandal root, a parasitic on other plants, to germinate and reach maturity. In turn, copra took over from sandalwood as the colony's second commodity although not exceeding 10 per cent of export by value up to the Second World War. 20

As discussed below with relation to the minerals sector, it was not for want of trying that foreign capital sought to enter Portuguese Timor. In this context it is of interest that in the mid-1920s a group ofelaide-based Australian businessmen set up the Timor Development Company with interests in coffee and cotton. 21

Yet, as with foreign interest in Timor's petroleum, this and other foreign ventures hardly existed except on paper.

Under the Portuguese Republic SAPT forged ahead producing around 200 tons of coffee a year by the end of the 1920s buying a further 100 tons of coffee a year from Timorese producers. SAPT's dominance was also at the expense of other companies, which were either absorbed or withered away. Indeed, by the 1930s, SAPT was even challenging Chinese dominance in the sphere of Trade. For all that, however, the export economy was not totally dominated by the plantation sector. Peasant producers or smallholders still produced between four-fifths and two-thirds of that produced by the planters. 22

This question has been contextualized by Holder Lains e Silva in his 1956 monograph on coffee in Timor who argues that the coffee industry in Timor developed as part of Peasant production outside of any capitalist activity owing to cultivation in a forestry condition. This is a reference to the ability of the coffee bush to thrive in Timor with only minimal attention under the canopy of the *Albizzia molucana* trees, still a feature of the industry today. Where capitalist plantation economies looked to maximizing returns, Timores

peasant cultivators, as with those of Bali and Colombia, typically yielded an extremely low income from few coffee bushes scattered over wide terrain. 23

Indeed, the Republican era favoured small farmers and peasants over large planters and landowners, a fact not altered by the coup of 1926 in Portugal by army officers who themselves represented the interests of large landowners. This bias did not preclude European settlement, however, and Governor Teófilo Duarte (1926-28), the first governor in the service of Salazar's Estado Novo, actively encouraged their emigration, including the deportados. Lawson observes that Governor Duarte gave instructions in 1927 to construct "indigenous villages" to resettle part of the population, an initiative carried on under Governor Alvaro Eugénio Neves da Fontoura (1937-39). As Governor Fontoura learned at first hand, colonial fiat and attachment of the Timorese to their sacred land came into sharp conflict only under extreme pressure did the Timorese submit to resettlement into the new colonial villages, especially on the malarial lowlands. But herein was the colonial dilemma -actually ruthlessly grasped by Indonesia after 1975- widely dispersed settlements in the mountains in the Timorese pattern, did not lend to administrative control but, without concentration, the recruitment and control of labour needed for public works projects, cash crop production and military conscription could not begin. As Lawson observes, numerous villages simply could not be traced at the time of the annual tax assessment.24

Such avoidance and foot dragging along with elements of compulsion would be a theme running through the history of the colonial encounter in Timor.

Economic Depression in the 1930s: But, as Lawson has written, the depression of the 1930s left Portugal on the verge of bankruptcy and, by the time recovery was in sight, the disruptive effects of World War II were already being felt. During this period, in the absence of funds, the development of Timor was almost entirely disregarded or neglected. While certain individuals, including Chinese merchants and coffee planters, may have been enriched, the colony of Timor remained a drain, albeit a small one, upon Portugal's resources.25

In this period SAPT was obliged to divest 47.62 per cent of its holdings to the BNU and the state.26 Lawson observes that, given the steady decline in coffee production in the 1930s after the relative growth in the preceding decade, the authorities were bound to make up this deficit in revenues by looking at alternative means, indeed a theme taken up in the following chapter. She comments that, while little is known as to what compensating measures were taken, evidence exists that, in addition to the head tax, the Portuguese introduced a new tax on barlaque and estilos.27

As part of the protectionist screen thrown up around the Portuguese colonies, foreign capital was excluded from the old planting zones of Angola, São Tomé, and Cape Verde, as well as the new coffee plantations of Timor. A decree law of 1937 stipulated that at least half the capital of companies exploiting land concessions had to be Portuguese. First confined to Timor, this decree was later extended to all the colonies. Clarence-Smith explains that agriculture was one of the few economic activities for which the Portuguese possessed the necessary background, skills, and industrial capital.28

Yet, in practice, unlike the African colonies, Timor largely remained outside the protectionist-trading network. The two Asia Pacific Colonies, Timor and Macau, were embedded in Chinese retail distribution networks. While some 15 per cent of imports came from Portugal and Mozambique, mainly wines and sugar thanks to a preferential tariff, imports of cotton piece goods, mostly of Japanese manufacture, dominated. Against this background, plantation agriculture expanded in Timor in the interwar period. But while 20 per cent of production was on modern estates, 80 per cent of production issued from the labour of peasant cultivators. Yanagisawa, a prewar Japanese specialist on Timor, noted that prior to the outbreak of War, the annual production of coffee in Timor (around 1500 tons) was a relatively high figure for an industry suffering from low production techniques.29

Although the state was instrumental in securing a direct shipping link between Macau and Timor, contracted out in 1891 to the E&A line, during the interwar years foreign trade became the unofficial monopoly of the Dutch KPM company which operated two 1,500 ton passenger-freighter vessels on the Surabaya run (monthly), and the Macassar route (fortnightly). An exception was the short-lived Macau-Timor line, launched in September 1930. But in 1938 Japanese shippers also commenced a Surabaya service in addition to a connection with the Japanese-mandated territory of Palau in the Pacific. Generally, the Japanese ships were welcome in the colony as their shipping rates were more competitive. In the years before the outbreak of War, Japanese ships were freighting such cargoes as maize, manganese ore

copra, rubber, and bees wax.

Such enterprise, albeit at an extremely low level of exploitation, was-as monitored by British intelligence-the hits of Japanese business and commercial acumen over the previous decade. The principal prewar destination for Portuguese Timor's coffee exports was the Netherlands East Indies, no doubt destined for re-export, followed by Portugal and Japan. Copra, hides, beeswax, and canine nuts were all exported to the Netherlands East Indies. Cotton, however, was exported to China although destined for mills under Japanese control. The principal import, textiles, came From Japan.

Australia supplied prewar Timor with dour and groceries. 30

By 1941, SAPT was the only large agricultural concern operating in the colony.

As property of the da Silva family, SAPT alone was exempt from the ban on foreign agricultural enterprise. It also monopolized the purchase of all high-grade Arabica coffee produced in Timor alongside that produced in its own extensive estates at Fatu-besai, Marin, and Betorema. SAPT, in turn, supported two subsidiaries, Empreza Agricola Perserverenca and Empreza Agricola Timor Limitada.³¹

SAPT also monopolized trade between Timor and Japan and Portugal, accounting for 20 per cent of the whole trade of the Portuguese colony. While the BNU never lost complete control of SAPT, it is significant that by 1940 Japanese interests represented by a certain Sachimaro Sagawa, a member of the board of Nanyo Kohatsu K.K. which set up operations in Timor in 1938, increased his stake to 48 per cent, with investments of one million pounds Sterling.³²

SAPT plantations were located on the slopes of the hills in the upper reaches of the Lois River. The Japanese observer described these as "ideal coffee plantations, being blessed with rich soil and well sheltered from the monsoon".

Besides coffee, rubber, cocoa, coconuts, cinchona, and tea were also cultivated on the plantations.³³

Archer identified two main types of Coffee grown in Timor in the prewar period, namely high grade Arabica and low grade Robusta with albeit, unsuccessful experimentation conducted in the cultivation of Liberian coffee.

Table 10.1: Coffee production in metric tons (1938-40)

Year	1938	1939	1940
Arabica	1522	821	704
Robusta	99	55	136
Liberia	5	3	

Source: Archer (1941)

Statistics for coffee production supplied by Archer covering the years 1938-40 [see Table 10: 1] reveal the problems of coffee monoculture in an ecologically vulnerable site in the Southeast Asia ecosphere. Archer observes that the 1940 crop was considerably reduced owing to lack of rain. Moreover, a fall in export price in 1940 did not cover production costs. In that year an offer was made by an Australian company to purchase five tons of Arabica and ten tons of Robusta.

While entailing an overall loss for Timor, the government sanctioned the deal as a means to establish a market niche in Australia. Such was Japanese commercial acuity in prewar Timor that earlier concern as to the Dutch stranglehold on communications via the Dutch inter-island KPM service was replaced by an apprehension that Japan could manipulate the coffee market as a way of applying political pressure. This was of real concern as a large part of the government's revenues and nearly all its supplies of foreign exchange depended upon the maintenance of coffee exports. Besides coffee, Nanyo Kohatsu, which also supported interests in Taiwan and the Netherlands East Indies, purchased whatever surplus remained of Timor's copra, rubber, beeswax, cotton, and manganese.³⁴

In any case, the death knell to the old colonial plantation system was dealt by the Japanese invasion, at which point the planters fled to Australia.

State Control over Resources

There is no question that Timor's natural resources have been much mythologized since the first outsider interest in the island. This is as much apparent in Chinese writings on Timor as in the writings of the

Dominicans and in journals bequeathed by Western visitors. The dream of gold, in particular, was one such myth that persisted into the modern period although hardly backed by scientific investigation. For example, writing in the early 1940s, one Japanese author observed that the mineral deposits of Timor included chromite, manganese, copper, gold and oil. Of gold, he observed, rich gold deposits are expected in the southern slopes of the central mountain range where natives gather "placer gold" in the streams and nugget: up to 107 grammes.³⁵

But neither should Timor's resource patrimony be diminished. A 1975 UN report described East Timor as having, besides offshore petroleum prospects, "fertile lands, valuable forests and probably deposits of Copper, gold and manganese".³⁶

The Oil Industry: In his standard work, *The Malay Archipelago*, Wallace observes that "a fine spring of Pure petroleum was discovered far in the interior". He also writes of the fiasco surrounding a company formed in Singapore by a Portuguese merchant attracted by stories of vast copper reserves in Timor and who dispatched to the colony at great expense an engineer brought out from England as well as technicians equipment and stores. To the great chagrin of the Portuguese authorities, the engineer declared the reports highly exaggerated if not fictitious.

Wallace concurred that no such ambitious projects could be entertained at least until the colony had acquired such basic appurtenances of civilization as roads.³⁷

In 1891 a geological expedition comprising several Portuguese officials and the civil engineer Dr. Selhurst disembarked from the Dilly in Manatuto and proceeded to Laclou and other locales. Besides researching the presence of gold and copper, the expedition also sought out petroleum sources. They would have had good reason for some success in the search for the latter, as Dili had in fact been illuminated at times since 1884 by lamps fuelled with oil from Laclubar. The presence of burning gas in Timor was subsequently broadcast by Selhurst in his "Report on a Geological Expedition to Timor" dated 20 November 1891.

This study undoubtedly led to the expedition by the English engineer, W.A. Duff, who arrived in Timor via Hong Kong and Macau in 1892. Duff, like Selhurst, was attracted to the search by stories of traditional uses of oil in Timor, the practice of illuminating Dili town with oil lamps during festival days, and commercial intelligence as to an "outflow" of oil from wells in the Laclubar region. Known locally as the land of "eternal fires", the Laclubar site was re-known for its dried gas and surface oil seeps. Duff succeeded in obtaining 470 gallons of crude from the Laclubar seep and placed it at the customs House at Dili with instructions for export pending official approval. Duff even mooted piping the oil from the hills to the coast, although nothing came of that dream, nor more general proposals he evidently made to the Portuguese authorities in Macau.³⁸

In 1901, "a well known Australia chemist", Dr. John Elliott, bound for Dili on the E&A steamer *Empire*, happened upon oil on water some hours steaming from Dili. The following year, Elliott, Captain Helens of the *Empire*, and others, formed a Company in Sydney, Australia, with a capital of 12,500 pounds. Having secured a small number of prospecting concessions in Timor they initiated drilling.

While the presence of oil and gas was confirmed, the results were pronounced unsatisfactory owing to inadequate plant and insufficient capital. In 1910 shareholder discontent led to the reconstitution of the company as the Timor Petroleum Concession Ltd. Again, with Elliott as one of the directors, this company was registered in Sydney, and capitalized with 15,000 pounds of shares at one pound each. H.G. Foxall, a geologist with the University of Sydney, was commissioned to make a geological survey of the concession, located in the Vessoro region, on the south coast, some 60 kilometres from the eastern end of the island. He concluded of the concession:

...There is every indication that the field will prove as important as the other East Indies fields. The geological structure and the indications are similar in each case, and the geographical position of the island indicates that this is an extension of the neighbouring productive fields. ³⁹

Company reports reveal the operators struck a gusher, which hit the derrick top at some 25 metres, but, after ten minutes spouting, the bore choked with sand and equipment seized up. While all the indications of the presence of oil in commercial quantity were good—seepages and gas vents occurred all over the concession—by 1910 the capital of the existing company was exhausted. Some 34,500 pounds had been expended without achieving any commercial results. While the Australian government was keen to ensure

that the Timor prospect did not fall into foreign hands, it declined to back the Timor concession, seeing more promise in British and German Papua.⁴⁰

On 5 March 1914 the Fenchurch Trading Syndicate of London, represented by one Captain William M. Cairncross, made application to the Minister of Colonies in Lisbon for a concession to search for and process deposits of oil and minerals in certain designated areas of Timor. A concession was duly granted for five years.⁴¹

Conceding the importance of the Syndicate's concession, the British Foreign Office made it clear that it did not wish to see it transferred out of British hands. In 1917 the British Consul in Batavia reported that a British syndicate, "The international Petroleum Co. Ltd." of Hong Kong had also applied but not received a concession in Timor. It was also observed that Japanese mining engineers had researched abandoned concessions in Timor but had not made application.⁴²

Work resumed in the field after some absence by a reconstituted and reconstructed company known as Timor Oil Ltd., formed in 1916. This was capitalized at 11000 pounds issued in 22,000 shares of 10 shillings each. Directors were Sir Joseph Carruthers and Arthur J. Straughton. Both Carruthers and Straughton were active lobbyists to, respectively, the British Admiralty and the Australian naval authorities citing national interest as sufficient reason to be offered financial backing, for their company activities. An Australian named Dodson pioneered this activity on the ground through to the Japanese intervention. In 1926, Straughton was successful in obtaining oil concessions in Timor on behalf of the Melbourne-based Timor Petroleum Company. In that year some equipment was shipped and drilling commenced at Aliambata. But when machinery broke down and the company's funds became exhausted, work was abandoned and never resumed on that site.⁴³

In the 1930s this company was liquidated and two companies, the Timor Oil Company and the "Anglo-Eastern Oil Company" were put forward to handle Straughton's interests. Eventually, Timor Oil Company took over the old concession held by Straughton but this company ran foul of the provisions of the Portuguese Mining Law, which treated Straughton as the sole concessionary and declined to recognize his transfer of rights. As no serious efforts were made by this company or Straughton to exploit its concession, the Portuguese government deemed the contracts cancelled. However, news of the demise of Timor Oil Company apparently had not reached the ears of Straughton's local representative, a Mr. Bryant, even on the eve of War. ⁴⁴

In 1936, Allied Mining Corporation, a Manila-based company promoted by the Belgian "adventurer", Serge Wittouck, obtained concessions to search for oil in Portuguese Timor, including in areas previously conceded to the Australian-owned companies. He also formed a separate company called Asia Investment Company Limited. Wittouck brought to Timor a considerable staff of experts to research the resources potential of the colony and engaged locally the services of one Max Sanders. The research results were published in a richly documented study entitled Exploration of Portuguese Timor.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, Wittouck entered into negotiations with the Portuguese authorities in both Dili and Lisbon making extravagant claims as to investments, equipment and the scale of Buildings and residences erected on the Dili waterfront. In this, and other matters, he was frustrated. But with Wittouck's unexplained suicide in 1940, Sanders remained on in Dili as the only company representative. Australian and British government circles feared that Wittouck and, especially, the Asia Investment Company was a front for Japanese designs. In July 1938, as a way of checkmating the competition, the British and Australian governments intervened with Lisbon in the way of assisting in the establishment of two new companies, Oil Search and Oil Concessions. By April 1939 the concession was granted but, as Oil Search considered the condition too onerous, it withdrew. With the support of the Australian government Oil Concessions decided to carry on and, in November 1938, it gained a new concession covering around three quarters of the colony. Still the Portuguese government took the line that the Asia Investment Company held prior claim to the rest of the territory.

In April 1940, fearful that the Japanese would intervene should the company fail to attract sufficient capital and fail to consummate its activities the British and Australian governments brokered a deal with Anglo-Iranian, Shell and Standard Vacuum Oil to buy out Oil Concessions. This was approved by Lisbon with the agreement that work would commence by 30 April 1941. In the prewar period a geological team commenced operations.⁴⁶

In October 1941, the UK and Australian governments advanced 10,000 pounds to the three oil majors to

induce them to acquire controlling shares in the Portuguese company (CUP) Companhia Ultramarina de Petroleos' concession rights in Timor. Yet, as reported by the visiting British Consul, Archer, on the eve of War, "the only oil production actually going on in Portuguese Timor is in the hands of the Government itself which runs a small refinery capable of Producing eight tins of kerosene a day". 47

Manganese: In fact, as one Japanese observer recorded, the only mining venture actually being worked on Timor in the immediate prewar period was a manganese mine in the eastern part of the island on the south coast. He described the ore as of good quality but limited quantity.⁴⁸ In the early 1930s a Dutch mining engineer, Hofman, was granted concession rights to manganese deposits found at Nova Benfica, near Aliambata, and in the district near Baucau. This was believed to be of more use for medical than metallurgical purposes owing to its rich content of Dioxide of Manganese. In short time Hofman commenced mining operations and, in 1936, sold 60 tons of Metallurgical manganese at 60 gold florins a ton to Japanese interests who freighted the ore from Laga using their company ship.

Hofman broke off this arrangement when the price offered by the Japanese concern was lowered to 45 florins a ton whereupon, in 1937, he negotiated a sale of 50 tons at 80 guilders a ton to German interests. However, Hofman stalled at unloading further stocks of ore at what he considered unprofitable terms. Left with around 100 tons of stock, in February 1941 Hofman then negotiated with Nanyo Kohatsu K.K. to sell 25 tons a month at 70 florins a ton. At this point the government stepped in and imposed upon Hofman a fine of 3,000 patacas evidently for breach of contract in not working his concession. Employing large gangs of Native labour, the government extracted a further 200 tons of Manganese ore. However, it appears, the government was no more successful in negotiating a satisfactory sale with Japanese interests. Prior to the outbreak of the war the government was negotiating with Australian interests. Archer saw in this initiative an attempt on the part of the government to reduce Timor's dependence upon coffee.⁴⁹

As Yanagishiwa concluded in 1941, Timor's mineral resources remained virtually unexploited.⁵⁰ Undoubtedly this was a sentiment that guided future fortune hunters down until the present, yet the Timor Eldorado proved elusive, at least on land. By the end of the colonial era, however, the promise shifted to Timor's offshore marine resources, a reference to what would emerge as the world's 23rd largest oil and gas field in the Timor Sea.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have emphasized the overarching role of the state in Timor, not only in the area of Sea and land communications and in pioneering industrial ventures running from salt extraction to minerals exploration, but also in mediating the way that private business operated and in virtually managing the man-land relationship, necessary to set the conditions for a plantation economy based on export-based monoculture. The state, we saw, also intervened in such areas as banking, money circulation, in the collection of Taxes and imposts, and even in such rent-seeking activities as the establishment of Monopolies. While the foundations of this statist endeavour in Timor reaches back to Celestino da Silva's SAPT operation, which paradoxically opened the way for private exploitation of Timor's resources, human and otherwise, the central role of the state in colonial Timor received further stimulus with the advent of the Estado Novo.

Never before as under the corporatist endeavour of the Salazarist state in Timor was the axiom that colonies should pay for themselves so inventively grasped.

But where the Portuguese in Timor failed by the standards of Northern European colonialism as an efficient extractor of resources, and failed even by the standards of colonial capitalism in breaking down pre-capitalist modes of Production through the substitution of money for barter, it is not the same as saying there was no economic motive and that there was no development. We have seen that a colonial enclave economy was successfully developed but in the geographically restricted sphere of coffee cultivation. But whether a colonial working class developed in the plantation sector in Timor separated from his (or her) land, selling his labour, conscious of his class position, as in the Marxist definition, such as occurred in certain African settings under Portuguese colonialism, remains highly dubious.

Just as we look to anthropological structures of Peasant societies to answer this question, so we should look to the ideological props of the Salazarist state in Timor if we are to grasp the full implications of the colonial project in this obscure Oceanic possession of Portugal.

Notes

1. W.G. Clarence-Smith, *Slaves, Peasants and Capitalists in Southern Angola, 1840-1926*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 3-3, 12-20.
2. René Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre, Le Crocodile et les Portugais (1847-1913)*, Orgeval, 1996, pp. 207-208
3. PRO CO129/457, "Opium Monopoly in Portuguese Timor", Hong Kong, 19 February 1919, British Consular Agent, Kupang to HBM Consul General, Batavia, Koepang, 10 April 1919.
4. AHU Doc. Imp.495 Timor DGE 2 Reparticao, December 1912...Relatório.
5. J. Ferraro Vaz, *Moeda de nmor*, Lisboa, 1964, p. 53.
6. BOGPT, No.13, 1 April 1911.
7. Ma Tak-wo, *Currency of Macau*, Hong Kong, Museum of History, Urban Council, 1987, p. 18.
8. Jose Augusto Correia de Campos, *A Resolucao do Problema Monetario de Timor*, Sociedade Nacional de Tipografia, Lisboa, 1932, pp. 34-45.
9. Ma Tak-wo, *Currency of Macau*, p. 18.
10. *A Resolucao do Problema Monetario*, p. 72.
11. Australian Archives (AA), VIC. 1 I 877/I 1163, Archer's report on Portuguese Timor, March-April 1941.
12. *O Macaense*, 29 April 1886. I
13. W. G. Clarence-Smith, "Planters and smallholders in Portuguese Timor in the nineteenth and Twentieth centuries", *Indonesian Circle*, No.57, March 1992, pp. 20-23.
14. Pelissier, *Timor en Guerre*, p. 205.
15. Clarence-Smith, "Planters and Smallholders".
Yet others such as the Conde de Penha Garcia argued that offering Timor to a concession company was no solution. Rather, given the "indolence" of the Timorese peasant, the solution was to introduce white colonists so as to transform Timor into an Oceanic Sao Tome. Necessarily these colonists would be capitalized, experienced, and offered protection by the military. In the absence of Metropolitan recruits, these immigrants would be drawn from the Portuguese community in Hawaii, well established since 1878. See Conde de Penha Garcia, *Algumas Palavras sobre a colonizacao de Timor*, Soc. de Geografia Tip. "A Liberal", Lisboa, 1901.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Lawson, "East Timor: Roots Continue to Grow", pp. 161-7.
18. *Ibid.*
19. AHU Doc. Imp 495 Timor DGE 2 Reparticao 1912 Dec. "Relatório do Governador Filomeno da Camara Melo Cabral, sobre administracao da Provincia", p. 47.
20. Helio A. Esteves Felgas, *Timor Português*, Agencia Geral do ultramar, Lisboa 1956; Archer's report, and Ruy Cinatti, *Esboco Histórico do Sndalo no nmor Portugues*, MiniStirio das Co16nias, Lisboa, 1950.
21. Peter Hastings, "The Timor Problem-II: Some Australian Attitudes, 1903- 1941 ", *Australian Outlook*, Vol.29, No.2, August 1975, p. 191.
22. Archer's report.
23. Helder Lains e Silva, *Timor e a Cultura do Caj:2E*, Ministerio do Ultramar, Junta de investigacões do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1956, p. 142.

The Interwar Years: Culture, Control and Dissuasion

Politically, the revolutionary process in Portugal culminating in 1910 with the ousting of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic was followed by 15 more years of instability. Matters changed when, in 1926, a group of military officers seized.

Power, dissolved parliament, outlawed political parties, censored the press and placed strong controls on trade unions. The new Finance Minister, Antonio Salazar, a former professor of economics at Coimbra University, soon began to exert enormous influence within the government. As Minister of Colonies, Salazar moved in 1930 to impose central government control over the colonies. In 1932, as Prime Minister, Salazar increased the powers of the political police. 1

This chapter seeks to set down the main features of Portuguese colonial rule in Timor in the interwar years. While, as shown, this was a rare period in the island's troubled history of apparent peace and quiet industry the absence of major outbreaks of rebellion cannot have been out of love of the indigenous population-although such bonds of loyalty were highly mythologized-but equally stemmed from what is here described as "coercive dissuasion". While, by this age, the population of the colony had grown to 451,604 and that of Dili to 8,136 (census of 31 December 1927), it is hard to conceive that either Salazarism or the church succeeded in making over the Timorese even within the idiom of colonialism. In any case, the voices of the Timorese were mostly silent in this epoch, at least outside of tribal lore, indigenous collective memory, and the pages of a few scattered colonial ethnographies.

The effort to reconstruct these years must, necessarily, involve some active deconstruction of colonial texts codes, and symbols. Where other colonialisms in prewar Asia generated a nucleus of colonial literates, the record is wanting for Timor. There were simply no Timorese Kartinis or Sukarnos of this age, a reference to the rise of literate and print conscious native-nationalists in the Dutch colony.

Salazar and the Estado Novo (1926)

Under Salazar's Estado Novo, a new administrative rationalization was created for Portugal's African and Asian colonies. On the legal plane the most important decree affecting Timor was the organic charter of the colony of Timor brought down in 1931. Inter alia, this law described Timor as an "administrative division of the Portuguese colonial empire", representing an "autonomous administrative and financial organism", albeit under metropolitan control. The charter also set forth in some detail the particular dispositions and conditions under which administrative control in Timor was exercised by the Ministry of the colonies through the person of the governor, local administrative agencies, and the military. As erstwhile chief executive in the running of the colony, the Governor-the first under the new dispensation was Governor Antonio Baptista Justo (1930-33) also exercised authority on military questions equivalent to commander-in-chief. Presented to the International Colonial Exposition in Paris, this document represented the first attempt on Paper, at least, to portray the Southeast Asian colony in the light of modern colonial administrative organization.²

No less, the modernizing thrust of Salazar's new order gave way to a series of overarching decrees and acts setting down the relationships between the colonies and metropolitan Portugal; among them being the Carta Organica do Imperio Colonial Portugues of November 1933, the Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina of November 1933, and the Acto colonial of September 1935.

Yet, no political space was created for political action in Timor under the long Salazarist regime. There was no parallel in Portuguese Timor to the limited opening seized by Timorese in Dutch Timor as a consequence of prewar Dutch "ethical policies" which saw the emergence of such socially concerned parties as Timorsch Verbond, founded in 1922, Timor Evolutie, founded in 1924, Pesekutan Timor, formed in 1926, and Timorsche Jongeren, formed in Bandung in 1933 by Timorese students in Java. Nor was there any parallel in the Portuguese colony with the experience of those Timorese under Dutch rule exposed to the rhetoric of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), not to mention the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) which established a branch in Kupang in 1925, inter alia calling for the mitigation of taxes and an end to forced labour (at least until the arrest and exile of its leader, Christian Pandie). Neither, for that matter, did the Indonesian nationalist movement take any interest in Portuguese Timor.³

It should also be emphasized that there was no parallel in Timor to other Portuguese colonies where by the 1920s and 1930s, either critiques of Salazarism developed among an educated class of *illustrodo* (Goa), or where disenchanted Portuguese mounted challenges to Salazarism in the colonies (Guinea). Educational opportunity in Timor, as explained below, was simply retarded and few Timorese, if any, availed themselves of an outside education. There was also no parallel in Timor to the situation in Mozambique in the 1920s where, until driven underground, several organizations existed representing the political interests

of educated Africans. Neither was there any parallel in Timor as in Goa where opponents of Portuguese colonialism, albeit products of this system, threw in their lot with the broader struggle against another colonialism, that of the British in India.⁴

But if an indigenous challenge to Portuguese rule during the interwar years appeared to be lacking in Timor, and in the apparent absence of a conspiracy of the *assimilado* along the lines of that preceding the Boaventura rebellion, exceptional was the class of *deportados* or persons banished from Portugal and other colonies for political offences. In Timor, according to a British source, this group of about one hundred comprised 60 per cent democrats, 30 per cent communists, and about 10 per cent ordinary criminals. Besides opponents of the Salazar regime, Timor was also a destination for condemned criminals from other Portuguese colonies, especially Macau. One was Joao Gomes Moreira Jr., deported from Angola for involvement in an independence movement, who, at the time of his meeting with a British consular official in 1941, was working as a clerk in the court.⁵

Others included a number who had participated in a revolt in Guinea in 1927 and 1931.

Another was the father of Jose Ramos-Horta, part of a progressive group who commandeered a Portuguese gunboat to participate in the Spanish civil war against Franco.⁶

Nevertheless, the *deportados* were deliberately scattered over various parts of the island, their movements restricted to designated areas, and otherwise subject to various controls. As shown in a following chapter, many of *deportados* would actively rally to the "antifascist" cause in defence of Timor against Japanese occupation.

Labour Control and Coercive Dissuasion

Greater political control, in theory, meant the wherewithal for greater extraction and, ipso facto, primitive accumulation. In Portuguese Timor, the prewar tax regime (1936) stood at 16 patacas per year for wage earners (some 2 per cent of the labour force) and 11 patacas for so-called auxiliary labour (98 per cent). For auxiliary labourers the tax became equivalent to four months labour although possibly offset by sales of garden and plantation products. The penalty for default was unpaid labour service in lieu of tax. Basically all male "natives" over the age of 16-18 were required to pay the tax. Dispensations, however, were allowed to Europeans, "assimilated" natives, chiefs, and, among other categories, owners of over 3,000 coffee trees or 1000 rubber trees all in production.⁷

While, in reality, as Metzner points out, official requirements relating to the collection of taxes amounted to little more than the annual census, ⁸

This view neglects the *modus operandi* of collection, indeed, the logic of colonial capitalism. As reported in a 1932 issue of the Australian publication, *Smith's Weekly*, by starving the local treasury Lisbon obliged local officials to squeeze the indigent Timorese harder and harder. On taxation, the paper reported, the district commanders "go after the Mexican dollars of the natives good and hard". While the link between the tax burden, and the tension between family budget and the demands of the state budget, have been widely aired in the literature on rebellion during the depression years in such colonies as Burma and Vietnam, it appears that the dissuasive and coercive power of the colonial states Portuguese Timor included, has been underestimated.

Witness:

... Our informant states that native prisoners in Portuguese Timor, guilty of no greater offence than that of inability to pay their taxes, are put to forced labour in chains, under the superintendence of native guards, and if they weaken in their tasks are dogged with long bamboo rods until they fall exhausted and bleeding. Guards standing over them hog them until they get up again.

To escape the rain of blows that falls with monotonous regularity on the stragglers they make frantic effort to overtake those in front of them, and thus the march continues. But inevitably exhaustion overcomes the weakest. They sink to the ground.... Port Arthur in 1832, the Devil's Island today, are pale shadows of this tropic island atrocity.

Another informant of *Smith's Weekly* explained the treatment meted out to runaways from the government plantations, who otherwise served up to half a year's *corvée* labour far from their homes, who were obliged

to supply their own food, and who were wracked with illness, under fed and overworked

:

... The runaway, when captured, is a convict. He is given from 100 to 200 strokes with the palmatoria (bamboo). After about sixty strokes the hands swell enormously and blood begins to flow. The victims of this torture shriek like men possessed. But the Moradores continue their work. Two hold their man while the third continues to swing the bamboo, relieving each other at every 25 strokes, lest the vigour of the punishment be lessened.

This eyewitness reported that the tenente or civil commander of the district of Viqueque, not only took a delight in witnessing the spectacle personally but also would kick the prisoners when recovering their balance. Another practice, although later discontinued, involved smearing the wounds so incurred with hot water and salt.⁹

As we have emphasized, colonialism was sui generis and to answer back to this Australian critic, rigid controls over Australia's aborigines at least the survivors of white settler colonialism "reached", in the words of one authority, "a climax in the depression years of the 1930's".¹⁰

But we write of Timor not Australia.

In part, the expanding administrative regime in Timor proceeded in tandem with the need to lay down city ordinances and planning codes such as relating to building codes, hygiene, the use of vehicles, and in the area of public order and peace, such as controlling the use of firecrackers, etc. But the codification of laws also implied a system of fines for transgression. By the 1930s city life was a more complex affair for the urbanized Chinese or semi-urbanized Timorese. In 1937, for example, a table of annual taxes was introduced covering almost every conceivable aspect of life. Under this dispensation imposts were imposed for, building renovations, new windows, animal powered tractors, bicycles, clubs, parties (a dispensation was made for marriages), flying a foreign flag (exemption for Portuguese flag), sign boards, alcoholic drinks, cockfights, etc., etc.¹¹

While enforcement of such a regime in rural Timor may have been one matter, default on obligatory labour service was a penal issue. Up until the immediate prewar period, the colony hosted three prisons, Aileu, Taibesse and Cadeia da Comarca. In a 1939 rationalization brought down by Governor Alvaro Eugenio Neves da Fontoura (1937-39), a move was made to "localize" prisoners, in part through the creation of a system of Colonia Penal Agricola da Timor.¹²

Commensurate with the "modernization" of public administration, new measures were also taken to introduce immigration controls, namely by prescribing two points of entry, Dili, and O-Silo in Oecusse. Neither was the deportado forgotten in these new control measures. As an additional control measure, they were required to report themselves to the local authorities every Saturday.¹³

In 1940, incoming Governor Manuel de Abreu Ferreira de Carvalho (1940-45) classified Timor as a penal colony, therefore ensuring a steady supply of condemned Chinese and Macanese from Macau. Conveniently, Macau also served as a penal colony for condemned Timorese.

The Portuguese Cultural Crusade

Against the backdrop of economic backwardness and labour control, what additional ideological features did the Republic, and especially the Salazarist state; seek to impose upon the Timorese consistent with the organic charter? How did Timorese society evolve within the rules laid down by the colonial state? What scope was there for educational advancement in Timor? What was the hand of the church in this project?

While, as discussed in Chapter 8, the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1910 virtually left the role of educating the population in the hands of the not very capable state, the slate was not entirely wiped clean. First, as mentioned, the Chinese community in Dili had not been backward in this area. The first formal Chinese school in the colony, the Clube Chum Fuk Tong Su, as witnessed by a Portuguese visitor in 1912, offered instruction not only in Chinese language, but also offered courses in English, zoology and botany.¹⁴

As of 1916, when Governor Filomeno da Camara laid down a new set of regulations for primary schools in the colony, state schools had already been established in sixteen widely dispersed locations. Additionally mission schools still operated in Lahane, Ainaro, Hatolia, Alas, Manatuto, Soibada, Baucau, Ossu, and Oecussi. Under the 1916 dispensation, rural schools were given priority with the emphasis on agriculture

and, practical subjects. While it is unclear as to whether the authorities ever envisaged that Portuguese would entirely replace Tetum and other dialects as language of local primary school instruction, the reality was recognized that it was impossible to teach children in babel of different languages. Again it is unclear, but under the new law, the schools in Timor were to be brought into "equilibrium" with those in metropole, suggesting an expanded role for Portuguese alongside Tetum. 15

But these were paper reforms and it is unlikely that Tetum or dialect was entirely replaced by Portuguese in rural education at that date.

Indeed, as the compiler of a Tetum-Portuguese dictionary wrote in the 1930s, even after four centuries, it was inconceivable that the Timorese spoke Portuguese.

Timor's "tribal" structure, the extreme isolation of various communities, and the history of internecine wars all contrived to prevent the extension of the domain of Portuguese. Rather, it was the Portuguese, notably the military, civil, and church authorities, along with the planters who were obliged to learn Tetum. Or at least the Latinized version of Tetum called Dili or Praca Tetum. The publication of various dictionaries, catechisms, and other works in Tetum or about Tetum actually accelerated the process whereby the domain of this language actually expanded and came to dominate over other languages and dialects. 16 -

As Governor Teofilo Duarte summarized, in 1926 there were six teachers and seven student teachers teaching 200 students in state primary schools. In addition, there were 15 fathers and ten assistants teaching 500 students in primary education, in addition to ten apprentices carpenters and shoemakers, and a section for the training of 30 catechists / Small increments in these numbers brought the grand total of primary students in the system to 1245 by 1928. There was no high school or college level education or opportunity. Of course, as Duarte recognized, there were many obstacles to the expansion of education, both on the side of the impecunious state and on the side of tradition, superstition, and the long distances separating isolated Timorese communities. But on the side of missions, he lamented, after 300 years; only 19,000 converts had been won. From figures offered by Duarte, in all Timor, only 1822 could read and write, 742 had reading ability, while the balance were illiterate. It is not clear whether these figures include Chinese and metropolitans, but a staggeringly low level of literacy by any measure. 17

It would be relevant then to take stock of the legacy of the missions in Timor.

Writing some seven years after the expulsion of the missions from Timor, D. Joao Paulino d'Azevedo e Castro, the Bishop of Macau, lamented that the number of missionaries and mission schools in Timor was vastly reduced, certain of them completely abandoned with great prejudice to the cause of evangelization and instruction. Moreover, of those members of the Canossian order who otherwise moved on to Malacca, Macau, or Singapore, it was difficult to find replacements, even though the atmosphere had become more supportive for the missions, especially after the passage of the provincial government portaria or decree of June 1916 confirming the employment of teachers and missionaries in the colony. Yet there is a sense that the small florescence of mission activity, as matched by the development of Soibada and Lahane missions, and the pioneering works of translations, had reached a nadir. No more than a dozen religious workers remained in Timor, most of them at the end of their service. 18

Notwithstanding the efforts of P. Jose da Costa Nunes, Bishop of Macao and Timor from 1920 onwards, the situation on the ground in Timor had little improved by 1938 when the number of missionaries had increased to twenty. By this time, the activities of the church in Timor, as in Portugal's other colonial possessions, had been relaxed. Under the new Portuguese constitution of 11 April 1933 and laws of 23 March and 11 April 1935, the decree of 1910 was revoked and religious groups legally recognized. Accordingly, in 1936, a new representative of the Diocese of Macau and Timor was appointed to Timor. This was P. Jaime Garcia Goulart.

But, reading through the pages of the principal church organ, the Boletim Eclesiastico de Macau, there is an overwhelming sense that the church was fighting an uphill battle, not necessarily against officialdom, as most privileges and support had been restored, but what one Soibada-based missionary described as "gente muito supersticiosa, agarrada aos seus luhiques e estilos", a reference to the intractable resistance of the Timorese to their "primitive" beliefs and culture. 19

Writing of Suro, another missionary commented upon the existence in Bobonaro of only an "incipient Christianity", although the conversion of a chief and his family was considered a real event. Manufahi, for example, site of the 1912 Boaventura rebellion, registered only 470 Christians in 1939. It was only in that year that the first Church was inaugurated in Manufahi. 20

Writing of Ossu, where a mission and small school was opened in 1939, another missionary spoke of a vast zone, where for want of lack of evangelization, there were few Christians. This outpost, located at the foot of the formidable Mundo Perdido mountain range, worked hard to overcome the handicap of distance, isolation of communities, nomadic habits of the interior dwelling people, and the prevailing culture of sacrifices.²¹

Nevertheless, in this period, small Christianized communities developed around the filagree of missions, churches, and capelas, some soundly constructed, others made of bamboo or local building materials. While the number of baptisms and conversions increased slowly, as did the educational and civilizational work of the church, it can be said that the role of the church in Timor society deepened during this period. The church even played a small economic role, in part because the missions always operated on a threadbare budget. The Dare mission, for example, supported a coffee plantation employing fifty local youths on a daily basis. Eventually, on 4 September 1940, under Papal Bull Solemnibus Conventionibus, the diocese of Dili was separated from Macau. The first apostolic administrator to head this position was Mgr. Jaime Garcia Goulart (1940-58).²²

Representations

While we have observed the late arrival of the printing press in Timor and the A Practice of the Macau press to serve as a surrogate press in the case of Timor, how did this change over the decades? From a scrutiny of prewar publications, it is clear that no Timorese writers were published in Dili in this period. In any case, the press was the exclusive outlet for official or officialized publications authored by metropolitans. Obviously, the link between a readership and a literate reading mass is symbiotic. It is not surprising then that, given the failure of the state and missions combined to significantly increase literacy over this period, civil society in Dili was restricted. Few Timorese entered this charmed circle, the domain of metropolitans, their military auxiliaries, some Chinese, and Goanese.

This is not the same as saying that Timor was a void in the world of literature or at least colonial writings. To the contrary, a number of works surfaced in Macau or Lisbon offering either critiques of administrative malpractice or attempts to set the record straight as to alleged misrepresentations in the eyes of the world. Some took cover by publishing in other countries. Such was A de Almada Negreiros, who, writing from Paris in 1907, compared Timor to Guinea as among the Portuguese colonies disposing abundant natural resources and offering great potential but which, paradoxically, languished over long years in a situation "sinon desesperer, du moins desesperable".²³

But, notorious in this sense were the writings of "Zola", alias Antonio Padua Correia, a Portuguese journalist who first placed articles on Timor in newspapers in Porto prior to the publication of two vitriolic pamphlets entitled, Quatorze annos de Timor (1909) and Timor; O governo do general de brigada do quadro da reserva Jose Celestino da Silva durante 14 annos. Latrocinios, assassinatos e perseguicoes (1911). Directed at the "rei de Timor", Correia amassed an array of official and unofficial documentation to lay open a catalogue of charges against Celestino da Silva, conjuring up, in the words of Pelissier, an image of Timor not unlike that of the Congo under Leopold. Among the charges levelled at Celestino da Silva and family include; abuse of office, financial fraud, employment of slave labour on family-owned plantations, systematic abuse of prisoners, crimes against otherwise loyal reinos, or, in other words, public theft on a grand scale for the profit of his family. Such was Celestino da Silva's reputation -evil or benign- that, unwittingly, Timorese in his employ earned the sobriquet criado do governado or (lit servant of the governor). But in fact, Correia served as the mouthpiece of two brothers, both military doctors, serving in Dili, Antonio and Jose Paiva Gomes, along with an army pharmacist, Ubaldo d'Oliveira. It is perhaps regrettable that Celestino da Silva died (March 1911) before answering back at these defamations. Neither did a proposed duel between the former governor's son, Julio Celestino Montalvao, and his leading detractor, Antonio Paiva Gomes, clear the air.²⁴

Another who looked to journalism, or rather literature, to reflect on the Timor "dilemma" was Alberto Osorio de Castro, author of Flores de Coral: Ultimos poemas, published in Dili in 1908.²⁵

And, in part, reworked in 1928-29, and eventually published in 1943 as A Ilha Verde e Vermelha de Timor²⁶

The judge was no ordinary writer, however, but part of a literary circle, which included distinguished

Portuguese poet and life-long friend, Camilo Pessanha. Pessanha's private reactions to news that Osorio de Castro would take up appointment in Timor echo in many ways the metropolitan reputation of the colony as both a physical and mental graveyard. In a letter written in 1907, Pessanha wrote to the judge his concerns at hearing of his new posting "entre os jacarés, as febres palustres e o Celestino". 27

Obviously the various editions of *Ilha Verde e Vermelha* found different audiences and, at the same time, different resonances.²⁸

Published in Dili by the official press soon after Celestino had left the island, the author of *Flores de Coral*, a Coimbra University educated judge of mixed Goanese origin who lived and worked for three years, eight months in Timor, could hardly have been naive as to the political context in which he wrote. As Pelissier has remarked on this felicitous conjuncture, namely the departure of Celestino da Silva and the arrival of a judge poet, the ambiguity of the situation bequeathed by the ex-Governor is well captured in the chant sung by a local pomaleiro or shaman of the reino of Suro: "We neither belong to earth or sun, we belong to the Embotte (Governor). Previously, we didn't wish to work and didn't know how. But now you have taught us, we want to work". But as the senior Juiz de Direito (Judge) in the colony, a position he previously held in Goa and Mocimedes (Angola), and sometime owner of a small plantation, Osorio de Castro also struck a blow for law and order in his original publication, signalling the futility of rebellion on the part of the Timorese, although at the same time allowing that a single indiscretion of the part of the Portuguese could rekindle the rebellion.²⁹

Part observation and travelogue - he accompanied the governor on a tour of coffee plantations in 1909 - part scientific analysis drawn from a range of Western writings on Timor's anthropology, botany and part linguistic analysis drawn from existing dictionaries, Osorio de Castro bequeathed in *Ilha Verde e Vermelha* a poetic version of a Timor embedded in a specific anthropological and botanical niche- best described as Wallacea- but within the Portugalized orbit whose points of reference included, distantly, Camoes and Fernao Mendes Pinto, and his contemporaries and correspondents, Camillo Pessanha and Wencelau de Moraes, among others. Reflecting, perhaps, his literary as much scholarly predilections, Osorio de Castro's image of Timor is almost Braudelian in its composition and detail for the quotidian; from the perfume of various botanica, to fine-grained descriptions of the mangroves of the coast and the flora of the highlands, to the detail of Timorese and Chinese dress, to asides on virginity and marriage, to observations on the creole of the Bidau, to renderings of Malay pantun or rhyming verse into Tetum, and literally a rendition of the colours of the "Ilha verde e vermelha".³⁰

Another who combined the approach of critique and panacea, while offering his own set of metropolitan bases, was Antonio Metello, author of *Timor Fantasma do Oriente* (1923). Metello, who served a two years commission as military commander of Suro and Lautem wished upon Timor a "governar em dictadura" to overhaul the archaic administrative system and to rectify the military question otherwise "completely abandoned". He argued that, with the exception of the *Companhia Expedicionaria Mozambique*, Timorese-encadred forces lacked unity, were poorly trained, and were scarcely capable of putting down rebellion much less defending the territory from the Dutch. Metello advocated a new system of military roads, Dutch-style bungalows, extended medical and school services and an extension of agriculture commensurate with Timor's potential. The number of Catholics, he observed, had fallen away owing to the "stupid and unjust" persecution of the missions. He also wished to rectify the false image of Timor held in Portugal as a "terra de exilio profundo, de morte e de sofrimento", when it could be an Eldorado for both military and civilians, a veritable *fantasma do Oriente*. At the same time, he wished to allay the negative image of Timor emanating from such countries as England and Holland. But like many who sailed or, at least, steamed down the Rio Tejo in the interwar years putting the Torre de Belem astern, Metello arrived in the colony by way of Batavia, Surabaya and Kupang on board a Dutch ship. Like many before him, Metello was also bound to make comparisons with the Dutch colony. 31

The arrival in the colony in 1937 of the celebrated artist Fausto Sampaio after a long journey via Africa was probably no accident. In this sense it is hard to think of a Portuguese Gaughin or even 'a Portuguese version of the itinerant Irish painter George Chinnery who put down roots in Macau. Sampaio's images of Portuguese empire were celebrated as art but also as collective images of the colonial ensemble, with all its ethnic variety and colour, but as recognized by the Ministry of Colonies, works of colonial ethnography. As exhibited in the Camara Municipal in Dili during his sojourn, Sampaio's works ranged from scenes of the Dili coastline, the Governor's palace, and the mission at Lahane, various scenes of Baucau, Manatuto,

Laclo, and Vermassim. Sampaio's small "classic", "chefe indigena" or native chief and party en route to welcome a new governor, carries something of the Estado Novo's paternalistic style in its exultation of the Timorese noble savage. Pointedly, the artist was commissioned to paint the portrait of D. Aleixo Corte Real pro-Portuguese hero of the Boaventura rebellion and future loyalist in the armed struggle against the Japanese. 32

It is of more than passing interest that, following his conversion to Catholicism in 1931, Dom Aleixo was chosen to represent the people of Timor at the grand colonial exhibition held in Porto in 1934, incidentally an affair in which Portugal sought to exhibit to Europe the fruits of its civilizing mission. But, in staging the festival of folk and colonial lore in the metropole, Portugal also sought to take its place besides France, Holland, and Great Britain as colonizer pares inter pares.

What this proud native chief learnt in Europe escapes us, but in the words of his biographer, having visited certain old Timor hands from among the military and civilian officials, he learnt "os dotes de caracter e a sua fidelidade a Portugal". 33

An important indice of how a colonial power imposes itself symbolically over a subject people can be read into the calendar of holidays and commemorations. In 1937, for example, festivities to commemorate the eleventh year of the "national revolution" were held over five days in Dili. This was more than a mere dying of nags and reading of speeches, but also drew in Timorese people in the form of corridas or horse and bull races, games, a batuque or African dance, special masses on the part of the church, and even a theatrical recital staged by the Chinese Association. Other anniversaries celebrated in the prewar period included, solemn remembrance of the fallen in the Great War (6 April), and the publication of the decree abolishing slavery (20 April). Neither were the primary schools spared the attentions of the Salazarist state. In 1938 choral singing of such fascist-inspired anthem as "Portuguesa" and Salazarist "Marcha da Mocidade Portuguesa" became compulsory in primary schools, along with such patriotic Portuguese catch phrases as "Tudo pela Macao" and "Nasci Portugues, Quero morrer portugues", but this is not surprising. 34

By this year, Dili boasted a Casa Portuguesa, where books, papers, inks, etc. were sold. For those with money -obviously highly restricted class-radios could be purchased for a price. Socially, as well, colonial society in Dili developed more confidently in this period. For example, the sporting club "Sport, Lisboa e Dili" was registered in 1937. The following year a group of residents created an Associacao de Beneficencia de Timor for the purpose of extending welfare activities to the peoples of the interior. That year, on 13 June, according to the official bulletin, a new paper called Timor was launched, although regrettably, no record can be found of this journal, which, if it existed, must soon have faded. 35

Street names in Dili along with toponyms were resonant of history and commercial function, as in the leafy Rua dos Arabes or the waterfront Avenida da India. As period photographs reveal, the Capital also supported a number of undeniably impressive buildings, albeit resonant with the symbolism of empire, including the colonnaded edifice of the Camara Municipal, the dominating Palacio do Governador, housing the governor's office, the council office, the secretariat and military department, the municipal school, the imposing church, the Dr. Carvalho hospital at Dare, and the governor's residence at Lahane. Such Luso-Timorese architectural forms came to be mirrored in the various circumscricao, in the form of fortalez mission buildings, escolas, and the invariable residencia of the commander or secretary. Needless to say, the allocation of housing was determined along the lines of the Colonial caste system. Precisely how this infrastructure related to the Timorese may be arguable, but more the pity, as shown in a following chapter, that this pre-war architectural legacy was utterly destroyed during the Pacific War.

It is also not without interest that under the Salazar order the penchant for substituting Portuguese toponym for native nomenclature reached its apogee, albeit selectively. Thus Aileu became officialized as Vila A. Monteiro, Hatu-Lia became Vila Celestino da Silva, Same became Vila Filomeno da Camara and Baucau, Vila Salazar, a name which endured into the postwar period, at least cartographically although hardly in people's minds. While the sacred peak of Tata-Mai-Lau did not undergo such a change of name, its service to empire was also signalled in 1938 by the erection on the summit of a bronze plaque, courtesy of the Geographical Mission of Timor, bearing the words, "Portugal-Alto Imperio que o Sol logo em nascendo ve primeiro".

Conclusion

The eve of war found Timor ruled by about 300 metropolitan Portuguese including 100 deportado. At the apex of the structure stood the Governor along with about 36 key European officials in addition to civil servants of Indian, Cape Verdian, Macanese and Timorese origin. To this number can be added around 2,000 Chinese, some dozen Japanese and several Australian or other European nationalities. Viewed as colonial subjects, it is clear that for the Timorese people this was a typically Portuguese African colonial situation in the sense of the imposition of labour controls and corvees with little scope for private accumulation beyond a subsistence level much less the possibility of attaining the status of assimilado. While the mission system offered the theoretical possibility of self-transcendence, or at least escape from servitude, very few Timorese made that transition. Here were one people separated by colonialism, obliged to dream different dreams, although there is no doubt that the creation of an embryonic Timorese middle-class, or at least class of Timorese conscious of their ethnic separateness, went further in Dutch Timor, at least as illustrated by the role of the parties and "lobbies". But it is also the case that the long historical "civilizing" role of the church, the special role of the colonial military and the creolized camp followers, the *moradores*, not to mention the rituals of the Portuguese state as filtered during the Salazaris years, all contrived to imprint a profoundly Latinized version of colonial society upon an essentially Melanesianized lineage society.

Yet, Portuguese Timor stood out among colonialisms in the prewar period for its seeming non-interventionism in matters of culture and tradition. In this sense Timor was run more like a protectorate than a colony. But whereas in Cambodia and Laos, for example, the French sought to revive certain culture practices to strengthen "national" identity, no such endeavour was mounted in Timor. In any case, Timor lacked centralized state structures. From our understanding of the way that metropolitans represented Timor it was never as a separate nation, but always as an extension of the Portuguese patria. So mythologized was this cultural crusade that very few if any Timorese could see through this smokescreen, at least none challenged it on these terms until the postwar period. Whereas in Malaya and Brunei, for example, the British encouraged the teaching of vernacular languages and the standardization of scripts, in Timor, outside of missionary endeavour, there was no attempt to even develop Tetum as a script language much less an official language. There were not even any officially-sanctioned dictionaries in Timor, the *sine qua non* of national language policy. Unrealistically, in the absence of a lingua franca on the level of, say, pidgin in Papua New Guinea, Portuguese served as both national and official language. It was only the rise of Timorese nationalist parties some half century later, which sought to rectify this matter.

Notes

1. Neil Bruce, *Portugal: The Last Empire*, David and Charles, London, 1975.
2. *Portugal: Chartre Organique de la Colonie de 27mor*, Exposition Coloniale Internationale de Paris, Imprensa Nacional de Lisboa, MCMXXXI.
3. Anon, *Republik Indonesia: Sunda Ketjil*, Kementerian Penerangan, Jakarta, n.d.
4. This is in part a reference to the figure of T.B. Cunha, the Goa-bom, French educated "nationalist": who, in 1929, exposed the perfidy of British capitalists in exploiting with Portuguese connivance labourers from Goa in the plantations in Assam. In so doing he created a Goa Congress Party linked with the Indian Congress Party. See his trenchant critique of Salazarism in *Goa's Freedom Struggle*, T.B. Cunha Memorial Committee, Bombay, 1961.
5. AustralianArchives (AA), Vie. 11877/11/163, Archer's report on Portuguese Timor, March-April 1941.
6. Transcript, "Ramos-Horta speaks for East Timor", 13 November 1996, News Hour with Jim Lehrer on PBS, USA.
7. JR & H.T. Landman, & Plant, "Notes on Portuguese Timor II", *South Pacific*, September, 1948, p.48.
8. Metzner, *Man and Environment*, p. 5.
9. Smith meekly, 20 february 1932.
10. C. D. Rowley, *Outcasts in W7lite Australia*, Pelican, Melbourne, 1972.
11. BOT, 19 June 1937.
12. BOGT, No.2, 14 January 1939.
13. BOGT, No.48, 27 November 1937.

14. Jaime do Inso, Timor-1912, Edie6es Cosmos, Lisboa, 1939, pp.101103.
15. 1916 dispensation on schools.
16. P. Manuel Patricio Mendes, Dicionario Tetum-Portugues, Macau, I 935.
17. Teofilo Duarte, Timor: Ante-Cdmara do Interno?I Famalicao, Lisboa, 1930.
18. D. Joao Paulino d'Azevedo e Castro, Os Bens das Missoes Portuguezas na China, Redaeao do Boletim do Governo Ecelesiastico de Maeau, Macau, 1917, pp. 186-187.
19. P. Januario Silva, "Reorganizacao das Missoes de Timor", Boletim Eclesidstico da Diocese de Macaw, No.423, 193 pp. ,854-873.
20. Pr. A.J. Fernandes, "O Evangelho na regio de Suro e Bobonaro (Timor)", Boletim Eclesidstico de Macau, No. 342, Sept. 1932, pp. 180188.
21. Pr. Ezequiel Pascoal, "Breve relat6rio sobre a Missao de Ossu e as Estac6es Missionarias que dela dependem", Boletim Eclesiastico de Macau, No. 424, Julho 1939, pp. 917-925.
22. Boletim Eclesiastico de Macau, various editions. For an Indonesian account of church history of Timor, albeit highly schentatic, see P. Drs. Gregor Neonbasu, SVD, Keadilian dan Pendamaian di Diosis Dili, Timor Timur, Konisi Komunikasi Sosial Diosis Dili, Dili, 1992.
23. A de Almeida Negreiros, Les Colonies Portugais, Agustin Challamel, Paris, 1907, p. 139.
24. Zola (Antdnio Padua Correia), Quatorze annos de I7mor (I serie, np., nd. [19091), Timor. O governo do general de brigada do quadjnO da reserva Josi Celestino da Silva durante 14 annos. Latrocinios, assassinatos eperseguido-es (2 serie), Lisboa, 1911.
- In part have drawn upon the analysis offered by Rend Pelissier, Timor en Guerre, Le Crocodile et leg Portugais (1847-1913), Pelissier, Orgeval, 1996, pp. 228-233.
25. Alberto Osorio de Castro, Flores de Coral. ultimos poemas, Dili, 1908. Other volumes of poetry published by this author included Exiladas (Coimbra, 1895), A Cinza dos Myrtyos QVova Goa, 1906) and 0 SinaldaSombra(1923). .
26. Alberto Osorio de Castro, A Ilha Verde e Vermelha de Timor, Cotovia, Lisboa, 1996.
27. Letter i(om Cami llo Pessanha, Vila do Conde, 7 Octobree 1907 to Osdrio de Castro, in Maria Jose de Lencastre, Camillo Pessanha/ Cartas a Alberto Osdrio de Castro, Jodo Baptista de Castro e Ana de Castro Osdrio, Imprensa Nacional, Casa de Moeda, Lisboa, 1984, pp. 65-66.
28. See, for example, the extensive critical note on Flores de Coral published in the Macau weekly A Vejndade, No.72 de 31 de Margo de 1910 by Camillo Pessanha. But Pessanha and Osdrio de Castro were lifelong friends and correspondents, part of the same literary circle and, indeed, whose travels or official duties overlapped in Timor and Macau.
29. Pelissier, Timor en Guerre. p. 232.
30. Osorio de Castro, A Ilha Vejnde e Vermelha. For an analysis of Osorio de Castro's contributions to the ethno-botany of Timor see, Ruy Cinatti Vaz Monteiro Gomes, Exploracoes Botanicas em Inor, Estudos, Ensaios e Documentos, Lisboa, 1950, pp. 17-37.
31. AlfTeres Antonio Metello, nmor: Fantasma do Oriente, Lusitania Editora, Lisboa, 1923.
32. Alvaro da Fontoura, in Fausto Sampaio: Pintor do uliramar Portugues, Agencia Geral das Col6nias, Lisboa, 1942, pp. 47-72.
33. Jose Sim6es Martinho, mda e Morte do Rigulo Timorense D. Aleixo, Lisboa, 1947, pp. 17118.
34. BOT, No.47, 19 November 1938.
35. BOT, No.26, 25 of 1938.

Wartime Timor: 1942-45

While the combined Japanese Navy-Army thrust into Dutch Timor on 19 February 1942 met with little native resistance, a success that can be attributed to careful intelligence preparation by Japanese agents prior to the event, as much adroit propaganda cultivation of an "older brother" image, the situation was more

complex in Portuguese Timor owing to both the status of Portugal as a neutral as much the presence in situ of a combined Dutch-Australian force. Whereas the Allied forces were badly defeated in the attempted defence of Dutch Timor, and where they became either prisoners-of-war or the subject of Japanese massacres, in Portuguese Timor military actions against the Japanese by the guerrillas were entirely useful the Allied cause and proceeded according to the textbook. Needless to say, the local Portuguese authorities treated the Japanese invasion of Portuguese Timor with the same disdain as the earlier Dutch-Australian intervention. Not surprisingly in these circumstances, Portuguese-Japanese relations in Timor came under severe strain as the occupation progressed. But, as this chapter seeks to expose, the wartime occupation of Timor by Allies and Japanese alike left the Timorese drained and exhausted by war end, abject victims of a cynical intra-imperialist struggle played out in Tokyo, Washington, Canberra, London and even Berlin. A sub-theme concerns the way that the wartime intervention opened up old wounds and rekindled atavistic tendencies reminiscent of the ancient Timorese funu.

Japanese Military Rule in Timor: 1942-1945

Japanese motives as to their invasion were first made known to the people of Dili in the form of leaflets dropped over the city on 21 February 1942, the day after the combined Navy-Army invasion of Portuguese Timor. These made known that Japan was now at war with both the Netherlands and Australia, deemed "a component of the United Kingdom", and that Japanese Forces were obliged to act in response to the stationing of Dutch forces in a "neutral country". 1

While, from the outset of the Japanese invasion, the Portuguese were under extreme duress, it was not until 9 August 1942 that the Japanese inaugurated a plan for the destruction of the Portuguese administration in Timor. From an Australian source, the Japanese political project involved a number of strands, which commenced to be implemented in that month. These were; the systematic bombing of Portuguese postos, the importation and training of Timorese allies from Dutch Timor, propaganda directed at the Timorese and elimination of pro-Australian Timorese, the killing of pro-Australian Portuguese officials, the gradual elimination of the Portuguese administration culminating in the transfer of all Portuguese officials to Liqui in December 1942, the introduction of paper currency, and the acceleration of the military campaign in the eastern sector of the island in order to eliminate the Australian threat.2

The following pages shall demonstrate how these objectives were met and with what results.

While Australian military mythology tended to question the neutrality of the Portuguese Governor Manuel de Abreu Ferreira de Carvalho, no such doubts were entertained by the Japanese who simply bypassed his authority and cut his telegraphic communication to Lisbon.3

One Japanese memo of June 1942 described Governor Ferreira de Carvalho as "obstinately uncompromising", having rejected Japanese demands to punish certain Portuguese officials and "servants" (i.e. loyal Timorese) and for assisting the "invading army" (i.e. Australia). 4

In short, the Governor was branded a "great hindrance to the carrying out of the air war and defence operations". 5

On 24 June, such obstruction prompted Tokyo to present Premier Salazar with a detailed list of hostile acts committed by the Portuguese authorities and Timorese alike. Two months later, however, the local Japanese authority could detect no change for the better. 6

Meanwhile, as the Japanese looked to Timorese collaborators to prop up their occupation, relations between the Portuguese and the Timorese began to unravel as well. In August 1942, Japanese diplomatic sources reported the "simultaneous uprising" by Timorese in two villages south of Dili leading to the death of a number of Portuguese and Chinese and creating a sense of "extreme apprehension" in the Portuguese community. While the Japanese source rationalized this event as the actions of "a group of natives from former Dutch Timor who came forward to cooperate with the Japanese forces" seeking to settle "grudges against the Portuguese because of ill-treatment" in their moment of vulnerability, 7

The truth was otherwise. In fact this attack on Aileu on 31 August 1942 resulting in the deaths of five Portuguese soldiers along with a number of administrators and missionaries was mounted by the infamous *colunas negras* or "Black Column", a group of disgruntled west Timorese armed and recruited by the Japanese to sow terror among the population. Dunn's interpretation of the actions of the column and the Japanese as intrigues to reopen the wounds left by the uprisings earlier in the century and to exploit

traditional tribal rivalries merits further examination. 8

Indeed, according to Australian soldier Bernard Callinan, this conflict had another dimension, a veritable war within a war. This is an allusion to the rebellion in August 1942 of the Maubisse against the Portuguese and the part played by the Portuguese in rallying the Christianized peoples of Ainaro and Same "not at all friendly with the non-Christians of Maubisse" to ruthlessly crush this show of independence. 9

As Pelissier comments, the uprising by Maubisse was not out of love for the Japanese, but out of decades-old memories of the Manufahi wars, especially the quest on the part of this disaffected people in seeking revenge against rival Suro (Aileu), and its loyalists, namely Dom Aleixo Corte Real, liurai of Suro, nephew of Nai-Cau, the "traitor" liurai of the 19 12 rebellion who stood with the Portuguese. Posthumously awarded Portuguese state honours, D. Aleixo, his sons and followers, mounted a heroic but doomed stand against Japanese-led forces in the mountains of Timor in May 1943. 10

In response to these harrowing events, Governor Ferreira de Carvalho sought to have all Portuguese temporarily evacuated to the offshore island of Atauro and, to this end, petitioned Lisbon to send a ship. 11

The message duly delivered-and intercepted-by the Japanese, spoke of "constant native uprisings" and the "impossibility" of continued residence in Timor. 12

In the event, the requested vessel did not arrive and the move to Atauro did not transpire (although, ironically, this scenario eventuated in the face of the Indonesian invasion some thirty years later).

But, on 24 October 1942, in line with the overall plan to dismantle the Portuguese administration, the Japanese Army moved to concentrate all Portuguese in Timor (around 600) in the Liquisa and Maubere concentration camps. Only the Governor and the Mayor of Dili were given a temporary reprieve. Meanwhile, all Portuguese were disarmed. According to Japanese sources, this policy was not only for the protection of the Portuguese but won their "gratitude". 13

According to a former Portuguese inmate of this camp interviewed by Australian war crimes investigators, conditions were very bad, food scarce, and hygiene conditions poor owing to lack of water. As a result, "many" Portuguese died in the camp. While in the first year, Japanese troops served as guards, in the second year they were replaced by Kempetai along with some Timorese guards or "spies".

Although a Portuguese doctor was resident in the camp from the outset, joined after two years by two Japanese doctors, no medical treatment was possible owing to lack of medicine. 14

While the Dili hospital remained open for the duration of the occupation, according to a Portuguese physician who remained in office for the first four months of the occupation, the Japanese did not offer medical supplies.

As a result, Timorese were not treated even though yaws was then very prevalent.

Also, according to this witness, contrary to International Red Cross rules, an Australian soldier being treated in the hospital was removed by the military. 15

As in other parts of Japanese occupied Southeast Asia, the colonial system of education was dismantled and teaching in Japanese language teaching introduced.

In occupied Timor, however, it is hard to imagine this writ being actually implemented outside of the capital city given the paucity of resources and the chronic instability. In any case, some progress was made in Dili in substituting Japanese symbols of government for Portuguese. As in other parts of Southeast Asia under Japanese rule, the new political-military reality that punished the old colonial order also offered promotion possibilities to collaborators. While certain liurai lost rank, others severely persecuted, such as the Chinese, others, including some among the small Arab community of Dili gained rank through appointments as chef de posto or through employment in the Kempetai. 16

The Japanese also mobilized Timorese labour for road building and for labour on such big projects as the construction of an airfield at Lautem. According to the account of a native of the Indonesian island of Kisar forced recruitment for these duties was not confined to Timorese. He describes how; in 1942, the Japanese military ordered all chiefs on the island to supply labour for the Lautem region under duress. Women recruited from Kisar supplied a so-called Japanese "restaurant" in Lautem. 17

But, according to other testimony, Timorese chiefs were also obliged to supply girls to Japanese brothels. It also came to light after the war that some sixty Chinese were deliberately killed during the war while another 200 died of hunger and abuse. Besides forcing-some fifty Chinese women into "concubinage", Chinese were isolated from native Timorese and forced to work in labour gangs. According to the head of the Chinese community in Timor Timorese Chinese suffered losses of property amounting to 3.5 million

patacas. 18

No less, the plan to substitute Japanese currency for Portuguese was problematical. The BNU, acting as government treasury, continued to pay Portuguese officials in Portuguese money until 23 November 1943. The Japanese then attempted to impose upon the Governor a loan in Japanese money. While, at first, the Governor resisted this attempt by drawing upon a reserve comprising Mexican dollars, two days later he was obliged to accept an interest-free loan of 100,000 guilden or invasion money. From this date, the Japanese forbade the use of Portuguese money and the Mexican dollars. Japanese military scrip was then enforced at parity with the pataca. Matters deteriorated further with the imprisonment of the Portuguese manager of the bank on 10 July 1944.

The following month the Portuguese were obliged to withdraw their guard over the bank only to have it mysteriously "burgled" the day after. Missing were seven cases of money containing 34,000 Mexican dollars along with a quantity of silver and jewellery. A "sum of money" was subsequently returned to the Governor after the surrender. 19

Infamously, Joao Jorge Duarte, the BTN manager, along with engineer Artur do Canto Resende, the administrator of Dili, Jose Duarte Santa, and the chefe de posto of Liquisa were at this juncture interned on Alor island. The first two named died of malnutrition while the others survived, albeit badly inflicted with malnutrition. One of the survivors, the soldier Antonio de Oliveira Liberato, went on to publish two books on his wartime experiences, blaming the collaboration of some of the Portuguese with the Australian guerrillas for contributing to Japanese reprisals and turning Timor into a battleground. 20

In Dutch Timor, where Allied forces had been routed and subject to various atrocities at the hands of the invading Japanese—a reference to the notorious Penfui massacres later subject to postwar investigation—many Indonesians with nationalist ideas saw in the Japanese intervention a means by which Dutch supremacy might be broken. Notable in this sense was the role of wartime collaborator and nationalist on the side of the Indonesian Republic, I.H. Doko. Doko, who went on to make his mark in postwar politics in Kupang as both politician and historian, became head of the Japanese-sponsored Bunko or Department of Health, Education and Information as well as editor of the small newspaper Timor Syuho. Doko had earlier formed the Perserikatan Kebangsaan Timor, an erstwhile nationalist grouping of Timorese. 21

Australian Commandos in Portuguese Timor

There is no question that life was made harder for the Japanese by the actions of Australian guerrilla forces during the first two years of the occupation. Japanese reports pay backhanded tribute to the estimated 300 to 400 Australians of the 2/2 Independent Company whose actions were "to the considerable discomfort of our opposing forces". 22

The strategic value of the Australian force was also not lost upon the Americans. In the words of General Douglas MacArthur, writing in the same month, "the retention of these forces at Timor will greatly facilitate action when the necessary means are at hand... These forces should not be withdrawn under existing circumstances. Rather, they should remain and execute their present missions of harassment and sabotage". Otherwise, he estimated, it would take between two brigades to a division to liberate Timor. 23

Known as Lancer or Sparrow Force, the Allied contingent in Portuguese Timor included at various times, members of the 2/2 Company, the 2/4 Company, and detachments of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (RNEIA). Total strength never exceeded 800. The Lancer operation commenced with the arrival of the 2/2 in Dili on 17 December 1941. It effectively ended some two years later with the evacuation of the 2/4 on 10 January 1943, although other stay-behind parties and special operations units dubbed "Z" special parties continued to operate behind enemy lines for the rest of the war.

Yet, as acknowledged in a Japanese report of April 1943, Australians did not have a monopoly over the anti-Japanese resistance as "recalcitrant Portuguese" and native forces in the hinterland also kept up opposition. 24

This is a reference to the anti-fascist "International Brigade" comprising a number of the deportados. Also known as the "Red Brigade", they numbered a former newspaper editor, army officers, communists, socialists, and even liberals. By joining up with the Australian commandos during the war, members of the Brigade tended to share the same fate, at least in the field. 25

Coincident with the disembarkation of some 6,000 Japanese marines at Dili, the 2/2 withdrew to the hills

surrounding the town. A rotation of Japanese troops in late March 1942, however, allowed the Australian commandos to execute raids and ambushes into Dili. While the Japanese forces had been able to push into Ermera and Aileu, by the end of June-subject to repeated ambushes-they were obliged to withdraw to a perimeter surrounding Dili. But with the arrival of reinforcements in August and the adoption of a new strategy, the Australians were thrown back on the defensive and pushed back to a hinterland zone almost devoid of roads, albeit with a lifeline to the beaches of the south-central coast. On 14 August 1942, with another lull in Japanese activity, the decision was made to insert in the field the 2/4 Independent Company then based in the Northern Territory, a strategy designed to boost morale of pro-Australian Portuguese and to win over the Timorese. This was accomplished but not without the unfortunate loss of the HMAS Voyager. By November 1942 the 2/2 was deployed in the Ailalec, Nova Caminha, Turascei, and Kablak areas with the 2/4 covering Ermera, Ainaro, Atsabe and with the RNEIA concentrated in the Casa and Belulic River areas. 26

While the Australians also sought to avoid provoking an even larger Japanese stake in Timor, one consequence of their presence was to create the opposite effect.

Through October-November 1942, the Japanese continued to increase their force strength in Timor, deploying four or five battalions in the drive towards the eastern part of the island. Faced with loss of food supplies and suffering from malaria, 357 members of the 2/2 were evacuated successfully in three trips between 11 and 19 December along with 192 RNEIA and 69 Portuguese evacuees by the Dutch destroyer Tjerk Hides. Meanwhile, as observed, the 2/4 was left to bear the full brunt of actions mounted by the Japanese-led Black Columns. By December, however, the overall position of Lancer force was extremely vulnerable especially owing to loss of access to vital food supplies as the Japanese pushed further east. By this stage, the Japanese had mobilized some 12,000 forces and had successfully occupied all anchorages on the north and south coasts east of and including Beaco.

With the construction of an airfield at Fui Loro they were also able to increase the pace of their aerial surveillance over the sea approaches to Australia. The HMAS Arunta effected the final evacuation of Lancer on 10 January 1943 at Kicras. A stay-behind Party was in turn evacuated on 10 February "without achieving anything of value". 27

While there were obviously limits as to the overall efficacy of maintaining the Lancer force in Timor against overwhelming odds, and an increasingly dubious welcome on the part of the Timorese, the Allied bombing of Dili took its toll on Japanese and Timorese alike. According to a Japanese diplomatic dispatch, commencing in late 1942 two or three Allied planes bombed Dili about once a week, in November becoming a daily occurrence. As a result there were many casualties among the Chinese and Timorese. According to Japanese Consular reports, major targets included the Consulate (November 1942), the radio station (March 1943), a Portuguese vessel, and the hospital (February 1944). By June 1942, Allied bombings had forced the Timorese population to flee the city for the countryside. Aside from the Army presence, only a few Chinese shopkeepers remained in the city. 28

In fact, the U.S. Commander-in-chief of the Southwest Pacific Area ordered the bombing of Portuguese Timor. Noting with concern the "successful and unhindered actions" of the "Black Column" from west Timor inside Portuguese Timor, the concerned U.S. military figure, Major General R. K. Sutherland, memoed his Australian military counterpart that, "all the available bombing strength at Darwin should be made available for the immediate bombing of Dili, Lahane and Aileu, with the exception of the buildings still occupied by the Portuguese". 29

Otherwise, the Japanese were not displeased with Timorese cooperation in the guerrilla struggle against the Australian "sparrow force". Not only were the Timorese seen to be "bitterly anti-Portuguese" but were positive in supplying information in acting as guides and in mobilizing to kill the enemy, meaning Australian troops. 30

The legendary Australian war cinematographer, Damien Parer, reporting from the war zone in early 1943, also touched upon the loyalty question:

The relations of our force with the native's embrace the two extremes. On the one hand there are the native who are employed by the Japanese in many cases with ruses and encouraged to hunt down our men and to intimidate the native who are friendly to the Australians. On the other hand we would hardly have been able to exist without the help and kindness of the mountain natives who are loyal to the Portuguese

Administration and who have formed a strong attachment to the Australians... The Japanese pay great attention to the native question, striving by all means to set them against the Australians and against the still constitutional Portuguese administration. They supply them with arms and encourage them to undertake forays against the mountain natives who are friendly towards the Australians. 31

The Australian writer, Wray, contends that, unlike in Dutch Timor where locals refused to assist the Allied troops and actually betrayed them to the Japanese, in Portuguese Timor the Australian "Sparrow Force" only survived thanks to the loyal support of the Timorese. He acknowledges, however, that with the disruption of agriculture, that support was withdrawn. Reading between the lines it appears that this was the deciding factor leading to the withdrawal of the commandos although not before inflicting some 1500 fatalities on the Japanese for a loss of forty. 32

While in west Timor, where the Indonesian population initially welcomed the Japanese as liberators from Dutch colonialism, a sense of resentment against Japanese excesses eventually developed, if short of armed revolt, 33

The situation in Portuguese Timor was obviously more complex. As Sherlock clarifies, there had been sharp divisions within the Portuguese community in Timor in respect of collaboration with the Allied Forces, both before and after the Japanese landings. Such divisions, or at least bitterness, are also reflected in some of the books written by concerned Portuguese on their personal experiences in Timor during the war "each of them being a matter of setting the record straight in response to an earlier publication... of those who collaborated with the Allies, those who tried to maintain strict. Neutrality, those who stayed, those who evacuated, those who died". 34

As for the Timorese, the intra-imperialist struggle fought out in their homeland could hardly have been welcomed, although as clients of the respective armies or, as "free agents" as in the case of the anti-colonial rebels, some may have seen marginal advantage in the turmoil. But these were "primitive rebels", not yet men with a national programme, as were the Fretilin independence fighters some thirty years on.

Tensions also arose between the pro-Salazar camp and the "antifascist" deportados in exile in Australia. Representing a cross-section of Portuguese colonial society, this group of 540 people evacuated from Portuguese Timor during the war included Portuguese and their Timor-born families, Chinese as well as mestizo. Numbering the Bishop of Dili, Jaime Goulart, priests and nuns, high government officials as well as ordinary civilians, the Timorese society-in-exile also included members of the Red Brigade evacuated by the Tjerk Hides. There was even one convicted murderer from Macau.

Around half were children, while 400 were described in one Australian report as "natives and half castes". Only the exiled Deputy Governor of Portuguese Timor, Dr. Ferreira Taborda, and Antonio Policarpo de Sousa Santos, the pro-Salazar administrator of Bobonaro, were spared the indignity of detention in Australia. 35

Australia, Portugal, and the Japanese Surrender

In March 1944 the Japanese learnt of a report in which Premier Salazar explained how, at a recent British Empire Conference in London, the Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, contended—apparently with the concurrence of other delegates—that the recovery of Timor was "imperative for the protection of Australia." An Anglo American expedition to guarantee that objective was thus foreseen by the Japanese. But, it was speculated in Tokyo, should the Allies seek this objective without Portuguese concurrence, and then they would necessarily refuse to restore Timor to Portuguese rule. In the light of this scenario, the Japanese surmised, Portugal might be compelled to dispatch its own forces to Timor to achieve its restoration of power. 36

While this intelligence assessment proved prophetic of future events, it was not until the immediate pre-surrender period that Japan moved to diplomatically stymie the Allied advance on Portuguese Timor by restoring sovereignty to the neutral power.

As Premier Hideki Tojo, made it known to Morito Morishima, the Japanese Minister in Lisbon in early 1945, Japanese policy in the southern areas involved evacuating "rear areas" first. Accordingly, such "frontline" zones as Timor would be left to the last. (The rationale of course was that retreat was an exceedingly difficult operation.) In the meantime, as Tojo instructed, the negotiating tack with Portugal was

to check fallout by approving the withdrawal as a matter of principle. 37

On 16 May 1945 Tojo advised Morishima that there was no longer any objection to his entering into negotiations with Portugal over the terms of the Japanese troop withdrawal from Portuguese Timor. Conditions set by Tojo for an eventual withdrawal of Japanese troops were that Portugal remain neutral (an improbable demand since Portugal was clearly by this stage pro-Allied), that Portuguese Timor not be reoccupied by the Allies (also an improbable demand as Portugal could hardly call the shots on the matter), and that Portugal obtain a guarantee of safe conduct for the withdrawal of Japanese troops. In conversation with Salazar on 28 May 1945, Morishima reported to Tokyo that the Portuguese leader intended to maintain "neutral" relations with Japan. Both parties were in agreement that the Japanese withdrawal would not occur before the arrival of the Portuguese forces.

Such an event, the Japanese Premier advised, could lead to friction between the Portuguese and Japanese troops. Indeed, Japan was hopeful that the Portuguese contingent would weigh up as more than just a token force so as to counteract the envisaged allied occupation. 38

With the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and the surrender rescript announced on 15 August, Japan was no longer in a position to stonewall the Portuguese. On 15 August, the Japanese Foreign Ministry informed Morishima that Japan was proceeding to restore Portuguese Timor to Portuguese control.

In fact, just prior to receiving this message Morishima cabled Tokyo imploring, first, restoration of Portuguese sovereignty, second, the return to Portuguese control of their radio link (to Macau) and, third, the transfer of Japanese arms to the Portuguese authorities. Tokyo replied that while the arms transfer issue was stalled owing to its "delicate" nature, within the week the "military authority on the spot" would have been ordered to comply. 39

But events were moving fast. On 5 September, three days after the formal surrender ceremony on the battleship Missouri, and four days after the Japanese military commander in Dili, Colonel Yoshioka, accompanied by Consul Yoshitaro Suzuki met with Governor Ferreira de Carvalho communicating an end to hostilities, Tokyo duly notified the Portuguese government that the colony was restored to Portuguese administrative control. Portugal further made it known via its Foreign Office that all Japanese officials and military personnel in Timor would be placed at the disposal of the UN, and, if desired, transferred by Portugal to any port the Allies might designate. 40

The following day the Portuguese Foreign Office made it known that it had informed the Allies, first, that Portugal viewed the occupation of Portuguese Timor by Allied troops "with disfavour", second, that Portugal wished to settle the Timor question by direct negotiation with Japan and, third, that Portugal was in the process of negotiating with the Anglo-Americans for the dispatch of a warship. 41

Yet the Allies, especially the Australians, conveniently sidestepped the transfer of sovereignty achieved by the Japanese on 5 September. Incredibly, Timor was destined to be "invaded" one more time before the Portuguese contingent could arrive. In fact, as archival sources reveal, Canberra was informed on 10 September by the Portuguese Consul in Sydney that the Governor had achieved a de facto transfer of powers from the Japanese on 5 September and, moreover, had deployed a contingent of armed Japanese commanded by a Japanese police officer to execute his orders. 42

Yet, as shown below, the Allies were determined to "punish" Portugal for its alleged acquiescence" in Japanese demands.

The Portuguese, at least, must have been relieved that Japanese rule in Timor did not mirror the wartime occupation of such colonial possessions as French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, or British Burma where the Japanese had either cultivated or armed anti-colonial sections of the population (Burma, Java), or at war end, had, in part, turned their weapons over to insurgent nationalist forces (Vietnam). Indeed, such a concern had been expressed by a Portuguese foreign office spokesperson, Marcelo Matias. Specifically, he -argued, unless Japan transfer its weapons direct to Portugal then the colonial power may well have to contend with a "native uprising." 43

Morishima, whose pro-Portuguese bias has been noted, reported in early September that the Portuguese were apprehensive lest Australian forces re-enter Portuguese Timor on some pretext or other. The Portuguese, he noted, were adamant that negotiations should not be held in Tokyo with the Allies over Timor. Rather, discussions by the Allies on the important question of arms transfers should be held in Lisbon, the administrative authority as far as Portuguese Timor was concerned. Accordingly, Morishima

advised Tokyo not to discuss the Timor question with the Allies "before learning of the outcome of Portugal-Allies negotiations". 44

It is unlikely that even Morishima's sources in the Portuguese capital would have been au courant with the shadow boxing behind U.S. bases diplomacy over the Azores, with Timor as the Portuguese ace. 45

On 13 September, in reflection of the real situation in post surrender Japan, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu cabled his Minister in Lisbon that Japan awaited allied instructions as to the terms of the arms transfer issue. Accordingly, he sought Portugal to gain Allied consent before issuing the arms-transfer order. No reports of local surrender negotiations had been received by Tokyo; although it was well understood that radio contact had been established between Timor and Macau (thus signalling a resumption of Portuguese authority in the colony). 46

In fact, the first telegram message received in Lisbon from liberated Timor were those sent on 12 September by the Governor to the President of the Republic, President of the Conselho and Minister of the Colonies. For metropolitan consumption, the messages offered decisive evidence of "an end to hostilities and the return of Timor to Portuguese authority". 47

It is clear that, by war end, a major disagreement occurred between Australia and Portugal as to which party would take and enforce the terms of surrender of the Japanese. According to W.D. Forsyth, the senior Australian diplomat concerned, by August-September the Australian government was determined that an Australian as opposed to Portuguese force take the Japanese surrender on Timor. Originally, a separate surrender ceremony was envisaged in Kupang as well as in Dili.

Australian motives in pursuing this course, as expressed by Forsyth, were twofold; first, to mark the fact that it was the Australians alone who resisted the Japanese and, second, that the Portuguese whose "neutrality had helped the Japanese to turn (Timor) into a base" should have no military part in the termination of hostilities. 48

Accordingly, on 28 August 1945, Canberra cabled London requesting that no facilities be given to enable Portuguese forces to reach Timor and that the Japanese surrender should be to Australian forces only. No doubt sensitive to its relations with Lisbon, the British government rejected the suggestion of a second Australian occupation of Portuguese Timor. In any case, it was calculated, Portuguese Vessels could not be prevented from departing Ceylon or Mozambique for Timor. 49

On their part, the Japanese learnt of Australia's intentions on 7 September via an Australian press dispatch reporting the words of the Australian Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley that "arrangements have been made to accept the surrender of the Japanese in Dutch Timor while arrangements for the capitulation in Portuguese Timor will be made in cooperation with the Portuguese government." 50

No doubt the Japanese were still banking upon the arrival of Portuguese reinforcements to pre-empt the Australian advance. 51

Not surprisingly, perhaps, news of the Australian announcement of the Japanese surrender was censored in Portugal. 52

As a prelude to the Australian-staged surrender ceremony in Dili, Brigadier Lewis Dyke in Kupang accepted the Japanese surrender in Dutch Timor on behalf of Australia on 11 September 1945 on the quarterdeck of the Australian ship HMAS Morseby. As an Australian press account of the time remarked, the failure of the Australian government to permit participating Dutch service representatives to sign the document was understandably met with expressions of "keen disappointment and concern" on the part of the Dutch authorities. 53

Almost simultaneously, the Australians were engaged in an active diplomacy with the Portuguese to gain agreement as to an Australian occupation of Portuguese Timor by Australian troops. Australian Foreign Minister D.V. Evatt proposed this in a note to the Portuguese Ambassador in London on 10 September, albeit rejected outright in the Portuguese reply two days later. Only under duress did the Portuguese Governor in Dili accept a compromise position whereby an Australian military mission would supervise the carrying out of the terms of the surrender with the assistance of the Portuguese administrator. According to Forsyth, on 19 September the Australian cabinet decided on a scheme for a separate surrender ceremony at Dili, an exercise "recognized to be primarily political." He describes his own role in the affair as finessing what amounted to an unprecedented involvement in military tasks in peacetime on neutral territory." 54 The Australian contingent duly departed Kupang for Dili on 23 September where, upon arrival, Commander Dyke congratulated Governor Ferreira de Carvalho on the restoration of Portuguese rule. The

party established that there were no Australian POWs in the colony, and that only 200 Japanese remained. 55

On this occasion the Governor was informed of the surrender in Kupang and was briefed on arrangements to be made for the surrender of remaining Japanese forces. 56

According to Wallis, an Australian journalist who witnessed the "restoration" ceremony it was "a short and simple affair, held in front of the landing stage from which the Portuguese ensign flew." 57

The haste with which the Australian contingent dispatched with ceremonials and the timing of the event were well considered. Indeed, the following morning (27 September), the long expected and much delayed arrival of the Bartolomeu Dias and the Zarco transpired. As Wallis coyly observed, they were welcomed in "another colourful ceremony." 58

Dunn who writes that Portuguese rule resumed two days later with the arrival of troopship carrying a military expedition echoes this chronology. 59

In fact the ceremony, as much the arrival of the ships, carried far more significance than that described in the Australian reports. According to Didrio de Noticias, the "impressive" ceremony held beneath the tottering colonnades of the bombed out Camara Municipal evoked pathos at wartime suffering, patriotism, and the regeneration of the colony. In attendance were most surviving Portuguese, many local Timorese, the moradores from Baucau and Manatuto, loyal chiefs, and a grand display by Timorese brandishing Portuguese nag-lulics otherwise hidden from the Japanese. Internal evidence suggests that the occasion was also one of winning renewed pledges of loyalty and commitment from the Timorese, certain of whom were sorely tested by the irruption of a new power on the island. Notable was the effusive pledge of support written by die rifgulo of Viqueque to the Governor on 29 September. The arrival of the ships was more than just symbolic, but part of a long-prepared rescue plan for Timor. Besides bringing 2,223 troops, including infantry and artillery, the mission included three engineering companies along with substantial supplies of food and construction materials. Above all, the mission provided the wherewithal to stave off the kind of starvation and chaos that ensued

In the wake of other Japanese surrender acts, the great famine of North Vietnam being a notorious case. 60

What also seems to be ignored in these Australian versions is that Portuguese rule had in fact resumed on 4 September 1945 when the Japanese informed Portugal of the occurrence. Clearly, as both the surrender ceremony in Kupang on 23 September and the "transfer" ceremony in Dili the following day suggest, the Australian side was adamant in bypassing both the Portuguese (and the Dutch) in their dealings with the defeated enemy. The haste with which the Australian expedition was dispatched to Kupang and Dili and the cavalier attitude towards complex questions of international law strongly point in this direction.

War Crimes

Besides the questions of Allied POW's and Australian war graves, Forsyth also broached discussions on Japanese war crimes at the time of his visit to Portuguese Timor. While efforts were made to induce the Governor to initiate proceedings, he took the view that Portuguese authorities should exclusively investigate Japanese crimes committed against Portuguese subjects, therefore ruling out the possibility of joint investigations. In the event, the two parties agreed that the question of cooperation would be referred to the respective governments.

Dyke, however, entered into some preliminary investigations in the knowledge that the difficulty to collect concrete information would increase with time. 61

On 21 June 1946 Major Quinton of the War Crimes Commission arrived in Dili. With the agreement of the Governor, who in turn communicated with Lisbon, a committee was formed including Quinton, Manuel Metelo Raposo de Luz Teixeira, the Administrator of Bobonaro, and Captain Pos of the RNEIA, attached to the U.S. Prosecutor of Major War Criminals in Tokyo. While, once again, the Australians sought joint investigation, they were obliged to confine their activities to Australian victims. In a memo to Charles Eaton, the first postwar Australian Consul in Dili, Quinton complained of "obstinacy" and even of cover up" by Portuguese officials in revealing the names of those who collaborated with Japanese prior to and during the war. 62

But it was also the case that the Australian War Crimes section felt that war crimes investigations "should not be left in the hands of neutrals". 63

The theme of blaming die Portuguese for their own misfortunes was one that would recur in official Australian attitudes towards Timor.

A scrutiny of the relevant official documentation on war crimes investigation in Timor reveals, first, real reason for concern, second, a certain zealotness on the part of investigators to come up with the smoking gun, and third, grave difficulties in bringing about prosecutions owing to conflicting evidence, vague testimony, difficulty in identification of individuals in the various military units that rotated through Timor and even in tracking down the guilty parties who had already re-entered civilian life back in Japan. For the historian, the problem of reconstruction is exacerbated by the fragmentary nature of the remaining and available documentation.

The following incidents as well as judgments are well documented, however; torture of members of "Z" Special Force comprised of groups of special commandos inserted in Timor in September 1943, and April and August 1944, following the withdrawal of the 2/40 and the 2/2. [At war crimes trials held in Darwin in May 1946, three Japanese were handed down one to three month prison sentences, while six accused persons were acquitted]; 64

Execution of 24 Australian and Allied persons discovered in a mass grave near Kupang; 65

The detention of Australian and other Allied personnel in the appalling Oesapa Besar POW camp near Kupang until evacuated to Java in August-September 1942; 66

And atrocities committed by the Fukumi Butai corps against a party of 16 men of the 2nd Independent Company on 23 February, the morning of the Japanese Navy assault on Dili. In this affair, 16 men of the 2/2 were captured, four were immediately shot and the rest bar one executed by sword. Many fingers point to the nefarious activities of an organization called Ortori, linked with the Kempetai. One of the Australian commandos survived his bayonet wounds to tell the story. Although the prime subject committed suicide following interrogation, at a subsequent war crimes trial, two Japanese were sentenced to death by hanging two were handed down life sentences and one was given fifteen years imprisonment. 67

Conclusion

Many Timorese including liurai paid with their lives either for standing neutral or for alleged support of Australian guerrillas. Many other Portuguese and Timorese were executed by the Japanese without court martial. 68

One Portuguese writer who has studied this question, Vieira da Rocha, lists the names of 75 Portuguese and assimilados who died as a result of the Japanese occupation. At least ten died in combat against the Japanese, 37 were murdered while eight died in detention.

Many were deportado, most were officials. 69

The number of Timorese who died during the war is impossible to calculate with precision but is of the order of 4070,000 out of a total prewar population of around 450,000. The disruption to native agriculture and the breakdown of prewar society stemming from the harsh system of food collection and corvees imposed by the Japanese inevitably led to famine and other hardships, including debilitating disease.70

It is clear that the Australian War Crimes investigators were only interested in investigating crimes against the Australian commandos, not against civilian Timorese or Chinese victims who suffered most from Japanese regime of terror.

While Australian investigators collated a mass of oral testimony as to atrocities committed against Portuguese, Chinese, and Timorese, no action was taken in these cases. While Japanese crimes against the Portuguese were actually commemorated in stone in a splendid and surviving monument in Aileu it also has to be said that ordinary Timorese were prime victims of Japanese excesses and recriminations. Equally, it was ordinary Timorese who suffered most from draconian labour details not to mention the economy of scarcity imposed by wartime conditions. 71

It also cannot pass without mention that alone among the peoples and countries occupied by Japan during the Pacific War, Portugal's oceanic colony was not a beneficiary of war reparations as set down at the 1951 San Francisco Conference as Portugal was not, technically, a belligerent in this war. As a visiting private Japanese consortium leant at first hand in Timor in the 1970s, neither had Japan seen fit to redeem military script issued during the war, the basis upon which the Japanese army financed its occupation of the country

72

The issues of Japanese wartime compensation including the Claims of so-called "comfort women" or sexual slavery in Timor first became public in 1997 but only in the Macau media where Jose Ramos-Horta speaking on behalf of the Timorese people took it up. 73

No less, as we have seen in this chapter, the disruptive actions of outsiders awakened in familiar patterns the atavistic fury of the Timorese from killing violence to dangerous levels. Without question, the manipulation of ancient animosities by the Australians and, especially, Japanese in their own version of intra-imperialist struggle imposed a heavy price upon the Timorese as victims.

Notes

1. Copy of leaflet dropped by the Japanese in Dili, 21 February 1942, signed Commanding officer, Imperial Japanese Forces.
2. AA Vie MP729/6 file no. 74/401/124, Maj. Gen. Stevens, Commanding NT Force, "Report on the Operations of Lancer Force, in Portuguese Timor".
3. The Magic Documents: Summaries and Transcripts of the Top Secret Diplomatic Communications of Japan, 1938-1945, US War Department (Magic), 30 May 1942.
4. Ibid., 8 Jun. 1942.
5. Ibid., 10 June 1942.
6. Ibid., 15 September 1942.
7. Ibid., 15 October 1942.
8. James Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed*, The Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1983, p. 23.
9. Bernard Callinan, *Independent Company: the Australian Army in Portuguese Timor 1941-43*, William Heinemann, Sydney, 1953, pp. 154-155.
10. Jose Simões Martinho, *nda e Morte do Rigulo Timorense D. Aleixo*, Agencia Geral das Colónias, Lisboa 1947, and see Rend P61 *issier*, *Timor en Guerre, Le Crocodile et les Portugais (1847-1913)*, Pal *issier*, Orgeval 1996, p.262.
11. "Magic", 17 October 1942.
12. Ibid., 4 November 1942.
13. Ibid., 18 December, 1942.
14. AA CVic) 336/11724
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., testimony of Anselmo Bartolomeu de Almeida.
20. Kevin Sherlock, "Timor During World War I and II: Some Notes on Sources", *Kabar Seberang*, 1988, No.19-20! p. 43.
21. Ian Rowland (compiler), *Timor: Including the Islands of Roti and Ndao*, Clio Press, Oxford, 1992, XXIX
22. Magic, 15 June 1942.
23. Historical Division., GHQ9 SW Pacific Area, "McArthur to Blamey", 11 June 1942.
24. Magic, 14 April 1943.
25. Callinan, *Independent Company*., p. 131.
26. AA Vie MP792/6 file no.74/401/124, Maj.Gen. Stevens, Commanding NT Force, "Report on the Operations of Lancer Force in Portuguese Timor". ?
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 1 December, 1942, 9 February 1944, 20 March 1942.
29. Historical Division, GHQ, SW Pacific Area.
30. Ibid. 15 October 1942.
31. Damien Parer, 1943 (typescript, Mitchell Library).
32. Christopher C.H. Wray, *Timor 1942*, Hutchinson, Sydney, 1987, p. 178.
33. Sejarah.

34. Kevin Sherlock, "Timor During World War, I and II", p. 43.
35. Australia Archives (ju) Series A1838/2, Ite. 436/3/3/3.
36. "Magic", 16 March 1944 and 26 July 1944.
37. Ibid., 18 May 1945.
38. Ibid., 5 June 1945.
39. Ibid., 22 August 1945. The evident surrender order by Tokyo to its forces in Timor, as announced by Domei and carried in a Reuters report, was front paged in Didrio de Noticias (18 August 1945).
40. Ibid., 14 September 1945.
41. Ibid.
42. AA Vie 1932/2/203, "telegram sent by External Affairs to Dr. Evatt in London", 10 September 1945.
43. i.Magic", 14 Sept. 1945.
44. Ibid.
45. See author's, Wartime Portuguese Timor.. The Azores Connection, Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies working paper, No.50> 1988. Also see, Carlos Bessa, A Libertacao de Timor na II Guerra Mundial: Importancia dos Acores para os Intereses dos Estados Unidos, Academia Portuguesa da Historia, Lisboa, MCMXCII. Bessa's research is based, in large part, upon the memoirs of US diplomat George Kerman and Portuguese Foreign Ministry documents.
46. AA Vie 1932/2/203 "telegram sent to Dr. Evatt..."
47. See Carlos Bessa, A Libertacao de Timor na II Guerra Mundial, p. 155.
48. W.D. Forsyth, "Timor II: The World of Doctor Evatt," New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and Southeast Asia, May/June, 1975.
49. Peter Hastings, "The Timor Problem III, Some Australian Attitudes, 1903-1941 ", Australian Outlook No.2, 1975, pp. 180-96.
50. "Magic", 14 September 1945.
51. Domei in The Mainichi (Tokyo), 7 August 1945.
52. Reuters (Lisbon), 11 September 1945 in "Magic", 14 September 1945.
53. Sydney Morning Herald, 14 & 26 September 1945.
54. Forsyth, "Timor II", p. 34.
55. Sydney Morning Herald, 26 September 1945.
56. Hastings, "The Timor Problem", p. 333.
57. N. K. Wallis! "Peace Comes to Dili," Walkabout, Feb. 1946.
58. Ibid.
59. Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, p. 27.
60. Carlos Bessa, A Libertacao de Timor, and see Carlos Cal Brandao, Funo (Guerra em Timor), Edicoes, AOV, 1992, p. 177.
61. Australian Archives (ju) Vie MP 742/I and 246/1/148, Department of Defence. (III) Army HQ.
62. AA Vie 336/11724.
63. juVic 336-12073.
64. AAVic 336/I/1213.
65. AA Vie 336/I/876.
66. AAVic 338/1/1724.
67. AAVic 336/I/1876, 336/11724, 336/12073.
68. AA CVic) 336/11 1724.
69. Carlos Vieira da Rocha, Timor Ocupado Japanese Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, Sociedade Hist6rica da Independencia de Portugal, Lisboa, 1996.
70. -Wray, Timor 1942.
71. AA Vie 336/I/1724.
72. Shoji Shibuya, "Asia's Last Colony: On Timor", Koen (Lecture), No.1204, 15 November 1975 (in Japanese).
73. Luis Andrade de Sa (ed.), "Comfort-women e desculpas p6blicas: Ramos Horta confirmou ao Futuro exigencia de reparac6es ao Japao", Futuro de Macau, Ano IV, N6mero 793, 15 de Janeiro, 1997, pp. 12.

Colonial Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Postwar Timor

Setting aside for a final chapter the political changes wrought in Timor at the end of the Salazarist state in 1974, this chapter seeks to trace the contours of colonial capitalism and underdevelopment in postwar Timor. While nothing in Timor's colonial history and wartime legacy would challenge the commonsense understanding that the colony suffered from all the symptoms of classic underdevelopment on an "African" scale, again it is not the same as saying that economic change did not occur. It is also not the same as saying that Portugal's stewardship over Timor was entirely negated by its economic failings. Timor's weak world-historical incorporation and the cocoon imposed over the colony by the Salazarist state actually rescued the half-island from rapacious foreign investment and exploitation, bequeathing to the late twentieth century a version of Wallace's "Oceanic island-in-miniature", although to be sure such a romanticized view of Portuguese colonialism had its serious downside especially in the area of social development. It is sufficient in the foregoing, then, to strike a balance sheet of colonialism in its final phases a calculus that would expose the failure of the state in Portuguese Timor to efficiently collect rent and develop extractive industries along the model of northern European colonialism, on the one hand, weighed against the conservation effects of the model which preserved, rather than destroyed, the major traits of indigenous society and culture, on the other.

Postwar Rehabilitation

Following the Japanese capitulation, general administration was soon re-established in the colony. Experienced administrators from Portuguese Africa replaced many of the prewar officials. The legacy of the war, both human and physical, undoubtedly weighed heavy on the first attempts at economic recovery. Almost half of the 92,000 contos (1000s of Portuguese escudos) expenditure budgeted in Timor's first five year "plano de fomento" or Development Plan (1953-58) was allocated to reconstruction of the capital, with the balance divided between reconstruction in the interior and agriculture and livestock resources. 1

Demographic losses incurred by the war are revealed in the first postwar census data. As of 13 June 1948 the population was calculated as 420,480. This figure included 1217 Europeans (1947), 3,592 Chinese (1947), 146 Arabs (1949), and 660-mixed race (1949). 2

Census data for 1950 reveals a total population of 442,378, rising to 517,079 in 1960 and 555,723 in 1965. The rate of increase for the 1950-60 period was 17 per cent, extremely weak compared to a Southeast Asian average for this period of 2.1 per cent. By 1968 the population had increased to 591,000.

According to an official Portuguese source published in 1970, projections of population size for 1970 were 632,700 and for 1973, 671,600. 3

Beyond these bare statistics it would be appropriate to draw a picture of urban life in Timor in the final two decades under Portuguese rule. In this sense Dili was special as primate town, administrative capital, centre for foreign missions, and also the commercial centre of the colony. While other towns such as Baucau, Aileu, or Bobonaro shared many of the socio-demographic features of colonial Dili, the Capital was unique in the sense of pulling in diverse peoples and moulding or blending them into a distinctive Portugalized community, or communities.

According to Ramos de Oliveira who conducted a study of Dili's social structure in the early 1970s, the town with a population of around 10,000 comprised four distinct communities or socio-ethnic groups. These were, respectively, the Europeans, Chinese, Arab and Timorese communities. 4

Of the Europeans, which by this date included several hundreds of young Portuguese serving out compulsory military service, almost all were sojourners. The only exceptions, as noted, were the deportados, decommissioned military officers who made their homes in Timor, and a few hotelkeepers and several other merchants who alone challenged the Chinese commercial monopoly in Dili. This group included some who had intermarried with Timorese. Most Europeans, including soldiers, were on official business and resided either in military cantonments or official residences in the leafy, and architecturally distinct Farol quarter of Dili.

The Chinese, residing in Dili's commercial zone imparted a typical Southeast Asian commercial character to the city. But outside the Chinese shop house centre, others resided in the Kulu-hum bairro to the southeast of the city. Characteristically) the social cohesion of the Chinese was maintained through a parallel system of Chinese language primary and even secondary schools, albeit incorporating a complimentary curriculum including Portuguese language and history. In the postwar period, teachers were recruited in Taiwan and the trend among the Chinese community in Timor was to celebrate official holiday of the Republic of China, represented by a Consulate housed in a prominent building on the Dili waterfront. Although many of the Chinese of Dili had close commercial or even family links with Macau, the main dialect spoken was not Cantonese but Khe or Hakka. Many Chinese were acculturated with Timorese ways and were speakers of Tetum. At the same time, as discussed in a following chapter, some Chinese came to be targeted by Timorese nationalists for their commercial aggressiveness or at least stranglehold over commerce.

The "Arab" or Muslim community in Dili numbering some hundreds only, were descendants of Hadramau Arabs who had settled most parts of Southeast Asia by the nineteenth century. This community was concentrated in a specific quarter, Kampong Alor, also known as Kampong Arab or Campo Mouro⁹ fronting the sea to the north, the Comoro River to the west, and Farol quarter to the east. Occupationally, they grew rice, manufactured copra and engaged in fishing and other commercial activities. Defined by the Islamic identities, the community supported a mosque and an Islamic school, offering Koranic education including the study of Arabic. Almost exclusively in Portuguese Timor, the Muslim community of Farol, which also included some converts to Islam from the island of Alor) were speakers of Malay and otherwise acculturated to Malay culture. Yet, as shown in the following chapter, certain scions of these ancient Arab families rallied to the Timorese nationalist cause.

By contrast, Timorese society in the mundo urbano or urban world of Dili was more complex, especially a traditional structures continued, albeit in modified form. By contrast to the Europeans and Chinese, Timorese occupied peripheral residential zones, the so-called bairros de palapa. Here, communal traditions were strong and "shared" poverty characteristic. Herein these urbanized Timorese agglomerations lived the quintessential men and women, later dubbed the Maubere by Timorese nationalists, who, in part, recreated and celebrated their clan and rural antecedents in new form. The centre of Timorese urban life was the bazaar and, as witnessed by the author in the late 1960s, the futu-manu or cockfight held at the mercado semanal was, as in real Timorese life, very much a fight to the finish. Outside of the bazaar, most worked in low status positions such as in construction, manual labour or as low level functionaries. But overall, status and integration depended upon level of education. Neighbourhood, place of origin, occupation and status, as much key rites de passage such as marriages and baptisms> served to conjoin Timorese in the highly multicultural and multiethnic urban space as represented by colonial Dili.

But did these communities meet, or was this a version of what British historian J.S. Furnivall described of the Dutch East Indies as a "plural" economy with compartmentalized societies that only related to each other through commerce?

Probably yes. But even so, an unjaundiced view of Portuguese Colonial society would hold that, unlike, say, its British counterpart, it distinguished itself by its capacity to extend, beyond racial categories. The mixed racial character of many of the "metropolitan" administrators reveals this truism. Added to that, the major foreign communities in colonial Timor, the Chinese and Arabs of Dili, were represented via their respective chefe de comunidade in the Dili Municipal Commission, an arrangement dating back to the Governorship of Filomeno da Camara.

Postwar Administration

How then was Portuguese Timor governed through unto 1975? As confirmed by a metropolitan decree of 22 November 1963, Portuguese Timor was regarded as an overseas province with its own administration. At the apex stood the Governor, below him the administrador do conselho, the administrador do posto, the suco and the povoacao. With some variation, the governor was appointed by a Council of Ministers upon the approval of the Minister of Overseas regions. In the execution of daily affairs he was assisted by a Conselho do Governo and a Conselho Legislativo or Legislative Council. But, as head of the Conselho do Governo, the Conselho Legislativo and Chefe de Estado Maior or commander-in-chief of the armed forces,

the Governor was supreme, directly responsible to the Minister for Colonies in Lisbon, with the caveat that his of {1Ce did not prejudice the independence of the judiciary.⁵

As in Macau, and indeed Hong Kong under British rule, membership of both the Governor's Council and the Legislative Council were drawn from a combination of appointed and "elected" members. In the early postwar Timor, the Council comprised four official members, including the Governor, and three unofficial members, all Europeans. Two of the unofficial appointees represented Timorese interests. While the system eventually made provision in the Legislature for three elected Timorese members, this was unquestionably an unrepresentative colonial setup. Though empowered to legislate all internal matters for Timor, an important exception was finance in which case the local Legislature deferred to the Minister for Colonies.⁶ It is also true, as Saldanha points out, that very few natives sons, much less daughters, rose to head the parallel system of secretariats and agencies in the government.⁷

Elaborating upon the prewar divisioning of the colony into nine *concelhos*, thirteen *concelhos* were created with 60 *postos administrativos* and one *camara municipal* (Dili). As in the prewar period an administrator assisted by a *Secretario* and frequently by an *Aspirante* headed each of the *circumscricoes*.

Circumscricoes were divided into administrative posts headed by *chefe de postos* in turn divided into *sucos* (groups of villages) headed by a Timorese chief, while these *sucos* were in turn divided into *povoacoes* (villages or settlements), an honorary office filled by a lesser chief. Each *circumscricao* and *posto* employed a number of Timorese police. The administrator of each *circumscricao* acted as president of a small local council known as the *Junta Local* comprising native representation, a representative of commercial interests, invariably Chinese, and where possible, the presence of a medical officer. While the administrators were invariably professionalized permanent members of the colonial service, *chefe de posto* could also be recruited locally as *encarregados*. Both were vested with limited judicial powers. While the administrator had executive authority, in the postwar period it was the *chefe de posto* who was the main interface between the colonial administration and the Timorese, insofar as he collected taxes, supervised the indigenous labour force, and attended to all details of administration in his respective *posto*, a duty involving regular visits to all chiefs. According to Landman and Plant, the *encarregados*, who included ex-non-commissioned officers of the army, *deportados* and *assimilados*, many of them with Timorese wives: "appear to have a much more friendly and understanding attitude towards the natives".⁸

Undoubtedly this setup had dictatorial features mirroring the corporatist character of the Salazarist state. But whether or not it was intrinsically repressive or arbitrary depended as much on the character of the local administration as upon the Governor *per se*. While the resort to corporal punishment and summary beatings dealt out by the Salazarist state offered little consolation to Timorese victims, rule of law nevertheless obtained in the colony over long time. While it could be argued that few but the most privileged had recourse to metropolitan courts, and while acts of "rebellion" were met with overwhelming force, the trend in the modern period was towards the strict imposition of rule of law mediated by judicial institutions separate from the executive. As discussed in a following chapter, the military coup that ended the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship in 1974 also ramified upon Timor in the way that the armed forces interposed themselves in the administration. But these were reformist democratic soldiers with a mission to decolonize not to recreate colonial hierarchies.

Still, one should not just view the system through the optic of, say, British or Dutch colonial precedent or even modern administrative science. The anthropological reality of Timor was specific and-the civilizing mission and "pacification" campaigns notwithstanding-it owed to Portuguese administrative practice if not policy, that outside of certain domains-labour recruitment was one-Portuguese rule rested lightly upon traditional honour status systems. As two Australians observed of this version of indirect rule in the early/postwar period:

Timor has a native aristocracy, which though lacking in the glory of former days, still retains some measure of power. The few remaining kings are recognized by the Government and are granted many privileges; their homes are provided by the Administration and they are free of the burden of head tax. They do not appear to have any very clearly defined legal powers, but apparently handle matters concerning native custom and before the war could have their subjects beaten... The chiefs are also men of importance and are utilized by the Administration in controlling labour and collecting taxes.⁹

It is tempting, then, to see in the method of Portuguese colonial rule, both respect for traditional institutions—to a surprising degree the Portuguese were obliged to defer to the power of the liurai in the manner of making claims upon ordinary people's loyalties and, at the same time, adapting the system in line with the norms of a modern colonial administration with both representative and meritocratic features. By falling between two stools, as it were, Portugal earned the scorn of both traditionalists, many of whom turned out to be reactionaries at the moment of climax surrounding Portuguese rule, and the modernizers as represented by the progressive elements within the embryonic political parties but who nevertheless had to speak the language of the people. Yet it is also true in Saldanha's memorable phrase that the trend in Portuguese rule, "reflected the endless castration" of the traditional power structure. Here he is reflecting upon the replacement or at least eclipse in modern times of the liurai or other traditional leaders with elected officials or officials elected by the colonial government such as represented by the chefe de posto. Thus, he explains, in the final coup against the mettle some liurai the Portuguese eliminated the rank of regulo from the administrative hierarchy relegating the liurai to the lower rank of chief of suco. But whether this was "tragic" or not, as Saldanha would have us believe depends on one's view of colonial administrative reform, and the role of new rising counter elites as represented by the new educated classes which were bound to come into collision with traditional forms of power. 10

Notably, it was not until 1952 that the first liceu (middle school) was opened in Dili and the first vocational school four years later. Some years later ciclo preparatorio schools were opened in Dili, Bobonaro, Maubisse, Baucau and Pante Macassar. Only by 1958 did a state-directed education program begin to become effective and really only took off in the early 1970s. By 1966-67 the liceu had enrolled 833 students. By 1972-73, some 1200 students were enrolled in the preparatory schools. But whereas only 28 per cent of the school age population received an education in 1970-71, by 1973-74 the figure had risen dramatically to 77 per cent. 11

But teaching standards were low and education was still far from universal. At the end of 1974 there were 200 teachers in Timor, 16 Portuguese and the rest Timorese, only a small percentage of whom had any teacher training. 12

Needless to say, education had both an urban bias and a bias towards children of privilege, although not necessarily race.

For the privileged few from among the assimilado, the peak of the education hierarchy broadened in this period to include higher education in metropole. But graduation from a metropolitan university or college did not necessarily imply a career in Timor, but could lead to service in other Portuguese colonies. On the other hand, other assimilado graduates of metropolitan centres of higher learning were eligible for posting in Timor. In any case, by 1974, there were only a handful of Timorese university graduates. At the other end of the scale, 90 per cent of the population remained functional illiterates. 13

In 1975, in the last months of Portuguese rule, in an exercise never since repeated by any UN agency, a delegate from UNESCO visited the territory with a view to offering assistance in restructuring the school system and making the curriculum more relevant to Timorese needs and culture. More the pity that UN agencies were not then or now engaged.

Yet, where the state failed in the field of education, the church and the Chinese schools compensated. Before 1962, the Catholic Church provided the only schools in the interior. Before the Indonesian annexation, the church operated 57 primary schools, one intermediate school offering some secondary education and two seminaries offering religious education alongside secondary education. 14

The church also supported some 20 priests in a seminary in Macau, the highest rung in the church school education hierarchy for Timorese. Of no small consequence, it was the Jesuit seminary at Dare that graduated a number of the core leaders of the Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste (Fretilin), while its first President was a graduate of the Macau seminary. Another graduate of Dare and student in the Macau seminary was Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, future Apostolic Administrator of Dili, who continued his studies for the priesthood in Portugal and Rome. Yet, it should be remembered, the pool of recruits entering the Catholic school and missions system was as small as its base. Only 229,314 or one third of the population were registered as Catholics in the Dili Diocesan office in 1974.

Dynamics of the Postwar Economy

A special feature of Timor's economy was the nature of its integration with the world economy. Arising from the political needs of Salazar's Estado Novo, all Portuguese colonies were economically integrated under the Espaço Económico Nacional, essentially a Lusophone trading and currency bloc that privileged trade between the Portuguese territories over immense distance which also imposed artificial barriers to the closer economic integration of the local economies with their "natural regions".

Broadly, development planning in Timor in the postwar period was in line with the overall metropolitan endeavour to stimulate development in overseas colonies. At the time, like the African colonies; Timor was also hostage to Portugal's own economic weakness and peripheralization within Europe.

Official Australian gloss on the 1948 census offers that, while statistics showing occupational groupings are lacking, an estimated 10,000 Timorese performed compulsory service for the administration, while a further 2,700 were engaged in small industries, such as vegetable oil and sisal production, fishing and fish drying, or as workers in such enterprises as a soap factory, a perfume factory, or in one of six potteries for tiles and bricks, sawmills, a mechanical carpentry shop, native weaving or in the handicraft industry. An additional 2,000 to 3,000 were employed on SAPT, either on the estates, or in coffee, cocoa, and rubber processing plants. The Carvalho coffee estates employed a further 300 Timorese with six or seven other estates each employing 50 to 150 workers each. 15

This account does not acknowledge the role of the small peasant producer, especially in coffee, whom, according to Lains e Silva, was even more important than strictly capitalist enterprises. While such individual efforts outside of modern organization and agronomy resulted in extremely low levels of productivity, Lains e Silva nevertheless recognized great potential for coffee production in Timor in the postwar period, especially for Robusta and Liberia types of coffee, such as grown on the south coast below 600 metres, especially in consideration that prime Arabica grown above 1000 metres was susceptible to the hemelia disease, even though it dominated exports. He also observed the success of a number of rich Timorese coffee producers in the Maubisse area, all cultivating Arabica coffee, including Martinho Lourenco with 2,500 coffee bushes, Matias de Sa Benevides, the liurai of Laqueco, with 127,000 coffee bushes, and his relative, Joao de Sa Benevides, owner of 20,000 coffee bushes. 16

While reconstruction in the immediate postwar period was carried out with some determination, at least in averting certain famine, as Saldanha has exposed, changes in the various economic sectors over the 1953-6 period indicated a "lack of seriousness" on the part of the colonial government in implementing the development plans. This writer found that in this period there was an actual relative decline in the banking and service sector participation in the economy, albeit a strengthening of the agricultural sector. In the 1968-72 period he found that routine expenditure was always less than routine income indicating a failure to anticipate development expenditures, and a consequent failure to stimulate other productive sectors. 17

There is no question then that the colonial state in Timor presided over an economy of extremely low productivity where development was a highly restricted concept based upon low levels of technical inputs and accountability.

However, it is the Third Development Plan (1968-73) that bears major scrutiny, not only because it was the final plan to be fully executed under the colonial order, but because it appears to represent a break with the past, at least in terms of its conception and scope in developmentalist terms. The Third Plan of 1968-73 involved a program of investments of the order of 556,000 contos, of which 540,000 derived from reimbursable funds from metropole. Unlike previous plans, including the Second and interim plans of 1959-55 and 1965-67, the Third Plan threw the emphasis upon stimulating export activities and import-substitution industries especially in the area of consumer goods, along with infrastructure related to enhancing productive potential. In linking this Plan to Timorese realities the emphasis was placed on increasing agricultural productivity, raising the cultural, sanitary and technical level of the population and expanding commerce. In examining the breakdown of findings by sector, the highest allocation (31.8 per cent) went to transport and communications, next was agriculture, silviculture and veterinary services (23.9 per cent), third was housing and urban development (11.7 per cent), next, industry (10.9 per cent), social promotion or education, (10.6 per cent) and fishing (3.7 per cent). For the first time tourism and development of tourist infrastructure figured in this statistic (2.6 per cent), as did scientific investigation of the territory and its population (2.1 per cent), and energy (2.1 per cent). 18

Table 13.1 Timor's exports by percentage (1955-68) Year coffee rubber copra other

1955	74,49	8,88	8,618,02	
1960	63,22	13,70	14,66	7,36
1961	59,29	13,06	13,72	14,76
1962	72,76	8,67	1104	7,52
1963	78,24	6,06	10,53	5,17
1964	8100	4,80	9,10	5,10
1965	82,00	4,88	8,08	5,04
1966	78,58	5,17	10,07	6,18
1967	79,34	136	9,74	
1968	9132	150	6,60	0,58

(source: Timor: Pequena Monografia, 1970: 153)

One measure of the Success of the economic plans is surely the orientation of external commerce or trade. For the 1960-68 period, Timor experienced a steady increase in the value of imports. Official sources claim that this measured an "index of social progress" of the population. Doubtless this was true, considering the nature of the imports, figuring Cement, iron, machinery, automobiles, clothing and other consumer items. Exports, however, while showing an overall increase, also showed reversals. This owed to the nature of agricultural exports and market fluctuations, especially coffee, but also rubber and copra. The figures also reveal that foreign exchange earnings derived almost exclusively from one commodity, coffee, which increased its dominance at the expense of other export commodities down until the end of the colonial period (see Table 13.1). 19

Very clearly, the coffee boom in Timor was linked with a situation of high commodity prices after the Second World War. Exports went over the 2,000 ton mark in 1963, for the first time in 30 years and, by the early 1970s, levels of 4,000 and 5,000 tons a year were reached breaching the levels of the 1880s. This made Timor the second coffee producer in the Portuguese empire. In the postwar period the plantations, of which SAPT was still the leader, increased their stake in Timor's coffee output to 45 per cent, although, as Clarerece-Smith clarifies, big planters also acted as buyers for smallholder production. 20

A scrutiny of Timor's postwar trade patterns reveals that the colony progressively moved out of the Portuguese trade bloc such as erected in the earlier period, and turned increasingly to more diversified markets. But this was mainly because of Portugal's dependence upon European shippers. The figures for 1972 reveal that the colony's major suppliers were Portugal (27 per cent), Australia (16.2 per cent), Singapore (14.1 per cent), Japan (9.2 per cent), Mozambique (8.9 per cent), UK (5.4 per cent) and others (19.2 per cent). In the same year, 27.8 per cent of exports went to the U.S., 21.2 per cent to the Netherlands, 16.7 per cent to Denmark, 10.6 per cent to West Germany, 5.5 per cent to Belgium, 5 per cent to Singapore and 5.8 per cent to others. That year, only 7.4 per cent went to Portugal. 21

In any case, separated by long distance from Portugal and the African colonies, it made greater sense for Timor to look to closer and more diversified markets.

January 1960 saw the replacement of the "historic" pataca as the official currency by the Timor escudo, a currency virtually non-exchangeable outside of the Portuguese trading bloc. Under the new monetary regime, the limit on circulation was fixed at 45,000 contos, 33,500 in notes and 11,500 in coins. As commercial transactions increased over the next few years along with the purchasing ability of the population, this threshold was raised to 110 million contos. While the BNU somewhat expanded its banking facilities in the colony in the postwar period, it has to be said that banking facilities remained underdeveloped and the colony distinguished itself for its low levels of monetization. To some extent this failing was recognized by the creation in the early 1960s of a number of credit institutions also aimed at stimulating economic development, such as the Caixa Economica Postal dos CTT, the Fundo de Fomento de Producao e Exportacao the Caixa de Credito Agro-Pecuario, and the Fundo de Habitacoes Economicas. 22

Portuguese Timor's early postwar experience suggests that it was more of a drain on colonial resources than an asset. In 1947, of a budget of 7,000,000 patacas, only half was derived from local revenues while the other half was a grant from Lisbon. The budget approved for 1949, amounting to 9,200,000 patacas,

allowed for a 4,000,000 patacas grant for reconstruction purposes. Otherwise, as in the prewar period, revenues were derived from poll taxes (around 2,000,000 patacas on the basis of an annual tax of 20 patacas per adult male) with import and export taxes making up the balance along with "numerous indirect imposts" and a small income and profits tax. 23

Even so, such "reconstruction grants" from metropole were at least in part offset by private profits accruing from export revenues in the plantation sector.

From an examination of budget receipts and budget expenditure for the period 1960-68 there is no question that colonial administrators ran a tight ship. Over this period receipts practically doubled showing a constant annual increase. While certain of this increase can be accounted by increased productivity, it could also be accounted for in a more rigorous collection of direct and indirect imposts along with other taxes. But even while receipts generally exceeded expenditure during this period, allowing the colony to present a generally balanced budget with allocations in line with the respective economic plans, 24

It was only the metropolitan subsidy that enabled even the modest development plans to be effected.

But, as a 1975 UN report underscores, as a result of controls introduced by the government in 1970, the value of exports increased from 95.8 million escudos in 1970 to 140.6 million escudos in 1972 (46.8 per cent), and the value of imports decreased from 207.1 million escudos in 1970 to 200.2 million escudos in 1972 (3.3 per cent). As a result, the trade deficit was only 59.6 million escudos in 1972, compared with 111.3 million escudos in 1970. [In April 1975, 23 escudos equaled \$US 100]. Nevertheless, over the same period, owing to a weakening production of sweet potatoes, maize and manioc, local production was inadequate to meet the growing needs of domestic food production and the territory was obliged to resort to food imports. 25

Evans, citing material drawn from the June 1973 Development Plan, offers that coinciding with the beginning of the 1974-1979 five year Plan, total government expenditure in Timor jumped from \$A 1.9 million in 1972 to \$A 7.6 million in 1973. But of the expenditure allotted for 1973, \$A 4.4 million was allocated for road building. As in the past only a minuscule amount, \$A 159,198, was generated within Timor itself. In any case, provisions to expend \$A 28.4 million in this plan were cut short by the destabilizations fomented by Indonesia in 1975, a question discussed in the following chapter. 26

Under Portuguese colonialism it is an undeniable reality that the Timorese ranked among the world's poorest people, a description, however, that does not exclude their long lost kin in the Sunda Islands under Indonesian rule. In 1971, per capita GNP was \$A 2 compared with about \$A 80 in Indonesia, although, as elaborated below, it is also instructive to make comparisons between the eastern and western parts of the island of Timor. As Nicol writes, considering the way that wealth was distributed, even this figure disguises the extent of deprivation of a people living at subsistence level. The rate of pay for an unskilled worker was one Australian dollar a week in 1974. The "elite" clerks in government service earned about \$A 25 a week. 27

The medical profile was no less disturbing. Life expectancy was 35 years. Infant mortality was a staggering 50-75 per cent. Tropical and other diseases took their toll, including malaria; pneumonia, elephantiasis, venereal disease and T.B. Malnutrition and famine were not unknown. In 1948 there were six doctors and four hospitals backed by a health service with a representative in each district and at each administrative posto. Indeed, as revealed in the 1948 census, either the system was not coping with the legacy of the war years or the failures of the colonial medical system was making its demographic impact felt. In 1947 there were 7,630 births showing an excess of 867 over deaths, but in 1948 there were 689 more deaths than births. One bias in the medical system was that it operated primarily to the advantage of the Portuguese. The Hospital and other medical services were centred in Dili. In 1974 there was only one surgeon and one dentist providing specialized care supported by a dozen GPs conscripted into the Portuguese army. 28

Yet, alongside west Timor under Indonesian rule, the Portuguese colony was in some ways more integrated into a capitalist world economy. A visit across Timor in the late 1960s revealed that, relative to west Timor, Portuguese Timor was far better serviced in terms of availability of basic consumer items, especially those imported from Macau or Hong Kong and widely sold in Chinese retail stores across the country. In the last years of Portuguese rule, monetization of the economy had actually expanded. Fixed prices for basic commodities spared the population the kind of hyperinflation experienced in Indonesia under Sukarno. While the degree of military-bureaucratic penetration to the village level may have been

greater in Indonesian Timor, a legacy of Dutch rule as much the insistence by the Indonesian military of its role in the village, as the author observed at first hand in Kupang and other interior towns in west Timor in 1967, the most basic commodities were simply not available even in Chinese stores. Even though West Timor was a beneficiary of Australian Colombo Plan aid for road construction and bridge building, communication lines and bridges were washed out or made impassable with equal frequency and inconvenience on both sides of the border. While economic penury and return to an erstwhile barter economy may have been a legacy of the economic-nationalist policies of the Sukarnoist order, prosperity only came to west Timor in the early 1970s especially as the Indonesian New Order gave the green light to foreign investment led resource's exploitation. At this time, Kupang emerged as a minor base for offshore oil exploration on both sides of the island. 29

Only in the 1960s did Portugal endeavour to attend to the territory's physical infrastructure. Centrepiece was the country's first Sealed airstrip at Baucau completed in 1963 capable of handling Boeing 707 aircraft. While some 5,000 foreign tourists were visiting the colony a year by the 1970s, the airport never realized its full potential, indeed became superfluous with the advent of longer haul aircraft. In any case, this airport became Timor's lifeline with Australia, just as in a later period it serviced Indonesia's airborne assault on the Timorese people. The development of Dili's port facilities in the 1960s was laudable but also tended to benefit big importers and exporters.

Road building and road surfacing was pretty much limited. Nicol insists that the Portuguese made no worthwhile attempts to overcome the rugged terrain and climatic conditions when they built roads and bridges. They gave little money and applied only the most elementary technical skills to the work. The result? "Even the most basic needs for developing the country were not provided" 30

One sphere of activity, which may have significantly reduced Lisboa's trade deficit in East Timor, was in the state-private sector. This is a reference to the colony's largest enterprise SAPT, and the third largest enterprise, Sociedade Oriental de Transportes e Armazens (Sota), the successor to the prewar Asia Investment Company that had come under Japanese control, in which the government held two-thirds share. Both had retailing and plantation interests and substantial interests in the import-export trade. In this sphere alone, the Portuguese encouraged efficient management. 31

In the postwar years, the government stake in SAPT stood at 40 per cent, with the balance held by the da Silva family (52 per cent) and the BNU (8 per cent). The Companhia de Timor was absorbed by SAPT during the late 1940s. The BNU maintained its monopoly status and role as note issuing authority to the end.

Outside this niche, the Portuguese allowed the Chinese—about 2 1000 strong before the Indonesian invasion—to dominate the economy. Through its control of a loans policy the Portuguese preempted the rise of an indigenous business and possible future troublesome political elite. The Chinese emerged under Portuguese rule as controlling 95 percent of all business in East Timor, owning 23 of East Timor's 25 import-export firms including Sang Tai Hoo, (second only to SAPT in size) and owning most of the coffee plantations and 300 retail shops. The only competition to Chinese economic dominance in the retail trade stemmed from SAPT and Sota, two Timorese retailers, a few Portuguese and Timorese planters, and Timorese small holders producing copra (and coffee). While many Chinese businesspeople in Timor failed to reinvest their profits locally, preferring to remit their earnings to Taiwan, 32

It should be recalled that not all Chinese were in business, but that through the postwar period certain were engaged in agriculture and in occupations such as carpentry and masonry.

Serving to coordinate business and commerce across the communities, the government sanctioned the creation in August 1952 of the Associação Commercial, Agrícola e Industrial de Timor. In this "class" organization typical, of the corporatist Salazarist state, structure throughout the empire, all fractions of capital as it existed in Timor were represented, from planters, to Chinese merchants to Portuguese business. But whether such representatives of merchant capital could deepen their investments in the colony as opposed to the extraction of rent and the circulation of commodities depended very much upon the willingness of the state to stimulate foreign investment, especially in the sphere of resources exploitation.

Minerals Exploration and Foreign Investment

In 1947 the Australian government received reports of "low grade crude" in Suai, Pualaci, and Aliambata,

deemed "suitable for cracking to yield a wide range of liquid fuels if only daily production from bores can be increased to make the project commercially attractive". 33

In 1956, doubtless encouraged by such information, the Australian-based company, Timor Oil Ltd. commenced searching for oil off the Timor coast, with a break in its activities between 1959 and 1968. In 1957 Timor Oil Ltd offered shares to the public to finance a new search for oil in Portuguese Timor. This new venture was in part stimulated by encouraging reports on the company's concession area in the Mota Bui formation where production from one seepage was estimated at 6,000 gallons a year. Reports drawn up separately by American oil geologists concurred that the possibility for commercial production of oil in Portuguese Timor was highly favorable. One of the concerned interests and shareholders, Oil Drilling and Exploration, undertook to do the fieldwork for the company in the Aliambata and Suai areas.

In January 1971, exploration activities offshore the south coast of Timor (in Portuguese and Indonesian Timor) were conducted by the U.S. companies, New Orleans Offshore Navigation Company and Western Geophysical, for Burma Oil and Timor Oil Ltd. Onshore Timor Oil Ltd. concentrated its activities around Suai and Betano. Timor Oil Ltd. subsequently entered into a farm out arrangement with Woodside-Burma Company in February 1974. While never officially confirmed, it was common knowledge that gas and perhaps oil had been found in commercial recoverable quantities. Onshore, the Australian company Broker Hill Proprietary Ltd. (BHP) was given the go-ahead in January 1972 to search for minerals. 34

There is no question that the onshore activities of the oil companies in Timor represented the largest foreign investment projects in the colony, offering limited employment to Timorese and having certain multiplier effects on local economies. In 1972, for example, Timor Oil's outlay was \$A 2,149,000 falling to \$A 770,270 the following year.

Australia had long been involved in negotiations with Portugal over the maritime boundary with Timor. Since 1953 Australia had laid claim to the potentially oil-rich continental shelf to some 90 kilometers from the coast of Timor. Both Australia and Portugal were signatories of the Convention of the Continental Shelf done at Geneva on 29 April 1958. Whereas Portugal argued that the median point should constitute the sea boundary between the two countries, Australia held that the trough the "Timor trough" at the edge of the continental shelf, should define the boundary. 35

While Portugal remained intransigent, Indonesia, with whom Australia had been conducting negotiations since 1969, conceded the principle in October 1972. This agreement, which ensured that Australia gained control of about 70 per cent of the sea-bed between north6m Australia and the island of Timor, left a 250 kilometer gap in the boundary in the area south of East Timor, later to become known as the "Timor Gap". From the outset, however, Portugal prudently refused to concede the basis of the Indonesian-Australian settlement. 36

While Australia again initiated discussions with Portugal to formalize a common maritime border in 1974, discussions were abandoned after the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. In any case, Portugal preferred to wait for the outcome of the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference, which, inter alia, dealt with the delimitation of maritime boundaries between adjacent states.

Meanwhile, in December 1974, over Australian government protests, the Portuguese government granted exploration rights in the disputed area to an American company, Oceanic Exploration Company of Denver, in return for specified royalties. According to Sasha Stepan, the Australian protest ignored the fact that Canberra also leased part of the area to interested companies. Even prior to the full scale invasion of the Portuguese colony by Indonesia, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott, foreshadowing his country's future policy on the Indonesian annexation of the Portuguese colony, stated his country's interest in the Gap by noting, "this could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia than with Portugal or independent Portuguese Timor". 37

Two important development projects under serious discussion in 1974 both involved foreign investment. One concerned Australian investment in a cattle project in Los Palos; the second was a joint Australian-Japanese development venture in a tourist hotel. 38

A conglomerate of Japanese investors in the Japan-Timor Association mooted an even more comprehensive development plan. The centerpiece of this plan, as stated in a 70-page project report of February 1975, concerned a hydroelectric plant based on Lake Lalaro in the Los Palos highlands. 39

While centered on electric power, the US\$6 million scheme also envisaged the exploitation of phosphate ore, manganese, fishing, agricultural development and salt manufacture, not only drawing upon Japanese

inputs but World Bank and international cooperation. Certain other investments were envisaged in infrastructure such as road improvements, the development of Jaco as a leisure area, and, with an eye to, the tuna and bonito spawning waters of the Timor Sea, the development of a deep sea fishing base. As Shoji Shibuya, Director of the Japan-Timor Association, wrote in 1975, "If such a development project were carried out on Timor, even if the present population of 600,000 reached 1,500,000, it would be possible to raise the present level of life to even that above Indonesia". Acknowledging the failure of Japan to give wartime compensation to Timor he offered that this development project could make amends. 40 Needless to say, this plan, presented to both the Japanese and Portuguese governments and discussed with representatives of the Timorese political parties, was rapidly shelved in the wake of Indonesian invasion of the colony.

Conclusion

It is obvious that the social and political hierarchies of Dili found their territorial correlates in the circumscriptions. At the apex of the system stood metropolitans on temporary commissions. Most were Europeans but this category also included Cape Verdians, Goanese, Macanese and others. Timorese and mestizo were relegated to the lower and middle positions. While this was a typical colonial structure, it was not necessarily racist in its biases but a function of colonial priorities and a division of labour in the empire which saw Timorese marginalized alongside better educated Africans and Goanese, not to mention metropolitans. As we shall view in a following chapter, the highly restricted political space offered the Timorese by the colonial regime, combined with the choke upon elite formation that other colonialisms conceded as a "natural" evolution on the way to independence, contrived to create the conditions for chaos that would be exploited by an external power.

Economically, we have seen, the colony was a burden upon the metropolitan centre which, in turn, was marginal within European capitalism, albeit useful at the same time to U.S. global interests, not just in continued access to the Azores bases in a nuclear era, but in the way that U.S. and Portuguese interests coincided in stemming revolution in Africa. But while the colony was a fiscal drain on Portugal, neither did Lisbon have the economic wherewithal to fully exploit or develop its Oceanic colony. While there is a definite sense that, in drawing up the 1974- 1979 Plan, Portugal had finally grasped the mettle with respect to a comprehensive development plan for the colony, it was obviously too little too late. Similarly, the belated invitation to foreign capital participation in development projects in the oil and non-oil sectors promised to launch the colony on a development strategy that would offer relief from the highly vulnerable coffee monoculture.

Notes

1. Helio A. Esteves Felgas, *Timor Portuguese's*, Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1956, p. 524.
2. Notes on South-East Asia (Portuguese Timor), Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 1950.
3. *Timor: Pequena Monarquia*, Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1970, p. 34.
4. Carlos M.G. Ramos de Oliveira, "Dili-Panorama de uma sociedade", *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia*, Vo189, 1971, Jan-Mar, 1-3.
5. *Estatuto Politico-Administrativo da Provincia de Timor*, Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, nd.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Joao Mariano de Sousa Saldanha, *The Political Economy of East Timor Development*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1994, p. 55.
8. J.R. Landman and H.T. Plant, "Notes on Portuguese Timor", *South Pacific*, Vo12, No. 11, August 1948, p.227.
9. Landman and Plant, "Notes".
10. Saldanha, *Political Economy*, p. 53.
11. A.B. Lopian, & J.R. Chaniago jrimor Timur Dalam Gerak Pembangunan, *Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional*, Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai-Nilai Tradisional, Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan, Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1988, pp. 2122.
12. Bill Nicol, *Timor: The Stillborn Nation*, Visa, Melbourne, 1978, pp. 21-22

13. Lopian & Chaniago, Timor TimujC
14. Nicol, Timor: The Stillborn Nation, p. 24. /
15. Notes on Southeast Asia.
16. Helder Lains e Silva, Timor e a Cultura do Caja Ministerio do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1956, pp. 111-112 and see W.G. Clarence-Smith, "Planters and Smallholders in Portuguese Timor in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", Indonesia CijnCle, March 1992, p. 20.
17. Saldanha, Political Economy, pp. 66-7.
18. Timor: Pequena Monograjia, pp. 170-171
19. Ibid., pp. 152-153.
20. ClarenceTSmith, "Planters and Smallholders", p. 25.
21. nmor: Pequena Monograjia, pp. 150-153.
22. Timor: Pequena Monograjia, p. 164.
24. Notes on Southeast Asia.
25. Timor: Pequena Monograjia, p. 159.
25. United Nations: Special Committee on the situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 20 November 1975.
26. Grant Evans, "Portuguese Timor", New Left Review, No.91, May-June, 1975, p. 72. -
27. Nicol, Timor: The Stillborn Nation, and Notes on Southeast Asia.
28. Ibid.
29. See Richard P. Momsen, "Timor: an untroubled Portuguese colony", Geographical Magazine (Lonl don), Vol.41, No. 9, June 1969, pp. 680-88, which states that per capita income in Portuguese Timor then exceeded that of Thailand and was double that of Indonesia. See Saldanha, Political Economy, p. 70.
30. Nico1, Timor: The Stillborn Nation.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. AA Vie 626/16 H. Temple Wafts, Petroleum Technologist, Bureau of Mineral Resources to Department of External Affairs, 9 July 1947.
34. Sydney Morning Herald, 6 March 1957.
35. V. Prescott, "The Australian-Indonesian Continental Shelf Agreements", Australia's Neighbours, 82, September-October 1972 cited in Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism, University of Queensland Press, 1978, pp. 58.
36. Cf. Letter dated 28 February 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, A/46/97, S/22285, 28 February 1991.
37. Sasha Stepan, Credibilio, Gap: Australia and Timor Gap Treao;, Development Dossier No.28, Australia Council for Overseas Aid, October 1990.
- 38 Nico1, Timor: The Stillborn Nation, p. 27.
39. Jean Inglis, regeast timor, 19 January 1996
40. Shoji Shibuya, "Asia's Last Colony: On Timor", Koen (Lecture), No. 1204, 15 November 1975.

14

Political Change and Declonization

With the end of the old order in Portugal arising out of the events of 25 April 1974, Portugal speedily affirmed its obligations to the UN to offer self-determination and independence to all its territories. Specific information on this question in relation to Timor was addressed to the UN on 5 June. On 10 September 1974 Portugal recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau. In turn, the independence of Mozambique was recognized on 25 June 1975, Cape Verde, (5 July), Sao Tome e Principe (12 July), and Angola (11 November). The status of Macau, of course, remained a special case. 1
 In Timor, as explained in this chapter, it would not be until the arrival in the colony in November 1974 of

representatives of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) or the military group which, three months earlier, had overthrown the Portuguese dictatorship, that any democratic concessions were made. To fully comprehend this apparent lack of preparedness for independence in Timor, as much the flowering of political consciousness in the colony down unto the historic departure of the Governor on 8 December 1975, we should look to history.

The Viqueque Rebellion of 1959 and Aftermath

From an international press perspective it is clear that Timor largely escaped outside attention in the postwar years. To the extent that Timor was reported, such coverage was sporadic and fragmentary. Nevertheless diplomatic interest in the status of the colony was tracked by Western diplomatic agencies, especially in the late 1950s early 1960s in the context of Indonesian President Sukarno's campaign to assert Indonesian sovereignty over the Dutch-controlled western half of the island of New Guinea. Sukarno stated the matter in 1957 in a conversation with U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, John Allison. Asked if Indonesia's next demand would be to claim British North Borneo and Portuguese Timor should Indonesian desires regarding West Irian be met, the Indonesian leader replied: "Nonsense! We only want what is ours. Our relations with Portuguese most friendly- when I was in Indonesian Timor the other day I had good talk with Portuguese officials from their territory and we are cooperating with them". 2

While, as yet, there would be no direct link between events in Africa in the 1950s, which saw the first stirrings of modern nationalist opposition to Portuguese rule, and events in Portuguese Timor, 1959 was also the year that the Permesta or Indonesian outer island rebellion centred on the south Molucca islands, ramified on Timor. To the Salazar regime, it came as a profound shock. Known as the "movimento do 1959" or more accurately the "massacre of 1959" which occurred near the south coast of eastern Portuguese Timor, the event was largely unnoticed by the outside world, at least unreported in the Australian press of the time. The rebellion began on 7 June 1959 in the village of Uato Lari and spread to the local administrative headquarters of Viqueque. According to Bruce Juddery of the Canberra Times who interviewed the last Governor of Portuguese Timor, Colonel Lemos Pires, the rebellion combined anti-colonial, anti-Portuguese and tribal elements. The ethnic friction was in turn exacerbated by the act of the Portuguese in raising a militia in the neighbouring Los Palos area at the eastern tip of Timor in order to combat the rebels. Suppression of the revolt, accomplished within a week, was extremely bloody with between 500 and 1,000 killed. 3

The "movimento do 59", according to Juddery, was not a spontaneous uprising, rather it had been prepared for some months beforehand by a handful of Indonesian officers who had infiltrated into north coast towns including Baucau, and spread disaffection, apparently easily gained. 4

Nicol clarifies that the concerned Indonesians, granted asylum by the Portuguese and allowed to settle at Uatolari, were not agents of Jakarta but were, rather, elements of the American CIA-backed Permesta dissident movement, which looked to Portuguese Timor as a base from which to launch a broader secessionist struggle for eastern Indonesia. 5

The exiles, which also managed to secure the support of the Indonesian Consul in Dili, Nazwar Jacob, apparently acted without Jakarta's consent or support. He was duly recalled and, on 3 June 1959, replaced by Tengku Usman Hussin. According to Dunn, while Indonesia disclaimed knowledge or involvement in the plot of 1959, some element of doubt remained in the mind of the authorities. The Portuguese nevertheless were jolted into stepping up security.

Local leaders of the movement were exiled to Angola and only allowed to return to Timor in 1968 while the Indonesian dissidents were expelled. 6

Also, in 1959, the Policia Internacional e da Defesa do Estado (lit. international and for the Defense of the State Police) or PIDE set up shop in Dili. This was also the year when the dockworkers of Portuguese Guinea mounted a strike, brutally repressed. Feared throughout the empire for its capricious use of torture and violence, this dreaded instrument of the Salazarist state also invigilated the indefinite detention of political prisoners including Timorese exiled or residing in Angola, a role also taken over in 1969 by its successor organization the Direcção Geral da Segurança (General Directorate of Security) or DGS, at least until it was withdrawn immediately after the coup in Lisbon. One victim of political police invigilation was the young journalist Jose Ramos-Horta exiled to Mozambique in 1970. PIDE/DGS archives reveal not only

that the Salazarist state had its eyes on Timorese at home but also Timorese in Angola, as well as such unlikely threats as the Timor Oil company, Australian trade union organizations, anti-apartheid campaigners, and even liberals, part of a global monitoring effort to shore up the dictatorship at home and the challenges posed by maintaining a sprawling colonial empire in the age of decolonization.

There is no question that 1959 represented a watershed in postwar colonial history in Timor. The Timorese historian Abilio d'Araujo directly links the establishment of PIDE and the arrival in Timor of counterinsurgency forces as a direct response to the 1959 uprising. 7

It was also probably no coincidence that in 1959 the Australia Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) opened a station in Dili, then one of three in the world. 8

While, as mentioned above, the Arab community of the colony were concentrated in the village of Alor to the west of Dili, the reason may not only have stemmed from their occupational niche. According to an Indonesian press report, certain of them had responded to Indonesia's independence struggle against the Dutch with the call for "merdeka bersama Indonesia" (independence with Indonesia). When in 1957 they sought to register as Indonesian nationals at the Indonesian Consulate in Dili, the Portuguese responded by offering them Portuguese citizenship. 9

At the time of the 1959 rebellion-and again in 1975-the loyalty of this community was severely tested. Another disaffected group of Timorese were those whose loyalties to the Portuguese were compromised by their wartime activities. Some 300 to 400 of those known to have collaborated with the Japanese were summarily imprisoned at war end and interned on Atauro Island.

At least in the years prior to the eruption of Indonesia's war of confrontation against Malaysia, the U. S. accepted Sukarno's blandishments that Indonesia would not press its attack against the British and Portuguese colonies. As Hamish McDonald has commented, Indonesian interest in Portuguese Timor was always desultory and, contrariwise, the Portuguese tended to regard the Indonesians with disdain and suspicion. 10

Portuguese Timor in the Foreign Media

Only in the early 1960s did the regional -especially Australian media commence to track Indonesian interest and possible political ambitions- in Portuguese Timor.

This new attention was also stimulated by Sukarnoist rhetoric, which made the Portuguese colony appear vulnerable in the extreme. Of interest was a report on a comment by the famed Indonesian nationalist historian, Mohammad Yamin, that Indonesian rule being extended to Portuguese Timor. 11

Yamin's exaggerated nationalist / historical claims, however, were not matched by official political Indonesian interest. 12

Feature articles, a characteristic of prewar Australian journalism on Timor, also made their appearance in the 1960s. Such was the evocative piece by Glen, Francis in the Sydney Observer, reflecting upon his duties in Timor as a member of the Australian War Graves Unit. Entitled "Slavery in Timor", Francis described Portuguese rule as a mixture of civility and brutality. Forced labour under the whip goes on from dawn to dusk, he observed with some distaste. 13

Once Trans Australian Airline (TAA) commenced regular flights to Baucau in the early 1960s and access improved, interest in Timor increased, accordingly. It is perhaps no contradiction that just as Timor began to figure as a travel destination, 14

So did negative reporting on colonial rule in the colony increase apace.

Osmar White writing in the Melbourne Herald (2, 3 April 1963), for example, found more evidence of brutality than civility in Portuguese colonialism. But he also raised questions as to the inevitability of political change in Timor, especially given what he observed as the abiding poverty of the colony and the repressive character of the administration. Prophetically, White foresaw an Army revolt led by European factions [the MFA coup?] and supported by Timorese conscripts [the rise of Fretilin?] as a likely outcome, although an even more likely prospect, he canvassed, was political infiltration from across the border [the Indonesian invasion of 1975]. White also raised the question, perhaps for the first time in the Australian press, as to appropriate Australian responses to decolonization in Portuguese Timor. 15

In any case, it would be another ten years before such questions were publicly debated and then in a vastly altered context.

While such negative reporting evidently threw the Portuguese back on the defensive, at least as regards the Australian media, 1964 witnessed the arrival in Portuguese Timor of the first Australian television crew. This initiative by Robert Raymond for the National Television Network led to the production of the first television programme on Timor ever shown in Australia. Raymond was accompanied by Desmond Mahon of 2SM, the Roman Catholic-controlled radio station in Sydney, and a factor that he believes led to him being granted a visa. Raymond also penned a long, not unsympathetic, feature article for the Australian magazine, *Bulletin* (29 February 1964), 16

A piece, which sums up the predicament of the colony as wholly of Portugal's own making.

Until Australian reporting on Timor again focused on Jakarta's ambitions in the early 1970s, partly in response to vague and contradictory statements made by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, only the border clashes of December 1966 attracted any press attention and none of it analytical. 17

One exception was a report on Portuguese Timor commissioned by the National Union of Australian Students published in its newspaper, *National U* (22 July 1968). Another was a travel book by an Australian journalist, J. Gert Vondra, (*Timor Journey*) also published in 1968.

While describing Timor as a land of wild primitive beauty this work also helped to prepare public opinion in Australia for political change. As he observed, "the writing is on the wall", Indonesia will intervene with or without UN sanction or the educated Timorese elite will induce the Portuguese to offer autonomy. 18

But as the signals emerging from Jakarta grew more ominous, especially as border incidents between Portuguese and Indonesian armed forces became more frequent, it became increasingly clear to astute observers that it was not the champion of Afro-Asian solidarity and nonalignment which threatened the decolonization process in Portuguese Timor, but his Western-backed successor, General Suharto. 19 Eventually, political motive was reported. This was in the *Melbourne Age* of 5 April 1972, which carried the response of the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik. When asked if Indonesia would support a liberation movement in Portuguese Timor, he retorted: We shall finance it and wish it". At this time a shadowy organization in Jakarta calling itself the "Unirepublic of Timor Dili" distributed leaflets describing political developments inside Portuguese Timor. 20

It is of interest, however, that two Australian journalists from across the political chasm, namely Peter Hastings and Brian Toohey, were at this juncture drawn into the Timor "debate" in the Australian media. Bill Nicol observes that the then foreign editor of the *Sydney Morning Herald* offered up the first reliable hint of an underground political movement in the Portuguese colony in an article published on 23 August 1973. This was dubbed the Timor Liberation Front. According to Hastings' informant in Dili, a "young radical", this group was "minuscule, disorganised and unarmed" but ready to move against the Portuguese in five to ten years. Nicol asserts that this radical could only have been Jose Ramos-Horta. 21

Several months later, Ramos-Horta's name surfaced in the Australian press.

This was in an interview with Ken White of the *Northern Territory News*. In this interview, published on 21 January 1974 the future international spokesperson on for the Timorese nationalist cause took some potshots at Portuguese colonialism and at the then Australian Labor government's muddled policy on colonialism. Rather than Australia sounding off in the UN, Ramos-Horta sought concrete assistance from Australia in Timor's development in the form of aid and scholarships. Nicol writes that publication of this article compounded Ramos-Horta's problems back home where he penned defences in *Voz de Timor* as a way of distancing himself from the compromising interview. 22

The inimical Brian Toohey, by contrast, seized upon the issue of Australian business links with Portuguese colonialism and the double standard this suggested in view of Australia's stand at the UN in support of resolution 2918 reaffirming the right of the Portuguese territories to self-determination and independence. In the *Australian Financial Review*, Toohey pointed out that the Whitlam Labor government was in the contradictory position of being an international critic of Portuguese colonialism while, through the operations of TAA to Timor, providing a critical link in the Portuguese lines of supplies and personnel to the colony. Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd., which had operations in Timor, also appeared to Toohey to be in contravention of UN resolution 2918. All this suggested to Toohey that, while the Australia government had yet to fully work out a position on Timor, it was already under pressure from various church and aid groups to match words with action. 23

Political Awakening

Education expansion promoted by Portugal in the wake of the 1959 rebellion also proved a double-edged sword. The new educational philosophy that encouraged the formation of a small native elite also carried, towards the end of the 1960s, the seeds of an anti-colonial nationalist movement. Yet it cannot be said that an informed critique of Portuguese colonialism developed in Timor around a modernist educated intelligentsia as definitely happened in Goa following the suppression of the civil disobedience movement of 1946. Nor did democrats in Portugal challenge the Salazar regime over independence for Timor as they did in the case of Goa. To be slightly cynical, the Timorese were not even "privileged" to win entry to such prison-universities as Peniche near Lisbon where languished their Goan and African brothers along with other republican, democrat, anarchist, socialist and communist critics of the Salazar regime. But unlike the Goans who looked to Nehru as liberator, and, for that matter, unlike radicals in Macau who in 1966-67 looked to China's cultural revolution to bring Portugal's rule to an end, no such cross border affinities developed between Timorese in the Portuguese colony and Indonesia, although that was the evident wish of the promoters of the 1959 rebellion. 24

In Timor, the vehicle for the albeit embryonic nationalist movement, was the Catholic newspaper, *Seara*, the fortnightly supplement of the *Boletim Eclesiastico da diocese de Dili*. In a repressive political environment only this church publication stood outside the existing censorship laws. Until closed by PIDE on 10 February 1973 such renowned figures of the Timorese nationalist uprising as Nicolau Lobato, Jose Ramos-Horta, and Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Domingos de Oliveira, Mari Alkatiri, Francisco Borja da Costa and Manuel Carrascalao contributed to these publication articles of searching social commentary. 25

Eventually, it was not the death of the Portuguese dictator that brought Portugal out of its time warp -essentially the same policies were pursued by Salazar's successor, Marcello Caetano- but the unpopularity of the African wars among Portuguese youth. The leftward turn in Portuguese politics, simultaneous with the emergence of the MFA in 1974, proved especially portentous. The political opening in Lisbon by the MFA on 24-25 April 1974, lifting the lid on decades of dictatorship, not only lent stimulus to domestic reform but also served as a catalyst for burgeoning independence movements in the colonies. The MFA immediately proclaimed that it sought to end its colonial wars and practices.

As explained below, events in the metropolitan country gave rise to the first political organizations in the history of the colony. The first of the groupings to emerge was the *Uniao Democratica Timorense* or UDT. Founded on 11 May 1974, UDT favoured eventual independence following an extended transition period of continued association with Portugal. Its leadership was drawn from Catholics of prominence, smallholders, or officials in the Portuguese administration. Two leaders, Francisco Lopes da Cruz and Augusto da Costa Mousinho, had been representatives of the *Accao Nacional Popular* (the former party of the Salazar/ Caetano regime) in Timor's Legislative Assembly. Two other leaders, the Carrascalao brothers were sons of wealthy coffee planters. Broad support also came from those who had benefited from Portuguese colonialism, including businesspeople of Chinese origin and individuals from within the Chinese community. Prior to the arrival of Governor Lemos Pires in November 1974, this party was widely believed as having some official Portuguese support.

Fretilin or the *Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente* emerged out of the *Associacao Social Democratica Timorenses* (ASDT) founded on 20 May 1974. ASDT's first manifesto called for a rejection of colonialism, immediate participation of Timorese in the administration and local government, and an end to racial discrimination, the struggle against corruption, and good relations with neighbouring countries. ASDT in turn had grown out of the committee for the Defence of Labour, which emerged immediately after the coup in Lisbon. Led by Jose Ramos-Horta the committee quickly won a 50 per cent pay rise for lower level civil servants after staging a strike, the first in the colony's history. As Evans explains, from research conducted in Timor at this time, the transformation of ASDT into *Fretilin* represented a reorientation towards the need of creating a massbased political organization around the slogan of independence. Writing in early 1975, Evans observed that, held together by "fervent nationalism and anti-colonialism", *Fretilin*'s strength was far more solid in the towns than the countryside where its cadres were spread very thin among a population inclined to be suspicious of the urban elite. 26

The minoritarian party, *Apodeti*, emerged from a meeting attended by thirty to forty Timorese on 27 May 1974. Early support derived from those who had been involved in the 1959 rebellion, and from members of the Arab community in Dili, who petitioned the Indonesian Consul for integration. But while the Arab

community revealed themselves the most avid pro-integrationists, certain among them -notably Mari Alkat and Hamis Bassarewan- went on to become staunch Fretilin supporters. Support for Apodeti also came from certain liurai, notably Guilherme Goncalves who allowed the party its only territorial base in the coffee growing area of Atsabe. Goncalves later emerged as the second Indonesian Governor of East Timor. Another Apodeti man, Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, owner of a cattle property near Zumlai, had the dubious distinction of being the first. He has also served time in a Portuguese prison for his wartime role alongside the infamous *colunas negras*. Apodeti, which emerged as a stalking horse for Indonesia's interests, claimed from the outset that East Timor could not be economically viable unless supported by ethnic brothers in Indonesia.

Between April 1974 and August 1975 a number of other very small parties emerged of no special significance except for their political use to Indonesia, at least in the way of claiming that Fretilin did not have a monopoly over political support. The most useful of the small parties to Indonesia was Klibur Oan Timor Aswain or KOTA (Sons of the Mountains), initially formed by seven liurai who claimed descent from the *topasse*. However it was Jose Martins, a former Apodeti man, who emerged as Indonesia's most effective collaborator, at least until he abandoned the cause of integration while attending a session of the UN in New York in 1976. Partido Trabalhista (Labour Party) barely claimed a dozen members, while the claims of Adilta (Democratic Association for the Integration of East Timor with Australia) were dismissed out of hand by Canberra.

Portuguese policy was spelled out in June 1974 by the pro-Salazar Governor Col. Fernando Alves Aldeia in the form of three political options. These were, first, continued association with the metropolitan power, second, independence and, third, integration with Indonesia. To a large degree, as seen, political activism gravitated around these options. But with the resignation from office in September 1974 of the right-wing General Spinola, the principal advocate of the idea of federation of Portugal with its "overseas territories" the political parties in Timor were obliged to modify their programmes. UDT, a former supporter of the Spinola line, came out for independence. Fretilin came out with a new political program around a broad national front. Until the arrival in Timor of the Portuguese Minister for Inter-territorial Coordination, Dr. Antonio de Almeida Santos, Portuguese policy can be described as inaction. Meanwhile, Indonesia, through the army newspaper *Berita Yuddha* and other agencies, launched into a disinformation campaign smearing Fretilin as a Marxist/communist and branding UDT as fascist. 27

Only the arrival in November 1974 of Governor Lemos Pires accompanied by officers Of the MFA offered new direction and hope for Timorese nationalists.

Notable in this sense was the commitment of Francisco Mota and Costa Jonatas.

In December 1974 the young officers From Lisbon established a government council with the view to drawing each party into the political process, much as in Angola.

Even so, this initiative was rejected by Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo of Apodeti who only entertained negotiations with Indonesia, and, at a later date, by Fretilin on the grounds that certain members of the council maintained links with the old regime.

Also, in early January 1975, the MFA commenced to reorganize the armed forces in the colony. For entirely different reasons Apodeti and Fretilin refused to go along with the new political procedure, although Fretilin subsequently enjoyed major success in village-level elections organized by the MFA. 28

Against these bald facts the success of Fretilin bears some scrutiny. As Helen Hill points out, ASDT was the first political grouping in Timor to use local languages at its meetings besides Portuguese. 29

This was realistic as it was effective as it was the only way to reach the mass of the population who spoke no Portuguese who were relatively untouched by Latin culture. In this sense the creation of the symbol of the Maubere man -a kind of quintessential Timorese- was a masterstroke by Fretilin. But here the influence was not so much Sukarno's "Marhaen", to which it bears faint resemblance, but the political influence of the writings of Amilcar Cabral of Guinea Bissau, especially an understanding of the imperative to educate on an organized basis a highly differentiated people as to the meaning of "liberation" in practical terms. No doubt the murder of Cabral in Conakry on 20 January 1973 by agents of PIDE/DGS was a salutary reminder to Fretilin as to their vulnerability, as much a possible stimuli as to their radicalism. 30

While Fretilin adopted Portuguese as its official language, it went further than the other parties in promoting traditional cultural forms. According to Hill, such cultural pragmatism was also shown in Fretilin's literacy programme, which got under way in selected villages in January 1975 more or less following the precepts

of the renowned Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. To this end, Fretilin prepared a Tetum-language literacy textbook, *Rai Timor, Rai Ita*. (Timor is our country). Later, when urban youth were formed into so-called Revolutionary Brigades and encouraged to return to the countryside, they took back to their respective villages, not only some of the urban skills and savvy they had acquired but also a new political awareness. The watchword became *consciencializacao*, a Portuguese word meaning consciousness raising. While Fretilin's enemies were quick to see in these measures confirmation of this movement's communist origins, the truth could hardly be further from the mark. Fretilin's intellectual influences were, at one level, metropolitan—the influence of the returned students—and, at another level, Afro-Brazilian in solidarity with brothers in the African colonies who reciprocated their rhetorical support—and, on another plane, at one with the Maubere, the Melanesian Timorese culture that formed the broad support for Fretilin in its two-decade struggle against Indonesian subjugation. 31

Indeed, Portuguese Timor stands out as one of the very few Southeast Asian colonies where communism failed to take root. The only possible exception to this statement is that in the May 1975 presidential elections in Portugal, 12 eligible metropolitans residing in the colony voted in favour of the Portuguese Communist Party. But that says more about the restoration of democracy in Portugal than dark Cold War plots. Whereas in the former Dutch, British, and French colonies, intellectuals and working class allies together formed the backbone of cadre parties invariably with the support of the Communist International, Marxism-Leninism has no history in Portuguese Timor. Rather, Fretilin's sense of social justice sprang from the Catholic Church, Timor's communitarian traditions, and drew its allies from the people themselves, a benign version of peasant populism, which found an ally in the MFA itself.

The Indonesian Destabilization Campaign

Even so, the kind of Third Worldism promoted by Fretilin stood as anathema to Jakarta, Washington and Canberra alike. Having spent the previous two decades putting down communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia, the U. S. and allies were not ready to countenance the emergence of yet another "Marxist" threat. For Australia, the acceptable model for decolonization was that of the Pangu Parti of Papua New Guinea, while the acceptable form of regional relationships was that of the Federation of Malaysia. An independent East Timor had no place in this strategic schema. The U. S. and the UK concurred. Arguably, it was the Jesuitical skills of the Timorese nationalist elite that Indonesia and the West together found so threatening: much the brilliant developmental anti-model that Fretilin sought to construct in the half-island. Nothing in the range of Indonesian (or Australian) historical experience could grasp the sophistication of Fretilin's model. Just as the experience of the two peoples under respectively Dutch and Portuguese colonialism were vastly different, so were their political expectations, so were their dreams.

Washington and Canberra have consistently rewarded Indonesia for its subordinate role as regional policeman.

Alarmed by the news that Australian Prime Minister Whitlam had effectively eschewed Australian support for an independent East Timor, UDT and Fretilin forged a coalition around a shared perception of Indonesia as the threat. In 1996 UDT President Joao Viegas Carrascalao acknowledged that it was through Ramos Horta's tireless efforts that the coalition came about, just as he sought to mediate the tragic rift between the parties leading to civil war the following August. 32

Accordingly, both parties sought from Portugal a deeper commitment in carrying out an effective decolonization. But as Fretilin's support mushroomed, in part in response to its popular literacy and agricultural policies, along with its promotion of nationalist symbols, strains opened up between the coalition partners encouraged by Indonesian propaganda directed at Fretilin's and the Governor's alleged pro-communism.

This pro-communist bias was entirely fanciful, but nevertheless formed the centrepiece of an Indonesian intelligence operation, led from October 1974 by Suharto's special advisor and deputy-head of the Indonesian intelligence service, General Ali Murtopo. Styled *Operasi Komodo* this plan broadly sought to destabilize the Portuguese colony by splitting the UDT-Fretilin alliance and creating the chaotic conditions under which Indonesia would spuriously justify armed intervention. As a first step, this plan involved sending emissaries to Lisbon and elsewhere to put across the Indonesian view. A purely military solution was not then entertained. In October, Suharto charged Murtopo to take over negotiations with Portugal

where he sought to make common cause with a minority of members within the MFA who viewed integration of Timor with Indonesia as the 'best option'. But, by this time, the destabilization operation had entered a new phase in Jakarta, Kupang, and even in Dili, where, by January 1975, the Indonesian Consulate became "blatant in its support of Apodeti". By mid-1975 the Indonesian army commenced training pro-Indonesian infiltrators and Apodeti recruits supplied by the raja of Atsabe. 33

On 27 May 1975 UDT made the fateful decision to back out of the coalition. Days later Indonesian troops and officials illegally entered the enclave of Oecusse. On 17 July 1975 Lisbon set down the timetable for decolonization in Timor under law 7175.

Formally disclosed at a "summit meeting" held in Macau between 26-28 June involving Portuguese and Indonesian officials and members of the Timorese parties, with the notable exception of Fretilin which boycotted this meeting, the future of the territory was to be the subject of debate following elections for a popular assembly in October the following year. On 25 July UDT leaders were again courted in Jakarta and informed of a planned Fretilin coup by General Ali Murtopo. 34

The contrary was the case, and, on 11 August, UDT itself staged a coup precipitating a short but bloody civil war. This coup was made possible with the support of the police chief in Dili and, in turn, access to the police arsenal. While the Portuguese confined pro-Fretilin soldiers to the barracks, Fretilin was nevertheless able to rally Timorese supporters from within the Portuguese army and to quickly mobilize support for a counter attack. In fierce fighting, involving civilian and military casualties, Fretilin gained the upper hand. At the time the Portuguese newspaper *Didrio de Noticias* reported over 2,000 casualties, although the figure may have been considerably less. 35

At this point the question was brought before the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, who on 27 August, called for a cease-fire. While Portugal sought at this juncture to internationalize the issue, it is clear with hindsight that through their inaction the Western powers played into the hands of the Indonesian hardliners.

Again, according to UDT spokespersons, it was Ramos-Horta who, in mid-September, made representations to the "radicals" within Fretilin to strike a new understanding with UDT even in their moment of triumph. Ramos-Horta who had been outside Timor during the period of conflict also took active steps to stop the mistreatment of UDT prisoners, arranged the repatriation of Portuguese soldiers captured by Fretilin, and facilitated the orderly departure to Australia of Timorese children separated from their parents. 36

As explained below, on 26 August, in a move regretted by Fretilin, the Portuguese government in the form of the Governor and his entourage protected by elite metropolitan forces, departed Dili by corvette for Atauro. Thousands of UDT supporters and others crossed the border into west Timor to escape the fighting where many became hostage to Jakarta's policies and manipulations.

Fretilin Rule

By mid-September Fretilin was in full control throughout Timor. Even though the vast majority of the former administration had left the country, Fretilin rapidly succeeded in laying down the basis of an administration, albeit still under the Portuguese nag. As the *Didrio de Noticias* (2 October 1975) correspondent reported the situation, Timor appeared to be at peace under Fretilin rule. Visiting Australian Labor parliamentarians, including aboriginal Liberal Senator, Neville Bonner, concluded in a joint statement that the Fretilin administration appeared to be, a "responsible and moderate government" and with widespread popular support. 37

Similarly, the head of a visiting Japanese development consortium expressed back in Japan his willingness to work with, Fretilin at the head of an independent Timor "toward a solution of many of Timor's problems". 38

Such problems were not strictly economic but also stemmed from Indonesian military incursions, which, under the leadership of General Benny Murolani, escalated into an invasion. As Murolani's candid biographer explains, *Operasi Komodo* was set aside, and a new military operational plan, named *Operasi Seroja*, and was established. In this new plan, volunteers would no longer be deployed, but massive joint military operation of brigade size would be mobilized, consisting of elements of all three armed services³⁹ As reported to a metropolitan readership in *Didrio de Noticias* (18 September) a Fretilin proposal to

Indonesia for a joint force to patrol the border was answered two days later with an Indonesian attack, a reference to covert guerrilla operations then being mounted inside the Portuguese colony. On 10 October the same newspaper reported that Fretilin forces were expelled from the ancient fort of Batugede. By this stage Operation Seroja was in full night with at least six border towns inside East Timor captured by the invading Indonesian army. While a Portuguese camera crew filmed certain of these operations, five members of a mixed New Zealand-British-Australian television crew installed in Balibo, also witness to the invasion, were at this juncture targeted and murdered by invading Indonesian forces on 16 October. The concerned Western countries hardly flinched, and until today their deaths remain unsatisfactorily explained. On 23 October 1975, the *Didrio de Noticias* headline read "Forças pro-Indonésia massacraram populações de Timor-Leste". 40

Such was the gravity of the situation that, on 24 November, Fretilin appealed to the UN Security Council to intervene in a situation where the territory was facing attacks from Indonesian warships, aircraft and infantry. The urgency of the situation, the inertia of the UN, and the failure of the Portuguese to become re-engaged on the mainland, pushed Fretilin to declare on 28 November 1975, a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), particularly as Angola (11 November) and Mozambique (25 June) had already declared their independence. 41

Fretilin's own *raison d'être* is explained in the pages of its political organ, *Timor Leste: Journal do Povo Mau Bere*, the first issue of which appeared in late September 1975. This was a weekly paper produced in Dili by Fretilin's Department of Information. While the Indonesian invasion put an end to this newspaper, a Fretilin radio service continued broadcasting from the mountains through unto the late 1980s. Jill Jolliffe has explained how *Timor Leste* (8 & 15 November) carried major press on Angola's wartime declaration of independence as well as Fretilin responses to news that thirty countries had recognized the Angolan independence. Jolliffe notes that the Fretilin press increasingly displayed a sense of bitterness towards Portugal reflected in the elevation of new themes around opposition to Portuguese colonialism and solidarity with the Angolan cause. At this stage, she points out, the Lobato brothers, Domingos and Rogerio, a former army *alferes*, were ascendant in Fretilin. Mari Alkatiri, spokesperson for the left-wing group held the platform, over and above the pragmatic Jose Ramos-Horta. 42

Other members of the Fretilin central committee and administration at that time, later to rise to prominence as leaders of the armed resistance in the 1980s and 1990s, were Antonio (Mau Huno) Gomes da Costa, vice-secretary of the Department of Administration and Security, who had also worked as a telegraph operator for the Marconi Radio Company in Dili from 1973-75, and Jose (Xanana) Gusmao, vice secretary of the Department of Information, and a former contributor to *Voz de Timor*, known internationally, following his capture in 1993 and subsequent imprisonment by Indonesia in 1993, as the Nelson Mandela of Timor.

Consistent with Fretilin's avowed cultural policy, *Timor Leste* carried articles in both Portuguese and romanized Tetum. While it is not so surprising that Timor's nationalist elite was and remains avowedly Lusophone, the efforts on the part of Fretilin to promote Tetum as an educational medium was revolutionary in cultural terms, a development, as Tetum scholar Geoffrey Hull emphasizes, only matched some five years later by the decision of the Diocese of Dili to substitute Tetum for Portuguese as the liturgical language of the local church. 43

While the radical sounding political rhetoric of this paper was targeted at urban sophisticates -or at least those who had not fled the fighting after the coup- the Tetum language segments were primarily offered up for the oral consumption of the largely pre-literate people, via the mouth to mouth method of solidarity-making that Fretilin turned to advantage. These were the Maubere people in Fretilin's new populist vocabulary.

While articles published in the Fretilin paper ranged from political analysis, international perspectives, Timorese culture, public information, and translations of key articles from the foreign press, it is significant that, notwithstanding the considerable constraints imposed by the Indonesian siege, a large volume of contributions were generated locally, all in all reflecting a high level of political sophistication by the paper's youthful editors.

Timor Leste also carried *poesia Revolucionaria* or revolutionary poems by such scions of the Timorese nationalist resistance as Jose Xanana Gusmao, Eugenio Salvador Pires, and Francisco Borja da Costa. Typical of the poetry of the future spiritual and intellectual leader of the "Maubere" people's resistance to

the Indonesian annexation and occupation of East Timor in the 1980s and 1990s was "A sacratissima pratica de politicantes burgueses" (11 October 1975), a poem angry with the legacy of colonialism and fascism and full of remorse for the kind of violence unleashed by the UDT coup. Although this poem was published at a time when the world had come to know that Indonesia had launched its invasion plan against East Timor, it is notable that Gusmao, signing his name Sha'a Na Na (Xanana), blamed disunity of the Timorese people for their dilemma. Similar sentiments were expressed in his "Homenagem aos que tombaram" (1 November 1975).

Other editions (No. 4, 18 October 1975) carried expressions of international support for Fretilin and the role played by Fretilin's roving ambassadors in Africa.

Notable was the expression of support from the late Samora Michel, President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cape Verde. East Timor's representations to the UN body were also explained. Edition No. 3 also carried transcripts of telegraphic communications between Fretilin and the Portuguese government on Atauro, a parody to be sure of the kind of secret diplomacy then being entered into between, respectively, Canberra and Jakarta and the U. S. and Jakarta. The apparent inaction on the part of the Portuguese Governor was the subject of the lead story in issue No.4 (18 October 1975), "Lemos Pires e o seu mutismo". Edition No. 5 (25 October 1975), for example, carried particulars on the Fretilin Department of Health and Hygiene mass TB vaccination in Dili and Baucau. It also carried a long article explaining the goals of its consciencializacao programme. Responding to the untenable situation created by the Indonesian invasion of Maliana and Balibo, the paper answered back with "Indonesia e as suas falsas propaganda" and "Indonesia: bastiao do imperialismo americans", an indictment of the Indonesian military dictatorship and its willingness to service imperialist goals, notably in supporting UDT as a Partido fantoche (puppet party). But, as shown below, not even Fretilin could have predicted the vindictiveness and viciousness with which Australia, Indonesia, and the U.S. together responded to such charges.

As confirmed by Timor Leste, Fretilin had no illusions about who were friends and who were enemies. Equally, Fretilin had no illusions as to the precarious-even perilous-status of their administration. If the youthful members of Timor's majority political party made errors of judgment, it was to underestimate the perfidy of erstwhile friends, to put too much trust in international law, and to offer up a view of society altogether too visionary, too imaginary for the gray men and women who staffed the concerned agencies in Canberra, Washington and Tokyo. Fretilin's African solution to the problems of underdevelopment was beyond the pale for these jokers. Neither did the international press pay too much attention to the overall Fretilin view of social change and nationalist renewal in East Timor at least compared to the instant news provided by the border raids, executions and posturing of Indonesia. While Fretilin bent over backwards to mollify Indonesia as to its future foreign policy-Ramos-Horta also wished that ASEAN accept the membership of an independent East Timor-again it is possible that Fretilin erred by not heeding the counsel of moderates, namely that the Generals in Jakarta were sui generis. Having risen to power on one bloodbath, with negligible international criticism, they would not be deterred by world opinion from perpetrating another should any obstacle stand in their way.

The Portuguese Denouement

On 14 November 1974 the 43 year old General Mario Lemos Pires was appointed as governor of Portuguese Timor, a fateful choice. Pires was a soldier who had been decorated for service in the wars in Angola (1961-63) and Guinea Bissau (1969-71) where he served under General Spínola. He had also undergone a training course in 1972-73 at the U. S. Army Staff Training College at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas. As he records in his memoir, this background made him vulnerable or at least the target of charges by Fretilin as to either his fascist connections or his role as agent of U.S. imperialism. Given the circumstances, this allegation was no doubt excusable. Pires, however, has gone to pains in his memoir to distance himself from this kind of charge or at least any insinuation that he delivered up Timor to Indonesia. As described by Pires, relative to the situations confronted by Portugal in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, Timor was a veritable ocean of peace.

Naturally, he remarks, the 25 April 1974 Movement in Portugal created great excitement and expectations in Timor. Such expectations were further aroused by the creation on 13 May of a Commission for self-determination for Timor and the law 7174 of 27 July 1974, which underwrote a plan for the

independence of Timor. The creation of political parties was thus a natural consequence of the 25 April Movement. He also explains the serious problems he inherited in Timor from outgoing Governor Aldeia, namely an untenable economic-financial situation, military indiscipline, and what he calls the reduction of Portuguese diplomatic leverage with Indonesia. 44

Additionally, there was a prevailing sense of insecurity on the part of the Timorese people that Portugal would abandon them.

Governor Lemos Pires also emphasizes that, unlike in the other colonies, the MFA played a special role in Timor in preparing the decolonization process. Besides being engaged in economic and social works, the MFA were also involved in preparing the electoral process, in acting as an arbiter between the different parties, and in restoring order, discipline, and direction to society. 45

What he is referring to here is the progressive role of metropolitan elements within the MFA as opposed to the Salazarist character of public administration in which Portugal and its colonies had awakened. Known as *apartidarismo*, this policy asserted that - the armed forces must stand above the political process, in a word, a doctrinal counterpoint to the Indonesian armed forces concept of *dwi-fungsi* or dual function which otherwise legitimizes military rule, military dominance, and the militarization of society.

One Australian who interviewed Governor Lemos Pires was Bill Nicol. The Governor also met with a group of visiting Australian parliamentarians. According to Nicol, at both meetings the Governor emphasized the theme that he served as a referee between the conflicting parties. 46

Pires also told the visiting parliamentarians that he wished that the Australian government re-established a Consulate in Dili as soon as possible, meaning that Australia, too, could play a referee role.

He first made this request in November 1974 and repeated on many other occasions. Nicol underpins a number of contradictions in Pires' policy positions. For instance, while the governor had no power base in Lisbon and therefore acted in Timor as a virtual puppet, he was also vulnerable to a leftist ascendancy in Lisbon.

Nicol also cannot make up his mind as to whether the governor was a progressive or a conservative. Nicol records that a consistent theme in Pires' public pronouncements was that "to decolonize is not to abandon". 47

James Dunn, acting as leader of a humanitarian relief team, who also interviewed Pires (on Atauro), was told that, while the Governor was not indifferent, he received no direction from Portugal.

Others have also noted the contradiction between the governor's orderly process for self-determination and abandonment of Dili. 48

According to Governor Lemos Pires, the UDT coup of 10 August 1975 came as a surprise not only to himself, but also to many UDT members. Nevertheless, the coup was not unanticipated by the Indonesian (hawks) who sought to take calculated advantage of the chaos so engendered. Termed *Operacao Sakonar*, the coupmakers sought to secure all strategic installations, as well as Fretilin headquarters and even the homes of Fretilin leaders. According to captured UDT documents, the final objective after the coup was the "erradicacao total do comunismo e libertacao nacional, unidade de todos os Timorenses para a independencia total".

As Pires has written, while UDT sought to eliminate "Marxist" Fretilin from the political scene, it did not yet seek to totally substitute itself for the Portuguese. 49

While Indonesian propaganda surrounding Operation Komodo was crude to foreign ears, it is possible that the Western media misread the full anti-communist dimension of the UDT coup at the time. In retrospect, the hysteria and hyperbole surrounding UDT's denunciations of Fretilin offers up a mirror image of Indonesian propaganda of the day. If UDT's autonomy and credentials were fatally flawed, at least in being seen to act as an Indonesian cat's paw, then it was also the case that such scurrilous rhetoric played into the hands of radicals within Fretilin who undoubtedly found in it ready confirmation of imperialist and subimperialist threats. At a juncture when the two parties stood to gain more by solidarity in the face of a common enemy, it is especially tragic that such spurious ideological claims fuelled civil war, bloodshed, and a bitter legacy of recriminations down until the present. Undoubtedly, then, it was the UDT coup, which subverted the provisions of the Macau Plan, whereby the three parties would have taken part in the election the following year. Indonesia also offered spurious promises to Portugal at a meeting in Rome on 1 November as to commitment to an orderly process of decolonization.

In the event, as alluded, on 26 August Governor Lemos Pires relocated the Portuguese administration to

the island of Atauro. According to Portuguese lawyer Joao Lo ff Barreto, in making this controversial and fateful decision, Timor's last Portuguese Governor was guided by two impulses; first, the "real horror" of the destruction of Dili, although that was an exaggeration, and, second, the tenor of a cable he received on 26 August from Portuguese President Costa Gomes:

In spite of the risk, try getting out of Dili to some other part of the territory, namely Atauro. Delegates will undertake talks. You should not, at any costs, be in a position to be taken hostage. 50

Despite repeated calls by Fretilin to Governor Lemos Pires to re-engage in the decolonization process his failure to act placed Fretilin in an invidious position. In any case, it was not until the first days of October that the Portuguese corvette Afonso de Cerqueira arrived in Atauro with the purpose of breaking the communications isolation. Almost uniquely in the history of decolonization the triumphant nationalist party was confronted, not by the intransigence of a colonial power, which refused to depart, but the aggressive designs of a neighbouring power which refused all calls to desist its machinations. Jolliffe writes that in the eyes of Fretilin and even UDT it was the MFA policy of *apartidarismo* or nonintervention, as opposed to the active neutrality practised by die Portuguese in Mozambique that was unforgivable. 51

In an event witnessed by foreign newsmen and assembled throngs of Timorese, on 28 November 1975 Fretilin's President Xavier Francisco do Amaral proclaimed the independence of Timor and the creation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. But, while Fretilin's UDI was a desperate move, it was also understandable in the circumstances. As do Amaral Cabled Lisbon the following day this decision was necessitated by both "Indonesian aggression" in violation of UN laws on self-determination and independence and the "disinterest" of the Government of Portugal in seeking a correct solution to decolonization.52

But why did the Portuguese side stonewall on Fretilin's request for recognition, even when the new independent state of Mozambique emerged in this way? As lawyer Barreto revealed in a controversial 1982 broadside aimed at official Portuguese complaisance to Timor's plight under Indonesian occupation, internal evidence contained in official documentation suggested that the government of the day feared that a Fretilin UDI, and the consequent downgrading of UDT and Apodeti, would have constituted a precedent that would have prejudiced the balance of forces in Angola. 53

Notes

1. See author's, *Encountering Macau: The Rise of a Portuguese City-State on the Periphery of China, 1557-1999*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1996.
2. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, 25 November 1957, *Foreign Relations: 1955- 1957, Vo1. XXII*, Washington.
3. Bruce Juddery, "East Timor: Which way to turn"?, *Canberra Times*, 18 April 1975. And see the account by the last Governor of Portuguese Timor, Mario Lemos Pires, *Descolonizaca-o de Timor: Missao Impossivel?*, *Circulo de LeitoresjPublicac6es Don Quixote*> Lisboa, 199 l.
4. Juddery, "East Timor..."; Bill Nico1, *Timor/ The Stillborn Nation*, *Visa*, 1978, p. 17.
5. Nico1, *ibid.* For detailed context on the Permesta rebellion, see Audry R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, The New Press, New York, 1995. While offering decisive confirmation of the US role in backing this anti-Jakarta "anticommunist" rebellion, it is surprising that these two experts did not touch upon the Viqueque connection. They do reveal, however, that the Permesta rebels, who successfully captured bases in the Moluccas, had designs on Kupang, p. 173.
6. James Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed*, Jacaranda Press9 Brisbane, 1983, p. 34.
7. Amrin Imran, *Timor Timur: Provinsi ke-2 7 Republik Indonesia*, Mutiara, Jakarta, n.d.
8. Abilio Araujo cited in Yvette Lawson, "East Timor: Roots continue to grow.. A provisional analysis of changes in foreign domination and the continuing struggle for freedom and independence", unpublished dissertation, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, August 1989} p. 3 l. And see, Brian Toohey, *Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secjnet Intelligence Service*, (William

Heineman 1989), Mandarin, Melbourne, 1990, p. 78.

9. Rurnhardjono, "Integrasi dan artinya yang dirasakan rakyat kecil", Kompas, 15 Augustus 1977.

10. Hamish McDonald, Suharto 3F Indonesia, Fontana, Melbourne, 1980.

11. -Extension of Indonesian Rule to Portuguese Timor suggested (Prof. M. Yamin)", Sydney Morning Herald, 21 February 1960.

12. "Portugal strengthening forces in Timor due to rumours that Indonesia is planning to overtake it", The Age (Melbourne), 1 September 1962, "Three civilians die in clashes between Indonesians and Portuguese troops", The Age, 23 December 1962, "Indonesia and Control of Timor", The Age, 17 December 1962, "Portuguese frigate for Timor", The Age, 16 July 1963, Frank Palmos, "Indonesia in Timor, "struggle" [Sukarno's Independence day Speech]", Sydney Morning Herald, 18 August 1965, p. 1.

13. Glen Francis, "Slavery in Timor", The Observer, 29 October 1960.

14. "Travel feature on Portuguese Timor", Sydney Morning Herald, 30 December 1968.

15. Osmar Vmite, -Timor Island of Fear: What is the future for this Portuguese Colony", The Herald, 2 April 1963 and "Where does Indonesia Stand?: Sooner or later Portuguese Timor will explode", The Herald, 3 April 1963, p. 4 and see White's reference to the problems of journalists visiting Portuguese Timor in "Alvaro and the Market", Time Now Time Before, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1967.

16. Robert Raymond, "Timor-Sleeping Island.. For Portugal-a financial drain and political embarrassment" The Bulletin, 29 February 1964, pp. 13-18.

17. "Border Tense", Sydney Morning Herald, 10 December 1966, p. 3, "Clashes in Timor common", Sydney Morning Herald, 13 December 1966, p. 3, "Timor Clash report denied", Sydney Morning Herald, 15 December 1966, p. 3.

18. J. Gert Vondra, Timor Journey, Landsdowne, Melbourne, 1968.

19. See author's (with Jofferson Lee), A Critical view of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor, Journal of Contemporary Asia Press, Manila, 1994, chapter 3.

20. Peter Hastings, "Jakarta casts an anxious eye over Timor", Sydney Morning Herald, 16 November 1971, "Indonesian Foreign Minister Mr. Malik to visit Timor later this month following reports of unrest in the Portuguese half of the island", The Age, 4 April 1972, p. 6, "Indonesia would aid rising", The Age, 5 April 1972.

21. Nicol, Timor: The Stillborn Nation, p. 115.

22. Ibid., pp. 11-19.

23. Brian Toohey, (Minor test for Government", Australian Financial Review, 15 May 1973, -Willesee skirts around LTN Portugal issue", Australian Financial Review, 24 May 1973, "Thiess Timor Plan crowds LTN policy ", Australian Financial Review, 27 June 1973, and see "TAA did not carry Portuguese troops to Timor-Willesee", The Age, 30 August 1973, p. 13.

24. See the selected writings of T.B. Cunha, the Goa-born Indian "patriot" and long time political prisoner of Salazar, who in 1926, after 14 years in France, returned to Goa to found the Goa Congress Committee affiliated to the Indian National Congress, in Goa Freedom Struggle, T.B. Cunha Memorial Committee, Bombay, 1961. While Cunha's critique of Salazarism is devastating, as is his analysis of Portuguese "denationalization of Goans", he was also prepared to concede political differences between the Goan case and the Macau case.

25. Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism, University of Queensland Press, St.Lucia, 1978 pp. 56-57.

26. Grant Evans, "Portuguese Timor") New Left Review, No. 91, May June 1975, p. 75.

27. Helen Hill, "Fretilin: the origins, ideologies, and strategies of a nationalist movement in East Timor", MA thesis, Monash University, May 1978.

28. Lawson, Yvette Lawson, "East Timor: Roots continue to grow", University of Jhsterdam, 1989.

29. Hill, "Fretilin".

30. For context on the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau see, Mai Palmberg (ed.), The Struggle for Africa, Zed, London, 1982, pp. 78-107.

31. Ibid.

32. Joao Carrascalao, President of UDT, Domingos de Oliveira, General Secretary, Timorese Democratic Union Supreme Political Cotmcil, Sydney, reg. East Timor, 27 October 1996.

33. Hamish McDonald, Suharto 3F Indonesia, Fontana, Melbourne, 1980, pp. 194-203.

34. Lawson, "East Timor: roots", p. 41.
35. "Mais de dois mil mortos já causou a guerra civil em Timor", *Didrio de Noticias* (Lisbon), 29 August 1975, and see Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed*, pp. 207-209.
36. Joao Viegas Carrascalao statement.
37. *Didrio de Noticias*, 2 October 1975; Jolliffe, *East Timor*, p. 161; Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed*, pp. 199, 212.
38. Shoji Shibuya, "Asia's Last Colony: On Timor", *Koen (Lecture)*, No. 204J5 November 1975.
39. Julius Pour, Denny Moejndani: *Projile of a Soldier Statesman*, Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, Jakarta, 1993, p. 328.
40. The deaths became the subject of an Australian Royal Commission in 1996, yet the taint of official Indonesian and Australian cover-up of the real events remains.
41. Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed*, p. 199.
42. Jolliffe, *East Timor*, p. 199.
43. Geoffrey Hull, "A Language Policy for East Timor: Background and Principles" *Its Time to Lead the Way*, ETRA. Melbourne, 1996, p. 50.
44. Mario Lemos Pires, *Descolonizacao de Timor* P. 62.
45. *Ibid*, p. 163.
46. Nicol, *Timor: The Stillborn Nation*, p. 179.
47. *Ibid*.
48. Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed*; Mark Aarons and Robert Dunn, *East Timor: A Western Made Tragedy*, Left Book Club, Sydney, 1992, p. 25.
49. Pires, *Descolonizacao de Timor*: p. 194.
50. Joao Loft Barreto, *7te Timor Drama*, *A Timor Newsletter Publication*, *Timor Newsletter*, Lisboa, 1982, p.48.
51. Jolliffe, *East Timor*, p. 127.
52. Cited in Pires, *Descolonizacao de Timor*, p. 3 18.
53. Barreto, *The Timor Drama*.

Conclusion

The Timorese Funu.

While Timorese nationalist historiography tends to explain conflict in Timor over the past 400 years as a war of resistance against colonialism, it would at the same time be a mistake if the indigenous concept of combat were marginalized. At least we should have some sense of how funu is remembered or actively constructed by Timorese through various phases of their struggle.

We have made repeated references to the ritualized quality of the Timorese funu even where conflict took on an anti-malai dimension, and even an anti-tax dimension.

But could an approach, which anthropologizes what, might otherwise appear as a rational response to the pressures and iniquities of outside colonialism diminish our understanding of how Timorese went to war? Might such an approach obscure the proto-nationalist underpinnings of certain of the rebellions? Or, does the approach, which fixates, on the larger outbursts of violence miss the point, in consideration of the quotidian and commonplace activities of noncompliance and evasion, footdragging, dissimulation, and other nonviolent forms of protest such as discussed by James C.

Scott in his aptly entitled *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, albeit in another Southeast Asian context and relating to a post-colonial order. 1

As this study has shown, over long time and across many generations Timorese have proven highly adept at, variously, adopting the religion of their conquerors, paying up the finta, swearing submission to the crown, paying the head tax and offering up their labour, the non plus ultra of a successful colonial development strategy, only to sabotage the best intended strategies of the Portuguese and, as shown below, their Indonesian successors. How and why the Timorese so consistently were able to turn the tables against

their erstwhile pacifiers for so long is not easy to answer but to clarify the question we should look to both anthropological and historiographical explanations and viewpoints.

While we have gone to lengths to describe the anti-finta dimension of native rebellions in Timor, at the same time we should not lose sight of what numerous students of this problematic have termed the messianic or millenarian dimensions of native protest. As Robert Redfield wrote long ago in a classic essay anthropologists typically encounter the "creativity of the disintegrated folk society in the form of nativistic movements". But even in responding to the impact of outsiders, "the stimulation of new ideas, new religions, and ethical conceptions" not all victims accepted the conqueror's ways without a fight. Typically such events invoke magical or shamanistic features, and often invoke the name of a prophet or leader along with a mythical kingdom. 2

Thus, while the irrational elements of the war of the *doidos* were not lost upon the Portuguese, it was often the case that such outbursts masked an alternative native logic, at least around a shared solidarity making against a common enemy. Indeed, the messianic element in public protest is a recurrent theme even in the modern history of Timor. As the Portuguese ethnologist, Duarte, recounts in his monograph on Atauro, when in March 1961 four Indonesian gunboats entered Dili harbour on an official visit, the Protestantized villagers of a fishing community took this as a signal of their impending liberation, a movement Duarte ascribes to the mischief worked by certain false prophets or messiahs. 3

No less, magic, animism, *adat*, Christianity and adherence to the Indonesian Communist Party became intertwined themes in the *makdok* movement in west Timor and Solor in 1965-66 coinciding with the slaughter in these islands alone of many thousands of erstwhile communist party members and other enemies by the Indonesian military and their dupes. 4

The messianic element also appears in the Santo Antonio movement, a religious-mystic-revivalist Catholic movement that won large numbers of followers in the Dili area in 1988. This movement, otherwise believed to be quiescent, came to the author's attention in 1993 in the form of a one-man vigil maintained outside the residence of the Apostolic Administrator of Dili. This individual, evidently half-possessed or slightly manic was also strongly bearded and swarthy suggesting a *topasse* or, more likely, a *Bidau* or *Sica* lineage. He addressed the author in a patois of recognizable Portuguese and Bahasa Indonesia code changing at my cues. His intervention-in part a plea for a Catholic and independent future for the island -also came in the form of crude drawings of religious and political symbols inscribed in a kind of Portugalized Malay, which he wished to be passed on to the Bishop, a promise I duly kept with a bishop anthropologist in Australia. 5

It is also true that under oppressive Indonesian military rule, the Timorese have turned en masse to the church, seemingly the only institution that offered protection.

In any case, animist belief and practice is highly stigmatized in Indonesian law, hence the safety factor in joining one of five state-sanctioned religions. While adherents to Protestant sects have also multiplied under Indonesian rule, it has been the inroads made by Islam via the influx of tens of thousands of immigrants from Java and Sulawesi, who have not only come to dominate the bazaar economy but have also altered the socioreligious profile of Timor. Tragically, this has led to unprecedented outbursts of violence in the 1990s in part religiously motivated but not without economic and other defensive overtones. The years 1996-97 alone witnessed violent clashes in Viqueque (by locals against Indonesian-trained agent provocateurs), in Pante Macassar against Buginese settlers and, unprecedented clashes against Muslim settlers in Kefamenan in west Timor.

Yet, between the poles of pacification and resistance, there is a great sense that war in Timor was a highly ritualized process outside of the experience of the Portuguese, Dutch, or their successors, at least until they made the effort to lean. As this book has emphasized, it is only through an understanding of the ritualized aspects of *funu* that the near half millennium of the Timorese resistance makes sense.

Dampier has recorded the sense that the two European antagonists on Timor did reach an early understanding and accommodation with local forms of warfare. Of the Dutch style of proxy warfare, he observed, the *Cupangayans* or native allies of the Dutch were given every quarter to "kill all they meet and bring away their Heads in Triumph". He also observed a large edifice in Kupang purpose built to contain the heads of Portuguese (or *topasse*?). "So that while the Portuguese are threatening to drive the Dutch out of the island, the Dutch, without so much as uttering their resentment, are taking off their heads as fast as they can".

In a sardonic note addressed at the Dutch, or in a rare flash of enlightenment spirit, he commented, "I know

not what Encouragement they have for their inhumanity". 6

These sentiments were echoed by Crawfurd who, in his essay on the "Art of War" offered up his own example of a Dutch governor in Macassar who was in the habit of receiving basketfuls of enemies' heads as valuable gifts. In his study of warfare in Java, Bali, Borneo and Celebes (Sulawesi), Crawfurd focused upon several defining features, including, weapons, the military character of despotism, modes of levying troops, ways of declaring war and organizing military force, fighting styles, provisioning, and especially conduct towards the dead. 7

In all this, Crawfurd and probably the rest of his generation would have agreed that there were two major variants of warfare, the degraded mode of savages who treated the dead with outrage, and-the mode of the civilized, with higher or at least other standards. Still, this is not to say that the methods of warfare were standard across the archipelago or even across time. As Anthony Reid has cautioned, just as the delineation of "traditional" models of behaviour should be treated with caution, so especially should warfare, especially as military technology is the first to be borrowed. 8

But whereas the Acehnese, Malays and Buginese had adopted the brass cannon even before the arrival of Westerners, it is notable that this weapon was missing from the Timorese arsenal. While the Senobai and Luca, for example, rivaled other Southeast Asian monarchs in their ability to mobilize manpower on land, the Timorese armed with lances, bows and arrows and blowpipes were at a loss when it came to defending themselves against the seaborne Westerners but also the Macassans or Buginese. Still, going by de Freycinet's estimate, the number of men under arms on Timor, including those using firearms was considerable by the eighteenth century. Belos, he reckoned, deployed 40,000 warriors of whom 3,000 were armed with guns, the rest sabres, shields, spears, and bows and arrows. Vaikenos (Serviao) deployed 25,000 men under arms, including 2,000 armed with guns. Owing to the more favorable terrain on the western part of the island, armed cavalry was better developed. Certain horsemen were even armed with crude pistols. 9

But despite the adaptation of firearms, military methods and codes of behaviour were still conducted in a time-honoured manner. Even the last great set-piece battle of this century on Timor, a reference to Boaventura's doomed stand, was a highly "traditional" defence, redolent of the battle of Cailaco 200 years earlier.

Mounted from the pedras using a combination of indigenous weapons and nineteenth century muskets. While heroism was not lacking⁹ this doomed defence was certainly no match against a twentieth century army. It is an interesting speculation but even the topasse, the first to successfully adopt the matchlock and muzzleloader, lost rank absolutely when confronted with even higher levels of naval and military technology and organization commencing at the beginning of the last century, with the deployment of European-officered Sepoys and, later, rapid firing weapons and steam powered gunboats.

Another who made the effort to understand the roots of warfare in Timor was Governor de Castro, even if certain of his successors demurred. Writing in 1860, he saw conflict as endemic among the Timorese, in part encouraged by the general non-intervention of the Portuguese in the affairs of the reinos. In particular, de Castro attributed blame to the kidnapping of individuals (into slavery), the theft of animals or the usurpation of land, complicated by the lack of well-defined boundaries between the reinos. While finely tuned dispute resolution mechanisms existed among the reinos, especially where they were allied, the converse was the case when the disputants were from opposing reinos. In such a case, if the ambassador to the court of the opposing reino returned empty-handed, preparations for war would begin immediately. Then a contract would be made with potential allies or vassal peoples offering indemnities in the form of buffaloes or gold to potential victims of war. In this *jeux de mort*, the two sides would engage *taux* or emissaries in a ritual encounter before engaging in combat. Combat, writes de Castro, consisted of firing several rime shots at great distance. While the combat often ensued for a month at a time, it concluded only when one side suffered a fatality from a musket ball. The victorious party would sever the victim's head and both sides would retire until the dead person was interred, only to resume the combat.

The war would conclude with the capture of the enemy's village, its sacking, and its destruction to ashes. Survivors would head off to the bush like animals while prisoners would be killed or, if spared, became enslaved. But if war breaks out between the kingdoms and the government, de Castro continues, matters transpire pretty much the same way because one can never muster sufficient force in Timor to punish the rebels. 10

Writing in 1844 on the link between custom, superstition and war in Timor to an audience in Macau, the Portuguese official Jose dos Santos Vaquinas feigned horror to learn that the *tabedae* or decapitation of heads of the enemy by the triumphant party on Timor also included many verses in the name of the King of Portugal and Timor. For him, this and other customs confirmed the "ridiculous" beliefs of a people who traced their ancestry back to the crocodile *lulic*. 11

As Osorio de Castro wrote in 1908, like the Dyaks of Borneo, the *tabedae* was a custom in Timor since times immemorial. From his informant, Sena Barreto, head of Dili customs, this author also learnt of the "lugubrious" shriek called *Lorca* along with the "sad and savage" *batuque* dance performed by women grouped in a semicircle playing conical shaped drums along with Malay gongs. Sena Barreto, who had made good his contacts with certain *regulo*, including some who had acquired education in Macau, witnessed young adolescents bringing back human heads from the battle ground, a probable reference to the aftermath of one of Governor Celestino da Silva's expeditions. Thereupon these heads would become *lulic* placed on rock cairns or even suspended on trees. 12

Pelissier addresses the question squarely at the outcome of his study: "la guerre pour on contre les autorites: est egalement une entreprise magico-religieuse hautement speculative". Typically, as we have seen in many of the rebellions, a coalition of *reinos* would prevail over adversaries in the quest of heads to satisfy the appetite of the sorcerer, leaving their macabre trophies to decorate their fortified villages.

The problem for the Portuguese was always to know which of the *liurai* could be depended upon and which were bound to resist with blood the demands of the state in the form of *finta* or manpower? 13

While we have digressed to draw attention to the Timorese style of *funu*, which also included certain practices which might loosely be labelled "head-hunting, we have also indicated that this practice had a wider currency throughout the archipelago. One modern anthropologist who has studied this question with relation to the Salu Mambi, an ethnic group in south Sulawesi, offers that head-hunting was rarely examined in colonial literatures in terms of a political context of dominance and subordination, but in terms of belief, however, troubling that may be. In the search for meaning of this act, this author offers that Salu Mambi head-hunting can be interpreted as a "ritual of resistance" against raids by slave-traders and other coastal interlopers. In part, the celebratory aspect of the rites-the *tabedae* in Timor- could conceivably be interpreted as a collective catharsis. While such claims have been made on behalf of the Igorots of Luzon, we still have no good study of this question in relation to Timor. Moreover, how did the rituals of the *tabedae* in Timor adapt in the decades following the ending of the practice of removing heads.

Here, I resist to state "suppression", as I cannot find any specific written actor statute constituting a definitive prohibition or suppression. But, as with the Salu Mambi, how do the Timorese "govern their own remembering" of these practices -the indigenous construction of violence- especially given the stigmatization associated with non-established religions in Indonesia today. 14

Will the *tabedae*, along other Timorese cultural traits outside of government-sanctioned sects, become reduced to a mere tourist spectacle as in other parts of the archipelago under Indonesian rule?

While no ambiguity surrounds the Indonesian project of colonization of East Timor, whether from an economic or ideological perspective, did Portugal actually treat Timor more as a protectorate than a colony. This is an important question as it comes to the heart of governance and power relations between the Portuguese, local rulers, and even their successors. We have stressed that, anthropologically, Timor was representative of the segmented societies of the eastern archipelago. Hindu-Buddhistic and Islamic notions of centralized states and mandalatype configurations of power relations were alien in Timor. Even the notion of a unified kingdom of Wehale has to be treated with much circumspection. The *raja* or petty rulers with whom the Dominicans first treated represented at best highly localized foci of power. Their importance for outsiders, whether Javanese, Chinese or Portuguese stemmed from their ability to mediate the trade in sandal between the coast and the interior. But as *rei* or *reino* within the Portugalized orbit the little kings transferred their symbolic loyalty to an utterly abstract King. Although the Portuguese flag-symbol of this bond of loyalty and submission-was also perfectly indigenized in the form of *lulic* worship, the chosen *rei* also accepted their subordinate and ranked status within the protectorate-colony through the acceptance of Portugalized honorific and military titles. While we have seen how, From Governor de Castro down, the principle of non-interference was set down on paper, there is no question that the Boaventura revolt and its outcome hastened the end of the power of the *liurai* as unbroken lineages.

It follows that, in the Wallersteinian perspective, the development of a plantation economy on Timor keye

to the export of a commodity in bulk to a truly world market -the European core- spelled the end of the usefulness of the Timor-Flores zone as a mere trading post in items of luxury consumption. In any case, by the mid-nineteenth century, the major lode pole of Timor's sandal trade, Macau, no longer served its classic tribute-paying intermediary role in the China trade, a function of China's own subsumption within the circuits of Western imperialism." 15

But did such revolutionary changes in the regional-economy signal Timor's classic peripheralization in a world economy? The answer in part surely depends on the degree of Timor's incorporation. We have seen how the introduction of coffee cultivation on the island rescued the economy from a local fiscal perspective just as sandal production was entering a long relative decline. Still, this rescue was hardly on the terms of modern colonial economics, facts of economic life occasioned by Timor's marginal status within a zone of colonial-capitalist activity which saw British, Dutch, and French capital along with immigrant labour deployed on the prime zones of extraction. Unlike colonies of direct domination, including the settler colonies of Angola and Mozambique, Timor, an oceanic outpost, stood with such backwaters or zones of extreme isolation as French Laos or, in the Portuguese world, Guinea, where local forms of tributary power attenuated the colonial and, later, the colonial-capitalist mode of production. 16

But was Timor just another example of non-economic imperialism? " On this question we are in agreement with Pelissier who holds that, even in the generation before Governor Celestino da Silva arrived on the scene, it is undeniable that development occurred even alongside the "clash of sabres and the glow of fire-ravaged villages". Even alongside Dutch Timor, where the policy of nonintervention up until the present century left the interior untouched, Portuguese Timor stood out for the creation of an export economy based on coffee. 17

Unlike the Dutch who deliberately spread their resources very thinly in the eastern islands, the Portuguese, albeit lacking the vastly superior financial and technical skills of their rivals, were nevertheless able to concentrate military and other resources on the part of Timor under their control. While the full development of a plantation economy based on coffee export sowed the seeds of salvation for the impecunious colony and offered the way to an economically independent future, certain extraneous factors once again arrested this development, a reference to the resilience of lineage power and the ability of warring liurai to soak up the meagre development budget otherwise channeled into pacification or military-related activities.

All things being equal, it would have been expected that by mid century, with its developing plantation economy and its incipient elite, Timor would have joined the postwar wave of independent nations. In some ways, however, the destructiveness of the Japanese occupation aroused the deepest atavism in Timorese culture, drastically setting back the best of colonial plans, reviving the sway of tradition and local power relationships. Timor stood alone among Southeast Asian countries insofar as the war did not germinate a nationalist movement. Neither did Japan successfully anoint a counter-elite in Timor as it did elsewhere in occupied Southeast Asia. But neither did the Salazarist state concede the possibility. While the storm cloud of the Indonesian revolution swept past the colony, the sway of events in Timor's giant neighbours also impinged indirectly. While we lack documentation, the 1959 Viqueque rebellion carries echoes of this thesis, as more demonstrably did the Apodeti treason alongside Indonesia in 1975, inflaming tribal loyalties and rekindling a vicious feud especially on the frontier districts of Timor.

But in Timor, far from the dissolution effects of colonial capital eliminating indigenous forms of production, such as we observed of the community mode of production, it was the failure of the church and state alike to make over the population in their mould -the head tax and corvee project notwithstanding- that overall, contributed to the dominance of conservation effects and albeit weak incorporation. The case may have been otherwise for the rootless peasant proletariat of Java and Sumatra who rallied to the communist cause in the mid-1920s and while the case may also have been different for among the incipient proletariat of Angola and Mozambique in the 1960s and 1970s, there is simply no evidence of class-based actions or strike activity in Portuguese Timor, with the minor exception of strikes by students and public workers in urban Dili in the final years. Fretilin's program, accordingly, spoke the language that Timorese knew best, nationalism or at least cultural defence against outsiders.

Epilogue: Invasion and Resistance

From the log of the Afonso de Cerqueira, one of two Portuguese corvettes anchored off Atauro on 7

December 1975, at 04h30 on that day "seven slow aircraft (helicopters) were seen in the distance". At 04h45 ships with "lights hidden", commenced "bombardments" in the direction of Dili, lasting until 05h30. At 05h10 "weak sonar contact was made" (with submarines). Very early in the morning an American yacht, believed to be the local U.S. "antenna" on the events slipped away unannounced from its mooring alongside the corvette Joao Roby. At 06h00 a reconnaissance plane and large landing craft were spotted heading for Ponta Tibar, west of Dili, where they landed. News of the invasion was immediately transmitted to the Portuguese Naval Chief of Staff, the Governor of Macau, and the President of the Republic. The command received was to respond only if attacked. But by midday the same day, the authorities in Lisbon ordered the corvettes carrying the rump of the Portuguese administration including the governor and his elite paracommando force to withdraw from the territory's waters and to remain outside the twelve-mile limit. 18

As it later became known, or as the U.S. wished it to be known, the prospect of a second Cuba in Southeast Asia would be inimical to the passage of nuclear submarines through the Ombai-Wetar Straits. There is no question that such thinking was uppermost in the minds of U.S. President Gerald Ford and U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, at the time of their meeting with President Suharto in Jakarta on the very eve of the invasion, an act that they undoubtedly endorsed. 19

So began Operasi Seroja, the full-scale Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor. On 4 December, three days before these events, Jose Ramos-Horta had just been appointed Minister for External Relations in the first East Timor government. At Lisbon's request, the UN Security Council convened on 22 December to discuss the Indonesian invasion, unanimously adopting a resolution calling for; all states to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor, the rights of its people to self-determination in accordance with UN law, and the withdrawal without delay of Indonesian troops. This was the first of ten UN resolutions condemning the Indonesian occupation and annexation over the years, albeit all ignored. 20

While the UN continues to hold Portugal responsible as the administering power in the territory pending an internationally acceptable act of self-determination, and while Portugal continues to champion this right on behalf of the Timorese in UN and other counsels, there is an abiding sense that through the long years of the Cold War, the concerned Western powers, the U.S., Great Britain, Japan and Australia, abetted Indonesia's illegal occupation of the territory and, together with Indonesia's partners in ASEAN, stonewalled attempts by interested parties-notably East Timorese in the diaspora and their supporters-to activate UN involvement in settling the question. The strategy of leaving Indonesia to digest the territory without outside interference was serviceable to Western interests up to a point Indonesia remains a major customer for Western arms suppliers, a major trading and business partner of the U.S., while Japanese-Indonesian business and economic interests in the archipelago are almost symbiotic. On its part, Australia rejoices at its luck in dividing up the spoils of Timor's oil with its new found defence ally Indonesia, a reference to the Timor Gap Treaty of 1989 and the secretive Australia-Indonesia Defence Treaty of December 1995.

Even so, the strategy of coddling a proven anti-communist dictator has had its limits, not necessarily because liberal opinion in the West called foul, but because the end of the Cold War has rendered the Marcos', the Noriegas and the Mobutus, irrelevant or at least an embarrassment. Needless to say, the post-Cold war situation which has seen such amazing reversals in fortunes of such states as Namibia, Eritrea, South Africa under the apartheid system, the Baltic states, and Eastern Europe have raised high the expectations of the peoples of the few remaining decolonization cases before the UN. Even so, East Timor has remained a forgotten dispute unlike even Western Sahara and Palestine where the UN has intervened on the ground, and unlike Mozambique and Angola where UN interventions have rescued those broken states. In the case of East Timor, it took a particularly ignominious event to arouse international public opinion, a reference, as discussed below, to the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre of November 1991. But even if this event raised the human rights situation in East Timor to the levels of editorial and op.ed. Still, the UN process revealed itself hostage to proceduralist delays and inaction." 21

And so when Holland broke ranks with its Western allies over Indonesia in protest against the Dili massacre, Indonesia proved its ability to look elsewhere for lines of international credit. In a situation of increasing standoff between the European Union, in which Portugal holds a veto vote, the announcement by the Norwegian Nobel committee in 1996 of the award of its prestigious Peace Prize to two sons of Timor must also be considered an event, which has significantly shifted opinion on the East Timor question

But there is no question that for ordinary East Timorese, global events are distant and abstract. For them,

Indonesia's "hidden war" in East Timor, has been prosecuted out of sight of the Western media, and veiled even from the UN, which has never established a permanent monitoring presence in the territory. The tragedy of Timor is that the violence visited upon the stillborn nation on day one of the Indonesian main-force invasion continues until today. From the disarmingly frank biography of the Indonesian general most concerned with on-the-ground planning of the invasion, General Murolani, we learn that the combined air-sea invasion of 7 December -described by one Australian journalist as one of the biggest para chute operations since World War - was seriously botched with the Indonesian marine corps sustaining heavy casualties in confused manoeuvres, certain from "friendly fire" before Fretilin evacuated the capital. The following day Murolani himself flew into Dili in a light aircraft with the express purpose of capturing Fretilin documents and securing release of captured opponents of would-be Indonesian collaborators. 22 Allegations of Fretilin torture against UDT prisoners, and allegations still repeated by Indonesian spokespersons as to the "lingering trauma of the civil war", however, pale alongside the blood bath prosecuted by invading Indonesian soldiers in the capital, consuming 80 percent of the male population of the town, large groups of whom were systematically shot in cold blood in Dili harbour. In this rampage, largely attributed to Airborne Battalion 502, the Chinese in particular were singled out for selective killings. So was the last remaining Western journalist and witness of the invasion, Roger East, following the Balibo murders earlier in October. Selected massacres replicated in other towns believed to have been host to Fretilin were accompanied by wide scale looting. By 10 December with the Indonesian paratroop landing at Baucau, 15,000 troops were added to the invasion force of 10,000. Fretilin then comprised 2,500 full time regulars from the former Portuguese army with 7,000 part-time militia and 20,000 reservists.

Fretilin also drew upon the sympathies of the rural population and a network of prepared interior bases. Fretilin also maintained radio contact with supporters in Australia although the Indonesian naval cordon and an official Australian acquiescence, effectively prevented Fretilin from even receiving outside moral support. 23

Until Suharto declared East Timor an "open province" in 1978, thereby paving the way for the unrestricted entry of Indonesian immigrants, and-in the interests of promoting a sense of normality-the entry of tourists, albeit under close surveillance, the half-island endured an isolation from the rest of the world rivaled only by such places as Tibet and North Korea. The only exceptions to this information quarantine were the controlled visits by known sympathizers and their entourages.

Nevertheless, with the arrival of the first refugees from Timor to Portugal in 1976, a fuller picture of the extent of the tragedy began to emerge, albeit treated with the greatest scepticism by the world media and Western capitals. Dissenting voices within the Western media began to emerge, however, from among journalists accompanying a foreign delegation to Remexio where, in September 1978, they witnessed scenes of starvation which they described as "worse than Biafra". Until his dismissal in May 1983, Mgn. Martinho da Costa Lopes, then Apostolic Administrator of Dili, also succeeded in getting his message through to the outside world, notably that the causes of hunger were inextricably linked with crude Indonesian attempts at population control and resettlement. But, beginning in the 1979-80 period, harrowing reports reached the outside world from church and other sources of massacres of erstwhile supporters of Fretilin in such locations as Dili harbour, Areia Branca beach, and Quelicai. Notorious in this sense was the massacre of the civilian population of the village of Kraras near Viqueque in August 1983. 24

But to the extent that the East Timor tragedy entered Western consciousness, it was only in the most marginal church or left-wing publications. Indeed, to the extent that the language of "human rights" entered the vocabulary of political constituencies in the West, the critique of right-wing dictatorship was seen as a left-wing reaction and greatly suspect. In other words, the system of military-initiated intimidation, terror, killings, arbitrary detentions, and internal prison camps were seen as the "necessary" costs of supporting the Indonesian New Order, the best guarantor of stability in a region where instability was a cliché. While the debate on Indonesia after the Santa Cruz massacre shifted to discontinuation or restriction on military aid and training of the Indonesian armed forces, we now know that in fact military-links with Jakarta were strengthened by, inter alia, Australia and, secretly, continued by the U.S., unknown even to the U.S. Congress. At no time did the West blow the whistle on the 32 year Suharto dictatorship, indeed heaped praise upon rewards on the economically pragmatic Indonesian New Order. But where, prior to his election to the U.S. Presidency, Bill Clinton called Indonesian actions in East Timor "unconscionable" the "Lippogate" scandal of 1996 revealed that even Suharto's business networks could with impunity buy

influence in Washington. Even with the hindsight gained from the deposition of the Marcos regime and, with more immediacy, the Mobutu regime, the West saw no alternative to authoritarian rule in Indonesia. The ruthless military-led crackdown, on leading Indonesian opposition figure Megawati Sukarnoputri in 1995 caused no weakening of Western resolve to support the dictatorship. Not even the question of culpability arising from the massively destructive Kalimantan fires of 1998 damaged Suharto's stranglehold on power as far as foreign creditors were concerned. Only the great Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 exposed the fragility of Indonesian "crony capitalism", but even then the country most economically committed, and exposed, to the Indonesian economic crisis, Japan, held back from coupling an economic rescue package with political reform. And so, the "dramatic" resignation of Suharto on 21 May 1998 did not arise from a situation of withdrawal of vital economic and political support on the part of Japan and the West, but owed more to the untenable situation arising from urban anarchy, rogue military actions, a rising "people's power" challenge, eroding elite support, and the adroit anointment of a civilian, albeit military-backed successor, in B.J. Habibie, otherwise seen as a pro-reformist figure acceptable to the West. Right up until the present period Indonesia contends that four political parties declared East Timor's integration with Indonesia on 29 November 1975, the day after the Fretilin UDI. This declaration, said to have been made in Balibo by six leaders of the Apodeti, UDT, Kota and Trabalhista parties, is called by Indonesia the "Balibo Declaration". Even though this document has subsequently been repudiated by certain of the signatories, and not recognized by the UN as part of any decolonization process, Indonesia still upholds it as a document constituting a "manifestation of the genuine wish of the people of East Timor in general". In fact, as Japanese academic Akihisa Matsuno has exposed, at least four versions of the text of the document exist and the unsigned version submitted to the UN has been heavily reworked, notably airbrushing out from what passes for the original document the erroneous statement that Portugal consented to Fretilin's UDI. Matsuno concludes that on the basis of internal evidence, the drafters of the document, proceeded from wrong intelligence. A second omission in the UN version concerns reference to Holland. While the original correctly notes the separation of the two halves of the island by, respectively, Portuguese and Dutch colonialism, the corrected version speaks of a 400-year separation of East Timor from Indonesia a separation attributed to Portugal. Matsuno observes that while the former argument could also be used to justify the unification of east and west Timor without reference to Indonesia at all, in the final analysis, the mystical unity argument is more serviceable to Indonesia's claims of East Timor's "return to the fatherland" Also, he comments, the UN document speaks of the "independence and integration" of East Timor into Indonesia, whereas the original draft speaks only of "integration". 25

It is of interest, however, that in 1997 in a statement to the UN Decolonization Committee urging the removal of the question of East Timor From the Committee's agenda, R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa of Indonesia argued that the people of East Timor had already exercised their right to self-determination "more than twenty years ago in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions", a process "witnessed by scores of foreign diplomats and international media representatives".

In this case, Natalegawa was not referring to the Balibo Declaration but to the utterances of the Indonesian-installed Chairman of the East Timor People's Representative Council, a 37-member body, elected by "consensus and consent", which on 31 May 1976 "acting upon the wishes of the people as had been expressed in the proclamation of Integration of East Timor on 30 November 1975, at Balibo" urged the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to "accept and legalize" the integration of the territory. In fact this was the occasion witnessed by a small number of Jakarta-based diplomats and journalists. Having masterminded East Timor's political status and seemingly oblivious to the letter and law of the UN resolutions, Indonesia then invited the Secretary-General and a representative of the Decolonization Committee to visit East Timor. Both declined this descent from New York to the hell of post-occupation Dili, citing binding UN resolutions. Indonesia was clearly rebuffed but unmoved. The weight of the Security Council resolutions did not, however, deter Indonesian President Suharto from signing Law no. 711976 of 17 July 1976 on the "formalization of the integration of East Timor into the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia and the establishment of the province of East Timor". 26

While Australia and the U.S. have gone as far as recognizing the de facto and de jure integration of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia, disingenuously, they do not condone the method of incorporation. Equally, while declaring the decolonization of East Timor complete, and while effectively imposing an information and access cordon sanitaire over the half-island, Indonesia not only excluded would-be probing

journalists, but at the height of the great famine, effectively excluded NGOs, and, at crucial times, even the International Red Cross.

Moreover, in 1996-97, while paying lip service to the UN call for "an internationally acceptable solution", Indonesia rejected a permanent UN Human Rights Commission presence in either Indonesia or East Timor. But by agreeing in 1983 to enter into UN-sponsored meetings between the Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers, Indonesia has exploited these talks to ensure that nothing is done to actually address the problem on the ground.

This is not the place to explain the reasons why the UN body has proved so ineffectual on East Timor or why such countries as the U.S. have applied double standards to the East Timor case alongside, for example, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, suffice it to say that the end of the Cold War combined with shifting opinions in the West as to the integrity of the Suharto regime with respect to democratization, human rights corruption and first family nepotism, opened a new window of opportunity for supporters of East Timor's self-determination. In this the UN system has been reactive, at least up until the appointment in late 1996 of the present incumbent to the Secretary-Generalship, Kofi Annan, who moved quickly to appoint the first Special UN Representative for East Timor with a brief to find a "speedy solution".

All of this is not to suggest that Indonesia does not have collaborators inside East Timor. Undoubtedly through a policy of carrot and stick Indonesia has successfully built up a large cadre of supporters inside the occupied territory. As a major beneficiary of Western and Japanese credit, Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990 has been able to wield a far larger development budget than that of Portugal in the early 1970s, although the near bankruptcy of the Indonesian economy in 1998 would even call that question into qualification. Observers have noted, moreover, that the lion's share of the development budget has gone to support what could only be described as social engineering schemes designed to integrate East Timor physically and mentally with Indonesia. Such would describe the emphasis on road building, otherwise serving counterinsurgency objectives, troop deployments, and, as mentioned, the entry into the territory of immigrants. Needless to say the ecological costs of the Indonesian economic exploitation of East Timor's natural resources have been severe. 27

Even the much touted extension of educational infrastructure in East Timor can be seen as serving political goals, namely in winning the hearts and minds of a bahasa Indonesia-speaking youth. But to understand why those schooled by Indonesia have turned out to be the least acquiescent to Indonesian rule and why East Timorese youth have emerged today as champions of unrequited decolonization, we have to focus upon the dynamics of military occupation and resistance.

It may seem anomalous, even counterproductive to the East Timorese independence cause, that armed resistance continues in remote tracts of mountainous country in the extreme east of the half-island. But their presence is understandable if we view these surviving guerrillas as the rump of the defeated Fretilin forces, heirs to the UDI of December 1975, just as it is important to understand why and how any surrender agreement by the resistance is likely to be seen by them as part of a comprehensive peace package for East Timor linked with demilitarization in a real sense. So far, Indonesia has categorically refused "conditional" surrender offers by the guerrillas. On the other hand, by dismissing the armed resistance as, variously, "communist", or from the 1980s when that appellation was no longer serviceable, as a "security disturbance movement" and, more recently, in an attempt to deflect mounting criticism of appalling human rights abuse committed by the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), as "terrorists", Jakarta seeks to justify its overweening military presence in the territory. In any case, for large numbers of Timorese, the resilience of Falintil, Fretilin's armed wing, against all odds, is highly symbolic and, as this book has laid bare, redolent of the historical *funu* by their ancestors against outsiders.

As recently recalled by a Falintil guerrilla, from June to November 1978 the Indonesians launched a punishing operation of "total encirclement and annihilation" striking with bombs and napalm against the guerrillas and local population, notably in such locales as the Matabean ranges. In December 1978 Fretilin President Nicolau Lobato, who replaced Xavier do Amaral (captured), was killed south of Dili. In March 1981, with the end of the first generation of Fretilin leaders, the guerrillas chose as their leader Xanana Gusmao also creating the CNRM or National Council of the Maubere Resistance. Yet worse was to come in the notorious Operasi Keamanan, a nefarious military sweep whereupon ABRI engaged East Timorese in an inhuman "fence of legs" -operation designed to destroy the armed resistance. 28

Taylor has described how Fretilin managed a recovery in 1983 even after these bruising and highly

damaging Indonesian campaigns. In this year, in line with Xanana's new strategy, several Indonesian military commanders began negotiating local cease-fire. With Fretilin culminating in a cease-fire agreement between Xanana for the resistance and Colonel Purwanto, Indonesian military commander in East Timor. Inside East Timor, the ceasefire eased the burden on both the fighters and the population, outside the country it helped Indonesian to present the measure as one of its beneficence, especially to a visiting Australian delegation. Needless to say, this cease-fire soon broke down with the unilateral announcement by Indonesian Armed Forces Commander-in-chief, Murotani, of a new military campaign, Operasi Persatuan, to hit the resistance (With out mercy", in effect moving fifteen of the then twenty battalions in East Timor towards the east with the objective of capturing Xanana and other commanders. 29

In an attempt to break the stalemate and to advance the political side of the struggle, the movement further evolved in March 1986 with the historic agreement by Fretilin and UDT to put past differences behind them and to present a united front in the common struggle for independence. Under the Convergencia or Convergence agreement, Xanana placed himself above Fretilin as head of the CNRM, while Falintil, transformed itself into the Armed Forces of the National Liberation.

At this juncture the military engineered the removal of Monsignor Costa Lopes.

His replacement, die young Timor-born Carlos Ximenes Belo did not prove to be as compliant with the military as they expected, however. Besides firmly positioning the church as protector of Timorese victims of military abuses, Bishop Belo set about penning pastoral letters in defence of human and cultural rights, and, in no uncertain terms, wrote to the UN Secretary-General in February 1989, calling for a referendum. In a situation of increasing standoff between the church and the military, the engagement of the Vatican in the preservation of religious rights and cultural identity, albeit not political rights, injected a new factor into the equation, leading up to the announcement in March 1989 that the Pope would visit East Timor. While ostensibly offering a propaganda boost to the Indonesian state, it is clear in retrospect that the resistance, or at least the new urban-based centre of resistance, successfully turned the tables on the Indonesian hosts. It is not that the Papal visit was not carefully stage-managed. It was. But, also, that event aroused expectations of East Timorese youth that the visit would open a window of opportunity to protest before this august figure and his press entourage that their rights had been trampled upon, that their self-determination had been denied, and that their alienation from the military-imposed structures, was complete. Even before the Papal visit, as recounted by one of the leaders of the protest, Constancio Pinto, in his 1997 book, *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance*, youth in the last remaining Indonesian-sanctioned Portuguese language school in Dili had established a clandestine movement with links to the armed resistance. Undeniably, the emergence of an underground network of pro-independence Timorese in Timor and in Java, reaching to Timorese in the diaspora in Portugal and Australia shifted the focus of struggle from the mountains to the people of the urban areas. Notwithstanding increased levels of intimidation, this heroic band of activists made their independence statements, launching the anti-Indonesian resistance to new heights and dimensions. 30

Such-a turn became evident in a series of events leading up to what would become known as the Santa Cruz or Dili massacre, which, along with die Nobel peace award, has done much to place the East Timor issue on the international agenda.

The act by ABRI of tuning their guns on an assembled group of Timorese demonstrators-mourners at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili on 6 November 1991 was no aberration, as the then Australian Foreign Minister infamously made it known, but well flitted a pattern of similar incidents inside Indonesia and East Timor. The difference with this massacre was that it was filmed by foreign cameramen who, in a situation of great adversity and risk of life, managed to smuggle the film to the outside world where blood-filled scenes were replayed on television screens in world capitals. While the UN and Western capitals were quick to condemn the massacre by and large Indonesia's foreign backers also accepted Indonesia's bland assurances that the perpetrators would be punished. In fact, the reverse was the case with the evidence strongly suggesting further massacres and further cover-ups. 31

Small solace for the documented 241 Timorese victims of this massacre and subsequent "disappearances" that media attention, for once, was focused upon their struggle. In any case, the massacre represented both the zenith and die nadir for the urban-based clandestine movement. Above all else, the demonstration arising out of the brutal military slaying of a young Timorese in the Motael church, coinciding with the pent-up frustrations of the Timorese at the cancelled visit to the territory of a Portuguese parliamentary

delegation, proved decisively that a generation schooled under Indonesian rule rejected that rule. But also, Western acquiescence in Indonesian blandishments created extra space for Indonesia to step up its repression of the urban-based centres of resistance, by penetration, by co-optation, and, increasingly, in 1995-96, by resort to the use of agents of terror, described as Ninja gangs. The success of this strategy, undoubtedly reached a new high for Indonesia with Xanana Gusmao's capture in Dili in November 1992 and his subsequent showtrial in February-April 1993 leading to life sentence-later commuted to 20 year imprisonment in Jakarta.

But the imprisonment of Xanana Gusmao has also been problematical for Indonesia, not only because Portugal linked his release to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, but also, because of the effect of creating a Nelson Mandela-like figure out of the Timorese leader. It is significant that Jose Ramos-Horta, who answered to Xanana Gusmao as roving external spokesperson for the CNRM, went out of his way to accept the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the imprisoned Timorese leader. Since the award Xanana has been visited in prison and consulted by, inter alia, the UN Special Representative for East Timor and, indeed, the President of the Republic of South Africa. Subsequently, at a convention held in Portugal in April 1998, in a move to foster unity and to forge a vision for the future around an East Timorese Magna Carta, Timorese of the diaspora as well as those on the inside, elected Xanana Gusmao and Ramos-Horta, respectively, President and Vice President of a National Council of the Timorese Resistance (CNRT), superseding the CNM.

Meanwhile, through 1994-98, some hundreds of young Timorese studying in universities in Java and Bali commenced to stage news making "break-ins" of Western embassies in Jakarta, variously claiming political asylum, or accepting International Red Cross mediated "repatriation" to Portugal. The most spectacular of these "occupations" was undoubtedly that which coincided with the visit to Jakarta in 1994 of U.S. President Bill Clinton. But, while the sentiments of these asylum-seekers also won the admiration of small groups of pro-democracy forces inside Indonesia, it was not until the dramatic events inside Indonesia in May 1998 that anti-Suharto forces from among the opposition camp even made professions of solidarity with the East Timor cause. Indeed, prior to these events few Indonesian intellectuals broke ranks on the East Timor question, a matter of nationalist manipulation, the politics of patronage, Islamic solidarity, sheer ignorance stemming from a controlled and manipulated media, the extreme remoteness of East Timor even within the Indonesian archipelago, and simply-even for those Indonesians who cared-a broad band agenda of more pressing priorities in coping with daily life under authoritarian rule.

Nevertheless, the tactical victory won by democratic forces in Jakarta in May 1998 opened a new, albeit limited, political space for East Timorese under Indonesian occupation, such as in the phased release of East Timorese prisoners held in Indonesian jails, and the, albeit, unmet promise of troop withdrawals. But there is no question that B.J. Habibie's offer in June 1998 of "wide-ranging autonomy" to East Timor represented a decisive shift in Jakarta's hard-line position. Importantly, the offer was matched by UN Special Representative Jamsheed Marker in the form of an elaborately crafted autonomy document debated and discussed by the Portuguese and Indonesian sides in a series of consultations, albeit-with neither side relinquishing their basic positions as to the sovereignty question. Importantly, also, the autonomy proposal was the subject of a series of unprecedented "free speech" discussions held throughout East Timor between June-September 1998, under the banner of the Student Solidarity Council, informally sanctioned by Marker and largely condoned by the military. As witnessed by the author in August 1998, these peaceful mass rallies, seminars, and discussions attended by a cross-section of peoples, sounded a unanimous rejection of autonomy, while calling for demilitarization and an UN-sponsored referendum.

But just as UN discussions on the autonomy agreement were taking shape, on 27 January 1999, B. J. Habibie backed by armed forces commander, General Wiranto, surprised even UN mediators by making it known that if East Timor rejected "autonomy", then the territory could revert to its pre-1975 status and Portugal or the UN could pick up the bill and reinitiate the decolonization process.

Ingenuously, however, the Indonesian side ruled out a referendum, asserting that this would lead to civil war. But, in this plan, even if the East Timorese rejected autonomy, it would still have to be approved by the Indonesian parliament, the body that "legitimized" the annexation. Needless to say, such a conditional release of East Timor from Indonesian rule raised expectations and concerns inside East Timor, and in international circles, especially as it became apparent that elements of the armed forces were arming contra-type militias, opening up atavistic wounds and sowing the seeds of the kind of civil war that

Indonesia claimed to eschew.

Nevertheless, a further announcement by Habibie in February 1999 that he wished to relinquish East Timor by 1 January 2000 raised international expectations to a new height. Few then had any illusions that any fair UN consultation with the East Timorese would lead to any decision but independence and, as this book goes to press, the East Timorese and the international community were in advanced state of preparation for such a contingency, just as few had illusions as to an easy transition to statehood without international guarantees.

But for a people whose culture and identity is, irremediably, in an advanced stage of eradication, such "concessions" on the part of Suharto's successors offer little solace in the absence of genuine demilitarization including an ABRI withdrawal as called for by Bishop Ximenes Belo in June 1998. It is to the credit of the East Timorese resistance that they have fought a defensive struggle, one that has eschewed violence and terror, doubtless in large part owing to the staying hand of the church. The exception of course is the armed resistance, which, for self-preservation, targets the Indonesian military and close collaborators although not the people of East Timor.

The same cannot be said of the Indonesian armed forces who have time and time again turned their guns and goons upon even the civilian population of East Timorese including, as now grimly documented, East Timorese women.

Looking back some two decades after the Indonesian occupation of Timor Loro Sae, the preferred Tetum appellation given the half island nation agreed upon by Timorese participants at a UN sponsored meeting held in Austria in 1997, it has struck many observers as remarkable-the 1996 Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee included-that even a generation schooled by Indonesia has been in the forefront of actions that can be variously described as cultural defence and pro-independence. Rather than accepting an Indonesian identity, military rule by outsiders appears to have strengthened indigenous Timorese identity around Tetum as a spoken language, even at the expense of other dialects. But whereas in Portuguese times the embrace of an alien religion came to be synonymous in many ways with submission, so under Indonesian rule the embrace of the Catholic church and the choice by the church in 1980 to choose Tetum as the language of liturgy appears as a primary defence against new intrusions, both military and cultural. There is no question that the language of Cam6es has lost rank as a forbidden language in the Indonesian program to reculturalize Timorese as Indonesian, but even this reversal cannot be taken for granted in a juncture where the Western-backed New Order regime in Jakarta is on the cusp of a transition g2nd where the Timor problem is at the stage of heightened international renegotiation. 32

Notes

1. James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, Yale University Press, 1985, pp.298-304.
2. Robert Redfield, *The Primitive World and its Transformations*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca/New York, 1953, pp. 80-81.
3. Jorge Barros Duarte, *Timor: Ritos e Mitos Atauros*, Ministerio da Educacao, Lisboa, 1984, pp. 1 7-1 8.
4. R.A.F. Paul Webb, "The Sickle and the Cross: Christian and Communists in Bali, Flores, Stmba and Timor, 1965-6r, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 17, No. 1, March 1986.
5. Taking no chances, the Indonesian authorities in Dili acted to suppress the sect just prior to a visit by Indonesian President Suharto (*New Straits Times*, 12 December 1988).
6. William Dampier, *A Voyage to New Holland: The English Voyage of Discovery to the South Seas in 1699*, Alan Sutton, Gloucester) 1981, p. 185.
7. John Crawfurd, *History of the Archipelago*, Edinburgh, 1820, pp. 2 19- 50.
8. Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce Volume One: the Lands Below the Winds*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1988, pp. 121-122.
9. L.C.D. do Freyenet, *Voyage autour du monde, exicuti: sur de corvettes S.M. l'uranie et la Physicienne pendant les annies 1817, 1818, 1819 et 1820*, *Historique du Voyage*, Tome I, Paris, 1827, p. 710.
10. Affonso de Castro, "Resume Historique de Etablissement Portugais A Timor, des us et coutumes de ses Habitants", *TjdschnjTvoor Indische Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde*, Vol. II, 1862, pp. 465-506.
11. Jose dos Santos Vaquinas, "Estudos Sobre Macau", *OMacaense*, Vol. II (91): 195, 10 do janeiro do

1884.

12. Alberto Osorio de Castro, *A Ilha Verde e Vermelha de Timor*; Cotovia, Lisboa, 1996} pp. 137-39.
13. Pelissier, *Timor en Guenle*.
14. Kenneth M. George, *Showing Signs of Violence: The Cultural Politics of a Twentieth-Century Headhunting Ritual*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996.
15. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System II/ The Second era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s*, Academic Press, San Diego, 1989, p. 132.
16. Such is the thesis propounded by Clarence-Smith in reference to southern Angola. Characteristically, in situations of "uneconomic imperialism", chronic budget deficits, natural poverty, and effective military resistance of the people meant that huge expenditures were spent for no apparent reward other than the glory of colonial endeavour. W.G. Clarence Smith, *Slaves, Peasants and Capitalists in Southern Angola 1840-1926*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 34.
17. René Pelissier, *Timor en Guenle: Le Crocodile et le Porcupin (1847-1913)*, Pelissier} Orgeval, 1996 p. 73.
18. Serafim Lobato, "Invasion of Timor: The US -Antenna", *Expresso*, 10 June 1995 (original in Portuguese).
19. On the Kissinger visit to Jakarta, and the reporting of the strategic importance of the Ombai-Tetair straits, See Gunn with Lee, *A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor*: JCA Press, Manila, 1994, pp. 124-127.
20. See author's *East Timor and the United Nations*, Red Sea Press, Trenton, New Jersey, 1997.
21. See *A Critical View*.
22. Julius Pour, Benny Moendani: Profile of a Soldier Statesman, Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, 1993, pp. 316-344. Details of the botched paratroop invasion are also carried in a recently published blow-by-blow account by an Indonesian cameraman who accompanied the Indonesian invasion force [Hendro Subroto, *Saksi Mata Perjuangan Integrasi Timor Timur*. See David Jenkins, "Death in Dili.. 22 Years On", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 October 1997.
23. John O. Taylor, *Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor*: Zed, London, 1991, p. 93.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 100-110.
25. Akihisa Matsuno, paper read at the 6th Symposium on Indonesia and East Timor, Lisbon, 21-26 March 1995. For the "UN version", or the version offered the UN, see, *Decolonization in East Timor* Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, March 1977, p. 82.
26. S.R. Roff, *Timor's Anschluss: Indonesian and Australian Policy*, in *East Timor* The Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, 1992} pp. 95-128. Also see, *Decolonization in East Timor*, pp. 83-95. See author's petition to United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization, 1475th meeting, 16 June 1997, AG/COL/129.
27. The effects of Indonesianization of East Timor in terms of agricultural production, economic self-sufficiency, forced settlement and the environment is best described by the exiled Indonesian academic George Aditjondro, *In the Shadow of Mount Ramalew: The Impact of the Occupation of East Timor*; NDOC, Leiden, 1995.
28. Paulino Gam Ouauk Munik), "The War in the Hills, 1975-85: A Fretilin Commander Remembers", in Peter Carey and G.Carter Bentley (eds.), *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation*, Cassell, London, 1985, pp. 97-105.
29. Taylor, *Indonesia's Forgotten War*
30. Mathew Jardine and Constancio Pinto, *East Timor unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance* South End Press, Boston, 1997.
31. Such has been convincingly documented in book and film by John Pilger. See *Distant Voices*, Vintage London, 1994.
32. See author's "Language, Literacy and Political Hegemony in East Timor", in David Myers (ed.), *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the Asia/Pacific*, Northern Territory Press, 1995, pp. 117-123.

